Philosophy as Transformation of the Self in Foucault and Murdoch by Bearfield, CATHERINE ANNE
  
 
 
Università “La Sapienza” di Roma 
 
Dottorato di ricerca in Filosofia 
Ciclo XXII,  
Anno accademico 2011-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY AS TRANSFORMATION OF THE SELF 
IN FOUCAULT AND MURDOCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisore e Co-Supervisori :                                              Candidata : 
Prof. Piergiorgio Donatelli                                                    Catherine Bearfield 
Prof. Emidio Spinelli  
Prof. Francesco Saverio Trincia 
 
 
 
 1 
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OT        The Order of Things, London: Routledge Classics, 2002   
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2003 
AI         Whitebook, J, “Against Interiority: Foucault’s Struggle with Psychoanalysis”, pp. 312-48  
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MFEI    Bernauer, J. & Mahon, M., “Michel Foucault’s Ethical Imagination”, pp. 149-175 
PM        Rouse, J.,  “Power/Knowledge”, pp. 95-122 
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Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, (EWF1), ed. Rabinow, P., London: Penguin, 2000 
ECS      “The Ethics of the Concern for the Self as a Practice of Freedom”, pp.281-302 
FWL     “Friendship as a Way of Life.” pp. 135-40 
ISR       “Interview by Stephen Riggins”, pp. 121-34 
OGE     “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, pp. 253-80 
PHS      “Preface to The History of Sexuality, Volume 2”, pp. 199-206 
SCSA    “Sexual Choice, Sexual Act”, pp. 141-56 
S&S      “Sexuality and Solitude”, pp. 175-84 
STSW   “The Social Triumph of the Sexual Will”, pp. 157-162 
TS         “Technologies of the Self”, pp. 223-52 
WE        “What is Enlightenment?”, pp. 303-20 
WKI      “The Will to Knowledge: Introduction to the 1970-1971 Course at the Collège de 
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Other books and articles on Foucault  
BSH       Dreyfus, H., and Rabinow, P., Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Brighton, UK:  
               Harvester Press, 1982. 
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Works by Iris Murdoch: 
 
For essays published in Existentialists and Mystics (E&M) and elsewhere, page references are 
given only for this publication. For Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, ed. J. Broackes, Oxford University 
Press, 2011, references are given to this as (IMP). For essays published in Iris Murdoch and the 
Search for Human Goodness, ed. Antonaccio, M., & Schweiker, W., 1996, University of Chicago 
Press, references are given as in (IMSHG).  
 
AD         “Against Dryness” (1961), E&M 287-95 
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ME         “Metaphysics and Ethics” (1975), E&M 59-76 
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NP           “Nostalgia for the Particular” E&M 43-58 
N&S         Nuns and Soldiers, London: Vintage Books, 2001. 
OGG        “On God and Good” E&M 337 362 
S&G        “The Sublime and the Good” (1959), E&M 205-21 
S&BR      “The Sublime and the Beautiful Revisited” (1959), E&M 261-86 
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Philosophy as Transformation of the Self 
 
 Introduction: Foucault, Murdoch and Philosophy. 
 
[F]or what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réflechie] practice of freedom?” (Foucault, ECS, 
284). 
Morality is after all the great central arena of human life and the abode of freedom. (Murdoch, SRR, 31-32) 
 
 
Not much of the philosophy of the twentieth century could be said to be concerned with the 
transformation of the self. The work of Michel Foucault and Iris Murdoch, in very different ways, 
was, or came to be. Both had begun their work however, in a twentieth century dominated by what 
was known as “the linguistic turn” in both continental and Anglo-Saxon philosophy, by exploring 
the relation of language and experience; though from the beginning, each of them took a critical 
stance to their respective traditions. Foucault, in a much quoted passage from The Uses of 
Pleasure, puts together two questions as if the one followed smoothly from the other; but in effect, 
the conceptual space between these two questions marks both the turn about to take place in his 
own philosophical practice, and the gulf between his changing conception of philosophy and the 
more mainstream conceptions he was implicitly challenging. He writes: 
 
what therefore is philosophy today – I mean philosophical activity – if it is not the critical work of thought on 
itself? And if it does not consist in undertaking to know how and to what extent it would be possible to think 
differently, instead of legitimating what one already knows? (UP, 16)  
 
 
The first of these two questions would make no waves among the communities of academic 
philosophers today who see philosophy as a profession, not necessarily as an activity permeating 
their way of life; while the second, which prima facie seems to merely clarify the first, in fact 
suggests that philosophical practice might radically transform one’s life, might serve precisely that 
purpose, if, that is, as he goes on to say, “the living body of philosophy […] is still now what it 
was in the past, that is to say an ‘ascesis’, an akèsis, an exercise of oneself in the activity of 
thought.” (Ibid.) “Ascesis”, even when defined as an exercise of oneself in thought, does not 
succeed in shaking off all sorts of connotations in which thought is situated in practices that the 
professional philosopher of today would find completely alien, and of which Foucault, never one 
to use a term lightly, is more than aware; his own studies had always involved meticulous 
(“archeological”) attention to concepts, and to the historical correlates of their various 
connotations. His work had led to considerable insight into the way in which the thought of the 
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individual is shaped by the practices that determine what counts as “knowledge” in any given 
field, at any given time, and had instigated upheavals in the academic disciplines the work touched 
on; but it had not led to an investigation of subjectivity, let alone to an “ascesis”. 
As he turned his attention away from the ways in which our thought and lives are “objectified” by 
discursive practices, to use his own terms, to what he calls “subjectivation”; the “subject”, having 
a degree of freedom that will be circumscribed in a number of ways, moves to a more central place 
in Foucault’s thinking, in the first instance through an analysis of power and its counterpart – 
resistance. For a period of time – the middle, “genealogical” period in Foucault’s work – he 
dedicated his time to how this story, essentially that of the possibility of thinking differently, 
played out in various “games of truth” and practices of modernity. But freedom as resistance is 
just one form of freedom, and one that is reactive, tied as it is to the discourses and practices of 
one’s time and place; and as his interest in freedom deepened, his need to study other notions of 
freedom, and other practices of philosophical freedom, led him to the only secular place where a 
wealth of such practices are to be found, to the philosophy of Antiquity, where none of the 
practices of one’s life could be excluded from philosophy, and where all the practices of one’s life 
were philosophical practices. 
 
Against this ancient conception, what Foucault calls “the modern age of the history of truth” 
begins, he says, when “what gives access to truth, the condition for the subject’s access to the 
truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone […] That is to say, it is when the 
philosopher (or the scientist, or simply someone who seeks the truth) can recognize the truth and 
have access to it in himself and solely through his activity of knowing, without anything else being 
demanded of him and without him having to change or alter his being as a subject.” (HS, 17) What 
he is describing here “is a form of reflexivity that makes it possible to fix the certainty that will 
serve as a criterion for all possible truth and which, starting from this fixed point, will advance 
from truth to truth up to the organization and systematization of an objective knowledge.” (Ibid. 
460) This form of reflexivity that Foucault calls “method” is grounded in the conviction that 
objective knowledge is possible, and that in self-knowledge, in a certain sense, objective and 
subjective knowledge must come together. Orthodox at least in this, Foucault says that the first 
clear formulation of “the certainty that will serve as a criterion for all possible truth” is Descartes’ 
Cogito ergo sum; one of the few philosophical statements, in Latin at that, that have attained 
iconic status in the modern era of “the history of truth”.  
 9 
Foucault’s own earlier studies in and on this era of “method”, which in recognition of Nietzsche’s 
influence, he calls genealogies, took the form of analyses of the way in which new concepts and 
entire disciplines arise in response to historically specific conditions; of how the separate 
disciplinary practices in which knowledge is elaborated are interlinked; and of how they in turn 
create new “objective” filters through which we read ourselves. Underlying this disciplinary 
diversity is revealed, as a kind of epistemological style of the modern era, the depth of this 
conviction that truth can indeed be accessed by intellectual effort, and appropriate “method” alone. 
It is Foucault’s clear understanding (and substantial and explicit demonstration) of the illusion of 
an objectivity untainted by subjective, or intersubjective, notions or habits of thought, that first led 
him to his enquiry into subjectivation, that is, to those practices through which the self constitutes 
itself as moral subject. Foucault’s term “subjectivation” connotes the active nature of the process 
by which the individual becomes a moral subject. In shaping the raw material of myself into a 
moral subject, some form of inner change is therefore implicit: “There is no single moral action 
without reference to the unity of moral conduct; no moral conduct that does not require the 
constitution of the self as moral subject; no constitution of a moral subject without modes of 
subjectivation and without an ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of the self’ to sustain it.” (UP, 15)  
At a certain point, in need of exemplification of self-formative practices that had fallen into disuse 
in the modern era, Foucault turned to an examination of the reflexivity of a previous era, that of 
“meditation”, as he describes it, in Antiquity. This, he says, is a form of reflexivity which “carries 
out the test of what one thinks, the test of oneself as the subject who actually thinks what he thinks 
and acts as he thinks, with the object of the subject’s transformation and constitution as, let’s say, 
the ethical subject of truth” (Ibid.) His long engagement with some of the major developments of 
this form of reflexivity in Antiquity, and its repercussions on his later reflections on the 
possibilities of a philosophy for modernity will be examined here. 
 
Iris Murdoch meanwhile writes, in another philosophical language: 
 
“I think philosophy is very counter-natural, it is a very odd unnatural activity.[…] Philosophy disturbs the mass 
of semi-aesthetic conceptual habits on which we normally rely. Hume said that even the philosopher, when he 
leaves his study, falls back upon these habitual assumptions. 
[…] Philosophy involves seeing the absolute oddity of what is familiar and trying to formulate really probing 
questions about it.” (Murdoch, LP, 8) 
 
Hume’s cheerful acceptance (after his moment of deep crisis) of the disparity between the 
philosopher’s “truth” in his study and the semi-aesthetic conceptual habits on which we normally 
 10 
rely, had, according to Murdoch, a profound influence on philosophy in the British (and later also 
American) tradition in which she was trained; an influence which tended to circumscribe certain 
areas of human life as those on which philosophy could legitimately operate, and others as beyond 
its scope or interest. When Murdoch arrived on the British philosophical scene in the 1940s 
“philosophy” was largely treated as coinciding with “logic”, and “ethics” tended to be seen as a 
kind of annexed area of application. There was a certain Enlightenment optimism in this, in the 
belief that extending the reign of logic was an ethical priority, that through the gradual extension 
of “certain knowledge” and rational thinking to ever greater numbers of persons and domains, the 
array of semi-aesthetic conceptual habits, susceptible as they are to mythological narrative and 
other “nonsense”, would slowly diminish, replaced by rationally governed notions and human 
relations. Such reliance on the gradual rationalisation of human interaction led to codified forms of 
morality, what McDowell has called an “outside-in”1 view of morality, which Murdoch did not 
share; or rather she agreed that moral codes were necessary, but not that they in any way 
exhausted the requirements of ethics. She saw this faith in the power of rationality as one that 
completely leaves out of account the self-centred egoism of the human individual (hard to deny 
empirically, whatever the “causes”), and its capacity to twist any narrative in its own favour, often 
quite unconsciously; a reason for which she, and McDowell in a different way, see the need for 
what he calls an inside-out moral perspective, and therefore forms of self-related moral practice. 
The forms of such practice Murdoch puts forward may, and in some respects do, correspond to 
what Foucault calls ascesis, and defines as an exercise of oneself in thought; though for Murdoch 
the elaboration of such practices requires some form of moral psychology, whereas Foucault went 
to considerable pains to refute this idea, as we will see. 
The conflict between Murdoch’s induction into modern philosophy and (as a student of Classical 
studies at Oxford) her first encounter with ancient philosophy, could not have been greater; but 
whereas many of her contemporaries resolved the problem by reading the ancient philosophers 
through the spectacles of contemporary epistemological criteria, thereby consigning them to 
current historical irrelevance, for Murdoch the problems went much deeper. Entering into the way 
of thinking of ancient philosophy, essentially of Plato, enabled her to view analytic philosophy 
from the outside, as it were; to see it, that is, as what Wittgenstein called a “limited whole”, or a 
particular unified vision; and to see it as one among others, perhaps with profound insights, but 
                                                 
1 See McDowell, J., “Virtue and Reason” (V&R), in Virtue Ethics, ed. Darwall, S., 2003, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.121-
44, 
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with no infallible claim to truth. It was Wittgenstein’s elucidation of the ultimate impossibility of 
grounding any kind of metaphysical foundation in philosophy, including the one he had himself 
elaborated in the Tractatus, that provided her with the theoretical instruments necessary to 
elaborate the position she was herself seeking to articulate; and gave her also its central metaphor 
for philosophical systems in general, that of “pictures”, of ways of “picturing” the world. But 
whereas Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, focused on logic, and on the logical “pictures” we create 
to render orderly our experience of the world, Murdoch believed that our aesthetic sense of our 
world was equally fundamental. And yet the study of aesthetics, as with ethics, had been largely 
sidelined in mainstream philosophy. For Murdoch, to see is to evaluate, to be in the world is to 
evaluate – the descriptions we give ourselves of our world are constantly evaluative, that is to say 
that “good” and “bad”, as both aesthetic and moral judgement, are integral to our thinking, to the 
point that, she writes, “language itself is a moral medium, almost all uses of language convey 
value. This is one reason why we are almost always morally active. Life is soaked in the moral, 
literature is soaked in the moral.” (LP, 27) The problem, of course, is that so often we are, quite 
casually, immorally active, in myriad ways, big and small (a generous action does not come from 
an irritated mind, for example). Murdoch saw self-centredness, absorption in our own fantasies, as 
the crucial moral problem. Therefore, she writes: 
 
The problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and suggest methods of dealing with the fact that so 
much of human conduct is moved by mechanical energy of an egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is 
the fat relentless ego. Moral philosophy is properly, and in the past has sometimes been, the discussion of this 
ego and of the techniques (if any) for its defeat.” (OGG, 342) 
 
The exploration of this problem will be the deconstructive work, so to speak, of self-
transformation for Murdoch. The reconstructive work will involve changing the energy, re-
orienting Eros to the Good. And as for Plato, her inspiration in this, beauty will have its part to 
play, but above all, she writes: 
 
We need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by philosophers, can one 
again be made central.” (OGG, 337) 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
Ch. 1. Knowledge, power and, finally, the subject 
 
1. From objectification to subjectivation 
 
Foucault frequently remarks that “knowledge, power and the subject” form the “three axes” of his 
work, though it is well known that in the first phase his focus was mostly on knowledge, in the 
middle phase on the interaction of knowledge and power (construed very broadly, to include all 
gross and subtle games of power in human interaction), and that in both these phases “the subject” 
appeared mostly in the guise of individual elaborator of the particular package of 
knowledge/power that history had cast her way. It was only in the last phase that the subject, in its 
more usual guise as agent in its own history, became the important focus of his work. Spanning all 
three phases, however, the two concepts (neologisms he introduced) which form the cornerstones 
of Foucault’s work on the possibilities of self-knowledge, formation and transformation – of the 
self as object or subject – are those of objectification and of subjectivation. 
 
The process by which the “object” of a particular discourse, or corpus of knowledge, is created 
from the procedures of selection, exclusion and elaboration of elements considered relevant to the 
discourse itself is called “objectification” by Foucault. Thus, for example, “possession”, 
“madness” and “mental illness” are the objects of three differently constituted discourses, three 
historically singular objectifications, regarding what may in some cases appear to be the same 
assemblage of phenomena of human experience. Power relations at institutional and interpersonal 
levels function in relation to the formulation of objects, and the elaboration of the discourses in 
which they are situated, and also to the constraints which oblige the individual to internalise these 
objects. In applying the different configurations of knowledge that have been acquired to the self – 
and it is not possible not to acquire the “knowledge” of one’s society and time – one effectively 
objectifies oneself, reading oneself as evidence of acquired views of what one is, or perhaps 
dissenting from them, but still taking them as the reference point; and thus seeing oneself as 
caught in a network of (differently theorised) determinations.  
But there is another way of attempting to know the self, in the first instance through one’s 
experience as a knowing and active subject, focusing on what freedom one has to direct one’s own 
life, and this is what Foucault would come to refer to as “subjectivation”; though technically the 
term would also include, as its weak form, less conscious forms of personal adjustment to 
prevailing notions. This chapter will attempt to elucidate Foucault’s thematization of the subject, 
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and the conceptual shifts that mark his passage from a prevailing interest in objectification to a 
prevailing interest in subjectivation.  
 
In the three examples of objectification given above, of possession, madness and mental illness, 
those to whom these definitions have been applied may have accepted them or not, but they will 
probably have accepted the criteria: “I am/am not possessed/mad/sick, because I manifest/do not 
manifest these behaviours; I correspond, or do not correspond to the criteria used to define me.” 
One can reject the classification imposed on one, but one cannot so easily reject the historically 
specific criteria on which it is based. In the classifications of mental states mentioned here there is 
a historical development, which Foucault had traced in its non-linear passage through different 
historical epochs, from a knowledge system governed largely by religion to one governed by 
science. But as he demonstrates, while this signifies a greater attempt at objectivity, it is not 
necessarily any guarantee of an equivalent achievement. To give an example from a domain 
Foucault does not analyse, if we apply his methods to, let us say, the situation of a worker in 
industrial society, on the basis of a particular configuration of acquired knowledge and morality, 
this worker may see herself as earning a reasonable wage, and having a duty to work well. 
Alternatively (or successively) she may acquire a different view from among those historically 
available, based on different knowledge and a different moral vision, and then see herself as 
trapped in a carefully constructed illusion to deny the basic truth of her exploitation. For this 
individual subject, this might then translate into the notion of a moral duty to attempt to break 
down the profit-making process from within; using her energies for this purpose, now conceived 
as morally more significant than scrupulously carrying out the tasks she is paid to perform. These 
two conflicting moral positions represent subjective choices, but they are based on, and correspond 
to, two of the available objectifications of “labour relations”, or of “the mode of production”, in 
twentieth century Western society. Whilst each of the discourses in which these particular 
objectifications are elaborated is logically coherent in itself, and the two discourses are concerned 
with the same reality, communication between them may be impossible, precisely because their 
objectifications, that is, their attribution of significance to a particular reading of that reality, are 
structured in such a way that each excludes the basic presuppositions of the other. They are, 
nonetheless, at the same time forms of subjectivation, in that the moral decision of each individual 
represents her own subjective choices, but choices that are necessarily made in relation to 
historically specific objectifications of knowledge, and to effective social constraints, the forms of 
power. It is this interlinking of knowledge, power and the subject in particular historical 
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singularities that forms a kind of framework for all of Foucault’s work, with different focuses at 
different stages. 
 
There have been few moments in history, however, or societies, in which the practice of moral 
choice as a self-determining form of subjectivation has been actively cultivated, as opposed to 
submission to moral constraint; which is perhaps one of the reasons why Foucault came late to the 
study of the more self-directed forms of subjectivation. But the main reason he gives for his early 
reluctance to explore this field of subjectivity was his opposition to what he saw, in the mid-
twentieth century, as the fact that philosophy was still dominated by a preoccupation with the 
subject construed as a centre of consciousness and the source of all knowledge and signification. 
He attributed this to the influence of Husserl, to the institutional context of the French university 
and its subject-centred “Cartesianism”, and to “the political conjunct [in the 1950s and 60s]. Given 
the absurdity of wars, slaughters, and despotism, it seemed to be up to the individual subject to 
give meaning to his existential choices. [… However, this] philosophy of consciousness had 
paradoxically failed to found a philosophy of knowledge, and especially of scientific knowledge. 
Also, this philosophy of meaning had failed to take into account the formative mechanisms of 
signification and the structure of systems of meaning.”  (S&S, 176) This latter is a reference to 
structural studies in linguistics, anthropology, and psychology, and to the failure of academic 
philosophy to come to terms, literally and figuratively, with important developments in these 
adjacent fields of knowledge. It was to this perceived necessity that Foucault first turned his 
attention. Much later, through his studies of how knowledge is constructed in constant interaction 
with social practices and with individual subjects, and through a growing sense of the possibility 
of repositioning oneself, as individual subject, in relation to received views, he developed his own 
theory of subjectivity; or rather, of subjectivation, as arising from the inner relation of the self to 
itself, as the possibility of the self-formation of the subject. 
 
Neither in the case of objectification nor in that of subjectivation however, can the individual 
truth-seeker establish private criteria. There are ways of doing these things, and the ways of 
exploring the self that pertain to processes of subjectivation are grouped by Foucault under the 
term: “techniques of the self” : “techniques that permit individuals to effect, by their own means, a 
certain number of operations on their own bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own 
conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and to attain a 
certain state of perfection, happiness, purity, supernatural power. Let us call these techniques 
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‘technologies of the self’ ” (Ibid., 177). Historically these techniques are variable and there have 
been many of them; interestingly some have maintained a presence, or been reworked, in periods 
where “objective” knowledge has undergone significant epistemic change. This relative elasticity 
of techniques of the self in relation to the historical periods in which they were first formulated, is 
indicative of a space of subjectivity that was of great interest to Foucault; becoming, in the final 
phase of his work, a major focus.  
Knowledge of the self is governed by the same truth-criteria as any other object of knowledge in 
its own time and place, even where, as in contemporary Western society, two (at least) notions of 
truth coexist: the predominant, collective notion of “objective” truth, with its historically 
standardised criteria and its links to scientific method; and a notion of a private, “truth to oneself”, 
that, in a culturally mixed society, is more heterogeneous, and may delineate moral truths that are 
different from those linked to “objective truth”. (Murdoch makes the same point, noting also that 
the persons involved may believe that their truth is a superior description of reality to that of 
science, that it is indeed “objective”). Where any one such “private” conception of truth is mixed 
with power relations, however, as in the institutionalised religions, it may compete in the public 
sphere with “objective knowledge”, entrenching itself in primarily secular institutions such as the 
family, the school, the hospital, the State – institutions in which one’s knowledge of self is formed. 
Therefore one may experience oneself as “objectified” not only by “objective” knowledge, but 
also, and intensively, by “non-objective” systems of knowledge. The case of “original sin”, for 
example, an objectification which leads to presuming that one is constantly guilty of something 
(requiring investigation), whatever the circumstances, has had a long and variegated history in 
Western society.  
In the case of both kinds of knowledge, “objective” or otherwise, the process of objectification of 
the subject is the same. A corpus of knowledge that has among its objects some aspect of “what 
human beings are” (or what the normal and the mad are, the good and the bad, the hero and the 
coward, etc.) is acquired by the individual, through various “discursive practices”, as the standard 
against which the self is to be evaluated and defined. The self-knowledge so acquired cannot then 
fail to play its part in the subjective life of the individual. 
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2. Discursive practices and the formless subject. 
 
The discursive practices which engage the individual are described by Foucault as: “characterized 
by the demarcation of a field of objects, by the definition of a legitimate perspective for a subject 
of knowledge, [and] by the setting of norms for elaborating concepts and theories.” (WKI, 11) 
These are clearly epistemological criteria. The first and third refer to the internal organization of 
specific discourses or bodies of knowledge, and the second refers to the legitimacy that any such 
discourse may claim in the light of accepted notions of how truth may be determined, that is to 
say, to a deeper “epistemic”2 level of truth-determination, based on notions which differ in 
different historical periods. A field of objects may be as narrow as, say, laboratory procedures for 
certain sets of experiments, or as broad as the moral life, but once demarcated, it will refer to an 
existing body of concepts and theories which sometimes will, and sometimes will not coincide 
with, or cross, those of particular sciences or disciplines. These epistemological criteria are not, 
however, the only sets of rules to which such practices respond.  
Foucault goes on: “Discursive practices are not purely and simply modes of manufacture of 
discourse. They take shape in technical ensembles, in institutions, in behavioural schemes, in types 
of transmission and dissemination, in pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them.” 
The rules involved here are those governing human relationships, and even in the most intimate 
one-to-one interactions, one possible way of describing these relationships is in terms of the 
dimension of power. Not necessarily one-sided or established power – between lovers, for 
example – power may take different forms and may shift constantly, but “power” is a term that is 
useful to Foucault as an operator for distinguishing the socially sanctioned (and not sanctioned) 
games that are human relationships and institutions, from the type of operator, described above, 
that is systematised knowledge. 
What we have here is a perspective on the subject as enmeshed in historically specific rules of how 
to live, and of how to establish truth, but both these sets of rules will change over time, and what 
Foucault goes on to say at this stage about the “specific modes of transformation” of discursive 
practices (in the Course Summary to the 1970-1971 course The Will to Knowledge) is interesting 
for our purposes, and will need to be quoted in full: 
 
the transformation of a discursive practice is tied to a whole, often quite complex set of modifications which 
may occur either outside it (in the forms of production, in the social relations, in the political institutions), or 
within it (in the techniques for determining objects, in the refinement and adjustment of concepts, in the 
                                                 
2Foucault defines episteme “as the system of concepts that defines knowledge for a given intellectual era” (ICCF, 9) 
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accumulation of data), or alongside it (in other discursive practices). And it is linked to them in the form not 
simply of an outcome but of an effect that maintains its own autonomy and a set of precise functions relative to 
what determines the transformation. (Ibid., 12)  
 
According to this model, the dynamic of transformation rests predominantly with power in the 
case of change from outside the discursive practice; with the development of knowledge in the 
case of change from within, though this is variable (and from either in the case of change from 
“alongside”). At the same time, the pre-constituted discursive practices on which these forces of 
change operate retain a certain autonomy of their own in relation to them. One can almost hear 
Foucault arguing against the offstage voices of certain of his interlocutors at the time he was 
writing this, whose theories gave preponderant weight to one or other of the various forces of 
transformation (modes and relations of production; changes in mindset through the accumulation 
of knowledge, etc.). His placing of reference to these theories in parentheses here acknowledges 
that they have brought to light important features of what determines change in the way we think 
and enact our world, but also that each such deterministic theory has overplayed the role of its 
preferred aspects of reality with respect to those of competing theories.  
What is clearly absent from all this dynamism, however, is a role for the subject. Foucault 
relativises the deterministic capacities of the different theories competing in the academic and 
political marketplace at the time of his writing, but agrees with them in minimizing the role of 
individual subjectivity. That any one individual may have been the originator of change in the 
relevant system of knowledge or of power, is beside the point. Innovation from within a system, 
even revolutionary, is coherent with the system itself, as is interaction between systems. Foucault 
makes a point of noting here, with regard to the principles of exclusion and selection that 
determine the boundaries of any particular discursive practice, that they: 
 
do not refer to a (historical or transcendental) subject of knowledge that would invent them one after another or 
would found them at an original level; they point, rather, to an anonymous and polymorphous will to 
knowledge, capable of regular transformations and caught up in an identifiable play of dependence. (Ibid.)  
 
 
Is this our subject? What is clear from this is what Foucault is arguing against, his wish to distance 
himself from conceptions of a grand “historical or transcendental” subject; but what he is arguing 
for, or rather making reference to, this notion of an “anonymous and polymorphous will to 
knowledge” is not Foucault at his clearest or most precise and he does not pursue this theme 
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(despite the fact that it is the title of the course).3 What is considered “common knowledge” at any 
one moment in history, underlying the polymorphous forms of specialised knowledge, is 
anonymous, but it is characterized by mechanisms rather than by “will”, which remains 
unexplained here (and in the text which follows). As mentioned before, the same kind of analytical 
clarity on the question of the subject that was already evident in his work on knowledge and power 
was something that would come later.  
 
Earlier still however, in the 1960s, Foucault had been more concerned to demonstrate the subject’s 
lack of subjectivity, of any will, anonymous or otherwise; trapped between the realities of her life  
not yet described as “practices” – and the conceptual system that is knowledge/language. 
Commenting on Lacan, an influence at that time, he wrote that his importance derived from:  
 
the fact that he had demonstrated, through the discourse on the mentally sick and the symptoms of his neurosis, 
the way in which it was the structures, the system of language itself (and not the subject) that spoke […] Before 
each human existence, before each human thought, there is a system, a knowledge, that we then discover.4 
(emphasis mine). 
 
This structural (and structuralist) rigidity, though part of Foucault’s formation, is atypical of his 
work. By the 1970s he had largely left it behind; turning his attention to the way specific bodies of 
knowledge are produced, in relation to this epistemological framework, and to the ways in which 
life was organized and conducted in work, relationships and institutions. It is precisely because 
there is both a common, historically specific substructure underlying the formation of specific 
“knowledges”, and at the same time a number of heterogeneous practices in which this formation 
is played out, that individual subjects acquire their particularised knowledge. What is “known” by 
certain groups of people differs from what is known by others, and contamination is both systemic 
(what he refers to above as “transformation from alongside, from other discursive practices”), and 
productive of further discourse. Foucault was attempting to put some order into this multiplicity, 
and at the same time not allow his own “order”, his methods, to anchor all this flux to new 
determinations. The metaphors he uses for his own methods are well-chosen – archaeology for the 
buried, substructures of knowledge, - genealogy when his attention turned to the generative 
production of knowledge in the midst of life, so to speak. From the point of view of intellectual 
history, Gutting says that, given the exclusion of the “standard (subject-centred) approach” from 
                                                 
3 This sounds more like the problematic of earlier philosophers who inspired him. Foucault’s course titles have to do 
more with where his thought started out that year than with where it eventually led to.  
4 Entretien avec Madeleine Chapsal, in ‘La Quinzaine Litteraire’, n° 5, May 1966, in Antologia, p.36 
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archeological method: “Its weakness is the obverse of its strength: the bracketing or decentering of 
the subject. The power of archaeology is apparent from what it finds in the conceptual structures 
that lie beneath and outside the consciousness of individual subjects.” (ICCF, 14). From a 
philosophical point of view, this constitutes not so much a weakness as a delimitation of an 
epistemological field from which the subject (as agent) is absent, appearing only passively. This 
separation, impossible in ancient philosophy which, however, was of no particular interest to 
Foucault during his archeological (that is, predominantly epistemological) period, is by no means 
unusual in contemporary philosophy. 
 
The space of subjectivity that appears here, therefore, is still a limited one. It would seem to be 
contained in “the mode of subjection, the way the individual establishes his or her relation to 
moral obligations and rules.”5 (my emphasis). Nonetheless, Foucault’s conception implies also 
that the heterogeneous and changing nature of practices may engender an awareness that there are 
other ways of thinking and acting, and allow one to make choices among the available, 
preconstituted views; and, in some exceptional cases, to come up with new formulations. Though 
collaboration in one’s own subjection is required of the individual, she may also find ways not to 
collaborate, and in so doing a little power may pass into her hands. This is a small beginning of 
liberation from imposed conceptions. It is not thematized by Foucault as “subjectivation” at this 
point, however, but rather in terms of the production of knowledge-power (pouvoir-savoir). 
 
 
3. The pre-constituted and the self-constituting subject 
  
Some years later, at an intermediary point along the path from a focus on knowledge-power to a 
focus on the self, he described his ‘philosophical enterprise’ as a form of 
 
criticism – understood as analysis of the historical conditions that bear on the creation of links to truth, to rules, 
and to the self [that] does not mark out impassable boundaries or describe closed systems; [but] brings to light 
transformable singularities. These transformations could not take place except by means of a working of 
thought upon itself. (PHS, 201)  
                                                 
5 Davidson, A. “Ethics as Aesthetics” (EAF), in CCF, p.126 Davidson translates mode d’asujettissement as ‘mode of 
subjection’, which seems to me the best of available alternatives. In Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984 
Vol.I, Rabinow, the editor writes: “Especially in early translations, asujettissement is often brought into English as 
‘subjugation’; and its related verb, asujettir as ‘to subjugate’. Here, however, we opt for a neologism that signals 
Foucault’s technical, and more positive, usage. Hence asujettissement consistently appears as ‘subjectivation’; and 
asujettir, as ‘to subjectify’.  EW1, p.xliv. Personally I think this unfortunate as Foucault uses his own neologism quite 
distinctly from the way in which he uses asujettissement. 
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The three axes “that constitute any matrix of experience” (Ibid.), and provide the framework for 
his work – those of knowledge, power and the subject – are presented in a different conceptual 
language here as “links to truth, to rules and to the self”. A link is a more flexible metaphor than 
an axis, and in this later conception, the transformational power that is ‘thought working on itself’ 
operates in two directions simultaneously, that is – on its object – the discursive practices that 
constitute the transformable ‘historical singularities’, and on the subject as thinking agent. Thus, in 
this notion of “transformable singularities”, the possibility of a passage from an objectified self to 
a self-constituting subject is already indicated, the passage from objectification to subjectivation.  
This is not at all to say that the self can ever totally invent itself, there is no complete escape from 
the epistemic forces of one’s historically singular life, but that through thought, as the primary 
medium of the self’s relation to itself, one can gain an understanding how one’s life, and one’s 
thinking, have been shaped by the discursive practices of one’s time, and this change in 
perspective can engender a change in lived reality. Foucault has explored this possibility in various 
ways throughout his work, particularly in his work on forms of conduct and counter-conduct in the 
1970s, which dealt with both conscious and inarticulate forms of counter-conduct or rebellion. The 
relation between objectified self knowledge – our application to self of “knowledge” that has been 
culturally imbibed – and a space of subjectivity, is in itself a relation that is both historically and 
discursively variable; and within it freedom may arise in the first instance as the possibility we 
have of enlarging that non-objectified space, in relation to ourselves and to others. This freedom 
may in turn give rise to a radical reconstitution of the self, and thereby a new subjectivity and a 
new ethics. 
It is important to note, however, that the subject of whom Foucault speaks is rigorously not a 
transcendental Subject, not a reified Reason, or Logos, or Spirit, nor is it the existential subject of 
Sartre, as Foucault always felt that with Sartre’s notion of “authenticity” of finding one’s 
“authentic” self, some kind of subject that pre-exists experience, with some kind of essential 
characteristics, was reintroduced. In this later phase of his work, where he turns his attention to the 
subject, he retains his earlier opposition to essentialist conceptions of the self. In an interview 
given a few months before he died he says: 
 
What I rejected was the idea of starting out with a theory of the subject – as is done, for example, in 
phenomenology or existentialism – and, on the basis of this theory, asking how a given form of knowledge 
[connaissance] was possible. What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted itself, in one 
specific form or another, as a mad or healthy subject, as a delinquent or non-delinquent subject, through certain 
practices that were also games of truth, practices of power and so on. I had to reject a priori theories of the 
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subject in order to analyze the relationships that may exist between the constitution of the subject and games of 
truth, practices of power, and so on.  
[… The subject] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself.  
You do not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject 
who goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. 
Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of the subject, but we are 
not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship 
to oneself. And it is precisely the historical constitution of these various forms of subject in relation to the 
games of truth which interests me. (ECS, 290)   
 
There is a sense in which this seems to take us full circle, back to the subject (as “form” that has 
gained a little more agency) that is objectified in different ways through different discursive 
practices; a sense in which Foucault’s determination to avoid the creation of a theory of a 
substantive subject leads him to minimise whatever sense of unity the self-constituting subject, in 
its different roles may have. As if, in its relation to itself, the individual container of these different 
subjectivities, for example (his examples here) the political and the sexual, does not also constitute 
relations between these different subjectivities. Such affirmations have a hollow ring to them, in 
the sense that experience suggests we do make these connections. Murdoch certainly regarded 
them as fundamental to ethics, to our relation to ourselves. 
There is another sense, however, in which this problem can be seen as one arising from the current 
juncture of his work, possibly to be taken up later. His method was always, when exploring a 
particular set of problems, to make note of those arising from them, requiring new concepts and 
new methods, and set them aside for further elaboration at the next available opportunity. Perhaps 
one indication of a possible unifying of subjectivities in one subject is through the use he makes of 
the notion of creativity, of an art of life. Foucault comments “What strikes me is the fact that, in 
our society, art has become something that is related only to objects and not to individuals or to 
life. …] But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be 
an art object but not our life?” (OGE, 261) What he is not talking about however is the beautiful 
life-styles of the “beautiful people” who feel they already have all the answers to how to live (and 
the means). He is talking about work on the self, which may or may not be as austere as that 
undertaken by the Greeks, but will be as arduous. Certainly he saw this as an alternative quest to 
that of “authenticity”. “I think that from the theoretical point of view, Sartre avoids the idea of the 
self as something that is given to us, but through the moral notion of authenticity, he turns back to 
the idea that we have to be ourselves – to be truly our true self. I think that the only acceptable 
practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of 
creativity – and not that of authenticity.” (Ibid., 262)  
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The possibility of creativity, as an art of living, was given, for Foucault, in the first instance by 
thinking differently. He held that to ‘think differently’ was the essential element of philosophy as 
an activity. Thinking differently about particular philosophical and historical problems, and 
thinking differently about one’s own thinking, are entwined activities, and constituted for him an 
art of (philosophical) living, a form of subjectivation, which came to matter more and more to him. 
In an interview in1982 he said:  
 
You see, that’s why I really work like a dog, and I worked like a dog all my life. I am not interested in the 
academic status of what I am doing because my problem is my own transformation. That’s the reason also why, 
when people say, ‘Well, you thought this a few years ago and now you say something else,’ my answer is … 
‘Well, do you think I have worked like that all those years to say the same thing and not to be changed?’ This 
transformation of oneself by one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic 
experience. Why should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting? (ISR, 131)  
 
Different conceptions of the art of philosophical living have inspired many individuals throughout 
the history of the West, ensuing in lifestyles of radically differing kinds. For the most part, 
however, these have involved individuals or small groups of people considered “unusual” either 
by virtue of extraordinary capacities or commitment, or by virtue of their eccentricity, or both. 
Socrates had already described the philosopher as atopos, atypical in precisely these ways, but at 
least for the Greeks his6 moral integrity, and the practices necessary to preserve and maintain it, 
were considered as exemplary models for society, unlike in present times. 
 
 
4. The ancient and the modern subject   
 
At a certain point in his studies, pursuing other themes, extensive contact with the writings of 
Antiquity, and a growing awareness of the variety, multiplicity, and assiduity with which practices 
of self-intelligibility and self-transformation were then practiced, induced in Foucault the desire to 
learn more of and from the Greeks. As Paul Veyne wrote: “Greek ethics is quite dead, and 
Foucault judged it as undesirable as it would be impossible to resuscitate this ethics; but he 
considered one of its elements, namely the idea of a work of the self on the self, to be capable of 
re-acquiring a contemporary meaning, in the manner of one of those pagan temple columns that 
one occasionally sees reutilized in more recent structures.” (FFE, 231)  
But there were also other parallels that Foucault found interesting: 
                                                 
6 Moral integrity, along with so much else, was largely considered a male preserve at the time. 
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What strikes me is that in Greek ethics people were concerned with their moral conduct, their ethics, their 
relations to themselves and to others much more than with religious problems. […] The second thing is that 
ethics was not related to […] any legal – institutional system. For instance the laws against sexual misbehaviour 
were very few and not very compelling. The third thing was that what they were worried about, their theme was 
to constitute a kind of ethics that was an aesthetics of existence. 
Well I wonder if our problem nowadays is not, in a way, similar to this one, since most of us no longer believe 
that ethics is founded in religion, nor do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, personal, private life. 
Recent liberation movements suffer from the fact that they cannot find any principle on which to base the 
elaboration of a new ethics. They need an ethics, but they cannot find any other ethics than an ethics founded 
on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on. I am 
struck by this similarity of problems. (OGE, 255-56)  
 
The problems are of course dissimilar in as far as, for the Greeks, there was never any question of 
an ethics based on the hazardous ground of science – this is a problem particular to modernity; but 
this insight of Foucault’s into the similarity of negative conditions, in the disassociation of the 
ethics of how one lives from religion and law,7 constitutes a further explanation, valid from the 
point of view of modernity, for a renewed interest in the Greeks. Greek philosophy contributed 
much to the development of law as the regulatory principle of civil society, but this was not the 
pastoral law of the centuries of Christian domination, which attempted to control and pervade 
every area of life. Foucault recalls Plato’s opposition to a pastoral role for politicians in The 
Statesman, when he asks: “How, Socrates, could someone sit beside each individual at every 
moment of life, in order to prescribe exactly what is right for him?”8 Yet this pervasive presence 
of the ‘shepherd -pastor’ was precisely the legacy that, for Foucault, the medieval Church left to 
the pastoral State, a legacy that has been at least partly overturned in modern times. Against the 
metaphor of the shepherd for the politician’s role in society, Plato offered that of the weaver, 
weaving all the different realities, and temperaments, into a web, but allowing others to take the 
roles of caring and supervising. Foucault paraphrases Plato, in The Statesman thus:  
 
The activities of the shepherd exist, and they are necessary. Let us leave them where they are, where they have 
their value and effectiveness, with the doctor, gymnast, and teacher. Above all, let’s not say that the politician is 
a shepherd … the Pythagoreans [among the very few advocates of a pastoral state that Foucault found in 
antiquity] are deceived in wanting to emphasize the pastoral form, which may really function in small religious 
and pedagogical communities; they are wrong in wanting to emphasize it at the level of the whole city-state. 
The king is not a shepherd.9 
 
                                                 
7 At the same time, for moderns and Greeks alike, as fervently maintaining the need for law to regulate questions of 
public ethics. 
8 Plato, The Statesman, cited in: STP, p.158n 
9 Ibid, p.147 
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But if the Greek politician was not to prescribe exactly what was right for us, it was because we 
were expected to prescribe it for ourselves, by undertaking philosophical practice. That is to say, 
as a citizen one was expected to undertake the practices necessary to act as a good citizen, and 
what this meant included seeking out those wiser than oneself in order to learn from them the 
techniques that would help one to develop as a moral being; techniques of self-intelligibility and 
self transformation. 
Foucault says that when the Delphic precept ‘know yourself’ “this gnòthi seauton, appears in 
philosophical thought, it is, as we know, around the character of Socrates” (HS, 4); and further, 
that what he calls the “Socratic-Platonic” expression of the care of the self – epimeleia heautou, “is 
referred to not only in the Alcibiades, although only the Alcibiades gives its complete theory.” It is 
in this text that the question “What is the self we must take care of?” (Ibid., 66) is clearly posed. In 
the pages that follow these remarks, Foucault adopts the same practice as the Greek text he is 
studying, in referring to the ‘self’ and the ‘soul’ interchangeably; and he summarizes the principle 
thus: 
 
To care for the self one must know oneself; to know oneself one must look at oneself in an element that is the 
same as the self; in this element one must look at that which is the very source of thought and knowledge; this 
source is the divine element. To see oneself one must therefore look at oneself in the divine element: One must 
know the divine in order to see oneself. (HS, 70-71)  
 
This “divine element” is associated in Plato with a notion of divinity and of ideal forms, outside of 
and pre-existent to the self, accessible to reason, in which they are mirrored. In later conceptions, 
particularly that of the Stoics, the “divinity” is directly identified with “universal reason”, the 
ordering principle of the universe, which manifests and is reflected in human thought. In these 
differing conceptions, however, the road to self-knowledge was deemed to be a long one, full of 
obstacles, and these obstacles were mostly located in less limpid parts of “the self”. The “self” in 
ancient texts, therefore, seems sometimes to indicate the divine element, or the portion of universal 
reason within the human being, and sometimes to indicate the human being in its entirety. This 
being the case, “self-knowledge” can refer to contemplation of this higher part of the self, or to 
investigation of what happens in what we can call the “lower” part of the self, where ignorance, 
false judgements and other unpleasant matters are said to abound. But the texts themselves rarely 
specify which of these notions of self is being used, and Foucault adopts the same practice. 
However, in as far as Socrates’ dialogues can be read as examples of philosophical practice, it 
appears to be the unlearning of false knowledge, of the world and of the self, that opens the door to 
true knowledge, the knowledge of one’s ignorance (or, for the Stoics, of the falsity of one’s 
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judgements); that provides the key to the ontological truth without which there is no truth at all. 
The human capacity for self deceit (and to be deceived) thus constituted the material on which 
many of what Hadot calls “spiritual exercises”, and what Foucault calls “techniques of the self”, 
were designed to operate. But among these techniques, those of self-examination (concerned with 
the whole individual human being), seem to recall for Foucault the image of an interior 
panopticon,10 the genealogy of whose forms he had attempted to trace through Christendom and 
beyond; and this was not what he was looking for in Greek philosophy. Another development 
struck him as more promising. He writes: 
 
It seems to me that in the religious crisis of the sixteenth century – the great rejection of the Catholic 
confessional practices – new modes of relationship to the self were being developed. We can see the 
reactivation of a certain number of ancient Stoic practices. The notion, for example of proofs of oneself seems 
to me thematically close to what we find among the Stoics, where the experience of the self is not a discovering 
of a truth hidden inside the self but an attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available 
freedom. Among both the Catholics and Protestants, the reactivation of these spiritual techniques in the form of 
Christian spiritual practices is quite marked. (OGE, 276)  
 
The distinction between types of spiritual practice that Foucault is drawing here is crucial to an 
understanding of his reading of the Greeks. The description of the Stoic “experience of the self” as 
“an attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available freedom” is an original 
formulation, with a vaguely Stoic ring to it; but it seems to suggest that for the Stoics “one’s 
available freedom” is some kind of given, whereas achieving that freedom is more generally 
considered to be the hard-won goal of Stoic practice, and the necessary groundwork of the moral 
life. In the context of what freedom means for the Stoics it is important to distinguish between that 
everyday human freedom which allows us to pursue moral good or evil, which they recognized as 
an attribute of human rationality11; and the freedom of the guiding principle or hegèmonikon of 
that rationality, or the soul, from the traps of desire and aversion which might induce us into evil – 
a transformation of one’s life that required assiduous practice – which they pursued. There was in 
effect only one Stoic answer to the question of what to do with one’s freedom – pursue the moral 
good; the problem at the heart of Stoic subjectivation was to free the mind from its self-created 
obstacles in order to do that; but the “moral good” is not an operative term in Foucault’s 
vocabulary. 
                                                 
10 Bentham’s image of the watch-tower in the prison yard which allowed for surveillance at 360°; that Foucault took 
as his symbolic image of disciplinary control. See especially Discipline and Punish. 
11 “It is human beings who, thanks to their freedom, introduce trouble and worry into the world. Taken by themselves, 
things are neither good or evil, and should not trouble us. The course of things unfolds in a necessary way, without 
choice, without hesitation, and without passion.” Hadot, The Inner Citadel, p.107 
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Foucault clearly associates the search for a “truth hidden inside the self” with the Catholic 
confessional, with the introspection that he will then trace through its secular forms in the 
psychological sciences. Against this he sets the self-constituting Stoic practice of determining 
what to do with one’s freedom, some form of which he saw as ‘reactivated’ as a result of the 
Protestant Reforms, eventually for both Catholics and Protestants. His juxtaposition of the two 
types of practice, as self-investigative and self-constitutive, seems to suggest that they are not 
compatible, that they imply an irreconcilably different form of relation to the self, and yet it would 
be hard to ignore the central place that self-investigative techniques play in Stoic philosophical 
practice. How are we then to interpret this statement that the Stoic “experience of self is not a 
discovering of a truth hidden inside the self”? Clearly the “truth” of the self that the penitent 
Christian found through self-exploration was the truth of her sinfulness, and this is not the case 
with Stoic practice. But the Stoic practice of observing the formation of one’s own thoughts, or 
representations, of observing whether or not one’s way of representing reality to oneself is 
influenced by desire or aversion, by wishing things to be different, by a rejection of the nature of 
human life in this universe, is the self-investigative basis of that Stoic quest for freedom without 
which no transformation of the self could occur. 
In fact, the very example Foucault gives of Stoic asceticism in this essay, that of Epictetus’ 
recommendations concerning how to take a daily walk as a spiritual exercise, is indicative of the 
lack of (Stoic) distinction between self-investigative and self-constitutive practice. The 
recommendations he refers to were that during one’s morning walk “one should try to determine 
with respect to each thing (a public official or an attractive woman), one’s motives, whether one is 
impressed by or drawn to it, or whether one has sufficient mastery to be indifferent.” (OGE, 276) 
This advice states quite baldly that it is through the examination of one’s motives, noting the 
presence or absence of envy, desire, or whatever else one finds there, that one can arrive at ‘one’s 
available freedom,’ here characterized as sufficient self-mastery to be indifferent. Epictetus 
therefore seems to assume that in identifying the motive – quite literally the movement within the 
self that takes the form of attraction (or repulsion) – one frees oneself of its hold, it is this that is 
self-mastery. Thus “the attempt to determine what one can and cannot do with one’s available 
freedom,” in this particular walking exercise, would seem to pass precisely through the discovery 
of one small, “hidden”, that is – not immediately apparent – “truth of the self”, of the order of 
small discoveries to be made one at a time. But the “truth of the self” discovered here is one small 
instance of the mechanistic movements of the mind – a mechanism from which one can choose to 
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free oneself; it is not original sin. The “self” to which Epictetus’ practice is addressed is one that 
contains both the higher (free) and the lower (unfree) parts of the self, dominated by the passions; 
and freedom arises from the inner discourse between these aspects of the self. The higher part of 
the self, the Stoic hegemonikon, or guiding principle, is identified with reason, the intellect, the 
soul.12 If the ascetic practice of observing and retraining one’s own mind allows the hegemonikon 
to shape one’s inner discourse, the choice to pursue the moral good in one’s actions will follow.  
 
In writing of the work on the self of contemplatives, and particularly philosophers, in the long 
intervening period between the Stoics and the Reformation, in the shadows of medieval Christian 
Europe, so to speak, Foucault says that “In Western culture up to the sixteenth century, asceticism 
and access to truth are always more or less obscurely linked”. Obscurely – presumably - in that 
very little is recorded of the types of ascetic practice adopted by philosophers in this period, as 
compared with the wealth of detail regarding such practices available in antiquity. This is partly to 
do with the sidelining of ascetic practices within Christianity in the Middle Ages. Individuals with 
ascetic leanings then had the choice of monastic withdrawal; eccentricity  – if they were 
aristocratic enough to escape censure; or art; or scholarship, which was mostly lived, right down to 
and including Descartes, more as a form of contemplative ascesis (communicating to the world 
through the medium of written texts) than as a worldly profession.  
Ironically, perhaps, it was the Aristotelian turn in theology, with scholasticism, and its hegemony 
over everything that counted as knowledge in medieval Europe,13 that allowed for the eventual 
separation of ascetic practice and access to truth, in that: “Theology is precisely a type of 
knowledge with a rational structure that allows the subject – as and only as a rational subject – to 
have access to the truth of God without the condition of spirituality. Then there were all the 
empirical sciences (sciences of observation, etcetera). There was mathematics, in short a whole 
range of processes that did their work. That is to say, generally speaking, scholasticism was 
already an effort to remove the condition of spirituality laid down in all of ancient philosophy and 
all [previous] Christian thought (Saint Augustine and so forth).14” (HS, pp. 190-191, my emphasis)  
                                                 
12 Hadot writes of “a complete equivalence [in Marcus Aurelius] between five terms: 1. the self; 2. intellect (nous); 3. 
the power of reflection (dianoia); 4. the guiding principle (hegemonikon) and; 5. the inner daimòn. IC, P.123 
13 There was, of course, a separate, though interlaced, genealogical development of the rise of science. The efforts of 
medicine to become academic-professional, for instance, and shake off the clutches of the medieval Church, was one 
important example. 
14 The fact that, of all ancient philosophers, it was Aristotle who inspired scholasticism’s suppression of ascesis in 
favour of theology is no surprise here, in that he was, Foucault says, “the only philosopher in Antiquity for whom the 
question of spirituality was least important; the philosopher whom we have recognized as the founder of philosophy in 
the modern sense of the term: Aristotle. But as everyone knows, Aristotle is not the pinnacle of Antiquity, but its 
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The decisive step, however, the problematization of this separation, comes with Descartes:  
 
Descartes, I think, broke with this [link to asceticism] when he said, ‘To accede to truth, it suffices that I be any 
subject that can see what is evident.’ Evidence is substituted for ascesis at the point where the relationship to 
the self intersects the relationship to others and to the world. […] After Descartes we have a nonascetic subject 
of knowledge. This change makes possible the institutionalisation of modern science.  
I am obviously schematizing a very long history, which is, however, fundamental. After Descartes, we have a 
subject of knowledge that poses for Kant the problem of knowing the relationship between the subject of ethics 
and that of knowledge. […] Kant’s solution was to find a universal subject that, to the extent it was universal, 
could be the subject of knowledge, but which demanded, nonetheless, an ethical attitude – precisely the 
relationship to the self which Kant proposes in The Critique of Practical Reason. (OGE, 279)15  
 
 
 
5. The divided subject of knowledge and ethics  
 
In Kant’s article, “What is Enlightenment”16, published in the journal Berlinische Monatschrift in 
1784, on which Foucault wrote a commentary under the same title, Kant defines Enlightenment as: 
“man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity.”17 This definition, so appreciated by 
Foucault, draws this conception of ethical practice very close to a Stoic commitment to taking full 
responsibility for one’s thinking and acting (for men only, given Kant’s misogyny), and it also 
reads like an attack on pastoralism, in conformity with his own Pietist moral sentiments. Kant 
(here quoted by Foucault) writes: 
 
It is so easy to be immature. If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, 
a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all. I need not think, if only I can 
pay: others will readily undertake the irksome work for me. The guardians who have so benevolently taken 
over the supervision of men have carefully seen to it that the far greatest part of them (including the entire fair 
sex) regard taking the step to maturity as very dangerous, not to mention difficult (Ibid.) 
                                                                                                                                                                
exception.” (HS, p.17) This is pure provocation, but that there were consequences in the long term of Aristotle’s 
separation of “science” from “philosophy” is of course true. 
15 See also HS, p.190: “Obviously the model of scientific practice played a major role in this: To be capable of truth 
you only have to open your eyes and to reason soundly and honestly… The subject only has to be what he is for him 
to have access in knowledge (connaissance) to the truth that is open to him through his own structure as subject. It 
seems to me that this is very clear in Descartes, with, if you like, the supplementary twist in Kant, which consists in 
saying that what we cannot know is precisely the structure of the knowing subject, which means that we cannot know 
the subject. Consequently the idea of a certain spiritual transformation of the subject, which finally gives him access to 
something to which precisely he does not have access at the moment, is chimerical and paradoxical. So the liquidation 
of what could be called the condition of spirituality for access to the truth is produced with Descartes and Kant; Kant 
and Descartes seem to me the two major moments.”  
16 Kant, Immanuel, An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment (1784) 
17 Kant, cited in Foucault, (WE, 305) 
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But just as this indicates a connection between Stoic and Kantian conceptions of moral maturity 
there is also a rupture, in that for Kant, the question of the freedom of the subject was dependent 
on an act of will, not therefore, on the slow process of the care of the self. Foucault notes that 
“Kant defines Aufklärung in an almost entirely negative way, as an Ausgang, an ‘exit,’ a ‘way 
out’” (WE, 305) of this immaturity. Foucault says this is presented rather ambiguously as “an 
ongoing process; but he also presents it as a task and obligation”; and notes that “in any case 
Enlightenment is defined by a modification of the preexisting relation linking will, authority, and 
the use of reason.” (Ibid.) Foucault clearly appreciates Kant’s decisive, non-introspective mode of 
self-transformation, in the form of moralisation by reason, as it were. And most of all he 
apreciates the motto Kant suggests for Enlightenment “Aude sapere: ‘dare to know,’ ‘have the 
courage, the audacity, to know.’ Thus Enlightenment must be considered both as a process in 
which men participate collectively and as an act of courage to be accomplished personally.” (Ibid. 
306)  
Foucault points out that Descartes’ separation of revealed truth, inaccessible to the intelligence, 
which governed one’s relationship to God and to ethics; and scientific truth – knowledge of a 
domain of objects, including of the self as the thinking object – res cogitans; was profoundly 
dissatisfying to Kant. However, Kant’s attempt to reunite the subject of knowledge and the subject 
of ethics through the faculty of Reason ended up, Foucault says, leaving the subject split along 
different lines, as an empirical being trapped in causation, which manifests in inclination, and as 
the transcendent self. Foucault certainly did not share Kant’s thinking on inclination, especially in 
its strong form of “desire”; in fact, he saw desire, or rather pleasure (cleansed of its bad publicity, 
as it were) as a notion around which new moral theory could be constructed. However, one of his 
key reference points in his thinking about the subject, was what Cavell calls: “Kant’s formulation 
[… that]: Man lives in two worlds, in one of which he is determined (by being fated to the laws of 
causation), in the other free (to do what reason commands)” (CW, 127). Foucault’s (cumbersome, 
but explicit) term for this was [the human as] an “empirico-transcendental doublet.” (M&C, 329) 
Cavell says that Kant “does not deny the empiricist claim that our knowledge of the world begins 
with experience, but […] he interprets ‘beginning with experience’ as invoking the passive 
(sensuous) side of human nature, requiring, in order to add up to what we call knowledge, the 
active (intellectual) side, organizing, forming, experience under the categories of the 
understanding, which turns out to be derived from the fundamental forms in which we make 
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coherent judgements of the world, individuated into stable objects with observable, changing 
properties, related to each other causally, and so on.” (CW, op. cit.)  
This formulation is very far from the way in which the problem of the subject of knowledge is 
presented by Foucault in various of his texts, though there may be an echo of Kant’s historically 
immutable “categories” in Foucault’s historically mutable concepts, and of Kant’s ‘stable objects’ 
in Foucault’s “objectifications”. But perhaps his greatest debt to Kant is the focus on thinking as 
that activity which renders possible freedom from forces of determination, or objectification. The 
question of the relationship of ethics to knowledge remained problematic, however. Foucault asks: 
How can I constitute myself as a subject of ethics? Recognize myself as such? Are ascetic exercises needed? Or 
simply this Kantian relationship to the universal which makes me ethical by conformity to practical reason? 
Thus Kant introduces one more way in our tradition whereby the self is not merely given but is constituted in 
relationship to itself as subject. (OGE, 280)  
Foucault’s words here seem carefully chosen to avoid taking a position on contemporary debates 
about whether Kant’s “subject” is self-constructed or pre-existent to experience – “the self is not 
merely given” could mean that it is given, but not “merely”, or that it is not given. This question is 
not relevant to the use he wishes to make of Kant, which is to illustrate the way in which Kantian 
subjectivation is foundational to modernity, and it relies on the self-transforming power of 
thought, a notion which he shared. It also relied on a metaphysic that Foucault did not share, but 
which gave rise to a widely ramified genealogical descent in ethics, that is still flourishing in 
contemporary society. It is clear, however, that despite Kant’s attempts at solving the Cartesian 
problem of the divided subject, and the consequent division in philosophy – between epistemology 
(as the standard-bearer of philosophical work) and ethics (now an optional extra) – this division, 
and the varying attempts at overcoming it, remain at the heart of contemporary philosophy.  
Foucault notes the irony of the fact that Descartes himself was in the position of practising 
philosophy as a form of meditation, as a reflection on the self as subject of knowledge, within a 
tradition that had come down from antiquity; and yet the results of his Meditations, the particular 
form of self-discovery that was the cogito, were to lead to the abandonment in mainstream 
philosophy of meditative practice, an ascetic practice, itself. Foucault writes: 
we must not forget that Descartes wrote ‘meditations’ – and meditations are a practice of the self. But the 
extraordinary thing in Descartes’s texts is that he succeeded in substituting a subject as founder of practices of 
knowledge for a subject constituted through practices of the self. 
This is very important. Even if it is true that Greek philosophy founded rationality, it always held that a subject 
could not have access to the truth if he did not first operate upon himself a certain work that would make him 
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susceptible to knowing the truth – a work of purification, conversion of the soul by contemplation of the soul 
itself. (Ibid., 278-79)  
 
In writing of the Greeks, Pierre Hadot’s work was a constant reference point for Foucault, though 
they did not always agree in their interpretations, and it may be useful here to recall his remarks on 
the connection between rationality and techniques of the self for the Greeks: “Logic, for instance, 
was not limited to an abstract theory of reasoning, nor even to school exercises in syllogistics; 
rather, there was a daily practice of logic applied to the problems of everyday life. Logic was thus 
the mastery of inner discourse. This was all the more necessary since, in conformity with Socratic 
intellectualism, the Stoics believed that the human passions correspond to a misuse of human 
discourse.” (WAP, 135)  
Similarly, for Hadot, ancient physics did not imagine itself to be laying down absolute truths about 
nature, but rather to be offering plausible explanations, and developing a capacity for dealing with 
problems methodically; research, for Aristotle and others, being a means to the highest pleasures. 
Hadot quotes Cicero, thus: 
 
I do not think we need to renounce the questions of the physicists. The observation and contemplation of nature 
are a kind of natural food for the soul and the mind. We rectify and dilate [I read latiores] ourselves; we look 
down at human things from on high, and as we contemplate the higher, celestial things, we feel contempt for 
human things, finding them petty and narrow. The search for the largest things, as well as for the most obscure, 
brings us pleasure. If something probable presents itself to us in the course of this research, our mind is filled 
with a noble, human pleasure. (Ibid. 209)  
 
As Foucault puts it: “The one who cared for himself [the practitioner of philosophy] had to choose 
among all the things that you can know through scientific knowledge only those kinds of things 
which were relative to him and important to life.” (Ibid. 270) It may be hard for us, today, to 
imagine a world that, lacking instruments of verification concerning the microscopic and the 
macroscopic, may have had no concept of “objective” certainty; where the advancement of 
knowledge was a fascinating and inspiring branch of human activity, the highest such activity, but 
one in which the discovery of a probability regarding the natural world, as Cicero says, rather than 
a certainty, was a sought-after fulfillment. And it was precisely this Aristotelian scientific world of 
probabilities that Descartes set out to overthrow, grounding scientific thought in certainty. 
Nonetheless, for the ancients, lack of certainties did not mean lack of truths, in fact, it was one. 
Lack of certainty was seen as a truth of the human condition, of human experience; and as such, an 
important element of the truth that mattered in our lives, of the knowledge of ourselves that would 
teach us how to live.  
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6. Forms of reflexivity 
 
As the question of the relation of the individual subject to truth came into focus for Foucault, the 
conceptual instruments that had allowed him to frame his analysis of the relations between 
particular discursive practices and the underlying “intellectual unconscious” of the era, or 
episteme, concepts that had been so useful in focusing on the interaction of knowledge and power, 
no longer seemed adequate to the new task. The fact that the focus of his attention had shifted 
from the modern subject to the subject in antiquity brought to light these limitations. Clearly, the 
lack of anything resembling the Cartesian notion of “objective certainty” in Antiquity,18 is an 
epistemological difference of considerable importance; but it is one that goes beyond the bounds 
of what Foucault had formerly described as epistemic difference. In the “ancient” perspective, the 
emphasis in processes of verification is collocated more on the experiential than on the logical 
plane; not in any way in the sense of disregarding logic, on the contrary, logic is crucial to the 
process of establishing truth; but in the sense that the danger of manipulating logic, using it to 
convincingly establish what is false, to both self and others, is held to be an essential aspect of the 
problem. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions19, Thomas Kuhn demonstrates how even the 
contemporary scientist, who may be passionately committed to a particular, well-established set of 
objective criteria for the assessment of “truth”, may find herself choosing to ignore the relevance 
of inconvenient empirical data where a risk is perceived that such data might throw the theories 
she is working with into disarray. This conceptual conservatism within specific discursive 
practices, which was also studied by Foucault in relation to the vested interests involved in the 
stabilisation of conceptual fields, such as those of psychiatry, law, and other academic disciplines, 
has been shown by both Kuhn and Foucault, and by others, to be an epistemological feature of the 
modern scientific mind, as evident among contemporary advocates of objective truth as it was 
among the green young aristocrats who Socrates chose to awaken from their conceptual muddles; 
but it is something that modernity has been reluctant to recognise, whereas for antiquity it was 
held to be one of the primary obstacles between the subject and truth.  
                                                 
18 “objectivity” and “subjectivity” for the Stoics, for example, meant an honest appraisal of the facts of the world, as 
opposed to an appraisal conditioned by subjective desires. 
19 Kuhn, Thomas, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
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The new conceptual instrument that Foucault introduces at this point in his research to allow him 
to focus on these different conceptions of the relationship between subject and truth is that of 
‘forms of reflexivity’, a concept that expresses his shift from a strictly genealogical method to 
something resembling a form of hermeneutics (though this is not his description of his method, but 
of the contents of this study). During the 1981-1982 Course on The Hermeneutics of the Subject at 
the Collège de France, Foucault offers this explanation: 
 
In the West, we have known and practised three forms of the exercise of thought, of thought’s reflection on 
itself; three major forms of reflexivity. [First,] reflexivity in the form of memory. This form of reflexivity gives 
access to the truth, to truth known in the form of recognition. In this form, which consequently leads to a truth 
in which one recollects, the subject is modified since in the act of memory he brings about his liberation; his 
return to his homeland and to his own being. Second, there is, I think, the major form of meditation, which is of 
course set out above all by the Stoics. This form of reflexivity carries out the test of what one thinks, the test of 
oneself as the subject who actually thinks what he thinks and acts as he thinks, with the object of the subject’s 
transformation and constitution as, let’s say, the ethical subject of truth.” Finally, the third major form of 
reflexivity of thought on itself is, I think, what is called method. “Method is a form of reflexivity that makes it 
possible to fix the certainty that will serve as a criterion for all possible truth and which, starting from this fixed 
point, will advance from truth to truth up to the organization and systematization of an objective knowledge. It 
seems to me that these are the three major forms […] which in the West have successively dominated the 
practice of philosophy, or, if you like, the practice of life as philosophy. (HS, 460)  
 
Just as the second of these forms is “set out, above all by the Stoics”, though versions of it exist 
throughout antiquity and beyond, he regards the first as set out, above all, by Plato, and the third 
by Descartes. There is no pretension to the historical accuracy of this schema on Foucault’s part, 
the three forms are called “major” to indicate that there are others that are minor, there are 
variations and overlaps; but, as with all objectifications – without the delineation of an object, in 
this case that of the forms of reflexivity – it is impossible to draw certain matrices of experience 
into focus. What the two ancient forms have in common, and what distinguishes them from the 
‘method’ of modernity, is the fact that the rule that has always been considered to be at the root of 
philosophical practice, to “know yourself,” was indissolubly linked in the ancient world to the rule 
“take care of yourself”. Whereas, Foucault writes: “It seems to me that the Cartesian moment’20, 
again with a lot of inverted commas, functioned in two ways. It came into play in two ways: by 
philosophically requalifying the gnòthi seauton (know yourself), and by discrediting the epimeleia 
heautou (care of the self).” (Ibid.14)  
The two ancient forms of reflexivity, on the other hand, while they both hold that self-knowledge 
and the care of the self are necessarily linked, use these two concepts, for Foucault, in 
epistemically different ways. In both cases however, the link between self-knowledge and the care 
                                                 
20 He says of this term: “I know it is a bad, purely conventional phrase”. (HS, 14) 
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of the self is the notion of ‘conversion to self’ or turning to the self; Foucault lists: eph’heauton 
epistrephein, eis heauton anakhorein, ad se recurrere, ad se redire, in se recedere, se reducere in 
tutum (return to oneself, revert to oneself, review oneself, etcetera.) (HS, 248) The Greek 
expressions here are taken from Plato, the first of the Latin expressions from Marcus Aurelius, the 
other three from Seneca. In Plato, Foucault writes, this notion of epistrophè: 
 
consists first of all in turning away from appearances. ][…] Second: taking stock of oneself by acknowledging 
one’s own ignorance and by deciding precisely to care about the self, to take care of the self. And finally, the 
third stage, on the basis of this reversion to the self, which leads us to recollection, we will be able to return to 
our homeland, the homeland of essences, truth and Being. … You see anyway that this Platonic epistrophè is 
governed first of all by a fundamental opposition between the world down here and the other world. Second, it 
is governed by a theme of liberation, of the soul’s release from the body, the prison-body, the tomb-body, 
etcetera. (HS, 209-210)  
 
The self that one knows in this perspective is the metaphysically pre-established “true essence” of 
(human) Being, and the circular process of looking for and finding this true essence in the self, is 
thus defined as “recollection” as reawakening a lost memory. Though there is much in Plato’s 
reflections that continue to be of interest to Foucault, as an essentialist form of reflexivity, it does 
not readily constitute for him the type of pagan column that could be reutilised in a modern 
construction. Much more interesting in this respect is the Stoic form of “meditation”. Foucault 
writes: 
First of all, the conversion found in Hellenistic and Roman culture and practice of the self does not function on 
the axis opposing this world here to the other world, as does the Platonic epistrophè. It is, rather, a reversion 
that takes place in the immanence of the world, so to speak, which does not mean, however, that there is not a 
basic opposition between what does and does not depend on us. However, whereas the Platonic epistrophè 
consisted in the movement leading us from this world to the other, from the world below to the world above, in 
the Hellenistic and Roman culture of the self conversion gets us to move from that which does not depend on us 
to that which does. What is involved, rather, is liberation within this axis of immanence, a liberation from what 
we do not control so as finally to arrive at what we can control. (Ibid. 210, my emphasis) 
 
This question, that of learning to distinguish what does not depend on us from what does, is the 
crucial practice, the crucial element that distinguishes a this-worldly ascesis –  for which the whole 
of the self is susceptible to transformation – from an other-worldly ascesis, like that of Plato, for 
which the superior part of the self is identified with logos and with the transcendent, at the top of a 
hierarchy of parts of the soul, from where it imposes its law on the “inferior” parts such as desire 
and impulse. As Hadot points out, since for the Stoics impulses and desires are located within the 
rational soul itself, and “even if they do have affective repercussions upon the soul, are, according 
to Stoic teaching, essentially judgements made by the rational soul, [then] Reason is not 
essentially good; rather, like impulses and desire, it can be either good or bad, according to 
whether it emits true or false judgements, which then determine conduct.” (IC, 88) Foucault refers 
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here not just to the Stoics however, but more generally to a ‘Hellenistic and Roman’ practice of 
the self, thus to a model of practice that was common to the differing metaphysical systems of the 
schools of Epicureans, Stoics, Cynics, etc. This is possible precisely because, while these practices 
were linked in each case to the specific metaphysic of the school, and to their specific beliefs 
about nature and the cosmos, the ways in which one worked with one’s own mind, to get it to give 
up its fantasies and accept reality, however defined, were similar, as were the goals of self-
transformation.21 Philosophy was practice, one part of which was philosophical theory. The 
fundamental beliefs that counted for this model of practice were the empirical notions that each 
individual is a very small part of a larger whole (whether an ordered cosmos, as in the Stoics’ 
universal reason, or random, as in the Epicurean notion of atoms and the void), and that human 
beings possess the faculty of reason, with which they may (and therefore should) govern their 
lives. Expressed in modern terms, the empirical description of the human possession of reason 
leads, for the ancients, to the normative injunction that reason should govern our lives; and the 
empirical observation that each single person is a part of a larger whole, however conceived, leads 
to the norm that we take responsibility for ourselves and our interactions within this whole. This 
too is logos, but it may be construed as a logos that can be experienced through self-coherence, 
rather than a logos of pre-constituted form.  
Foucault’s identification here of the distinction between the two forms of reflexivity that he calls 
“memory” and “meditation” provides an extremely useful key to understanding them as forms of 
subjectivation. However, the particular twist that he puts on the apparently uncontroversial phrase 
whereby conversion gets us to “move from that which does not depend on us to that which does”, 
so that it comes out as: “a liberation from what we do not control so as finally to arrive at what we 
can control” can be confusing. The point for the Stoics is that what depends on us is how we live 
our lives; that is, how we interpret the world (construct our representations of it), and how we 
conduct ourselves on the basis of those representations; and it is this that we should be concerned 
with, not worldly goods (such as health, or life itself) or status. By introducing this notion of 
“control” without explaining that “what we do not control” refers to everything outside of the self, 
and also to certain basic elements of the self, whereas ‘what we can control’ refers to our way of 
                                                 
21 Hadot writes that, despite considerable differences: Hellenistic schools all seemed to define …[wisdom] in 
approximately the same terms: first and foremost, as a state of perfect peace of mind. From this viewpoint, philosophy 
appears as a remedy for human worries, anguish and misery, brought about, for the Cynics, by social constraints and 
conventions; for the Epicureans, by the quest for false pleasures; for the Stoics, by the pursuit of pleasure and egoistic 
self-interest; and for the Skeptics, by false opinions. Whether or not they laid claim to the Socratic heritage, all 
Hellenistic philosophers agreed with Socrates that human beings are plunged in misery, anguish and evil because they 
exist in ignorance. What is Ancient Philosophy?, p.102 
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being in ourselves and in the world, Foucault appears to create an impression of a Stoic concern 
with “controlling” aspects of our world other than our judgements and our behaviour. 
Epictetus clarifies: 
 
What depends on us are value-judgements (hypolèpsis), impulses towards action (hormè), and desire (orexis) or 
aversion; in a word, everything which is our own business. What does not depend on us are the body, wealth, 
honors, and high position in office; in a word, everything which is not our own business.(IC, 83)  
 
Hadot’s comment on this is that “Here, we can glimpse one of the Stoic’s most fundamental 
attitudes: the delimitation of our own sphere of liberty as an impregnable islet of autonomy, in the 
midst of the vast river of events and of Destiny. What depends on us are the acts of our soul, 
because we can freely choose them.” (Ibid.) 
The “immanence of the world”, for the Stoics, thus contains everything within and outside of us, 
but it is only what is within ourselves, and our conduct, over which we have any control. 
Therefore “liberation within this axis of immanence” can only refer to the acts of the soul. This 
passage, however, one of the most theoretically explicit passages in the entire course, is structured 
in such a way as to suggest that the “liberation from what we do not control so as to finally arrive 
at what we can control” has to do with the wider world, not just the acts of the soul. This shift of 
emphasis allows Foucault to mobilize the Stoics in support of his own theme of the continual 
reinvention of the self. 
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Ch. 2. The Genealogy of Ethics 
 
1. The embodied subject 
 
Analysing what kind of subjects we are began, for Foucault, with the modern subjects he 
encountered in his early years of work in psychiatric institutions, that is to say, the “mentally ill” 
and the supposedly “mentally sound” doctors and “experts”. These institutions provided a kind of 
cameo portrait of the disciplinary and “normalizing” practices of modern society, and of the way 
in which the internalisation of the appropriate concepts of normality, against which one was to 
judge oneself, was accompanied by the regulation of the body. As he observed, this tended not to 
mean a healthy diet and plenty of exercise, but rather the regulation of sexuality. When, years 
later, Foucault began to work on the history of sexuality, he did this not so much to write “the 
history of sexuality”, but because our sexuality is so important to who we think we are. Because of 
its role in how we experience ourselves as bodies, as body-minds, as it were; beyond gender, our 
sexual identity is now germane to our conception of ourselves. This is clearly equally true for the 
sexually active and the non-active, since sexual non-activity either represents an important choice 
(or an accepted or welcome circumstance), or else a source of suffering.  
Foucault set out on the quest to discover whether or not, and to what extent, our sexuality had 
always figured so prominently in our subjectivity. Starting with the early modern period, from the 
late sixteenth century, he began tracing the genealogy of the separate concepts out of which, he 
found, the notion of “sexuality” had been constructed: those of “desire”, and of “the body”, and of 
“sin.” The association of these three objectifications, brought together in the Catholic practice of 
confession, and evident in the discourses developed by the Church, especially in the highly 
salacious instruction manuals for priests22 (on guiding confession) that Foucault quotes in Volume 
1 of The History of Sexuality, induced a habit of self-examination among the “flock”, in principle 
the entire population, centred on a detailed analysis of the desires lurking behind even seemingly 
innocent thoughts and actions. This practice is what Foucault calls the “hermeneutics of desire”. 
The hermeneutics of desire is intended to reveal one’s “true self”, and as such it simultaneously 
constitutes a “hermeneutics of the subject” – it provides me with the key to understanding my 
subjectivity. The link between the foundational concepts of this practice and those of Freudian 
psychoanalysis, construed as a secular form of hermeneutics of desire and of the self, struck 
                                                 
22 Mostly sixteenth and seventeenth century texts. 
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Foucault very forcefully, and he was concerned to research, and reconstruct, the historical 
passages between the one set of concepts and the other. 
He had already studied the way in which Protestantism and the scientific advances of the sixteenth 
century had led to a vast proliferation of scientific discourse in other fields; and his investigations 
of these revealed that science had not been reluctant to incorporate sexual relations and desire 
within its field, producing a considerable number of separate discourses that Foucault refers to 
collectively as Scientia Sexualis. Paradoxically, at the same time, the “self” studied by philosophy 
had mostly been construed more as a floating mind with a material (corporeal) adjunct; a 
troublesome body, that tries to drag the ‘subject’ back into that animality from which reason 
releases it, and must be controlled, not allowed to partake of subjectivity. Foucault was interested 
both in the different ways in which “sexuality” has been objectified historically, and in the modes 
of subjectivation these gave rise to; but all this is not really clear from the title given to the three 
volumes (originally conceived as five) of The History of Sexuality. In the Preface to The Uses of 
Pleasure, Volume 2 of the series, he writes: 
 
The project of a history of sexuality was linked to a desire on my part to analyze more closely the third of the 
axes that constitute any matrix of experience: the modality of the relation to the self. Not that sexuality cannot 
and should not – like madness, sickness, or criminality – be envisaged as a locus of experience, one that 
includes a domain of knowledge [savoir], a system of rules, and a model for relations to the self. However, the 
relative importance of the last element recommends it as a guiding thread for the very history of this experience 
and its formation; my planned study of women, children and ‘perverts’ as sexual subjects was to have followed 
on those lines. 
I found myself confronted with a choice that was a long time in unravelling: a choice between fidelity to the 
chronological outline I had originally imagined, and a different line of inquiry in which the modes of relation to 
the self took precedence. (PHS, 204)  
 
He made the second choice. The chronological outline he had followed in Volume 1 had kept him 
within modern times, from the seventeenth to the twentieth century. But the decision to focus on 
the forms of relation to the self, forced him out of the periods he had originally intended to study, 
indeed out of this historical model, into immersion in epochs that were much further back, those of 
the Greeks and Romans. This served his purpose, he says, “both in order to address myself to 
periods when the effect of scientific knowledges and the complexity of normative systems were 
less, and in order eventually to make out forms of relation to the self different from those 
characterising the experience of sexuality” (Ibid.) Thus the analysis of modes of relation to the self 
anchored in sexuality led on to the exploration of other, and completely different, modes of 
relation to the self. His work on sexuality was therefore both a bridge to the study of these other 
modes, and significant in itself, in that sexuality remained for him the key to the relation to the self 
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as either a non-divided, or divided, or, in some cases, reintegrated body-mind; and it would 
become crucial to Foucault’s later vision of a new form of ethics, or of ethopoesis.  
 
The term “hermeneutics” which Foucault used to describe the self-directed practices of the 
Hellenistic era in particular (which Hadot calls “spiritual exercises”), could also be used to 
describe the exegetic methods Foucault himself uses to investigate them; in as far as he attempts to 
let the texts he was studying speak with their own voices; and in as far as he made a genuine 
attempt to really listen to what they were saying, without, in the first instance, imposing a pre-
constructed interpretive grid on his readings. This is very hard to do, of course, if at all possible, 
especially for such a systematic thinker as Foucault. Historical singularity remains however, his 
guiding thread; and if his self-formative intention was to learn something of what it might mean to 
think like a Stoic, if for no other reason than to provide himself, his thought’s thinking of itself, 
with a new challenge; his scholarly intention was still genealogical, that is, ambitiously: “to try to 
situate, in an historical field as precisely articulated as possible, the set of these practices of the 
subject which developed from the Hellenistic and Roman period until now”. (HS, 188)  
 
 
2. Ethical configurations 
 
The Introduction to the History of Sexuality, Vol.2 is one of those moments in Foucault’s work 
where a lot of theory is concentrated into a few very quotable pages; for this reason it is regarded, 
perhaps more than the book it introduces, as one of the most important of his texts, and is 
published separately in several anthologies. Still very much under the sign of genealogy, in it he 
sets up an entire methodology for analysing ethical systems. In the first place he draws a 
distinction between two different conceptions of ethics, as prescriptive “morality” and as practices 
of the self.23 Morality is defined as concerned with the codification of sanctioned sets of values (a 
process involving recognized moral “authorities”), and their elaboration in specific rules; and with 
the different, institutionalised forms of enforcement of these rules – from family and school to 
magistrates and prisons – morality as it is viewed and experienced in human societies. This had 
been the focus of much of his former work, but it is not his current concern, except in as far as it 
                                                 
23 In Murdoch’s terminology on the other hand, “morality” is the global term she uses for all ethical practices, the 
more public codification of moral rules, as well as private moral reflection and practices of the self. The distinction is 
however not just one of terminology, as the relation of private reflection to historically prevailing moral codes differs 
significantly.  
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provides the historical framework for the relationship that the individual establishes between these 
acquired notions of morality and her own way of living, of thinking and acting. He now turns his 
attention to: “the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in 
reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code” (UP, 26) The point he is making is 
that, with reference to any rule of conduct, there are many different ways in which one can observe 
the rule, or not observe it: consciously or unconsciously, willingly, or unwillingly, thoroughly or 
superficially, in accordance with or against one’s beliefs or feelings, and so forth; and that there 
are many different ways to (or not to) habituate oneself to behaving “acceptably”.  
In order to analyse this he isolates four aspects of “the self’s relation to itself”; and he calls these: 
the “ethical substance”, the “mode of subjection”, the “work on the self” and the “telos”, or goal of 
ethical conduct. These theoretical instruments are designed to be able to elucidate different 
cultural situations. To exemplify this way of problematizing ethical practices he describes their 
variations with regard to one particular precept, one that is to be found in some form in most moral 
codes, that of fidelity in marriage.  
He defines the determination of the ethical substance as “the way in which the individual has to 
constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct”. In this context of 
the moral requirement of fidelity, one might, for example, conform to this practice by curbing 
one’s desires, because one thinks it important to observe society’s rules, whether or not one 
believes that the obligation in question – marital fidelity – is (for oneself) important. Alternatively, 
one could believe that marital fidelity is indeed morally necessary, that desire is a threat to it, and 
that one must therefore attempt to control, and preferably eradicate, sexual desire itself. In the first 
of these cases, the desiring self is not seen as a problem, except in as far as it may lead to 
unacceptable acts. Therefore what one requires of oneself is self control in the form of the exercise 
of will-power over one’s acts, not over one’s desires as such, and one must work to strengthen 
one’s will, and moderate, but not eliminate desire.  
In the second case, the desiring self is itself the problem, one must therefore exercise constant 
vigilance, to try to extirpate desire; therefore even the “legitimate” expression of desire, within 
marriage, will be problematic in the subject’s relation to self. The third possible case he offers is 
one that may place a particular value on the marriage relationship, and on fidelity within it; and 
thus work to cultivate the feeling and expression of love for one’s partner.  
One could therefore conclude that in the first case, the ethical substance, the part of oneself on 
which one must concentrates one’s efforts is intentionality (with regard to one’s acts); in the 
second case it is desire, and in the third it is sentiment. Foucault does not however actually specify 
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which “parts of the self” he is referring to, even though this is the defining concept of this part of 
his analysis. Such specifications are obviously problematical – intentionality is generally more 
associated with moral agency which works on “parts of the self” such as desire or sentiment that 
are often construed as “passive”; but although he regards such differences as important when 
comparing other philosophical approaches, such as those of Plato and the Stoics, or Kant and the 
empiricists, Foucault does not address himself to the difficulties involved in characterising “parts 
of the self” on this model he is putting forward. As they stand, the descriptions given above of 
different attitudes to a moral rule of marital fidelity could all apply to modern times, the most 
morally eclectic of all periods of human history, but one gets the impression that the model 
Foucault is setting up is designed to link these determinations separately to specific historical 
epochs. 
Similarly, the descriptions of “modes of subjection”, or “the way in which the individual 
establishes his relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice”(p.27), 
would seem to have some degree of cross-cultural application: “One can, for example, practice 
conjugal fidelity and comply with the precept that imposes it, because one acknowledges oneself 
to be a member of the group that accepts it, declares adherence to it out loud, and silently 
preserves it as a custom.” This is the (Durkheimian) description of adherence to the rules of 
society, not for the sake of any commitment to the rules themselves, but because they represent a 
group identity, and social cohesion – “We do this, therefore I do this”, “My country – right or 
wrong”, as it were. This mode of subjection represents a form of conformist “morality” that is to 
be found (though perhaps never as the only form of morality in operation) in all societies. It is 
particularly common in societies where religion is largely based on cult practices and ritual 
observances, and where “correct” social behaviour is similarly ritualized, and incorrect behaviour 
punished. The second example Foucault gives is that one can practice conjugal fidelity “because 
one regards oneself as an heir to a spiritual tradition that one has the responsibility of maintaining 
or reviving”. Commitment to a spiritual tradition also requires conformity, but in a secondary, not 
a primary role; it is subordinate to a genuine conviction regarding the moral validity of the 
tradition. The type of relation to the self that this involves can also be found in many different 
societies, with differing metaphysics, but Foucault does not exemplify this. The third example he 
gives of mode of subjection is denoted “by offering oneself as an example, or by seeking to give 
one’s personal life a form that answers to criteria of brilliance, beauty, nobility, or perfection”, and 
here the reference is clearly to forms of moral and aesthetic perfectionism. The maverick forms of 
ethics in modern history. 
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No doubt there are many other modes of subjection that one could identify, but one in particular 
stands out by its absence from this three-part list. That is to say, that mode of relation to ethical 
codes whereby determining what is “correct” behaviour for oneself implies individual 
responsibility based on reflection; a mode occurring in societies where religion or philosophy 
either involve or tolerate contemplative practice. Given that the genealogical model for the study 
of ethics he presents here forms the introduction to a book on Greek and Roman ethics, one of the 
few historical situations where this unmentioned form of relation to the self is explored, this 
omission seems all the more curious. It may have to do with the fact that it could perhaps be better 
described as a ‘mode of accommodation’ to rules, than a mode of ‘subjection’ to them. In fact, this 
particular category of “mode of subjection” (mode d’assujettissement), as it is used here, is an 
awkward one, given the misfit between the term and its referent. Assujettissement implies 
subjection, even subjugation, that is, the presence of a coercive agent or agency, whether internal 
or external to the subject; and yet what he has just described are non-coercive modes of relation to 
the self. 
Perhaps what we are witnessing here is a conceptual shift of Foucault’s that is working itself out 
through the text. The analysis of modes of conformity to rules of moral conduct began for him 
with his work on disciplinary practices, and their relation to self-coercive forms of internalisation 
of rules. In such a context “mode of subjection” was highly pertinent, but it is much less so in this 
more variegated realm of relations to the self. What was required was a concept that was broad 
enough to incorporate both the simpler, objectified forms of relation to the self, where the 
individual subject more or less absorbs the prevailing moral norms as inevitable; and, at the other 
end of the spectrum, a fully conscious relation to the self where the subject chooses to conform or 
not to conform to the rules, and also chooses the form of work on the self required to develop the 
kind of self that the subject wishes to be.  
  
The term Foucault will invent for this purpose is “subjectivation” (sujetivation), which occurs, 
possibly for the first time, two pages on in the Introduction. (UP, 30)24. “Subjectivation” includes 
all four of the aspects that he has so carefully separated here, and in fact, once this new concept 
has become consolidated within his work, Foucault will no longer need to break it down into its 
component parts. But for the moment, this breakdown is presented as an analysis of the component 
parts of “ethics”, from which the new concept will be constructed. It is possible that utilising 
                                                 
24 UP, 30. Given that this text was published posthumously, and Foucault used the term in articles and interviews in 
his last years, it is impossible to clarify when he first used the term. Nonetheless, the process of conceptual elaboration 
leading from assujettissement to sujectivation is evident here. 
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“mode of subjection” in the weak sense of mere acknowledgement of obligation, as Foucault does 
here – as distinct from “mode” in the strong sense of the way in which one actually works on 
oneself in order to make that obligation one’s practice – may be just a theoretical strategy on 
Foucault’s part, serving the analytical purpose of demonstrating precisely the inseparability of 
moral attitudes and the correlative “ethical work” that constitutes the third element of this model. 
Though one gets the impression this was a discovery made in the course of this “exercise in 
thought”. Ethical work (the third element in his model) is, he says, what “one performs on oneself, 
not only in order to bring one’s conduct into compliance with a given rule [mode of subjection], 
but to attempt to transform oneself into the ethical subject of one’s behaviour”. In other words, the 
ethical work is the means by which both the second element, the mode of subjection, and the 
fourth and last element of this theoretical model, the telos of the type of self one wants to be, are 
achieved.  
 
Using the same example of conjugal fidelity, Foucault exemplifies ethical work thus:  
 
sexual austerity can be practiced through a long effort of learning, memorizing, and assimilation of a systematic 
ensemble of precepts, and through a regular checking of conduct aimed at measuring the exactness with which 
one is applying these rules. It can be practiced in the form of a sudden, all-embracing, and definitive 
renunciation of pleasures; it can also be practiced in the form of a relentless combat, whose vicissitudes – 
including momentary setbacks – can have meaning and value in themselves, and it can be practiced through a 
decipherment, as painstaking, continuous, and detailed as possible, of the movements of desire in all its hidden 
forms, including the most obscure. (Ibid., 27) 
 
Now this seems to be a very odd collection of “practices”. Decodified from the Foucauldian, it 
appears to refer to, respectively, the Stoics, Christian conversion, Christian (including Kantian-
pietist) self-repression, and psychoanalysis. The second of these is not a practice at all. Instead it 
refers to an event which is not named here; because what, other than a dramatic event, could 
provoke such a “sudden, all-embracing and definitive renunciation of pleasures”. The event, 
clearly that of Christian conversion which he describes in this way elsewhere in this text,25 is one 
which inaugurates a series of practices designed to achieve sexual austerity, notably the 
“relentless combat” with the self (with desire) which he places third on this list. The fourth 
practice listed is what he has called the “hermeneutics of desire”, begun in the early Christian 
monasteries, and reborn, as it were, in psychoanalysis. The categories are designed to draw these 
practices in line with more recent historical epochs, and to draw out the contrast between these 
practices and the “ancient” practice he lists first. The latter does not readily suggest itself as a 
                                                 
25 See also: Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. 
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means of achieving sexual austerity with much likelihood of success. The reference here to 
techniques of memorizing useful precepts, and “measuring the exactness with which one is 
applying these rules” to one’s life, is clearly a description of certain techniques of the self used in 
Antiquity, and yet, in its selectivity (masking the notion of the internal relation of intellect and 
desire), it gives a very strange, aseptic and possibly distorted impression of what work on the self 
might have actually meant for the Greeks and Romans. The reason for Foucault’s choice of 
presenting this particular “ancient” technique of the self in this way may have to do with his 
insistence on the intellectual nature of ancient techniques of the self in general, in order to draw 
out the contrast with the specifically psychological nature of the confessional techniques of 
Christianity, and the disciplinary descendents of these confessional techniques in forms of clinical 
psychological practice.  
 
As his work progresses, the pressure to define techniques of the self as either intellectual or 
psychological is constantly evident. This appears to mirror on another plane the mind-body 
dualism that still predominates in various ways in contemporary thinking in the West, and seems 
to be retained as an epistemic underpinning in his own work that is never fully thematized. And 
this despite the fact that there is no intellectual/psychological dichotomy in Stoicism, as he himself 
shows, though he constantly, as we will see, casts his description of their various disciplinary 
practices in an intellectualist light. Foucault never fully shook off the tendency to see techniques 
of the self that work directly on the psyche as self-judgemental; though there were in fact many 
such techniques in the ancient world, which he chooses not to problematize as “psychological”. 
This may leave us with the faintly disturbing impression that the Greeks were not given to 
investigating their own negative emotions, whereas this was clearly an important technique for 
them, and one which did not preclude a judicious use of self-blame; though this, of course, did not 
imply confirmation that one was bad to the bone; there was no “original sin”. Ironically self-blame 
is precluded as a technique of psychoanalysis, which has often much more to do with non-
judgemental healing than with the normalization, based on negative self-judgement, of the 
psychiatric institutions of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, with which Foucault was 
so familiar. 
The fourth element, the telos, has to do with the fact that, Foucault says, a “moral action tends 
towards its own accomplishment; but it also aims beyond the latter, to the establishing of a moral 
conduct that commits an individual, not only to other actions always in conformity with values and 
rules, but to a certain mode of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject.”(Ibid., 
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28) Here Foucault lists moral objectives (still with reference to the example of conjugal fidelity) 
which correspond to, and inform the work on the self, situating the specific practice in the broader 
context of moral finality. These finalities include self-mastery, tranquillity of the soul, and 
purification leading to salvation; but here again the telos corresponding to the event of Christian 
conversion is awkwardly put: “it can be a moral conduct that manifests a sudden and radical 
detachment vis-à-vis the world”. Here Foucault is conflating the symbolic image of conversion – 
Saul of Tarsus becomes St. Paul in a great flash of light – with the non-sudden practice of 
achieving a moral conduct of detachment from this-worldly passions, in the interests of personal 
salvation. Clearly conjugal fidelity is a moral conduct that can result from such a sudden event, 
‘manifesting’ it in the weak sense of being a visible sign of such a change, as with other aspects of 
the convert’s life. The telos here is salvation, and conjugal fidelity more a means to that end than a 
manifestation (in the strong sense of necessary correlate) of conversion. 
 
In “On the Genealogy of Ethics”, Foucault says of these four aspects that: “The first aspect 
answers the question: Which is the part of myself or my behaviour which is concerned with moral 
conduct? For instance you can say that in our society the main field of morality, the part of 
ourselves which is most relevant for morality is feelings. (You can have a girl in the street or 
anywhere, if you have very good feelings towards your wife.) Well, it’s quite clear that from the 
Kantian point of view, intention is much more important than feelings. And from the Christian 
point of view it was desire”. (OGE, 263) The question of “feeling” as the ethical marker of our 
society was something Foucault never thematized, though he sometimes used the informality of 
the interview situation to throw out a remark, as in this case, like this rather cynical one about 
twentieth century marriage, to indicate things he suspected, but – not having investigated them – 
he was as yet not prepared to argue for. Nonetheless, the observation that “moral feelings”, such as 
compassion, are important in modernity, whereas they were unimportant, even contrary to 
morality for Kant and for many of the Greek schools, is a potentially fertile one; but as “ethical 
substance” are they to count as moral agent or what moral agency must work with? “Desire” is 
clearly not the moral agent in Christianity, whereas intention is more usually agent than 
“substance” in Kant; so the category would seem to be more an experimental than a consolidated 
one. In the same text he goes on to say: “For the Greeks, the ethical substance was acts linked to 
pleasure and desire in their unity. And it is very different from flesh, Christian flesh. Sexuality is a 
third kind of ethic.” (Ibid., 263-64) This later version of “ethical substance” is more cohesive, 
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there is no confusion with moral agency, but as it stands it is only a partial description of what he 
defined as the prime material of […] moral conduct. 
 
I point out these awkward moments in Foucault’s passage from one way of thinking to another not 
as criticism – he was himself the first to recognize that we all succumb to our own best ideas and 
want reality to draw itself in line with them – but as evidence of the way in which he would 
experiment with theoretical models, working them out as he went along, and then, without turning 
back to correct them, recognize their theoretical unproductiveness, and let them fall by the 
wayside. Much later, he would declare that what he had said on earlier occasions was mistaken, 
which was sometimes false modesty, but he usually meant it.26 This particular theoretical model 
was used in the Introduction to Uses of Pleasure, and in the essay/interview On the Genealogy of 
Ethics, and then it disappears, leaving in its wake the much more theoretically productive concept 
of subjectivation. As he says, “all moral action involves a relationship with the reality in which it 
is carried out, and a relationship with the self” (UP, 28); and “subjectivation” is the concept that 
will allow him to build the bridge between historical conditions (the reality in which it is carried 
out) and individual variation in relations with the self, that he had been attempting to construct 
through the breakdown of aspects of ethics given above. 
 
 
3. Moral code and moral practice 
 
Since every morality includes both codes of behaviour and forms of subjectivation, an outside and 
an inside of human moral being, as it were, - one way of describing variation in moralities, in its 
historical and its interpersonal forms, is in terms of the emphasis placed on one or the other of 
these two elements. “[I]n certain moralities, the main emphasis is placed on the code, on its 
systematicity, its richness, its capacity to adjust to every possible case and to embrace every area 
of behaviour.” (UP, 29) The symbol, the prevailing image of such moralities is that of law, and 
law serves to determine, unequivocally, right and wrong, guilt and innocence. Musil illustrates this 
conception beautifully through the case of the sex-murderer Moosbrugger in The Man Without 
                                                 
26 With regard to The History of Sexuality, Foucault remarked: “One of the numerous points where I was wrong in that 
book was what I said about this ars erotica. I should have opposed our science of sex to a contrasting practice in our 
own culture. The Greeks and Romans did not have any ars erotica to be compared with the Chinese ars erotica (or at 
least it was not something important in their culture). They had a tekhnè tou biou in which the economy of pleasure 
played a very large role. In this ‘art of life’, the notion of exercising a perfect mastery over oneself soon became the 
main issue. And the Christian hermeneutics of the self constituted a new elaboration of this tekhnè”, (OGE, 259) 
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Qualities. In commenting on those people left in that grey area described by the law and forensic 
medicine as cases of “diminished responsibility”; he writes:  
 
Nature has a peculiar preference for producing such people in droves. Natura non fecit saltus, she makes no 
jumps but prefers gradual transitions; even on the grand scale she keeps the world in a transitional state 
between imbecility and sanity. But the law takes no notice of this. It says: Non datur tertium sive medium inter 
duo contradictoria, or in plain language, a person is either capable or not capable of breaking the law; between 
two contraries there is no third or middle state […] Of course, there was not a single person in that vast 
crowded courtroom, the doctors included, who was not convinced that Moosbrugger was insane, one way or 
another; but it was not in a way that corresponded to the conditions of insanity laid down by the law, so the 
insanity could not be acknowledged by conscientious minds. For if one is partly insane, one is also, juridically, 
partly sane, and if one is partly sane one is at least partly responsible for one’s actions, and if one is partly 
responsible one is wholly responsible; for responsibility is, as they say, that state in which the individual has the 
power to devote himself to a specific purpose of his own free will, independently of any compelling necessity, 
and one cannot simultaneously possess and lack such self-determination.27 
  
Foucault says that with this type of morality, the individual must focus on learning the code, fitting 
observed examples, one’s own and those of others, into the scheme of judgements, so that “in 
these conditions, the subjectivation occurs in a quasi-juridical form, where the ethical subject 
refers his conduct to a law, or set of laws, to which he must submit, at the risk of committing 
offences that will make him liable to punishment.” (UP, 30) And he goes on to say that whilst 
Christian morality (moralities) cannot be reduced to this model “it may not be wrong to think that 
the organization of the penitential system at the beginning of the thirteenth century, and its 
development up to the eve of the Reformation, brought about a very strong ‘juridification’ – more 
precisely a very strong ‘codification’ – of the moral experience.” (Ibid.)  
 
Foucault is a master of taking the philosophical step back from what he is saying (“it may not be 
wrong to think…”, etc.), but in fact he has amply documented this affirmation in other works 
previously mentioned. However, not only does he recognize the historical coexistence of different 
moralities, even of differing Christian moralities within the era in which Europe was the major 
stronghold of “Christendom”, but he has analysed and documented some of the ways in which 
prevailing systems of conduct, and the unwelcome constraints they put on individuals, provoke 
forms of counter-conduct that may contribute significantly to the eventual development of rival 
moral systems. This was one of the objects of his earlier genealogies, but it is important to bear it 
in mind here; also because when Foucault turns his attention to a new problematic, what has gone 
before can be read in a new light, but is never simply passed over. If now he turns to the inner face 
of morality, it is because his exploration of the outer face has brought him to this point. The inner 
                                                 
27 Musil, Robert, The Man Without Qualities, p.262 
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face, and the new territory, is “what might be called a history of ‘ethics’ and ‘ascetics’, understood 
as a history of the forms of moral subjectivation and of the practices of the self that are meant to 
ensure it.” Or, put slightly differently:  
 
a history of the way in which individuals are urged to constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct […] 
concerned with the models proposed for setting up and developing relationships with the self, for self-
reflection, self-knowledge, self-examination, for the decipherment of the self by oneself, for the transformations 
that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object. (Ibid. 29)  
 
The language that he uses here is indicative of the theoretical shift that this important text exhibits. 
From his former perspective of looking at morality from the outside in, as it were, the “mode of 
subjection” obliged, or constrained, or even compelled individuals to “constitute themselves as 
subjects of moral conduct”. Here they are merely urged to do so, which is closer to “invited” than 
it is to “compelled”. And in fact, the examples he gives demonstrate that choice, and not constraint 
at all, motivates some of the forms of self-constitution described. The use of the verb “urged” is 
therefore a clear sign of this transitional moment in Foucault’s thinking. Interesting also is his 
insistence on technical language: “setting up and developing models for the relation of self to 
itself” is a rather instrumental metaphor for this process, designed to confirm what is in effect 
Foucault’s anti-naturalist stance. One of the (unstated) presuppositions underlying his work is that 
much of what we are is artefact, that we construct ourselves in relation to our cultures. Foucault 
does not spell this out however precisely because he is not interested in refuting or appraising the 
part that nature plays in our being; it is not his purpose to adopt a strictly ‘constructivist’ position 
as some kind of closure on a nature-culture argument that will be forever open; all he wants to do 
is to define his own area of interest, which is in looking at how we construct ourselves, leaving to 
others, with other passions, the question of just how much nature constrains culture in human 
being. When he was asked, for example, about “the distinction between innate predisposition to 
homosexual behavior and social conditioning”, Foucault replied: “No comment. […] I just don’t 
believe in talking about things that go beyond my expertise. It’s not my problem, and I don’t like 
talking about things that are not really the object of my work. On this question I have only an 
opinion; since it is only an opinion, it is without interest.” (SCSA, 142) The metaphor of 
‘technique’ is also useful to him in that it throws light on the experimental nature of many of the 
practices of the self that he describes, almost as a laboratory of the self. Practices of putting 
oneself into carefully “set up”, out of the ordinary situations, and then closely observing how the 
self relates to the non-ordinary.  
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Foucault suggests that in the case of moralities “in which the strong and dynamic element is to be 
sought in the forms of subjectivation […] the system of codes and rules may be rather 
rudimentary. Their exact observance may be relatively unimportant, at least compared with what is 
required of the individual in the relationship he has with himself, in his different actions, thoughts, 
and feelings as he endeavours to form himself as an ethical subject.” (UP, 30, my emphasis) 
Foucault seems to be suggesting here some kind of probable historical correlate between weakness 
of codified morality and strength of subjective ethical practices; but – whereas he shows this to be 
true in the case he is about to explore, that of antiquity, where formalised law was a much simpler 
affair than it is today – the schema does not work in other historical circumstances, particularly the 
more recent – Romanticism, American transcendentalism, New Age moralities, to name but a few  
– all of which involve different, but nonetheless intense forms of moral subjectivation, formed in 
(and in opposition to) historical periods characterised by very strong bodies of law. What the 
Romantic and the contemporary “alternative” moralities have in common with Ancient ethics, 
besides certain kinds of practices of the self, is their social status as the prerogative of an educated 
(as opposed to socio-economic) “elite”. “Elite” in inverted commas, because many of the practices 
require a certain level of education, and this may correspond, as it did in Greece and Rome, to a 
privileged social caste, but not necessarily.  
 
In both ancient and modern cases, and Foucault wanted very much to contribute to the 
development of new ways of being, new forms of moral subjectivity, the particular slant given to 
the notion of “how to live”, of a life worth living, is that of heightened awareness and of individual 
self-determination; both seen as requiring a commitment in time and energy to practices that may 
be of little interest to most people. Especially as simplicity in life-style, and moderation, or at least 
the application of specific criteria, in the consumption of food, drink, and material goods (with 
considerable variation as regards sexual practices), often figure highly among the fundamental 
practices of the self in these traditions. Foucault himself lived a fairly monastic life, of extreme 
discipline, with occasional excursions into a world of pleasures, preferably equally extreme. The 
extreme was of great interest to him, extreme discipline and extreme spontaneity, 
extreme work and extreme play, and the kind of courage necessary to live by one’s own lights, at 
the price of being ghettoized on the margins of “society”. 
But whether moderation or excess is one’s instrument or goal, and whether the top or the bottom 
of the social ladder is one’s location, the resulting “elite” of practitioners is formed by personal 
inclination and consequent self-selection, not on the “elitist” basis of exclusion or of social 
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position. By virtue of the fact that an ethics based in practices of the self is one that makes sense 
only if it is chosen, not imposed, it will always be an ethics that exists alongside codified 
moralities; but as a place from which new perspectives on those codified moralities can be 
developed, and contributions to changing them be made. 
 
 
4. The hermeneutics of desire 
 
Much of Foucault’s theory on historically different forms of ethical practice was formulated in the 
course of his readings of ancient texts, juxtaposing Greek, Roman and Christian 
conceptualizations of related themes, and concentrating particularly on the Stoics. According to 
Hadot both Stoics and Epicureans conceived of wisdom, the goal of philosophical practice, as “a 
way of life which brought peace of mind (ataraxia), inner freedom (autarkeia), and a cosmic 
consciousness.” (PWL, 268)28 In this context, inner freedom means freedom to direct one’s life 
and actions according to reason, freedom from being driven by the passions, and inner peace also 
depends on this; so the techniques of the self through which one could learn to free oneself of the 
passions, particularly those for food, sex, and reputation, were of paramount importance. Foucault 
recognizes a certain historical continuity in the use of such techniques, particularly with regard to 
sex: “It is a fact that the pagan philosophers in the centuries before and after the death of Christ 
proposed a sexual ethics that was very similar to the alleged Christian ethics” (S&S, 179); and yet 
underlying this similarity is a world of difference. 
In The Care of the Self he compares two texts, The Interpretation of Dreams written by 
Artemidorus in the second century C.E., to which Part 1 is dedicated, and St. Augustine’s City of 
God. Artemidorus’ book is a both a “theoretical treatise on the value of interpretive procedures 
…[and] a technique of existence” (CS, 4-5), and as such, also a manual for utilising the 
interpretation of dreams, which may be diagnostic or predictive, in the interests of a healthy and 
good life. Foucault notes that there is no sense whatever here of sexual desire as being intrinsically 
wrong, even in the case of incest, dreaming of sex with a parent or child, for example, may be 
positive, in that it augurs wealth or strength, or negative, in that it augurs weakness. This depends 
mostly, and unabashedly, on who penetrates whom, or who plays the virile and who the passive 
role (he also notes that there appears to be no conception of reciprocal active-passive roles in 
                                                 
28 Hadot says that “By ‘cosmic consciousness,’ we mean the consciousness that we are part of the cosmos, and the 
consequent dilation of our self throughout the infinity of universal nature.” 
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treatises on sexuality in Antiquity). In other words, it is not desire that is intrinsically bad, but an 
unethical use of it. Penetration represents two contradictory aspects of male being, a precious 
manifestation of subjective power, as compared with the lack of subjectivity of the penetrated, as it 
were: women, slaves and boys; and a potentially dangerous drain on resources of energy. 
Therefore one must at all costs avoid being penetrated, and at the same time one must moderate 
one’s practice of penetration. By comparison, Foucault writes: 
 
Augustine’s conception is still dominated by the theme and form of male sexuality. But the main question is 
not, as it was in Artemidorus, the problem of penetration – it is the problem of erection [with regard to the 
involuntariness and ghastly spasms described by Augustine….] 
The principle of autonomous movements of sexual organs is called libido by Augustine. The problem of libido, 
of its strength, origin, and effect, thus becomes the main issue of one’s will. It is not an external obstacle to the 
will [as for the Greeks]; it is a part, an internal component, of the will […] Libido is the result of one’s will 
when it goes beyond the limits God originally set for it. As a consequence, the means of the spiritual struggle 
against libido do not consist, as with Plato, in turning our eyes upward and memorizing the reality we have 
previously known and forgotten; the spiritual struggle consists, on the contrary, in turning our eyes 
continuously downward or inward in order to discover, among the movements of the soul, which ones come 
from the libido. The task is at first indefinite since libido and will can never be substantially disassociated from 
one another. And this task is not only an issue of mastership but also a question of the diagnosis of truth and 
illusion. It requires a permanent hermeneutics of oneself. (S&S, 182)  
 
 
And the principle axis of this hermeneutics of oneself, as this text makes clear, is the 
“hermeneutics of desire”, of which Augustine’s Confessions was a foundational document. “As 
everybody knows” Foucault says “Christianity is a confession.” (Ibid. 178) And this implies an 
obligation of truth-speaking, where truth is construed as both the truth of the book, of biblical 
revelation, and the truth of the self: “Everyone in Christianity has the duty to explore who he is, 
what is happening within himself, the faults he may have committed, the temptations to which he 
is exposed.” And, sadly for the Christian, contaminated with original sin: “The more we discover 
the truth about ourselves, the more we must renounce ourselves; and the more we want to 
renounce ourselves, the more we need to bring to light the reality of ourselves. That is what we 
would call the spiral of truth formulation and reality renouncement which is at the heart of 
Christian techniques of the self.” (Ibid) 
 
Foucault’s analysis of these, and many other ancient and Christian texts, lead him to the 
conclusion that what we are left with, schematically, at the end of the Middle Ages in Europe, is 
a prevailing Christianity in which philosophy as it was known to the Greeks, as a way of life, has 
largely disappeared. From now on, what is known as “Philosophy” will be what was previously 
thought of as philosophical discourse or theory, an empty thing for the Greeks, if it were to be 
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removed from the context of the philosophical way of life that had produced it, and that it 
served.  
Those parts of this “philosophy”, which could now be put to serve another discourse, that of 
theology, were retained and, over time, reinterpreted accordingly; and some of the spiritual 
exercises which had constituted philosophical practice in antiquity were absorbed, in mutated 
form, in monastic practices.  
The practice of self-examination in particular became more a form of self-inquisition. One 
begins to examine oneself with the assumption that one is in a state of sin; the question is thus 
that of identifying the sin, through a hermeneutics of desire (always considered a good place to 
start), and a more general attempt to catch oneself out in self-deception of various kinds. The 
great reforms of Protestantism in the sixteenth century, which introduced a more direct 
relationship with God, unmediated by the clergy or by religious authorities, did much to free 
Christendom from the political domination of the “Universal” Church, and to replace “blind 
obedience” with “rational obedience”, but on the plane of the inner relationship of the self to 
itself, they often served only to strengthen this self-inquisition; reinforcing the need to search for 
the motivation behind the act, even behind the imagined act, or the not-even imagined act.  The 
barely perceived desire to commit a sin now becoming the sin itself, a sin of thought, behind and 
responsible for the sin of deed, committed, or not. 
For Foucault, therefore, it was through the form of subjectivation practised by Christianity, 
particularly when Protestantism generalized and intensified this practice as primarily an internal 
form of confession, between self and self, or between self and God within the self, that one’s 
psychological interiority became a possible object of knowledge, and thus a constituent object of 
the psychological disciplines. Having identified ‘confession’ as the practice behind the concept of 
psychological interiority, it became something of a leitmotiv for Foucault. To be hunted out in 
various forms in diverse institutional practices – of law, of the family, of the school etc. In Volume 
1 of The History of Sexuality, he says we have 
  
become a singularly confessing society. The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in 
justice, medicine, education, family relationships, and love relations, in the most ordinary affairs of everyday 
life, and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one’s crimes, one’s sins, one’s thoughts and desires, one’s 
illnesses and troubles; one goes about telling, with the greatest precision, whatever is most difficult to tell. One 
confesses in public and in private, to one’s parents, one’s educators, one’s doctor, to those one loves; one 
admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain, things it would be impossible to tell to anyone else, the things people 
write books about. One confesses – or is forced to confess. (WK, 59)  
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This flight of rhetoric follows, as sometimes happens, upon one of Foucault’s great insights; but 
his insight into the genealogy of confessing is here, as elsewhere, overplayed. ‘Confessing’ 
necessarily ‘plays a part’ in justice and medicine, and in family relationships, love relationships 
and education, varying in relation to the punitive and coercive powers of the society concerned. 
But it is as if Foucault is setting up a kind of “confessive hypothesis” here; in opposition to the 
“repressive hypothesis”, a theory that he had defined and ardently criticized in this book. The 
“repressive hypothesis” is Foucault’s catchphrase for his summing up of the consensus position of 
many disciplinary discourses, and much contemporary public opinion, to the effect that, in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries “On the subject of sex, silence became the rule.” (Ibid., 3) The 
confinement of legitimate sex to the marital bedroom, the negation of infant sexuality, the silence, 
were all “characteristic features attributed to repression, which serve to distinguish it from 
prohibitions maintained by penal law: repression operated as a sentence to disappear, but also as 
an injunction to silence, an affirmation of non-existence, and by implication, an admission that 
there was nothing to say about such things, nothing to see and nothing to know.” (Ibid. 4) Against 
this hypothesis, Foucault argues that 
 
since the end of the sixteenth century, the ‘putting into discourse of sex’, far from undergoing a process of 
restriction, on the contrary has been subjected to a mechanism of increasing incitement; that the techniques of 
power exercised over sex have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but rather one of dissemination and 
implantation of polymorphous sexualities; and that the will to knowledge has not come to a halt in the face of a 
taboo that must not be lifted, but has persisted in constituting – despite many mistakes, of course – a science of 
sexuality. (Ibid. 12-13)  
 
It is not, as this passage might suggest, but other texts would deny, that Foucault holds lightly the 
problem of the hard realities of sexual repression in modern times. It is rather that his sense of the 
power of opinions that have become commonplaces obliged him to attack those conventional 
views forcefully, and if that meant using exaggeration as a writing technique, so be it. In 
discussing the sixteenth and seventeenth century roots of this genealogy in his 1975 Course, 
Abnormal, he writes: The power exercised in spiritual direction does not therefore prescribe 
silence and not-saying as a fundamental rule; it posits it simply as the necessary auxiliary or 
condition of functioning of the wholly positive rule of enunciation. (A, 203) This more or less 
encapsulates what we are calling his “confessive hypothesis”. However, a few lines before he had 
written: 
 
Actually, we have a complex element in which silence, the rule of science or of not-saying, is correlative to another 
mechanism that is a mechanism of enunciation: You must say everything, but you must do so under certain 
conditions, within a particular ritual, and to a particular person. (Ibid., 202) 
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This is clearly a version that negates the repressive hypothesis without attempting to establish the 
contrary. Foucault often veers between highly cautious scholarly prose and the provocative grand 
statement, reserving his more florid prose for the latter. As, for example, when he couples the 
notion of confession with that of torture (“Since the Middle Ages, torture has accompanied it like a 
shadow, and supported it when it could go no further: the dark twins”. (Ibid. 59) ). On the surface 
this seems to be just a gothic flourish in his writing, but beneath the notion that torture is never far 
from confession, like a “dark shadow”, lies all Foucault’s hostility to practices of self-
examination. Clearly torture in historical reality often followed from a failure of confession, as an 
attempt to force it; but the practice of “confession”, a notion that Foucault recasts as a form of self-
inquisition that stands as the model for the hermeneutics of desire, is not only and in all 
circumstances this. In many non-inquisitional cases, it may involve a serious attempt at honesty, at 
truth to the self, whatever the conceptual constraints informing the particular variant of the 
practice may be. Foucault never pretends to historical thoroughness, which in any case he holds to 
be impossible, because what he is doing is the history of thought, which, in tracing a genealogy of 
ideas, does not, and rightly, pretend to deal with “contradictory” cases. Nonetheless he is 
conflating two of his own categories here, in that he describes confession as a practice of 
subjectivation, whereas torture is external coercion. The fact that they may have often gone 
together historically, represents a contingent, not a necessary connection, but he seems to be 
implying instead that there might be some kind of necessary connection, that confession actually is 
a form of self-torture. This being said, Foucault’s insight into the “repressive hypothesis”, and its 
function as part of the contemporary episteme, were crucial to the systematic deconstruction of 
that episteme that his work has achieved. The delineation of this central mode of subjection of the 
medieval subject, and the tracing of the genealogical descendents of that mode through their 
various historical ramifications down to the present, was an enormous achievement. The historical 
analysis of the hermeneutics of desire proceeds with the observation that “The Middle Ages had 
organized around the theme of the flesh and the practice of penance a discourse that was markedly 
unitary. In the course of recent centuries, this relative unity was broken apart, scattered, and 
multiplied in an explosion of distinct discursivities which took form in demography, biology, 
medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy, and political criticism.” (Ibid. 33-34) In order 
to demonstrate the common genealogical root of these separate discourses Foucault put together a 
vast and varied collection of literary and scientific texts in support of his argument. With regard to 
some of the more colourful of these juxtapositions, Joel Whitebook points out that Foucault’s 
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connecting, for example, Victorian pornography with “the arcane tomes of Kraft-Ebbing and the 
clinical interviews of psychiatrists and social workers, in order to argue that there was ‘a veritable 
discursive explosion’ which overstimulated the population and created a hypersexualised society. 
This sounds more like Rio de Janeiro than Manchester, England in the nineteenth century”. (AI,  
333) 
 
 
5. Homo psychologicus 
 
Ours is the only civilisation, Foucault says, to have produced an entire scientia sexualis and of 
course, the highest point of development of this sexual science was Freud and psychoanalysis. 
According to Whitebook, Foucault held that the psychological sciences were responsible for 
inventing “homo psychologicus - that is, a split subject with an inner world – as their object”. (AI, 
314) 
Foucault felt a particular solidarity for the “abnormals” and the marginalized of all times and 
places, and clearly, from the point of view of relations of power, psychological knowledge had the 
double function of external instrument of surveillance and control of the “patient”, and of 
rendering the patient a controller of herself through the interiorization of an image of self that was 
constructed on the basis of whatever “normality” was considered to consist in at the time. Thus, in 
the contemporary situation, “bourgeois normality […] is equated with psychic health.” The 
psychologist’s gaze was thus another form of panopticon, the image that Foucault took from 
Bentham and used as a symbol of disciplinary power. Just as the Christian hermeneutics of desire 
had sexuality as its ostensible object, but in reality operated on the wider field of subjectivity, so 
psychology placed one’s sexual subjectivity at the centre of one’s understanding of oneself. 
Foucault saw psychiatry and psychoanalysis as being among the major instruments of knowledge-
power; serving the purpose of “normalization”, of getting troubled individuals to interiorize 
external constraints. Of his antagonism to psychoanalysis in particular, Whitebook writes:  
 
 
Foucault’s objection to the inwardly directed gaze rests on the unstated assumption that self-observation is, by 
its very nature, violent. Because le regard is considered intrinsically malevolent, there is no possibility of a 
non-objectionable split between an observing and an observed part of the self and a form of benign self-
exploration (Ibid., 320)  
 
Nonetheless, when the hermeneutics of desire itself led him to a greater need to analyse what goes 
under the name of “the subject”, and he turned his attention to what he describes as the slow 
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formation, in antiquity, of a hermeneutics of the self, what he found himself confronted with was 
precisely forms of benign self-exploration, in many of the techniques of the self. 
The road to self-knowledge was seen in antiquity as strewn with obstacles that were both 
intellectual and psychological, though, as will become evident, Foucault tended to spend more 
analytical time on the intellectual aspects of ancient techniques of self-knowledge than the more 
explicitly psychological ones. 
Whitebook also observes that there is an unresolved tension in Foucault’s work between, on the 
one hand, a celebration of madness, usually in the form of mad genius: de Sade, Van Gogh, 
Nietzsche, Artaud, capable of making even bourgeois normality question itself; and on the other, 
the notion of a “dialogue with unreason”. On the one side this would “undo the exclusion and 
stigmatization madness has suffered in modernity. On the other, reason would become richer, 
broader, and suppler by reintegrating the madness it had split off and disavowed.” (Ibid. 321) 
There is a similar tension in his attitude to Freud, on the one hand seeing psychoanalysis as a more 
sophisticated practice of normalization, on the other recognizing that Freud opened up the 
possibility of a dialogue with unreason, in that “Freud went back to madness at the level of its 
language, reconstituted one of the essential elements of an experience reduced to silence by 
positivism.”29 But the potentially interesting theme of the dialogue with unreason was one that 
Foucault dropped early on. This is unfortunate in that psychoanalysis could perhaps have provided 
him with an important contemporary example of a sustained practice of self-knowledge and self-
transformation, whatever else it is, in a world where there are not many such examples available. 
Whitebook points out that “What Foucault disregards when he tries to consign Freud to the 
tradition of medical psychiatry […] is that analysts aren’t primarily concerned with the question of 
diagnosis, but of analyzability – or workability, as many analysts would put it today. In fact, many 
analysts agree with Foucault’s criticisms. Is a prospective patient capable of meeting the arduous 
and knotty demands [… of the encounter with the dark side of the self]: can she or he be an 
interlocutor in the analytic dialogue with unreason, working to understand archaic mentation and 
affective states and putting them into words?” (AI, 327)  
“Mentation” refers to the processes by which we learn to think, the formation of our mental 
activity, archaic mentation to the affective/intellectual processes in the earliest years of life, which 
psychoanalytic practice is designed to help the analysand return to. This is obviously a field of 
enquiry that is not Foucault’s and, eclectic as he was, he could not have done everything; nor is 
there any suggestion that he should have tried. This being said, however, along with his hostility to 
                                                 
29 Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, cited in Whitebook, op.cit, p.322 
 57 
psychoanalysis, he tended to exclude from consideration the emotional aspects of how thought is 
constructed, in concentrating on the intellect-practice relation. Any serious consideration of a 
dialogue with unreason could not have excluded this dimension. 
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Ch.3. Body and Soul 
 
1. The spirit and the flesh 
 
THE VOICE OF THE DEVIL.30 
  
All Bibles or sacred codes have been the causes of the following Errors: 
 
1. That Man has two real existing principles: Viz: a Body and a Soul. 
2. That Energy, call’d Evil, is alone from the Body; & that Reason, call’d Good, is alone from the Soul. 
3. That God will torment Man in Eternity for following his Energies. 
But the following Contraries to these are True: 
1. Man has no Body distinct from his Soul; for that call’d Body is a portion of Soul discern’d by the five Senses, 
the chief inlets of Soul in this age. 
2. Energy is the only life, and is from the Body; and Reason is the bound or outward circumference of Energy. 
3. Energy is Eternal Delight. 
 
William Blake’s three “Errors” summarize the conception of the antagonistic relationship between 
body and soul of much Christian theology, and the specific reference here was to the eighteenth 
century Protestantism that was his own personal source of suffering. Blake himself was a bold 
eighteenth century practitioner of religious, (hetero)sexual, and political counter-conduct, as such 
writing would suggest, for which he was much punished at home in Britain and also, as many 
given to principled individual positions were, in exile in revolutionary France. 
As to the Catholics of the same epoch, or slightly earlier, Foucault, in referring to Habert’s 
instruction manual for confessors, of 1748, writes: “For him, concupiscence begins with an 
emotion in the body that is a purely mechanical emotion produced by Satan. This bodily emotion 
causes what he calls a ‘sensual enticement.’ ”31 The notion of the body as a troublesome piece of 
organic machinery, capable of driving us if we fail to drive it, makes of the body something that is 
not to do with who we really are, but merely with what, morally, we have to contend with. This 
objectification, through which to read oneself, is central to the relationship of the self to itself in 
Christianity, but as Foucault has demonstrated, it remains central to much modern scientific 
discourse, even though this was developed in direct, often hostile, opposition to Christian belief. 
                                                 
30 Blake, William, The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, in Poetry and Prose, The Nonesuch Library, London, 1956, 
p.182 (first published 1793). 
31 Habert, L., Pratique du sacrament de penitence ou méthode pour l’administrer utilement, Paris, 1748, cited in 
Foucault, Abnormal, Verso, Lon.-New York,2003, p.190 
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What changes radically in more contemporary discourses is that Satan goes out, and anonymous 
biological forces come in. 
Between Christian moral contempt for the body, and a scientific moral neutrality that nonetheless 
reinforces the notion of the power organic forces exercise over the mind, there flourished a phase 
of eighteenth-century romanticism, illustrated here by Blake’s euphoric “Contraries” to the Errors 
of religion, in which the values of body (energy) and reason were equilibrated or, as here in Blake, 
reversed. This romanticism reflects a more unitary, almost Hellenistic conception of body and 
soul; though not of course the Greek and Roman preference for ‘reason’ as the locus of 
subjectivity. Instead the prevailing Christian conception of the ways in which the material body 
and the non-material soul are interwoven were by common accord of Platonic inspiration, but 
while it is true that the body was the prison of the soul for Plato, as Foucault reminds us, still the 
energy of Eros is God-given, and the form of Beauty, perceived in a beautiful human body, can 
open the eyes to the Good, as we will see with both Murdoch and Nussbaum. Certainly the desire 
of the lover for the beloved must be purified, but not crushed out of existence. 
  
Instead for the Greeks, and also for the Romans writing in Greek, as Nussbaum notes with regard 
to her use of the word “soul” to translate the Greek psuchè, the term “does not imply any particular 
metaphysical theory of the personality. It stands, simply, for all the life-activities of the creature, 
and in the case of Hellenistic contrasts between body and psuchè, it is especially important to 
insist that no denial of physicalism need be involved, since both Epicureans and Stoics are 
physicalists. The contrast is simply between the material constituents of the organism and its life-
activities, its states of awareness, and so forth.” (TD, 13n) Of course, the philosophical schools 
analyse “the life-activities” of humans in different ways, and have their own definitions of the 
metaphysical characteristics of “soul,” but with regard to the Hellenists, Nussbaum’s clarification 
here would seem to stand as the lowest common denominator within these definitions.  
Hadot remarks “that we must bear in mind that the word “soul” could have two meanings for the 
Stoics. In the first place, it was a reality made of air (pneuma) which animates our body and 
receives the impressions, or phantasiai, from exterior objects. … [and in the second it refers to] 
that superior or guiding part of the soul that the Stoics call hegemonikon.” (IC, 106) Both these 
two meanings refer to the “life-activities, states of awareness and so forth” of the human being, but 
when it is necessary to focus on the more physical, or the more intellectual or spiritual aspects, the 
more specific terms are employed. The former meaning has the soul as the activating principle, the 
dynamic transforming receptivity into activity, and its connotations are therefore qualified by 
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terms denoting both the physical (pneuma) and the mental (phantasiai) processes by which human 
beings take in, elaborate, and put back out, as it were. The latter refers to the more refined activity 
of reflection (dianoia), governed by the guiding principle (hegemonikon), but, as Hadot also notes: 
“there is no opposition, as the Platonists had held, between one part of the soul which is rational 
and good in and of itself, and another part which is irrational and bad. Rather it is reason – and the 
ego itself – which becomes either good or bad, as a function of the judgements which it forms 
about things.” (IC, 108-09) This is a vision of a dynamic soul that is situated in (or through), and 
not separable from, a specific body-and-mind with specific experiences, and a specific mode of 
elaboration of those experiences, through which the self forms itself.  
Plato on the other hand was of course no physicalist, but even in his conception of the soul seeking 
its return to its original transcendent form, and escaping the prison of the body, as in the Phaedo, 
nonetheless, while still trapped in its immanent form in this life, body and soul formed a cyclic 
unity. In examining Plato’s view of the self that one must know, and that one must take care of, 
Foucault asks: “What then is this heauton[self], or rather what is referred to by this heauton? I will 
go immediately to the answer. The answer, as you know, is given a hundred times in Plato’s 
dialogues: ‘psukhés epimeléteon’ (one must take care of one’s soul)”. (HS, 53) The self, he says, is 
therefore the soul, indicating a very different, though not contradictory, use of the term “soul” to 
that connoting the immortal entity trapped in the body. Foucault then analyzes this latter 
conception of soul as it is elaborated through dialogue in the Alcibiades thus:  
 
What does it mean when we say: ‘Socrates speaks to Alcibiades’? The answer given is: ‘we mean that Socrates 
makes use of language.’ This very simple example is at the same time very revealing. The question posed is the 
question of the subject […] that is to say, what subject do we presuppose when we evoke this activity of 
speech, which is the speech activity of Socrates towards Alcibiades? Consequently it involves drawing the 
dividing line within a spoken action that will make it possible to isolate and distinguish the subject of the action 
from the set of elements (words, sounds, etc) that constitute the action itself and enable it to be carried out. In 
short, it involves revealing the subject in its irreducibility. (HS, 54-55) 
  
Foucault then reconstructs from the text this long argument about the soul using tools, and using 
the body as a tool, and asks: “Can we say that man, understood as a combination of soul and body, 
uses the body? Certainly not. Because the body, even as a simple part, even supposing it to be 
alongside the soul, as auxiliary, cannot be what uses the body. What, then, is the only element that 
uses the body, its parts and organs, and which consequently uses tools and finally language? It is 
and can only be the soul.” (HS, 55) But Foucault sets this argument up not, as it might seem, in 
order to consider the claim that the soul is a separate substance (an aspect of Plato’s work which 
does not interest him, nor does he bother to demonstrate its weaknesses), but rather to focus on 
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what does interest him here, which is this: “you will see that the soul we have arrived at through 
this bizarre reasoning around “uses” has nothing to do with, for example, the soul which, as a 
prisoner of the body, must be set free in the Phaedo; it has nothing to do with the soul as a pair of 
winged horses which must be led in the right direction, as in the Phaedrus; and it is not the soul 
structured in a hierarchy of levels which must be harmonized, as in the Republic.” (HS, 55-56) The 
rigid separation of soul and body in the Alcibiades turns out rather to be connected with the Greek 
word khréstai, translated here as ‘use.’ Foucault notes that it has many meanings, and in particular, 
in this dialogue from the text: 
 
 [in] the expression ephitumiais krésthai, the meaning is not ‘to use one’s passions for something’ but quite 
simply ‘to give way to one’s passions.’[…] So you see when Plato (or Socrates) employs this notion of krésthai 
[…] in order to identify what this heauton is […] in the expression ‘taking care of oneself,’ in actual fact he 
does not want to designate an instrumental relationship of the soul to the rest of the world or to the body, but 
rather the subject’s singular, transcendent position, as it were, with regard to what surrounds him, to the objects 
available to him, but also to other people with whom he has a relationship, to his body itself, and finally to 
himself. We can say that when Plato employs this notion […] in order to seek the self one must take care of, it 
is not at all the soul-substance he discovers, but rather the soul-subject. (Ibid. 56-57, emphasis mine)   
 
This “bizarre” reasoning of Plato’s, as he puts it, leads Foucault to this radical interpretation (one 
that may bring the wrath of Classicists down upon his head), that although Plato only ever speaks 
of the soul as a substance, and as separable from the body, there is an implied distinction between 
the metaphysical construct of the soul, and the use Plato appears to make of the concept in relation 
to the care of the self. In this latter context, in which the “soul” is described as using the body, like 
the ghost in the machine (as contrasted with the person using whatever bit of itself is required – its 
mind to think, its eyes to see, its hand to work), Foucault says the argument is misleading, but that 
no contradiction appears to prevent the transcendent soul residing in the body from taking the 
temporal form of immanent, and as such, embodied, subject. On this reading, Plato’s soul-
substance, which – as “the self one must take care of” – is also an embodied soul-subject, is thus 
very different from its genealogical descendent in the disembodied Christian soul-substance. 
(Clearly the Christian concept of “soul” also has other antecedents in Judaic, Roman and other 
historical lineages, besides the Platonic). Foucault’s interest in Plato here is however restricted to 
gaining a fairly superficial understanding of how such a major piece as Plato’s “soul” fits into the 
genealogical puzzle of human subjectivity. He dedicated relatively little time to this, given his 
antipathy toward the metaphysics; and he quickly moved on to what was of much greater interest 
to him in this respect, that is, to the Greco-Roman descent from these concepts, and the treatment 
the soul-subject, now recognised as such, received at the hands of the Hellenistic philosophers. 
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2. Cognitive passions 
 
In alignment with their unitary view of body and soul, the Hellenistic philosophers held a similar 
view of emotion (or the passions, often synonymous in the literature32) and reason. They were 
physicalists in that they had no concept of “the person” as detached from the body, or of the 
passions as driving, bodily forces that it was the place of reason (as an autonomous counter-force) 
to curb; the struggle with the passions was internal, not external to reason. From the moment of 
inception of any particular passion (as a reaction of the soul to an external event), and through all 
the stages of its development, bodily sensation and mental representation are interwoven in each 
one, and shape each other reciprocally. Marcus Aurelius describes the process thus: 
 
This is how the passions are born, develop, and become excessive. First of all, there is an involuntary 
movement; a kind of preparation for and threat of passion. Then there is a second one, accompanied by a desire 
which we are still able to reject: to wit, the idea that ‘I have to get even because someone has done me 
wrong…’ Finally there is a third movement which can no longer be mastered […] we must have revenge at all 
costs. The first shock to the soul cannot be avoided with the help of reason, any more than other reflex 
movements which happen to the body, such as yawning […] reason cannot vanquish them, but perhaps habit 
and constant attention may attenuate them. The second movement, which arises from a judgement, can be 
suppressed by a judgement. (Meditations, IV, 43, in IC, p.117) 
 
Note here that what will become a passion, if unattended to, begins with a shock to the soul, which 
is felt in the body as an involuntary movement: no separation. And whilst reason is powerless 
against the inevitable shocks that immersion in life provokes, from that moment on, reason is 
engaged in the formulation – and adjustment and reformulation – of desire; empowering, or 
disempowering, the passions. Nussbaum notes that already in Aristotle emotions are seen as 
having “a rich cognitive structure […] they are not mindless surges of affect”. She  explains that 
for Aristotle it is, for example, not possible to “describe the pain that is peculiar to fear, or say how 
fear differs from grief or pity, without saying that it is pain at the thought of a certain sort of future 
event that is believed to be impending.” And she goes on: “But if the beliefs are an essential part 
of the definition of the emotion, then we have to say that their role is not merely that of external 
necessary condition. They must be seen as constituent parts of the emotion itself.” (TD, 88, 
emphasis in original). In the cases of fear and anger, and also in the case of erotic desire, the 
                                                 
32 The term “emotion”, in its modern sense was not in use in Ancient Greece, therefore one finds the term generally 
translated as “passion” used for emotions that are relatively mild compared to those indicated in contemporary usage. 
Given that today the more generic term is “emotion,” of which “passion” refers to the subset of stronger emotions, I 
will follow Nussbaum’s practice of using whichever seems more appropriate. 
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thoughts formulated with respect to the object of desire or aversion were held to take precedence 
over the corresponding bodily sensations in determining one’s desires and impulses to action.  
After spending several years exploring the lugubrious genealogies of ‘the flesh’, the encounter 
with this linking of desire to the imagination and to reflection, this precedence of the notion of 
‘pleasure’ over blind bodily urges, must have been a pleasure in itself to Foucault. And, running 
counter, as it does, to the biologisation of desire in our contemporary world, and along with it the 
biologisation of human subjectivity; as a piece of conceptual material that could possibly be 
reworked outside of its original metaphysic, it would seem to have liberating potential. At this 
stage, however, what was needed for Foucault was to investigate its ancient genealogy.  
 
Martha Nussbaum, in appreciating the ground-breaking work done by Foucault33 in presenting 
philosophy (Hellenistic, but not only34) as “a set of techniques du soi, practices for the formation 
of a certain sort of self… [and as engaged in] complex practices of self-shaping” (TD, 5); suggests 
that he underplays the fact that “what is distinctive about the contribution of the philosophers is 
that they assert that philosophy, and not anything else, is the art we require, an art that deals in 
valid and sound arguments, an art that is committed to the truth.” Here she is using the definition 
of “philosophy” as what Hadot calls “philosophical discourse”, that is, for Hadot and Foucault, as 
the central area of philosophy, but still one of a series of practices which he calls “spiritual 
exercises”, and Foucault calls “techniques of the self”. Nonetheless the remark is surprising, given 
Foucault’s intellectual preferences and immense work on, and dedication to, philosophical 
discourse itself. One shared interest of these two very different philosophers however, is the notion 
of philosophy as therapy, though here inevitably their divergence in focus increased. In the 
opening sentence of her book, The Therapy of Desire, Nussbaum cites Epicurus, thus: “Epicurus 
wrote, ‘Empty is that philosopher’s argument by which no human suffering is therapeutically 
treated. For just as there is no use in a medical art that does not cast out the sicknesses of the 
bodies, so too there is no use in a philosophy, unless it casts out the suffering of the soul’ 
Epicurus, Us.221” (Ibid., 13) She takes this concern with healing human suffering, expressed here 
by Epicurus but a common theme in Greek and Roman philosophy, as evidence of the emotion of 
compassion, which, she notes, seems paradoxical, given that: “These philosophers do not simply 
analyze the emotions, they also urge, for the most part, their removal from human life.” (p.41) In 
                                                 
33 From a different perspective to that of Hadot, with whom he maintained some dialogue. 
34 See Nussbaum, (TD, 49), “From Homer on we encounter, frequently and prominently, the idea that logos is to 
illnesses of the soul as medical treatment is to illnesses of the body.” 
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this regard, the question that she poses for herself, “of considerable philosophical interest, [is] to 
understand on what grounds compassionate philosophers, committed to the amelioration of human 
life, […] judge that the emotions should be removed from [it].” (Ibid.)  
Foucault’s question was a different one. He was interested in Hellenistic philosophy as a form of 
subjectivation, and not so interested in this contradiction, noted here by Nussbaum, between the 
theoretical rejection of all emotion, and the fact that in reality, both Stoics and Epicureans 
cultivated compassionate behaviour, concerned as they were to console the grieving and to heal 
their own and others’ sufferings; and, in effect, also to teach what could be describes as 
compassionate practice. And yet, in a study of the forms of subjectivation intrinsic to Hellenistic 
philosophy, to Hellenistic work on the self, this does seem to be a strange oversight on Foucault’s 
part. Clearly there are significant problems here of the way in which the relevant concepts function 
within differing philosophical systems. Hadot points out that “it is not the case that the Stoic finds 
his joy in his ‘self’ [arguing against Foucault]; rather as Seneca says [in Letter 23], he finds it ‘in 
the best portion of the self,’ in ‘the true good.’” (PWL, 207) Clearly “joy”, so central an objective 
of Stoic practice, is for us today an “emotion”, though we would not describe it as a “passion”, the 
two terms being distinguished in modernity by the degree of calm or agitation manifested by the 
feeling. Similarly “the true good” is an attitude of concern for humanity which was a major reason 
for Stoic practice, but can it therefore be described as a motivation? “Reasons for” and 
“motivations” are in some language games interchangeable, in others (dualist systems) decidedly 
not so, because the change of concept involves crossing the (theoretically constructed) border 
between thought and emotion. If “the good” translates as “concern” for humanity, then in some 
language games, such as the one Nussbaum is using here, it translates also as “compassion”; in 
others it does not. This vast question can only be briefly noted here, in order to clarify this aspect 
of Foucault’s focus on Hellenistic philosophy, that is, the question of which concepts and practices 
that interested him, and which did not. What Foucault underplays is not, as Nussbaum suggests, 
the importance of argument and the search for truth in the philosophical art of life, but rather the 
way in which this philosophical art of life centred on a form of self-reading that in fact paid great 
attention to the emotions. Whether the purpose was to eradicate or transform them, the essential 
step in Hellenistic philosophy was to understand the emotions as a complex construct of ideas, 
desires and aversions, requiring investigation.  
Foucault instead tends to take the ancients at their word (their many words, it is true) with regard 
to their objective of extirpating the passions, rather than looking at the actual techniques of self-
transformation that they employed, many of which were in fact more concerned – as Hadot (who 
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did look at them), has amply demonstrated in his writings – with modifying, reshaping, the 
emotions, than with eradicating them. His disinterest in the introspection that such practice 
inevitably involves goes beyond a mere question of choice of philosophical argument however; it 
is a selecting out of material that is designed to reinforce an “intellectualist” reading of Hellenistic 
philosophical practice (in line with the prevailing view), but one that does not take into account the 
extent to which Stoic “intellect” contained features that today would be categorised as 
“psychological”. For the same reason, perhaps, Foucault has in effect selected out the 
Epicureans35, as Nussbaum rightly notes, with their much more overtly “psychological” language 
and practice, from his study of the hermeneutics of the ancient subject. This may have to do with 
the lack, in Foucault’s own thinking, of a developed concept of a form of introspection that is not 
necessarily linked to guilt, either by conceptual affinity or in self-shaping practice. When he 
encounters such a concept, it does not escape his notice or his listings, but his sojourn in its 
company tends to be brief. (HS, 390-91) 
 
 
3. Appetites and instincts 
 
To return from the psychological to the biological, or from the passions to the appetites, so to say, 
it is this concept, that of “appetite” (epithumiei) that the Greeks tend to use if they wish to refer to 
the more strictly physiological aspects of desire. Nonetheless desire is not biologised by this 
choice of word. As Nussbaum again points out, even “the bodily appetites – hunger, thirst, sexual 
desire – are seen by Aristotle [and Greek philosophers generally] as forms of intentional 
awareness, containing a view of their object…. Appetite is one form of orexis [desire], a ‘reaching 
out for’ an object,” (TD, 81) that is to say, appetite is merely a subclass of desire, and not the other 
way round. The driving force of animal need was seen by the Stoics (if not Epicureans) as merely 
that material on which the human imagination, and human reason, operate; not as a primary active 
force in itself. 
                                                 
35 Of the 35 references, and 3 footnotes to Epicureans in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 3 serve to contrast, briefly, 
Epicurean friendship with that (more thoroughly explored) of the Stoics, 6 contain comparative references to notions 
of knowledge, and 5 are to do with the pedagogic organization of the schools and the master-pupil relationship, partly 
in connection with Philodemus, the one Epicurean Foucault is interested in because of his work on parrhesia. It is not 
insignificant that parrhesia, as a notion, of frankness and truthful speaking, is concerned with one’s behaviour, not 
with introspection; though it depends on first finding truth in oneself. In the great majority of the remaining 
references, the Epicureans figure only in lists including the Stoics, mostly, and sometimes also Cynics and Sceptics. In 
other words, Foucault’s references to the Epicureans are all marginal with respect to the central argument of this 
course, the hermeneutics of the subject. Noteworthy by his complete absence from the text is Lucretius, the Epicurean 
whose records of his “relation to self” are so extensive and profound. 
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Foucault seems therefore to be on solid ground when he uses “appetite” and “desire” as synonyms 
in writing about certain Greek conceptions of desire and pleasure. Thus: “the appetite, Plato 
explains in the Philebus, can be aroused only by the representation, the image or the memory of 
the thing that gives pleasure; he concludes that there can be no desire, except in the soul, for while 
the body is affected by privation, it is the soul and only the soul that can, through memory, make 
present the thing that is to be desired and thereby arouse the epithumia.” (UP, 43) Or, as T.S.Eliot 
describes it, providing an example of the stirring that words, like the dangerous words of poetry, 
can provoke in us: “Mixing memory with desire, stirring dull roots with spring rain”36. 
 
The non-biological conception of desire had a very long, if varied, reign in philosophical thinking 
on the question, and before returning to Foucault’s encounter with the Greeks (in the following 
section), it will be necessary to recall another important part of his work, in which he traces the 
more recent genealogy of certain key conceptual shifts that have contributed to the contemporary 
biologisation of the passions, and therefore of the self. Perhaps the most paradoxical of all 
conceptions of desire, along the sliding scale of its collocations in the body or the mind, is the 
Christian conception that actually manages to locate desire within a “body” that is only quite 
incidentally material, for this Christian “body” is infused with non-material principles – “original 
sin”, “evil”, and even “Satan”. Conversely, the most extreme “bodily” conception, for which the 
body is genuinely held to be more matter than spirit, is that of much contemporary psychology, 
which sees desire as largely instinctual (and in some cases, as primarily neurological or even 
biochemical). Foucault, through his investigations of some of the genealogical developments that 
are antecedent to this biologised notion of the human, has demonstrated the force of this 
conception within the modern episteme, in the prevailing contemporary objectification of desire; 
and as a consequence, of the way in which this conception constitutes an important building block 
in the predominant mode of subjection in contemporary Western society.  
It will therefore be useful here to look at one particular aspect of Foucault’s work, that on the 
emergence of a “scientific” concept of “instinct”, at “the point at which instinct enters the great 
taxonomic architecture of psychiatry at the beginning of the nineteenth century” (A, 139). Useful 
in that through it one may gain a greater understanding of our own contemporary self-readings, 
and also of Foucault’s extraordinary capacity to distance himself from concepts that are 
constitutive of his own epistemic formation, situate them in the networks in which they are or were 
operative, and clarify the particular force that the internalisation of such concepts entails for the 
                                                 
36 T.S.Eliot, Collected Poems 1909-1962, Faber & Faber, London, 1989, ‘The Waste Land’, p.61 
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subject. “Instinct,” in contemporary usage, shares with the Greek use of “appetite,” (and with 
Blake’s use of “energy”), the connotation of some kind of moving force that is natural to our 
animal being, though, given that such words tend to be not merely descriptive, but also evaluative, 
“instinct” has much more power than the weaker “appetite,” and is made of darker, more 
problematic stuff, than the life-affirming vibrations of Blake’s energy. In its earlier history, 
however, the word did not have the deep-rooted zoological-physiological connotation it has since 
acquired. 
Foucault has analysed part of the process by which it took on this connotation, appearing as a new 
objectification of what it is to be human. The role that this objectification of “instinct” then played 
in nineteenth-century modes of subjection, however, was not his primary concern at the time of his 
1975 Course on Les Anormaux, at the Collège de France. Nonetheless, the role of this new 
objectification in contributing to the development of these new modes of subjection becomes 
apparent here. His focus in the 1975 course was on the key role that the concept played in the 
knowledge-power games developing, especially in France, at that time. Foucault examined the 
way particular concepts, such as “instinct”, emerged (as transformations of earlier usage) and were 
reinforced in the interaction of psychiatry, jurisprudence and penal practice. He also looks at how, 
in a cyclic process, the concepts strengthened the institutions making use of use them, and the 
institutions strengthened and further developed the concepts. Thus he asks: “What is this 
instinct?”, and answers:  
 
It is an element that can function on two levels, or, if you like, it is a kind of cog that enables two mechanisms 
to mesh: the penal mechanism and the psychiatric mechanism. More precisely it enables the power mechanism 
– the penal system with its need for knowledge – to engage with the knowledge mechanism - psychiatry with its 
need for power. […] In fact, the notion of instinct enables the legal scandal of a crime without interest or 
motive, and consequently an unpunishable crime, to be reduced to intelligible terms. Then, from a different 
angle, it makes possible the scientific transformation of the absence of a motive for an act into a positive 
pathological mechanism. This, I believe, is the role of instinct as an element in the game of knowledge-
power.(A, 138) 
 
In the preceding period, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries in Foucault’s reconstruction, 
heinous crime was seen as ‘monstrous’ indicating that the perpetrator is an aberrant, not a 
“normal” human being. Through this objectification of the ‘monstrous’ self, the criminal was to 
read herself, or himself, as essentially non-human or only quasi-human, and therefore not entitled 
to be treated as a human being. The others, as “normal”, could derive satisfaction from the relative 
superiority this difference accorded them; a phenomenon that has by no means disappeared from 
contemporary ethical configurations. The element that has changed is that formerly monstrous 
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behaviour was considered to be indicative of the “delirium” that was the proof of madness, 
construed as a mental, not a physical, inbalance, and this entailed “interdiction” the loss of all 
citizen’s rights, and hence unlimited punishability. At the beginning of this early modern period, 
still in the juridical reign of the principle: “an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” the atrocity 
of the crime had to be matched at least, as symbol of retribution and in practice, by the atrocity of 
the punishment. The Age of Enlightenment, however, put public torture, as a barbaric 
accoutrement of ancien regime, behind it; in favour of a generalised “humane” practice of 
confinement of criminals and the mad, in prisons or other institutions. This re-humanized to some 
extent the objectifications of the “deviant” self, thus modifying the possible associated forms of 
subjectivation. The decision as to which institution was appropriate, however, depended on the 
madness or sanity (responsibility) of the individual in question. Foucault has discussed this history 
extensively elsewhere.37  
In Abnormal, Foucault analyses the perplexity produced by several legal cases where the 
perpetrator had no apparent motive for her (or his) crime, but at the same time demonstrated no 
forms of “delirious” behaviour other than the crime (unwitnessed) itself. In one case, of 1826, the 
defence lawyer calls in a doctor who “refers to an ‘irresistible direction,’ an irresistible affection,’ 
an ‘almost irresistible desire,’ and an ‘atrocious tendency about whose origin we can say nothing.’ 
(my emphasis) […] The lawyer, Fournier, speaks of […] ‘the influence of a violent passion’ ”, etc. 
Foucault comments here, with extraordinary perspicacity, that:  
 
You can see that all these names, terms, and adjectives, et cetera, designating this dynamic of the irresistible, 
revolve around something named elsewhere in the text: instinct. Fournier speaks of a ‘barbarous instinct’, and 
Marc [the doctor] speaks of an ‘instinctive act’ or even of an ‘instinctive propensity.’ It is named in the defence 
plea and it is named in the consultation, but I would say that it is not conceptualized. It is not yet conceptualized 
and it cannot and could not be conceptualized because there is nothing in the rules of formation of psychiatric 
discourse of the time that allows this absolutely new object to be named. As long as madness was conceived in 
terms of error, illusion, delirium, and nonobedience to truth – as it still was at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century – then there was no place within psychiatric discourse for instinct as a brute, dynamic element. It could 
be named, but it was neither constructed nor conceptualized. (A, 129-130) 
 
As Dr. Marc had put it, these phenomena had an origin about which they could say nothing. The 
term “instinct” had hitherto tended to denote a mental characteristic (of “unaccountable” origin) 
rather than “the brute, dynamic element” beginning to be connoted here. In the previous century, 
writing of the “direct passions of desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear” (Treatise of 
Human Nature, 1739), the philosopher David Hume states that “The mind by an original instinct 
tends to unite itself with the good, and to avoid the evil, though they be conceiv’d merely in 
                                                 
37 See for example: Foucault: Discipline and Punish, and Psychiatric Power.   
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idea”38; and further: “Beside good and evil, […] the direct passions frequently arise from a natural 
impulse or instinct, which is perfectly unaccountable.”39 Instinct (or natural impulse), therefore, 
was of the mind, though it was both “original and unaccountable”; and this in the words of Hume, 
who was, among Enlightenment philosophers, the one who was most concerned, against both 
“rationalist” and religious conceptualisations, to see virtue and vice as rooted in our natural, 
animal being. At that time, as he wrote: “No distinction is more usual in all systems of ethics, than 
that betwixt natural abilities and moral virtues; where the former are placed on the same footing 
with bodily endowments, and are supposed to have no merits or moral worth attached to them”; 
(emphases in original) a position that he hotly contested, arguing that they “are both of them 
equally mental qualities”40.  
Foucault’s genealogical analysis of ‘instinct’ proceeds thus: 
 
I think that there is the sudden emergence here of an object, or rather of a whole domain of new objects, of a 
whole series of elements that will be named, described, analyzed, and, bit by bit, integrated, or rather 
developed, within nineteenth century psychiatric discourse. These objects or elements are impulses, drives, 
tendencies, inclinations and automatisms. In short they are all those notions and elements that, in contrast with 
the passions of the Classical Age, are not governed by a prior representation but rather by a specific dynamic 
in relation to which representations, passions and affects have secondary, derivative, or subordinate status. (A, 
131, my emphasis) 
 
 In other words, Plato’s notion, cited above, of the primacy of representation or mental image in 
the arousal of desire is here reversed, its place taken by bodily drives. What may seem hard to 
believe, looking back from the perspective of our contemporary episteme, is that this overthrow, 
by now so total, was taking place less than two centuries ago. Foucault has here identified some of 
the significant conceptual shifts in the process. One immediate implication of this redescription of 
instinct as a bodily force was that aberrant behaviour deemed to result from instinct was thus 
pathologised. Madness, that had been construed as a disorder “at the level of consciousness or 
grasp of truth” (A, 157) was hereafter gradually transmuted into mental illness, but this, like all 
‘illness’, implied physiological origination. At this conjuncture, a person “who is mad, is someone 
in whom the demarcation, interplay, or hierarchy of the voluntary and the involuntary is 
disturbed”. This is a phenomenon that may be invisible in most circumstances, and may wear a 
mask of benign normality, thus making the old question about cool-headed madness irrelevant: 
“How can we speak of madness when we can find no trace of delirium?” (A, 157) 
                                                 
38 Hume, David, Treatise of Human Nature, Prometheus Books, N.Y. 1992, p.438, (emphases in original). 
39 Ibid. p.439 
40 Ibid. p. 606 
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Foucault goes on: “You can see that everything is now reversed. It is no longer necessary to find a 
little element of delirium beneath the instinctive so that it can be inscribed within madness. Rather, 
behind any delirium we must discover the little disturbance of the voluntary and the involuntary 
that makes the formation of delirium understandable.” (A, 158) This dethronement of delirium as 
the hallmark of madness, and its replacement by behaviour that was disturbed in some possibly 
minor way, represented an enormous conceptual leap, and one which made the fortune of 
psychiatry, in more senses than one.  
With delirium now dethroned, the next step in this genealogical process of concept mutation is a 
smaller one – not a reversal, rather a logical extension, but again one with vast consequences. For 
if a disturbance at the instinctive level underpins madness, and this can be identified through the 
study of behaviour, then all behaviour must now be studied, in order to determine what is 
“normal” and what is “abnormal”, or deviant. The field for psychiatry opens up to incorporate all 
forms of conduct, to determine what is symptomatic of disturbance, and what not, and psychiatry 
becomes, (and has largely remained), from around the 1850s according to Foucault, the arbiter of 
what conduct constitutes “mental health, and what constitutes “mental illness”. “Any kind of 
disorder, indiscipline, agitation, disobedience, recalcitrance, lack of affection, and so forth can 
now be psychiatrized.” (A, 161) In determining what constitutes “normal’” behaviour, the 
descriptive function of the scientific discourse of psychiatry slides easily into a normative function 
that goes beyond its original collocation as partner to criminal law. The normalizing force of these 
psychiatric objectifications is obviously extensive. Many an individual, in many a social context 
experienced as in some way oppressive, would want to assert their own individuality by being 
simply, gloriously and healthily bad, without thus being labelled as “disturbed.” And so many 
have come to define themselves as “rebels,” or aesthetes, or outsiders, or whatever, as a result of 
choosing for themselves a form of subjectivation that is not based on the internalisation of the 
norms laid down by psychiatry, making of this resistance a true exercise in subjectivity. This 
clearly requires no awareness of the tiny part played by a conceptual shift in the meaning of 
“instinct,” and the contribution of this to the biologized objectification of the human being within 
the contemporary episteme. And yet it is Foucault’s revelation of these tiny parts, conceptual shifts 
on certain key words, that allows for an understanding of the inner mechanisms of epistemic 
change, and the consequences of these for our possible subjectivities. “Little crimes […] and little 
mental illnesses; tiny delinquencies and almost imperceptible abnormalities of behaviour 
essentially constitute the organizational and fundamental field of psychiatry.” Or, in Foucault’s 
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brilliant metaphor: “The great ogre [of madness…] has become little Tom Thumb, the crowd of 
little abnormal Tom Thumbs…” (A, 163).  
 
There follow several decades of consolidation during which “normal” and “abnormal” behaviours 
continue to be classified as substantively different; but inevitably, as the number of borderline 
cases grows, and with them the grey areas of categorisation, the whole bipolar structure begins to 
come apart at the seams, opening up the space for new theories that place human behaviours on 
some kind of continuum of healthy and sick, full of variables, exceptions, and surprises. And into 
that space sailed Freud, but coming from a different discursive development. Because, running 
parallel (historically) to these disciplinary and institutional reformulations that meet in the concept 
of ‘instinct’, were the developments in the domain of what Foucault has called the “hermeneutics 
of desire”, explored, as we have seen, in his History of Sexuality. Freud was the key player in the 
turn of the century game of knowledge-power in this field, but even before this, in the late 
eighteenth century, as Foucault writes: “The problem now is how this technology of abnormality 
encountered other processes of normalization that were not concerned with crime, criminality, or 
monstrosity, but with something quite different: everyday sexuality.” (A, 163) 
Before consolidating itself in the field of medicine, Foucault says that psychiatry was initially 
concerned with “public hygiene” or the security of the community with regard to dangerous, or 
“potentially” dangerous individuals within it, and it has never lost this role.41 But subsequently, its 
remit was extended to include the analysis of normal as well as abnormal behaviours in different 
domains of life; and in the course of these studies the whole sector of what is “reproductive 
behaviour” from the standpoint of “public hygiene”, but is “sexuality” from a  psychological and 
individual perspective, was delineated. This meant, as Foucault writes, that: “Sexual abnormality 
initially appears as a series of particular cases of abnormality.” However, he goes on, as the 
volume of case histories grew exponentially: “soon after, around 1880-1890, it emerges as the 
root, foundation, and etiological principle of most other forms of abnormality.” (A, 168). Foucault 
has shown that the contemporary form of the hermeneutics of desire, for which our “sexuality” 
marks our biological determination, but is at the same time still largely infused with the guilt 
associated with the earlier, metaphysical Christian concept of the “flesh,” leads to a hermeneutics 
of ourselves that leaves many people today with little chance of reading themselves as “normal,” 
healthy subjects of their own lives. In the coming together of this genealogy with those underlying 
                                                 
41 Further explored by Foucault in Security, Territory, Population. 
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the exterior, public domain of psychiatry and law, we all risk coming to see ourselves as, and 
therefore becoming, that crowd of little abnormal Tom Thumbs.  
 
 
4. Desires and pleasures 
 
 “When St. Augustine in his Confessions recalls the friendships of his youth, the intensity of his affections, the 
pleasures of the days spent together, the conversations, the enthusiasms and good times, he wonders if, 
underneath its seeming innocence, all that did not pertain to the flesh, to that ‘glue’ which attaches us to the 
flesh.” (UP, 40)  
 
With this comment, Foucault illustrates for us the most bone-chilling aspect of Christian austerity, 
whereby all human pleasures, without exception, are morally suspect. Augustine is of course not 
alone in thinking that while there are marked differences of quality and intensity, there are no clear 
borderlines between different forms of emotional experience, from an enthusiastic conversation to 
companionship, to sex, (and to spiritual ecstasy one might add, against Augustine). Philosophers, 
scientists and ordinary human beings can experience great difficulty in categorising intense forms 
of human experience as specifically physical, emotional, mental, or spiritual; and such experiences 
often serve as metaphors for each other – sexual orgasm (with a partner, in total attunement) is 
described as a sense of fusion, not just with the partner, but with the universe; and listening to the 
music of one’s most beloved composer, for example, is described as orgasmic. The question, 
however, the moral and philosophical question, is what value is placed on this multiform 
continuity of experience. A life-affirming one, as in the case of the Romantics, for example, and in 
very different ways of some Greek philosophers; or Augustine’s own, underpinned as it is by a 
total suspicion of the ubiquity of sin, and marked by his deliberately distasteful metaphor of the 
“glue” that attaches us to “flesh”.42 And the second question is how and where and why to draw 
dividing lines. 
 
The Greeks and Romans, in recognizing the lack of definable borders between one form of 
pleasure, one expression of desire, and another, were concerned, precisely for this reason, to 
establish conventional borders, through philosophical reflection on the different forms that desire 
may take; both when, like Aristotle, they were concerned to validate certain forms of emotion and 
condemn others, and when, like the Stoics, they were committed to extirpating all passions. It was 
                                                 
42  (A metaphor that Sartre used for the en-soi, as Murdoch notes.) See § PT. II, Ch.2, 3. Existentialism. 
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of course conceptualised very differently by the Epicureans, but Foucault does not discuss this and 
their conceptions will not be discussed here. In general, pleasure, as opposed to desire, was seen as 
a relatively simple, dependent phenomenon, in that anything could be determined as pleasurable; 
what is determined as pleasurable depends on the representation that we make of it. And it is here, 
at the point of formulation of representations, that ethical reflection is necessary. For this reason 
Aristotle, Foucault tells us, in both the Nichomachean Ethics and in the Eudemian Ethics, draws a 
distinction between different types of “pleasures”:  “It is not self-indulgent [akolasia] to ‘delight 
in’ (charein) colors, shapes, or paintings, nor in theatre or music; one can, without self-indulgence, 
delight in the scent of fruit, roses, or incense […] For there is pleasure that is liable to akolasia 
only where there is touch and contact”.(UP, 40) In other words, the pleasures that are morally 
suspect are, inevitably, as they correspond to “the three basic appetites” of Plato’s Laws (UP, 49), 
those of food, drink and sex.43 Aristotle makes a point, however, as Foucault tells us, of excluding 
the “noble” pleasures of massage and heat in the gymnasium from any taint of self-indulgence! 
This indulgence, or akolasia, is the extreme, and therefore negative, form of the aphrodisia44, but 
in Greek thinking the existence of extreme forms is not sufficient to taint all forms of pleasure in 
relationship, sexual or otherwise; just as the existence of gluttony does not taint pleasure in 
wholesome food taken in moderation. On the contrary, finding pleasure in beauty, in harmony, in 
the gifts of nature is, certainly for Aristotle, one of the guiding principles of a life worth living.45  
Nonetheless, for Aristotle too recognition of the ease with which one crosses the undefined 
borders between “noble” pleasure, and ignoble self-indulgence meant that great attention to 
oneself was required, so that one could catch oneself at the crucial moment, as it were, in order not 
to be blown off one’s rationally chosen path to happiness. As a technique of the self, however, it 
appears in Aristotle only in this relatively rudimentary form of “wariness,” and not in the much 
more developed form of constant attention to the self – necessary to the conscious direction of 
one’s own actions, one’s life – that it will later come to take in Hellenistic philosophy. Foucault 
                                                 
43 Foucault does not distinguish between Plato’s varying conceptions of “pleasure”, the “pure pleasures” of the 
Philebus, the strictures from the Gorgias, etc. 
44 “The Suda gives a definition of aphrodisia that will be repeated by Heyschius: Aphrodisia are ‘the works, the acts 
of Aphrodite’ ”, (cited in UP, 38); (a fickle goddess who liked to party, not a thundering God, though Foucault does 
not comment on this.) That is: “the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure.” (UP, 40). 
Following the Greek practice of not rigorously defining the aphrodisia, Foucault uses it to refer to sexual acts and 
gestures in this loose way. 
45 Aristotle’s notion of the noblest pleasures (in connection with the theoretical life, as in Bk.X, Nichomachean 
Ethics), was not seen as relevant by Foucault in his explorations in The Uses of Pleasure, which had to do with sex 
and subjectivity; nor does it figure in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. However, Aristotle’s pragmatism on the 
question of more physical pleasures is evident in the remarks quoted by Foucault here.   
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describes what amounts to an application of this guiding principle of attention to the experience of 
pleasure, but does so by invoking another basic principle, that of ‘moderation.’ Thus:  
 
To be sure, in the teaching and the exercise of moderation, it is recommended to be wary of sounds, images, 
and scents; but this is not because attachment to them would be only the masked form of a desire whose 
essence is sexual: it is because there are musical forms capable of weakening the soul with their rhythms, and 
because there are sights capable of affecting the soul like a venom, and because a particular scent, a particular 
image, is apt to call up “the memory of the thing desired” (Aristotle NE 1118a, cited UP, 41).  
 
In other words, desire is of the imagination, whether it be of music or of love (as anger too is of 
the poisoned imagination). But desire in this conception (and others) is a much more complex 
phenomenon than pleasure. As we have seen, it is a reaching out (orexis) to pleasure, and it is the 
imagination that selects the particular pleasure, but at the same time, this reaching out always 
depends upon a lack.  “It is true” Foucault says, “ – Plato always comes back to the idea – that for 
the Greeks there could be no desire without privation, without the want of the thing desired and 
without a certain amount of suffering mixed in” (UP, 43). And it was nature that, on this view, 
produced desire as a means of satisfying the basic needs of hunger, thirst and reproduction, all 
three of which “are strong, imperative and intense, but the third one in particular, although ‘the 
latest to emerge’ is ‘the keenest lust’ [Plato, Laws, VI,783a-b]. Socrates asks his interlocutor in the 
Republic whether he knows of ‘a greater and sharper pleasure than the sexual.’ ”(UP, 49) (The 
reply is: “No, nor a madder” [Republic III, 403a].) The intensity of this pleasure was also nature’s 
work: “Nature intended … that the performance of the [sexual] act be associated with a pleasure, 
and it was this pleasure that gave rise to epithumia, to desire”46 (UP, 43). The vital force of all 
passion is thus a bodily force, but never such that it is distinct or distinguishable from the mental 
faculties that shape it. On the contrary, “the desire that leads to the act, the act that is linked to 
pleasure, and the pleasure that occasions desire” are linked in what Foucault calls “the dynamics 
that joined all three in a circular fashion.” (Ibid.) But in this circularity, the ethical point of entry is 
that of the imagination. It is the image, or representation, that we construct, that determines what is 
or is not a pleasure, what is or is not desirable. 
It is not difficult to see, therefore, why Foucault concludes from the above references that: “The 
attraction exerted by pleasure and the force of the desire that was directed toward it constituted, 
together with the action of the aphrodisia itself, a solid unity.” (UP, 42) It is less easy to see, 
however, why, in contrasting this unity with the Christian conception of desire and pleasure 
epitomized by Augustine, he goes on to say:  
                                                 
46 Foucault tends to use epithumia for “desire” rather than “appetite”. 
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The dissociation – or partial dissociation at least – of this ensemble would later become one of the basic 
features of the ethics of the flesh and the notion of sexuality. This dissociation was to be marked, on the one 
hand, by a certain ‘elision’ of pleasure (a moral devaluation through the injunction given in the preaching by 
the Christian clergy against the pursuit of sensual pleasure as a goal of sexual practice; a theoretical devaluation 
by the extreme difficulty of finding a place for pleasure in the conception of sexuality); it would also be marked 
by an increasingly intense problematization of desire (in which the primordial sign of a fallen nature or the 
structure characteristic of the human condition would be visible). (UP, 42) 
 
This “intense problematization of desire” – as the damnation built into human nature and its 
elaboration in confessional practice – he has exhaustively demonstrated, both here and elsewhere; 
but the dissociation theorized here with regard to the “ethics of the flesh”, (as well as the later 
concept of “sexuality”) is directly contradicted by his own citation of Augustine’s linking his 
‘innocent’ pleasures to ‘the flesh’, to sexual desire. This would seem to suggest, conversely, a 
Christian concept of the unity of pleasure and desire – in sin – or nature cursed by God, set against 
the Greek unity of pleasure and desire – in the immanence of nature, or in nature that is blessed as 
god-given. It would seem then that the moral devaluation of pleasure of which he speaks is due 
precisely to its association with sexual desire, rather than to any theoretical dissociation; and that 
rather than the “extreme difficulty of finding a place for pleasure in the conception of sexuality”, 
no such attempt was either made, or considered at all necessary, by earlier forms of Christianity. In 
the more recent history of Christianity, rebellion from the ranks (and evident counter-conduct), 
affected by liberal notions in general (and therefore other lines of genealogical development), in 
particular those relating to the pursuit of pleasure as an inalienable right, has forced the Catholic 
Church to confront the question of possibly acceptable sexual pleasures.47 This has produced some 
very odd discourses, tied up in Jesuitical knots that the faithful can generally make neither head 
nor tail of, and therefore (apart from a slogan-wielding, chaste minority) largely ignore48. 
 
While Foucault was investigating the past History of Sexuality, and writing his three books on it, 
he was also imagining possible future histories of sexuality (or perhaps of post-“sexuality”), that 
would be lived through the different conceptualisations still in the process of formulation. New 
concepts were emerging as they will, and as he has shown that they will, from forms of counter-
conduct being elaborated on the fringes of society. In the interviews in which he discusses this 
(which is virtually all we have), he introduces a new conceptual distinction of desire and pleasure, 
                                                 
47 Indulgence in the taking of food was a pleasure the Church seems to have quietly given up on long ago, as less 
problematic.  
48 Italy, the country with (along with Ireland) the highest per capita Catholic population, has the world’s lowest birth-
rate. The Church chooses not to comment on the implications of this in terms of “sinful” contraception. 
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which will be discussed later, which may have to do with the ambivalence of the theoretical 
dissociation introduced here. Already, however, his analysis of the hermeneutics of desire, under 
process of elaboration in these books, had set out to trace the shifting locus of subjectivity as it 
moved away from the mental/spiritual plane, where it had hitherto been exclusively collocated, at 
least until the seventeenth century, towards the material/biological plane where it is now widely 
collocated by science, and is, as such, reduced to a shadow of its former robust self. Philosophy 
and science, bedfellows for the Greeks and for many centuries, have steadily diverged since the 
16th Century, as the quantity of scientific discourse has multiplied exponentially, and the quantity 
of philosophical discourse has diminished relative to the games of knowledge and power. Since 
Foucault’s primary concern was to study those discourses wielding greater epistemic, institutional 
and formative power, this meant for him philosophy and religion up to the 18th Century, and 
starting in the 16th Century, science, in which the ghosts of religious discourse could often still be 
identified. 
 
Foucault has amply demonstrated the significant role of the Catholic confessional in 
problematizing desire and making it central to introspective practice; he has not, however, 
demonstrated the dissociation of pleasure and desire that he hypothesizes here. Rather than 
dissociation, what his work does reveal in the different epochs is a significant difference of 
emphasis on the two parts of the coupled concepts of pleasure and desire. Put in his terms, it could 
be said that the Greek texts problematize both the pleasures and the desires of which they are the 
objects: Aristotle is concerned to clarify which pleasures are acceptable and which are not, 
Epictetus and the Roman Stoics are concerned with the modes of representation of pleasures, and 
so on; but, as Foucault himself says, always in the context of an assumed unity of desire and 
pleasure. As noted however, the most extensive ancient (and ethical but non-condemnatory) 
phenomenology of pleasure, that of Epicurus, he did not deal with. Conversely, the Christian texts 
express less interest in the pleasures themselves (other than to formulate a related hierarchy of 
damnability), and focus almost entirely, and obsessively, on the problem of desire. It is not that 
their definitions of the (inseparable) relation between pleasure and desire differ; it is that the 
problematization differs radically, in the fullest ontological sense given it by Foucault. That is to 
say: “the problematizations through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought – and the 
practices on the basis of which these problematizations are formed.” (UP, 11, emphases in 
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original.) (The allusion here is to the fact that he considered both the ancient and the modern 
hermeneutics of desire to be central in different ways to the hermeneutics of the subject.49) 
 
Following Augustine, the founding father of this Christian genealogical line, Foucault uses “the 
flesh” to denote the Christian conception which problematizes the human body as inhabited by an 
evil force in conflict with “spirit” or “soul”, and he appropriates (usefully) the term aphrodisia to 
encapsulate the triad of desire, pleasure and sexual acts which form the Greek conception. Though 
he admits the considerable variations on the theme in different schools and epochs of ancient 
thought, and studies the changes in some of them, he says that in all cases the aphrodisia as such 
were not seen as the key “problem” in antiquity, they were part of nature, and he cites, among 
others, Rufus of Ephesus’ on this: “seeing that sexual activity was deeply and harmoniously 
grounded in nature, there was no way that it could be considered bad.” (UP, 48)50 There was 
nothing, Foucault writes, “resembling the concern – which was so characteristic of the question of 
flesh or sexuality – for discovering the insidious presence of a power of undetermined limits and 
multiple masks beneath what appeared offensive or innocent. Neither classification nor 
decipherment.” (UP, 38)  
On the contrary, though moderation was applauded in both traditions, given the danger intrinsic to 
all pleasure for the Christian tradition, moderation itself often appears therein as merely a grudging 
concession to the necessities of this tiresome body that one would rather do without, or as a sort of 
weak form of an ideal and absolute renunciation. For the Greeks on the other hand, moderation 
was a positive thing, and on occasion it could also be seen as an instrument for the increase of 
pleasure. The necessary relationship between bodily needs, desire and pleasure was thus 
pragmatically exploited: “Everyone knew” Foucault writes, “that pleasure was dulled if it offered 
no satisfaction to the keenness of a desire: ‘To my friends, meat and drink bring sweet and simple 
enjoyment […]’, says Virtue in Prodicus’ speech as reported by Socrates, ‘for they wait till they 
crave them.’ And in a discussion with Euthydemus, Socrates remarks that ‘hunger or thirst or 
                                                 
49 The term “problematization” has a range of connotations running from the epistemological to the methodological to 
the ontological. Epistemological uses refer to the epistemic underpinnings of concepts (madness, sexuality, instinct 
etc.), and the way in which these concepts are identified as new objects of a pre-existing discourse (thus modifying the 
discourse), or found a new discourse (paradigm change). Methodologically, this refers to a form of critique of theory 
rather than production of theory – Foucault’s own method of standing outside a particular discourse and examining its 
dynamic relation to the network of social and intellectual relations it forms part of. Ontologically it refers to the 
interiorization of such problematized discourse “through which being offers itself to be, necessarily, thought”; as he 
puts it here with a rare, Heideggerian flourish. 
50 He also notes that: “The desires that led to the aphrodisia were classed by Plato among the most natural and 
necessary; and the pleasures that could be obtained from the aphrodisia had their cause, according to Aristotle, in 
necessary things that concerned the body and the life of the body in general.” (UP, 48) 
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desire (aphrodisiòn epithumia) or lack of sleep are the sole causes of pleasure in eating and 
drinking and sexual indulgence, and in resting or sleeping, after a time of waiting or resistance 
until the moment comes when these will give the greatest possible satisfaction’.” (UP, 56) What 
was important, therefore, was to manage one’s pleasure activities in an appropriate way, with the 
proviso that this meant “natural” activities, however these were defined. Foucault saw this 
management of pleasure, particularly sexual pleasure, expressed as the principle of chrésis 
aphrodision: “the uses of pleasure”, as so significantly positive an attitude to one’s own sexual 
being, and its implications for the way one lives with oneself, and lives one’s life, that he took it as 
the as the title of this second volume of the History of Sexuality. 
 
As to the “naturalness” of desire, here as elsewhere for the Greeks, description lends itself to 
particular forms of normative interpretation. Nussbaum says that for Epicurus, “nature is treated as 
a normative notion – opposed not to artifice, but to that which is puffed up, excessive, that which 
might well impede healthy functioning.” (TD, 105) And it would seem from these references that 
this principle had already been established (if not universally) in early antiquity. Foucault shows 
that this corresponds to a norm of self-work, in that “need” – what was natural – was “to serve as a 
guiding principle in this strategy, which clearly could never take the form of a precise codification 
or a law applicable to everyone alike in every circumstance. The strategy made possible an 
equilibrium in the dynamics of pleasure and desire: it kept this dynamics from “running way,” 
from becoming obsessive, by setting the satisfaction of a need as its internal limit”. (UP, 56) What 
was thus problematized by the Greeks was not so much the status of the natural phenomena of 
desire and pleasure, seen as ubiquitous in human life, but the way one was to relate to their being 
part of self. What Foucault wishes to draw out is this recognition that body and soul interact 
constantly, and that reflection, voluntary discipline, and care (epimeleia) are the keys to the 
relation of the self to itself, as opposed to the anguished inner battleground of Augustine in his 
Confessions, and the self-hating relation of the split self of Christianity. (Though of course, there 
are ancient, dualist antecedents for Christian ethics in Plato and the Neo-Platonists). 
 
 
5. Forms of sexuality 
 
In the contemporary episteme, sexual drive is attributed primarily to the body, though, since 
Freud, it is also held that the form this drive will take will generally be considered “normal” if the 
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child grows in “normal” circumstances, and “perverted” if the child experiences some kind of 
trauma at an impressionable age. There is a sense in which Plato’s conception of desire as 
stimulated by memory (non-conscious) and the re-evocation of old representations and images, 
finds an echo here (and Freud acknowledged his great debt to Plato’s Eros in theorising the libido), 
but the processes described in the modern conception are passive, more deeply unconscious ones, 
over which we have no control. Also, there was no concept (no problematization) of infant 
sexuality in the ancient world, and this concept is central to the widespread popularisation of 
Freudianism, producing a deterministic portrait of the adult human being as dominated by 
invisible forces; by the force of nature and by the arbitrariness of one’s early personal history, of 
which one is unaware, and therefore unable to control. The interiorization of this portrait of the 
human being produces a psychological self deprived of subjectivity. Freud was concerned, within 
his own paradigm, to find ways of reclaiming control of the self, notably through the long, self-
transforming path of psychoanalytic practice. This path, available only to a privileged minority (as 
were the self-transforming practices of the free, mostly male, Greek citizens) is designed to help 
the individual free herself from the determinations that afflict her; to allow her to choose her life, 
but it is not designed to re-situate this individual self in that space of freedom and self-
determination that the ancients enjoyed. 
And whereas Freud was concerned to elaborate certain techniques of the self, Western science in 
general, and the non-therapeutic branches of psychology in particular (knowledge-power games 
that continue to proliferate in disciplines and sub-disciplines), clearly set themselves the task of 
finding the causes of “normal” and “abnormal” behaviour, not that of elaborating any such 
techniques of the self. With regard to possible forms of sexual expression, throughout the 
twentieth century, the categorisation of what is normal and what is abnormal underwent various 
changes, with more and more sexual practices being gradually moved from the “abnormal” to the 
“normal” camp, thus liberating many people from the constraint of reading themselves as 
abnormal. Most importantly, “homosexuality” shifted, in the West, from collocation in the 
“perverted” camp, where it remains for many non-Western societies, and large sections of Western 
society itself, to collocation in the “normal” (if minority) camp, which is now its official status in 
the liberal democracies, though full equality (which would depend on full “normality”) has in no 
way been achieved even here. As a form of human life, and of identity, however, it will always 
frustrate those scientists whose passion it is to discover whether or not everything human is 
“genetic” or neurological in origin (“hard-wired” in the ugly new metaphor of the current 
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objectification in English), in that it will never be possible to put all those aspects of a life that 
shape one’s sexuality under a microscope, or into an epidemiological report.  
Greek “sexuality” flouts nineteenth century notions of normality, and of “nature” in that it takes 
for granted that sexual attraction and romantic feeling are aroused (in men, who mattered) by 
beauty, the beauty of young girls, and more particularly of boys. Being aroused by such beauty 
therefore defines what is natural, but what one does about one’s natural human desires is social, 
and central to ethical practice. Given that the ideal object of these desires are young boys for 
whose development one is responsible, it is a moral question of the highest priority (girls of the 
higher classes were out of bounds outside of marriage, slave girls had no choice in the matter – 
removing the exquisite pain of courtship from the game of love). Ancient Greece thus provides 
Foucault with a starting point from which to investigate the relation between form of life and 
coeval concepts of desires and pleasures historically, shaking off the contemporary pressure to 
ground all such investigation in whatever science can (or cannot) offer, as purported bio-
psychological universals. But this does not mean that he would substitute one set of universals for 
another. In a different context,51 Foucault wrote: “instead of deducing concrete phenomena from 
universals, or instead of starting with universals as an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain 
concrete practices, I would like to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these 
universals through the grid of these practices. This is not what could be called a historicist 
reduction, for that would consist precisely in starting from these universals as given, and then 
seeing how history inflects them, or alters them, or finally invalidates them.” (BB, 3)  
The method Foucault adopts is thus to look at things as concrete phenomena, therefore in their 
historical particularity, but carefully avoiding the type of historicist perspective which, rather than 
ridding itself of universals, merely investigates them in longitudinal studies, as opposed to studies 
without an axis of historical time. In the case under examination of his investigation of “desires” 
and “pleasures”, this means that he sets aside current definitions of these terms, and classifications 
of forms of “sexuality,” that purport to be universals. As well as methodically examining the 
varying uses and connotations of such key terms, another method he occasionally employs is that 
of making use of a particular concept – that of bisexuality in the example given below – outside of 
the context which generated it, thus demonstrating its inappropriateness in its displacement, and 
therefore its non-universality. Here he poses the deliberately anachronistic question: 
                                                 
51 In the 1978-79 Course at the Collège de France on The Birth of Biopolitics, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 
with reference to: “sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state and civil society […] all those universals employed by 
sociological analysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy” (p.2)   
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“Were the Greeks bisexual, then?” And he answers: 
 
Yes, if we mean by this that a Greek [read: a Greek male] could, simultaneously or in turn, be enamoured of a 
boy or a girl […] but if we wish to turn our attention to the way in which they conceived of this dual practice, 
we need to take note of the fact that they did not recognize two kinds of “desire”, two different or competing 
“drives”, each claiming a share of men’s hearts or appetites. We can talk about their “bisexuality”, thinking of 
the free choice they allowed themselves between the two sexes, but for them this option was not referred to a 
dual, ambivalent, and “bisexual” structure of desire. To their way of thinking, what made it possible to desire a 
man or a woman was simply the appetite that nature had implanted in man’s heart for “beautiful” human 
beings, whatever their sex might be. (UP, 188) 
 
Instead, as he shows in The Uses of Pleasure, the bi-something-ality, the duality, that constituted 
the fundamental Greek conception of difference in human character revolved around a completely 
different polarisation from that of the choice of the sexual object. And this had to do with 
characteristics of activity and passivity that were symbolized as a masculine/feminine difference, 
and were tendentially, but by no means exclusively, considered to be characteristic of actual males 
and females. In fact, the ease with which males could develop “feminine”, passive tendencies was 
one of the Greeks’ constant preoccupations. Foucault attributes the problematization of 
masculinity in sexual practice to “the principle of isomorphism between sexual relations and social 
relations. What this means is that sexual relations – always conceived in terms of the model act of 
penetration, assuming a polarity that opposed activity and passivity – were seen as being of the 
same type as the relationship between […] an individual who dominates and one who is 
dominated, one who commands and one who complies”. (UP, 215) This “principle of 
isomorphism” is one that is found everywhere in the ancient world, underpinning differing pre-
modern epistemes, but it merits only a passing reference in the History of Sexuality, where his 
focus was not on epistemological themes. It was instead extensively explored by Foucault in The 
Order of Things52 through the concept of “resemblance,” particularly in its Renaissance usage. 
According to this principle, the morphological similarity between the walnut and the brain, to take 
one graphic example, could not be an arbitrary one, and it would therefore lend itself to 
therapeutic investigation. By the same token (though not discussed by Foucault), the manifold 
phallic metaphors of rigidity, strength, straightness, uprightness (the sceptre of the law), and 
                                                 
52 “Up to the end of the sixteenth century, resemblance played a constructive role in the knowledge of Western culture. 
It was resemblance that […] organized the play of symbols, made possible knowledge of things visible and invisible, 
and controlled the art of representing them. The universe was folded in upon itself; the earth echoing the sky, faces 
seeing themselves reflected in the stars, and plants holding within their stems the secrets that were of use to man” (OT, 
19)  
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therefore a vertically organized social order, may all have their origins in this epistemic principle 
of isomorphism.53 
Since attraction to beautiful boys or girls was considered entirely natural, there was no blame 
attached to sexual relations with one’s inferiors – women, and slaves of either sex; such relations 
were neutral in terms of the moral code, in that they mirrored the social hierarchy, though they 
were certainly not considered “uplifting”. For men only, of course; for a woman to have sexual 
relations with an inferior would constitute a violation of the social order, and an offence against 
both husband (father, brother etc.) and state. At least in classical antiquity, however, where this 
notion of isomorphism was more rigidly held, these were not potentially “ideal” erotic 
relationships; the ideal love relationship was held to be that between an older man (the lover, 
erastes) and a free adolescent boy, (the beloved, eromenos). But the eromenos, once he had grown 
a beard (the first use of a razor to shave off this beard was jokingly considered to mark the end of 
boyhood), had to become a man. “Hence” Foucault writes “the problem that we may call the 
‘antinomy of the boy’ in the Greek ethics of aphrodisia. On the one hand, young men were 
recognized as objects of pleasure – and even as the only legitimate and honourable objects among 
the possible male partners of men […] but on the other hand, the boy, whose youth must be a 
training for manhood, could not and must not identify with that role.”(UP, 221)  
A complex moral problem, evidently, and in the first instance deontological, in that it was 
essential for the lover, whilst courting the boy, to ensure that the gratification that the boy would 
get from the relationship would be in the form of patronage, and advancement of his later career; 
and would certainly not be sexual gratification. Confined as the boy must be to the passive role, 
any sexual enjoyment on his part would risk “feminizing” him, stunting his growth into “active” 
manhood, and the possibility of his assuming the appropriate social role. As in all societies in 
which masculinity and social order are thought to maintain each other reciprocally, so too in 
Classical Greece socially sanctioned forms of sexuality were part of the formative model 
considered apposite to the development of an active male subjectivity. Though ensuring that the 
boy who was the object of pleasure took no pleasure himself from the aphrodisia must have 
caused many an ethical headache for the erastes. 
Beyond the reciprocal, utilitarian aspects of the relationship, which, (as in all relationships) were 
considered entirely healthy; love, in the form of reciprocal affection, together with adoration and 
protection on the part of the lover, and respect and devotion on the part of the beloved, both 
justified and idealised the relationship. Thus, for example, Foucault tells us that Xenophon, in his 
                                                 
53 See esp. Héritier, F., Masculin/Féminin, La pensée de la difference, Paris, Odile Jacob,1996. 
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Symposium, attributes to Socrates the notion of friendship – with its kindness, reciprocal attention 
and shared feelings – as the goal of eros and its pleasures. “Friendship […] is not made a 
substitute for love, or something that would take over from it in due time [when the youth enters 
manhood – the traditional view at the time.] Xenophon makes it the very thing lovers should be 
enamoured of: èrontes tes philias, he says, employing a characteristic expression that makes it 
possible to save eros, to maintain its force, but without giving it a concrete content apart from the 
behaviour that results from the mutual and lasting expression of friendship.” (Symposium VIII, 18, 
cited in UP, 234) As the expression of a form of subjectivation, this view transforms a mode of 
relating that was basically utilitarian and deontological in early antiquity, into one in which the 
ever-present utilitarian aspect is subsumed to an ideal, that of friendship. A friendship which 
ennobles the lover by placing him more in the position of giver (of himself), than of taker of his 
pleasure (with compensation, as it were) from the boy; and at the same time is educative for the 
boy, providing him with a first experience of that adult friendship which was considered the 
noblest form (therefore male) of human interaction in ancient Greece. 
 
 
6. Love, beauty, sōphrosynē54 
 
Besides the lover’s duties to the beloved in Greek society, he also had a duty to himself. The 
desire and/or the love he felt represented an important opportunity for work on the self; an 
opportunity not necessarily seen or welcomed in other cultures. On Foucault’s view, whether or 
not such self-work is actually seen as an opportunity, or practices of dutiful constraint or the 
rejection of such restraint are preferred, the way in which one lives one’s relationships, especially 
the most intense, is central to one’s subjectivation. So it was for the Greeks, who therefore 
preferred to live their relationships consciously. The relative poverty of their relationships with 
women however, as inferiors, meant that their self-forming and other-forming attention was 
almost exclusively directed to relationships with other men: to friendship with their peers, erotic 
relations with boys, and a passage, requiring very careful handling, between the two conditions. 
“Let us be quite clear”, Hadot says, “the love in question […] is homosexual love, precisely 
because it is educative love.”55(PWL 158) Foucault records the description in Plato’s Symposium 
                                                 
54 Sōphrosynē was “the notion of ‘moderation’ […] that characterised the ethical subject in his fulfilment.” (UP, 37) 
55 Relationships with women and slaves had to be handled authoritatively and justly, but were not grounds for soul-
searching. 
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of Socrates lying quietly next to the beautiful Alcibiades (HS, 221) all night, to test his own 
resistance. This bizarre exercise was, among other things, considered an extreme form – Socrates 
putting all his considerable showmanship to didactic ends – of cultivation of sōphrosynē. In 
Foucault’s definition: “Sōphrosynē was a state that could be approached through the exercise of 
self-mastery and through restraint in the practice of pleasures; it was characterized as a freedom.” 
(UP, 78) As such, it was also another example of the principle of isomorphism operating in 
parallel between state and individual citizen.  
Foucault notes: “freedom in classical Greek thought was not considered simply as the 
independence of the city as a whole, while the citizens themselves would be only constituent 
elements devoid of individuality or interiority. The freedom that needs establishing and preserving 
was that of the citizens of a collectivity of course, but it was also, for each of them, a certain form 
of relationship of the individual with himself.” (UP, 79) In The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 
Foucault explores further this parallel between self-government and the government of the city in 
classical antiquity. He notes that the notion of the care of the self first appears in the Alcibiades, 
(HS, 96) in another context, that of Socrates’ training of this young aristocrat. “It was a world, 
then, in which relations between the status of the ‘preeminent’ and the ability to govern are 
problematized: the need to take care of oneself insofar as one has to govern others.” (HS, 44) The 
question for Foucault here was whether this self-mastery was part of the care of the self, or vice 
versa. His conclusion – that in Plato, self-mastery, because of one’s duty to the city, is 
predominant, but that this priority will be reversed later, in the more individualistic Hellenistic 
times – is in alignment with prevailing historical opinion; but what is interesting is his tracing of 
the inner mechanisms of these discourses and practices, and his constant awareness of the 
epistemic filters through which we read the ancients, and through which his own readers may read 
him. In citing the famous phrases from Aristotle’s Politics on the goodness of the state depending 
on the goodness of its citizen-governors: “The goodness of all is necessarily involved in the 
goodness of each”; Foucault notes that “the individual’s attitude towards himself, the way in 
which he ensured his own freedom with regard to himself, and the form of supremacy he 
maintained over himself were a contributing element to the well-being and good of the city.”(UP, 
79) But Foucault seems always to have in mind the risk that this notion of self-mastery, viewed 
from a contemporary perspective, could seem to correspond to a Kantian struggle of the will (or 
soul, or reason), for mastery of the body (or inclinations, or desires) resulting (in the case of moral 
victory) in the exercise of the will in relation to moral codes. Foucault is therefore keen to explain 
that this is not the way he reads it. He makes a point of noting that: “This individual freedom 
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should not […] be understood as the independence of a free will. Its polar opposite was not a 
natural determinism, nor was it the will of an all-powerful agency [God]: it was an enslavement – 
the enslavement of the self by oneself. To be free in relation to pleasure was to be free of their 
authority; it was not to be their slave.” (UP, 79)56  
 
In this reading of Socrates’ night with Alcibiades, however, it is desire, as the counterpart to self-
mastery, and not love, that is problematized. The story is often told as if Socrates were the only 
protagonist, young Alcibiades having only a walk-on, or sleeping, part in it, though the fact that it 
was he that wished to seduce Socrates, and not the other way round, is crucial to the pedagogic 
value of the story. Were Alcibiades to figure merely as an object to be resisted in this exercise, the 
use made of him would be as opportunistic as if Socrates had succumbed to his charms.57 But 
while this story of self-work is indeed about sōphrosynē on the one hand; on the other it figures in 
the ongoing discourse about the ideality of the man-boy relationship, and therefore about what 
love is. Foucault tells us that in the first dialogue of Plato’s Symposium, Pausanius differentiates 
“between two loves the one ‘whose only aim is the satisfaction of its desires,’ and the other which 
desires above all to test the soul.” (UP, 231) And yet, again, both of these are self-referential in a 
way that does not take the relationship with the other, the eromenos into account. Also, in both 
cases, love is reduced to desire. Xenophon’s solution to this is through friendship, as mentioned 
above. The Socrates of his Symposium is one who makes a radical separation between love of the 
body and love of the soul, and sees the attempt at combination thereof as doomed to failure: “when 
one loves ‘the body and the soul at the same time,’ it is the first that will dominate, and the fading 
of youth causes friendship also to wither away.”(UP, 234) These are the words that Xenophon 
gives to his Socrates, and against them he “outlines a conception of eros and its pleasures that 
would have friendship itself as the goal. Friendship […] is not made a substitute for love or 
something that would take over from it in due time. Xenophon makes it the very thing lovers 
should be enamored of: eròntes tès philias, he says, employing a characteristic expression that 
makes it possible to save eros, to maintain its force, but without giving it a concrete content apart 
from the behaviour that results from the mutual and lasting affection of friendship.” (UP, 234). 
  
An emphasis on friendship is obviously a significant step away from mere desire and towards love 
in the conception of the erotic relationship, but not the only possible one. According to Foucault: 
                                                 
56 Although, even if the metaphysics are different, it is no surprise that such a view would appeal to Kant. 
57 As in the unfortunate case of Gandhi spending a chaste night next to his beautiful niece.   
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“Platonic erotics is constructed very differently” (Ibid.), developing the theme of love not from a 
relational premise, but from the life the soul as it is lived through the body, so to speak. All sorts 
of discourses on love are discussed in the Phaedrus, and developed differently in the Symposium, 
that do not have the status of “true discourse”. But Foucault reads the discourse of Diotima in the 
Symposium, and “the great fable of the Phaedrus, related by Socrates himself”, as “etymoi, true 
discourses [… which] set themselves apart because they do not pose the problem in the same 
[conventional] way; they carry out a certain number of basic transformations and displacements 
with regard to the game of questions that were traditional in discussions about love.” (UP, 235) 
From a question of amorous behaviour that is respectful of the required social symmetry, the 
question for Diotima and Socrates becomes: “ ‘What is the essential nature of Love, what are his 
characteristics, and then what are his works?’ An ontological inquiry and no longer a question of 
deontology” (UP, 236), as Foucault puts it. This involves a shift away from the focus on the love-
object, as if the charms of the boy were the cause of love. “Diotima reproaches Socrates – and in 
fact all the authors of encomiums – for having […] mistakenly attributed his [the boy’s] merits to 
love itself; the latter will manifest its characteristic truth only if that truth is sought in its nature 
and not in its object.” (UP, 236-37) This implies, as Foucault records from both the Phaedrus and 
the Symposium, reflecting on “the ‘intermediate’ nature of love, the deficiency that characterizes it 
(since it does not possess the beautiful things that it desires […] it will also have to speak, as in the 
Symposium, of the way in which forgetfulness and remembrance of the supra-celestial vision are 
mixed in love, and of the long road of suffering that will lead it finally to its goal.” (UP, 236)  
 
Foucault makes no comment at this stage on the fact that Plato is here taking the question in the 
two directions that he himself is most suspicious of as relations to truth: from pleasures back to 
desires, and from immanent to transcendent origin. But he picks up the question later, at the point 
at which the soul has attained freedom and self-mastery after the long hard journey described so 
movingly by Plato in the Phaedrus, commenting: “the struggle she [the soul] has been able to 
sustain against the violence of her appetites, she would not have been able to conduct it without a 
twofold relation to truth: a relation to her own desire questioned in its being, and a relation to the 
object of her desire recognized as a true being. Thus we see where ground is broken for a future 
inquiry into desiring man.” (UP, 244) So, the ground is thus broken, and much later, this 
“problematization of sexual behaviour would be reworked in terms of the concupiscent soul and 
the deciphering of its arcana.” (UP, 245) But in the meantime, as he says, the focus continues to be 
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on pleasures and their uses in Platonic erotics, as its many Greek and Roman descendents will 
testify. 
 
This shift in emphasis has consequences for the way the love object, the boy, is thought of. The 
reference to the boy as a “true being” here refers to another of the “displacements” that Plato’s 
reflections provoked within this discourse; that by which the dissymmetry between the partners, 
though structural to the man-boy relationship, was no longer to be taken for granted, or was to be 
replaced by “the convergence of love,” Foucault says. For: “if Eros was a relation to truth, the two 
lovers could only be rejoined provided that the beloved too had been moved in the direction of the 
truth by the force of the same Eros.” (UP, 239-240). That is to say, if this motivation, the pursuit 
of truth and wisdom, comes to the fore, then the boy’s love of the older, wiser figure, reverses the 
relationship of lover and beloved. Foucault notes that the beautiful boy now loves “the old man 
with the ugly body”(UP, 241).58 Hadot, writing on the significance of Socrates’ ugliness, notes 
that that the portrait of him in Plato is that of “a mediator between the transcendent ideal of 
wisdom and concrete human reality” and that as such, we “should therefore expect to see in 
Socrates a harmonious figure, combining divine and human characteristics in delicate nuances.” 
(PWL, 147) Instead of which his ugliness – like that of a Silenus, (“hybrid demons, half-animal, 
half-men” (Ibid. 148) was as legendary, as the battered old cloak he wore. In his elogy to Socrates 
in the Symposium, Alcibiades describes him as like the little carved Sileni to be found in the shops; 
but, Hadot tells us, “if one opens up the little Sileni mentioned by Alcibiades, they turn out to be 
full of statues of Gods.” (Ibid.) To love the ugly old man with the beautiful soul represents, 
therefore, a longing for truth, and “in Diotima’s description” Hadot writes: 
 
Eros is the desire for his own perfection, which is to say, for his true self. He suffers from being deprived of the 
plenitude of being, and he strives to attain it. When other men fall in love with Socrates/Eros, that is - when 
they fall in love with love, such as Socrates reveals it to them – what they love in Socrates is his love for, and 
aspiration toward, beauty and the perfection of being. In Socrates, they find the path to their own perfection.59 
 
This is Eros at his most refined, but Socrates also shares the all too human relish for the tales of 
Eros at his most monstrous – “good-for-nothing, shameless, obstinate, loud-mouthed and savage” 
(Ibid., 161) – when his clumsy attempts to achieve this “plenitude of being,” by satisfying his 
basest desires, are at their most unwise. The vision of reality, with all its warts, that Socrates 
always taught us to recognize, the reality of ourselves, could not fail to apply to “love,” and the 
                                                 
58 In a footnote here (32), he refers the reader to Hadot’s work on Socrates and Eros (Hadot PWL). 
59 Ibid, 
 88 
tension between this and our aspirations to truth and beauty was not something Socrates was ever 
going to allow us to forget or to neglect.  
But the young boy Socrates talks of, the beloved who takes a crucial step in becoming the lover, 
“still does not know the true nature of that which he longs for, and he finds no words with which 
to name it; […] he ‘throws his arms’ around his lover and ‘gives him kisses.’ ” (UP, 240) Socrates 
certainly appears to be stretching a point here in presenting this inchoate aspiring to something as a 
demonstration of a love of truth  – “that is the same for both of them” Foucault records  – ; 
nonetheless, Foucault sees the discourse as a whole as representing an important turning point; 
giving greater philosophical depth to notions of self-work that emerge from their background in 
the formative training of the archaic warrior, then of the Athenian citizen. A step away from 
behaviour governed by an ethos of formal relationships, towards behaviour governed by a relation 
of the self to itself, and at the same time to a relation to others whose behaviour is governed by a 
relation of their self to itself. As Foucault puts it, these texts “indicate a transition from an erotics 
structured in terms of ‘courtship’ practice and recognition of the other’s freedom, to an erotics 
centred on an ascesis of the subject and a common access to truth.”(UP, 244)  
 The importance of the boy’s beautiful soul over that of his beautiful body is also stressed, but 
Plato was not original in this. What is original in Plato, Foucault says, is that he bases the notion of 
the inferiority of bodies “not on the dignity of the boy who is loved, but on that which, in the lover 
himself, determines the nature and form of his love (his desire for immortality, his yearning for the 
beautiful in its purity, the recollection of what he has seen beyond the heavens).” (UP, 238) And 
importantly, in this context,  
 
(and both the Phaedrus and the Symposium are quite explicit on this point), he does not trace a clear, definitive, 
and uncrossable dividing line between the bad love of the body and the glorious love of the soul; however 
devalued and inferior the relation to the body compared with that motion toward beauty, and however 
dangerous it can sometimes be […] From one beautiful body to other beautiful bodies, according to the famous 
formula of the Symposium, and on to the beauty that is found in ‘occupations,’ ‘rules of conduct,’ ‘the 
sciences,’ the motion is continuous, until one gazes at last upon ‘the vast ocean of beauty.’  (UP, 238-9) 
 
And here at last Foucault shows himself to be conquered by the poetry of Plato’s vision, which 
connects desire and pleasure to love of beauty, and to the beauty of this love, this feeling, this 
aesthetic, in which the sense of beauty and love are experienced as the same thing, as inseparable 
and indistinguishable. Therefore it really doesn’t matter what the object is that provokes it: the 
dome of stars, the moral law, a mathematical solution, a cello solo, a beautiful body. What matters 
is that it is experienced, and that the experience takes us beyond the ephemeral components of the 
present moment to the sense of the value of life, and this, in whatever way our beliefs may 
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characterize it, is also experienced as the discovery of a truth. “For Plato, it is not exclusion of the 
body that characterizes true love in a fundamental way; it is rather that, beyond the appearances of 
the object, love is a relation to truth.” (UP, 239) So that if, by chance, it is the beautiful body that 
provokes this experience, then, also “for the Phaedrus. While it praises the courage and perfection 
of souls who have not yielded, it does not promise punishment for those who, leading a life 
devoted to honour rather than to philosophy, let themselves be taken by surprise, so that, carried 
away by their passion, they chance to ‘commit the thing’. ” (UP, 239) No doubt it is the softening 
influence of the contemplation of beauty that renders the severe Plato less of a moralist on this 
occasion (be it only for honourable non-philosophers!). Beyond the ethics of socially responsible 
behaviour, to which both Plato and Foucault are committed in their utterly different ways; there is 
this ethics of commitment to both finding one’s truth and living it, and a sense that the two are 
intertwined. And in this rare but important moment there is an affinity between Foucault and Plato.  
 
The conception of the self behind this extraordinary practice of erotic abstinence, whereby desire 
is actively cultivated, but in order to be sublimated and spiritualised, as in the tantric yoga 
developed even earlier in the East, is one that recognizes erotic desire as a powerful force that is 
part of human nature, and as such to be welcomed; but as an aspect of self that can be 
downgraded, as it were, to mere physical discharge, in which case it is used up in the physical act, 
taking some of the lover’s reserves of strength along with it; or can be upgraded, through retention 
and modification of expression, to love. But far from being modified merely by will-power and 
repression (always highly problematic techniques of the self), the route to this transformation is a 
surprising one. 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates describes a “kind of madness … which occurs when someone sees 
beauty here on earth and is reminded of true beauty. His wings begin to grow and he wants to take 
to the air on his new plumage. […] So the point is that this turns out to be the most thoroughly 
good of all kinds of possession, not only for the man who is possessed, but also for anyone who is 
touched by it, and the word “lover” refers to a lover of beauty who has been possessed by this kind 
of madness.”(249a)60 Socrates says that we cannot see wisdom, but that “as with everything else 
which is an object of love, wisdom would cause terrible pangs of love in us if it presented some 
kind of clear image of itself by approaching our organ of sight. But as things are, it is only beauty 
which has the property of being especially visible and especially lovable.”(250a)61 Coleridge 
                                                 
60 Plato, Phaedrus, Oxford  World Classics, transl, Waterfield, Robin, 2002, p.33 
61 Ibid.,p.34 
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expresses this fusion of the visible and the loveable (as ‘feeling’), when he writes of the beauty of 
the sky: “Deep sky […] is of all visual impressions the nearest akin to a feeling. It is more of a 
feeling than a sight, or rather, it is the melting away and entire union of feeling and sight.”62  
However, for Socrates, anyone who is “corrupted” will not be drawn “towards beauty as it really 
is. Instead, he gazes on its namesake here on earth, and the upshot is that the sight does not arouse 
reverence in him. No, he surrenders to pleasure and tries like an animal to mount his partner”. 
Whereas for those “surrounded by rays of pure light, being pure ourselves and untainted by this 
object we call a ‘body’ and which we carry around with us now, imprisoned like shellfish.” 
(250a)63 When this awakened person “sees a marvellous face or a bodily form which is a good 
reflection of beauty, at first he shivers […] and the sight also moves him to revere his beloved as if 
he were a god.” (251a)64 The ugly Socrates, the butt of many a joke in the Athenian marketplace, 
who “ ‘spends his whole life,’ says Alcibiades, ‘playing the part of a simpleton and a child’ ”, 
(PWL, 148) could suddenly remove the mask, and reveal the ray of pure light. Hadot quotes 
Kierkegaard saying: “One can deceive a person for the truth’s sake, and (to recall old Socrates) 
one can deceive a person into the truth. Indeed, it is only by this means, i.e. by deceiving him, that 
it is possible to bring into truth one who is in an illusion.” (Ibid., 150)  
Foucault says that the Socrates of the Symposium demonstrates the powers of “physical endurance, 
the ability to make oneself indifferent to sensations, and the power to absent oneself from the body 
and concentrate all the soul’s energy on oneself.” But that he does this in the context of erotic 
relationship, and his total self-mastery is what qualifies him “as the highest object of love to which 
young men might appeal, but at the same time, as the only one who can guide their love all the 
way to the truth.” (UP, 242)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 Quoted in Grant, M. op cit, p.105 
63 Plato, Phaedrus, op.cit. pp.33-34 
64 Ibid. 
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Ch. 4. Bodies and Pleasures 
 
1. The History of sexuality 
 
The history of sexuality which Foucault set out to write, before, as he said on many occasions, 
getting bored with it, and moving on to more interesting things, was never, as the innocent reader 
might at first suspect, a “history” of “sexuality”. To write such a history would be to accept the 
notion that there is such a thing as sexuality that can therefore have a history, and this Foucault 
denied. What he did want to write was the history of the concept of sexuality and its operations: 
how it arose, from what social practices, how it became the object of so much discourse, how it 
entered into our way of reading ourselves and there became so crucial to our identity and to 
rendering us more docile and controllable. 
In the same vein, Volume 1 of his trilogy on The History of Sexuality is called The Will to 
Knowledge (La volonté du savoir)65, but this does not refer to any substantive “will”; not to the 
will of an individual, or to a characteristic of human beings in general. It is instead a sort of 
metaphor: the only knowledge he is concerned with here is knowledge of “sexuality”, and the 
“will” refers to what Foucault saw as a generalized pursuit of knowledge concerning human 
beings – that is to say, ourselves – as creatures characterized in the first instance by our sexual 
desires. Foucault had the intuition, and on investigation, the conviction, that this conception was 
so prevalent in modern Western society, that it functioned as an epistemic underpinning of both 
our human sciences and our way of understanding ourselves, and therefore living our lives. When 
he began this enquiry the prevalent notion regarding sexuality was, he says, that, up to the 
seventeenth century the “[c]odes “regulating the coarse, the obscene and the indecent were quite 
lax compared to those of the nineteenth century. It was a time of direct gestures, shameless 
discourse, and open transgressions, when anatomies were shown and intermingled at will, and 
knowing children hung about amidst the laughter of adults” (WK, 3). The Renaissance codpiece 
may stand (as it were) as sufficient symbolic confirmation of this. But, the theory (that called the 
“repressive hypothesis” by Foucault) continues: all of this was suppressed in the Victorian 
nineteenth century, pushing discourse on sexuality out of sight, and it was hoped, out of mind.  
Conversely, Foucault’s investigations revealed instead a steady increase in such discourse, and 
against the repressive hypothesis he argues that:  
                                                 
65 The echo of substantive philosophical uses of the term “will”, in Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, three of his 
preferred authors, is misleading here. 
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since the end of the sixteenth century ‘the putting into discourse of sex’, far from undergoing a process of 
restriction, on the contrary has been subjected to a mechanism of increasing incitement; […] the techniques of 
power exercised over sex have not obeyed a principle of rigorous selection, but rather of dissemination and 
implantation of polymorphous sexualities; and … the will to knowledge has not come to a halt in the face of a 
taboo that must not be lifted, but has persisted in constituting… a science of sexuality. (WK, 12-13)  
 
 
The high rhetoric here was a style Foucault used when faced with “common knowledge” of a 
particularly entrenched kind. It worked. Not in the sense that he won the argument against the 
repressive hypothesis, and not, as he had himself written with regard to Marx, Nietzsche and 
Freud, that he had merely added to or “multiplied the [interpretive] signs”, but in the sense that, as 
he said of those three titans: they have “changed the nature of the sign itself, and modified the way 
in which it can, in general, be interpreted.”66 “Sexuality” was certainly among the key signs of the 
times that Foucault modified profoundly. It can no longer be used as a given. These concepts 
consecrated as ‘signs’ are pivotal to the interweaving of knowledge and power; and as he says: 
“[a]s to power relations themselves, to an extremely important extent, these operate through the 
production and exchange of signs.”67 
In Foucault’s reconstruction, the “science of sexuality” thus constitutes a kind of secular 
continuation of the form of “hermeneutics of desire” that had been introduced by the medieval 
Catholic Church through the practice of confession. In their various practices, each of these 
specific forms of introspection finds what it is seeking – the sin of desire in a Catholic context, the 
biological drives underlying sexuality in the laboratories, and one’s individual psychological 
variant of these drives in the troubled modern secular soul. In each case, by focusing our attention 
on something presumed to exist, and called sexuality, this “will to knowledge” simultaneously 
problematizes and invents it. That is to say, if I am not aware of having something called a 
sexuality, it is not a problem for me, and I can live without such knowledge, describing my 
experiences in other ways; but once I am in possession of such knowledge, it is also in possession 
of me, as it were – I cannot leave it out of my account of myself, to myself.  
The moral codes of all societies impose prohibitions on sexual practice that differ greatly, though 
all are of crucial importance to social organization; but not all societies have a word that denotes 
“sexuality” and connotes both the species characteristic of being permanently characterized by 
sexual desire or its sublimations, and the individual characteristic of identity based on one’s 
particular, and psychologically fixed, variant among available themes: heterosexual, homosexual, 
                                                 
66 “Marx, Nietzsche and Freud”, DE, pp. 596-597 
67 “Le sujet et le pouvoir”, DE, p.1055 
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bisexual, sadomasochistic, pedophile etc. For this reason, Foucault is particularly concerned not to 
give the impression that there is something real and universal – called “sex”, that needs to be 
discovered by removing the veil of the historically circumscribed “sexuality”. On the contrary: 
 
We must not refer a history of sexuality to the agency of sex; but rather show how “sex” is subordinate to 
sexuality. We must not place sex on the side of reality, and sexuality on that of confused ideas and illusions; 
sexuality is a very real historical formation; it is what gave rise to the notion of sex, as a speculative element 
necessary to its operation. […] It is the agency of sex that we must break away from, if we aim […] to counter 
the grips of power with the claims of bodies, pleasures and knowledges, in their multiplicity and their 
possibility of resistance. (WK, 157)  
 
His apparent insistence here on the precedence of concept over experience appears to verge on 
idealism, which, in the context of the anti-naturalist stance he takes can be hard to avoid. But 
Foucault would insist that in his study of “discursive practices” as descriptions of reality, in all 
their plurality and contingency, he makes no claims about the status of the reality that is the object 
of the discourse; other, that is, than the fact that it is in fact subject to various possible 
descriptions, as the empirical record of the changes in discursive practices confirms. Here he 
applies this “nominalist” method to “sex”, as he had previously, and infamously applied it to the 
concepts of “man” and “power”, declaring, for example that “man” did not exist before nineteenth 
century science invented him.68 Clearly therefore, that certain human practices to do with bodily 
pleasures, the reproduction of the species, the basic institutions of human societies and their 
organization and prohibitions do all have to do with something we call sex is not what is at issue 
here. What is at issue is the agency of sex. For Foucault, it is the discourse on sexuality that places 
sex in the role of agent, rather than object, of such a significant part of these human practices. 
 
 
2. Bodies and pleasures 
 
The rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not to be sex-desire, but 
bodies and pleasures. (Ibid.)  
 
                                                 
68 For a discussion of his “historical nominalism” see Flynn, “Foucault’s Mapping of History,” in CCF pp. 29-48. 
Flynn notes that for Foucault: “It is the historian’s task to uncover discursive and nondiscursive practices in their 
plurality and contingency in order to reveal the fields that render intelligible an otherwise heterogeneous collection of 
events. There is no foundational principle, no organising or final cause.” (p.40) 
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As near as one gets to a political slogan in Foucault69 (and this is it), what we have is not “We 
shall overcome” or “Venceremos”, (though his work on prisons could perhaps be considered a 
contemporary “Ά la Bastille, citoyens”), but the enigmatic “bodies and pleasures”. What Foucault 
is attempting to do, with this “bodies and pleasures”, is to displace sexuality, construed as rooted 
in bio-psychological desire, from its central place in our relation to ourselves; and to replace it 
with something that is determined by thought, by choice; and yet to this something he gives the 
paradoxical name of “bodies and pleasures”. 
“The deployment of sexuality”, against which “bodies and pleasures” should be our rallying point, 
was already a vast affair in his writings; part of “the great technology of power in the nineteenth 
[and into the twentieth] century” (WK, 140). This technology of power, which Foucault also calls 
“bio-power”, a term which has readily lent itself, to his regret, to use in polemics, involved 
“numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of 
populations” (Ibid.). Among these techniques, or “specific mechanisms of knowledge and power 
centering on sex” (WK, 103), Foucault listed four in particular: firstly, the hysterization of 
women’s bodies (he was not dealing with twentieth century techniques, when the medicalization 
of first childbirth, then pregnancy and conception, replaced hysteria in this scenario); secondly, the 
pedagogization of children’s sex, including “the war against onanism, which in the West lasted 
nearly two centuries”, and was to be conducted by parents, “educators, doctors, and eventually 
psychologists”; thirdly, the socialization of procreative behaviour, involving economic, medical 
and political intervention in the lives of couples and families; and finally, the psychiatrization of 
perverse pleasures. (WK, 104-105)  
The “counterattack” against all this has therefore to do with resisting that subjugation, and that 
control, in all the domains in which they are manifest. But it must be more than this. Foucault says 
that, in general, “there are three kinds of struggle: those that oppose forms of domination (ethnic, 
social and religious); those that denounce forms of exploitation that separate the individual from 
what he produces; and those that combat everything that ties the individual to himself, and thus 
ensures his submission to others”.70 These are not mutually exclusive, and often are mixed, but for 
him the first form typified the pre-modern era, the second form typified the nineteenth century 
struggles, and: “today, it is the struggle against forms of subjection – against the submission of 
subjectivity – that prevails more and more, even though the struggles against domination and 
                                                 
69 Which is not to suggest that Foucault was not politically active, just that he avoided slogans. 
70 Le sujet et le pouvoir, Dits et Ecrits 306, p.1046 
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exploitation have not disappeared – on the contrary.”71 Resisting the deployment of sexuality is, in 
the first place, a struggle against a particular form of subjection, and as such it must be conducted 
on two terrains: outside and inside of the self. Outside, against the practices to which submission is 
required, and inside against that particular form of power which: 
 
classifies individuals in categories, denotes them by their own individuality, attaches them to their identity, 
imposes on them a law of truth they have to recognize, and that others must recognize in them. It is a form of 
power that transforms individuals into subjects. There are two meanings to this word “subject”: that of the 
subject subjected to the other by control and dependence, and that of the subject attached to his own identity by 
consciousness or self-knowledge. (Ibid.)  
  
What “bodies and pleasures” may therefore mean in this context of struggle is not immediately 
easy to see. As Foucault uses the phrase, it clearly refers to something that is tangential to the 
usual connotations of “bodies” or “pleasures”, and to make things more difficult, the notion 
operates in different ways on different levels. At the most concrete level, he uses it to refer to the 
culturally circumscribed phenomenon of certain sexual practices that were first popularized in gay 
and lesbian ghettos on the East and west coasts of the USA in the 1970s and 1980s. These were 
elaborated to explore the possibility of maximizing sexual pleasure using parts of the body other 
than the genitals; or, where the genitals are used, as in certain sado-masochistic (hereafter S/M) 
practices, they are used in such a way as to denigrate “virility” in favour of intense, but non-virile 
sensory experience.72 
At the ethical level, Foucault sees these practices, freely chosen, as a means of constructing a way 
of life and a new identity on one’s own terms; in other words, as a new and self-determined 
subjectivation, with its own social and political dimensions. “To resist” Foucault says, resistance 
“must be like power; as inventive, as mobile, as productive. [… Like power, resistance] comes 
from below, and distributes itself strategically.” (NSR, 267) When questioned on his own 
celebrated remark – that where there is power, there is resistance – he replied, and this is 
important, that: “I am not positing a substance of resistance in the face of a substance of power. 
I’m simply saying: where there is a relationship of power, there is a possibility of resistance. We 
are never trapped by power: one can always modify its hold, in determined conditions, and 
according to a precise strategy.” (Ibid.)  
                                                 
71 Ibid. p.1047  
72 Halperin writes : “[S/M] involves the eroticization of non-genital regions of the body […] And it finds other erotic 
uses for the genitals than stimulation to the point of orgasm. S/M therefore represents a remapping of the body’s erotic 
sites […] a breakup of the erotic monopoly traditionally held by the genitals, and even a re-eroticization of the male 
genitals as sites of vulnerability instead of as objects of veneration.” Saint Foucault, p.88 
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Though the reference to pleasure in this context of resistance is explicitly sexual (nor is ‘bodies’ 
given any other interpretation or exemplification) Foucault nonetheless sees these practices as 
opposed to “sex-desire” and describes them as forms of “désexualisation”. In discussing the “S/M 
subculture” he says:  
 
We know very well that what these people do is not aggressive; that they invent new possibilities of pleasure in 
utilising certain bizarre parts of their bodies – in eroticizing this body. I think that here we have a sort of 
creation, of creative enterprise, one of the principal characteristics of which is what I call the desexualisation of 
pleasure. The idea that physical pleasure always comes from sexual pleasure, and the idea that sexual pleasure 
is the basis of all possible pleasures, that, I think, is really something false.73 
 
There is a kind of misfit here, which appears whenever Foucault discusses these problems74, 
between the vastness of the problem, and the restrictedness of the proposal put forward. The 
problem – the sexualisation of the subjected subject – starts with suspicion about the sexual nature 
of the baby’s pleasure in sucking it’s bottle, and proceeds through all our acts, desires and dreams 
of phallic trains.75 This sexualisation, as if in confirmation of Foucault’s observations, has been 
further highlighted in recent years by the transformation of the English adjective “sexy”, which 
from its obvious origins has now come to mean anything that is exciting, stimulating, new and 
original – it has almost come to substitute “good”, at least in the world of publicity and the media 
which dominates the contemporary imagination. It has also become internationalised as an 
untranslatable neologism in many languages. 
  
Clearly Freud represented a major turning point in the history of this aspect of the present; and 
Foucault certainly saw him as a major innovator  – as he says, as one who changed the way in 
which the signs he operates with may be used  – but not as ex novis, as if out of nowhere. Rather, 
he saw him as having drawn together and reformulated a whole series of genealogical 
developments that led to this sexualising of the subject. And Foucault saw his own role in this, as 
historian of thought, as being that of an excavator of whatever genealogies had led to Freud. As he 
says, the “history of the deployment of sexuality, as it has evolved since the classical age, can 
serve as an archeology of psychoanalysis.” (WK, 130) He was not going to take on Freud 
theoretically, however, as the prime converter of everything long, hard and straightish into a 
phallus, nor was he going to hazard an attempt at discrediting psychoanalytic theory (apart from 
digging around its genealogical roots, perhaps) – which has in any case become partially 
                                                 
73 « Michel Foucault, une interview : sexe, pouvoir et la politique de l’identité », DE, pp.1556-57 
74 Partly because they were often interviews for homosexual journals, more oriented towards practice than theory. 
75 With regard to Freud’s key role in this, Murdoch too, while respecting and drawing on his work, is highly 
sceptically of the sexualisation of the notion of the human his theories have promoted, as we will see.  
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“desexualised” over the years, from within its leading discourses and practice. Nonetheless, to 
describe “eroticizing the body” as a principal characteristic of desexualisation, and at the same 
time never describe any other characteristics of desexualisation, leads to some confusion. The 
word “erotic” for Foucault evokes the notion of ars erotica,76 of an art of life, which he contrasted 
with the intrusive science of sexuality; whereas in ordinary usage today the sphere of reference of 
“erotic” tends not to go beyond that of exciting, as opposed to boring, sex; or its representations. 
This  – many would no doubt agree  – is a good thing, but it doesn’t make it any easier to see it as 
the central practice of a new form of desexualised subjectivation.  
 
Halperin notes that “[t]he notion of “desexualisation” is a key one for Foucault, and it has been 
much misunderstood.” 77 He points out that Foucault’s use of desexualisation is partly due to the 
fact that the word “sexe” in French, connotes, along with the standard connotations in 
contemporary English usage, the genital organs. This would leave us with the meaning of 
“degenitalise” or “devirilise”, rather than desexualise, but this does not really clear up the 
confusion, as desexualisation, in either language (he discussed it in both), is about desexualising 
the self for Foucault, that is to say, it is both about rejecting classification on grounds of one’s 
sexual identity (and gender, if somewhat as an after-thought), and more importantly, about 
rejecting a form of self-reading, centred on one’s desires, that was self-judgemental. This being the 
case, whether one’s sexual pleasures are genital-centred or non-genital, genital mortifying as in 
some S/M practices, foot-fetishist, or whatever, would seem to make little difference to the form 
of subjectivation Foucault set himself to struggle against – that of a hermeneutics of the self based 
on the hermeneutics of desire. 
 
His recasting of the term “pleasures” to carry the connotation of “freely chosen”, in juxtaposition 
with “desires”, which biology and psychology have laden with heavy connotations of being driven 
by forces outside of our control, is of course legitimate within the bounds of a form of discourse 
which recognizes that the concepts that we apply to selected bits of a complex reality are merely 
useful analytical tools, not existential truths. But there is a certain slippage between the two modes 
in Foucault’s use of these terms, as if to suggest that our choices of our sexual “pleasures” could 
                                                 
76 In 1983, in “The Genealogy of Ethics”, EWF1, p.259, Foucault disclaimed what he had written about ars erotica in 
The History of Sexuality, saying: “One of the numerous points where I was wrong in that book was what I said about 
the ars erotica […] The Greeks and Romans did not have any ars erotica to be compared with the Chinese ars erotica 
[…].” The disclaimer refers specifically to the Greeks and Romans, but it was also highly questionable in its other 
references, particularly as regards Indian practices. 
77 See David Halperin, Saint Foucault, p.88   
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be completely detached from our “desires” and determined intellectually, as an ascetic act of self-
creation. This would of course be impossible to establish, and Foucault was not interested in either 
attempting to establish it, or in getting tangled in the controversy that such a claim, baldly stated, 
would provoke; but much that he said or wrote on the question tends to suggest this. What is 
happening, for example, in such sentences  – and there are many  – as: “What we must work on, it 
seems to me, is not so much to liberate our desires but to make ourselves infinitely more 
susceptible to pleasures”? (FWL, 137) This hovers around the borderline between these two uses. 
If one is familiar with Foucault’s argument in this connection, one will read into this a reference to 
his entire discourse on the deployment of sexuality and its capacity to incorporate the liberation of 
desires within its net; but this is an interview in a popular gay magazine Le Gai Pied, where not all 
of his readers can be presumed to think Foucauldian “desire” and “pleasure”. The unanswered 
question here is: what could it mean to make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to pleasures if 
one has not liberated one’s desires? 
This ambiguity serves his experimental purposes, both theoretical and practical. Theoretically the 
ambiguity serves his own thought experiments, where thinking the impossible, breaking the 
historical and epistemic taboos on what can be thought, opens up new perspectives from which to 
read the world and the self. Practically it served the purposes he shared with those of his audience 
who were engaged in these practices rather than, or as well as, in academic discourse. It indicates a 
raising of the level of experimentation with bodies and pleasures from the bodily and social to the 
spiritual level, the level of self-transformation. Certainly Foucault was loved by communities who 
were stigmatised for their sexual practices, for whom the support of this eminent scholar gave a 
great sense of dignity. His analysis of counter-conduct has shown that even the least consciously 
determined resistance can bring about new and less oppressed forms of subjectivation; though 
perhaps the idea of a spiritual dimension to this, the idea of “self-transformation” needs to be kept 
for intentional processes – “for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious 
[réfléchie] practice of freedom?” (ECS, 284)  
 
 
3. Queering the self 
 
Foucault’s theoretical interest in the question of whether it is desire or pleasure that is 
problematized, together with his rejection of the various problematizations which treat them as a 
binary pair, dates from the beginnings of his investigations for The History of Sexuality in the early 
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1970s; but it was some time later that he began to see, or at least to discuss publicly, a connection 
with a new life-style, centred on sexual pleasures, that was at that time emerging in the United 
States. He used this to make of “bodies and pleasures” one of his various new objectifications, in 
this case in order to elaborate a discourse for this practice from the perspective of the participants, 
rather than of the scientific panopticon. This was welcomed, by the relevant community – whether 
he was actually read or just mythicized (as “Saint Foucault,” as Halperin so aptly put it), and just 
as he has been demonized elsewhere – to the point where Foucault has become indispensable to 
the further elaboration of discourse in and on this way of life.  
This new identity, new subjectivation, born in the USA and quickly taken up in Europe, Australia, 
etc. has, however, taken for itself the symbolically more powerful sign of “queer”, leaving “bodies 
and pleasures” to the academics. “Queer”, which is applicable as an adjective (in standard English) 
to all oddity, but has for some decades been used as a disparaging noun to refer to homosexuals, 
has thus been reclaimed as a source of pride, rather than shame. In this sense, the queer movement 
follows very closely the lines laid down by “black pride” and “gay pride”, which had made giant 
strides in reclaiming the equal human dignity of those people that had been denied it.78 In so 
doing, however, they had to some extent “normalized” themselves. Instead, the adoption of a 
queer identity, which incorporates a whole range of sexual practices and behaviours that confound 
the linking of identity to both gender and life-style – cross-dressing, camp, transexuality, s/m, etc. 
–reclaims “abnormality”, again rejecting normalization79; though there is a sense in which this 
quest for the acceptability of the “abnormal,” construed as defence and promotion of the enormous 
variation of human ways of being, extends the boundaries of the “normal”, making them very 
inclusive and elastic. (One wonders what Foucault would have had to say on the current 
international gay objective of the recognition of marriage.) 
As a form of subjectivation, however, queering is much more radical than the claim of equality 
(normality) and civil rights. It requires much more honesty with oneself to reclaim difference than 
to reclaim sameness, and honesty requires courage. To “come out” as gay or lesbian takes courage, 
to come out as “queer” even more so, and this is surely the reason why Foucault saw much more 
potential for self-reconstruction in these practices than in the claims for civil rights; and yet at no 
stage does he tell us what – besides bodies and pleasures, which must be the easy part – the 
considerable self-work required for this transformation consists in. There seems to be a 
                                                 
78 And which, in changing forms, continue to evolve. 
79 The feminist movement, active throughout the period and similarly responsible for introducing new forms of 
subjectivation, was more concerned with challenging “normality” than with normalization. 
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fundamental contradiction in the notion of freeing ourselves from self-definition based on 
“sexuality” (understood as labels corresponding to drives – hetero, homo, S/M, undersexed, frigid, 
oversexed, nymphomaniac, etc.) by the sole instrument of exploring our bodies and pleasures, with 
no need of any other techniques of the self, designed to further the self-transformation process that 
may be thus set in motion. “Coming out” can itself clearly be seen as a form of courageous truth-
speaking, to the world and to oneself; as an important contemporary form of the ethical practice of 
parrhesia, the self-work which was to occupy Foucault so centrally in his final years, but in a 
different context; and yet he never explicitly makes this connection.  
 
In terms not only of liberation, but crucially of self-construction, the case could be made that this 
parrhesia of coming out was ultimately far more self-transforming than bodies and pleasures. 
Foucault does tell us that these body practices engender the establishment of communities, and 
new forms of friendship among their members; presenting them, therefore, as central to a new life-
style in which one can freely construct oneself, and thus as the complementary social dimension to 
this form of subjectivation. Along with the (outer, individual) level of sexual practice and the 
(inner, individual) ethical level of self-work, there is thus this third level of social practice. In 
discussions on this, however, he appears to rely on our contemporary “common knowledge” that 
individuals derive strength and therefore courage from not being alone, in their ideas and in their 
practices; but he never undertook, or perhaps never had time to undertake, a scholarly study of this 
nascent form of subjectivation; and therefore never explored the two-way nature of the 
connections between private pleasures and community practices in contemporary reality. Nor did 
he ever draw directly on his extensive studies of Greek problematisations of the ethics of private 
pleasure and community relations. “Bodies and pleasures” is thus left carrying the responsibility 
for this work of self-reconstruction, a burden that seems too heavy for such a limited (if intense) 
practice.  
 
 
4. Theory and practice 
 
In the practices of gay and lesbian communities, the notion of bodies and pleasures has been 
joyfully taken up, but theoretically it has remained in limbo; as neither a fully-fledged theory, nor 
as the idea of one moment that will be discarded in another. This is because Foucault left it, at his 
death, at the stage of a sketch of an idea that would have to be thoroughly explored to determine 
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its operative potential. It would therefore be unfair to accuse Foucault of theoretical inadequacy on 
grounds of work he was unable to complete; but at the same time the problems with this idea 
require attention. “The rallying point […] ought not to be sex-desire, but bodies and pleasures.” 
(WK 157) This juxtaposition of sex-desire and bodies and pleasures is evidently a juxtaposition of 
bodily driven “desire” and – despite the Foucauldian shifting of “bodies” from the one camp to the 
other – mentally determined “pleasures”. It is the individual and interpersonal imagination that 
invents and experiments with pleasures, not the deep, dark compulsion driving desire. But he is 
not suggesting some kind of ontological separation of desire and pleasure. Foucault’s major 
philosophical battle, running through all his work, was with the kind of essentialism that presents 
concepts as substances, as if “madness” or “sexuality” or “desire” or “pleasure” were universal 
realities that take on different historical forms. He insists that his entire method is nominalist, 
seeing concepts as meshes of historically specific discourses that need to be unravelled and 
understood in context, without any universal substance lurking beneath them.  
The great difficulty here is that he uses ordinary words with non-ordinary sets of connotations, 
selecting the connotations useful to him, and substituting others, so that he appears to be creating 
new universals – Foucauldian sexuality is not “sexuality”, Foucauldian discipline is not 
“discipline”, Foucauldian pleasure is not “pleasure”, they are not their ordinary uses, but they are 
something else. That something else, in the case of the way “bodies and pleasure” is used as an 
injunction, may merely be a reference to a nascent historical practice that can be used strategically 
to counter the prevailing form of subjectivation - the hermeneutics of desire; and thereby to initiate 
a new one; but treating desire and pleasure as if they were two different things, rather than 
different modalities of description, leaves a world of problems – theoretical and practical – without 
any answers. Theoretically, if we are to abandon the bio-psychological notion of desire, with its 
outdated but persistent aura of guilt and sin, do we not need another notion of desire, in relation to 
the new notion of pleasure? Foucault says that “for centuries, people in general – but also doctors, 
psychiatrists and even the liberation movements – have always spoken of desire, and never of 
pleasure. “We must liberate our desire” they say. No! We must create new pleasures. Then 
perhaps desire will follow.” (DE, 1557) But is this then a different “desire”? And at the practical 
level, if the current mode of subjection has me experiencing my choice of pleasures as determined 
by my desires, do I not have to unlearn this mode of self-reading before I can believe that I can 
freely choose my pleasures? Is the intellectual decision to do so sufficient in and of itself to bring 
about a change in my subjectivation? In all his discussions of the relation of the self to itself, 
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Foucault never addressed these problems. He drew upon the Greeks, however, to reinforce his 
argument.  
 
In contrast to medieval Christianity and to psychology – throughout its short history – both of 
which problematized desire almost exclusively, he shows that the Greeks problematized pleasures 
(he comments on different forms of problematization in Plato, Xenophenes, Aristotle, the Stoics, 
Epicureans, etc., providing many convincing examples80). But while it is clearly true that the 
Greeks problematized pleasures, especially sexual pleasures, it is also true that much of that 
problematization had to do with their relation to existing ethical codes, and the kinds of moral 
balancing acts that the contradictions inherent in the satisfaction of their desires in the light of 
those codes involved. As Foucault says: “The goal of moral reflection on the aphrodisia was […] 
to work out the conditions and modalities of a “use”; that is, to define a style for what the Greeks 
called chresis aphrodision, the uses of pleasure.” (UP, 53) Foucault specifically contrasts this with 
moral reflection designed to “establish a systematic code that would determine the canonical forms 
of sexual acts, trace out the boundary of the prohibitions” (Ibid.) etc. in other words, with 
Christian asceticism; but the context of these “uses of pleasure” was not the furtherance of 
enjoyment, as this juxtaposition might suggest – which seems to have been Foucault’s original 
working hypothesis –but sexual austerity, as he came to understand in the course of his studies. 
The problematic was always how to restrict sexual activity, keep it, at most, to what was 
considered a healthy regime, under the sign of moderation. This was of course a fairly rudimentary 
form of self-work, and we have seen how Foucault traced it through its deontological forms in 
early antiquity, through to its more ascetic forms in Hellenistic and Roman times. 
The interesting question, however, is the connection between theory – in this case theoretical 
understanding of the way in which our thoughts shape our pleasures and desires – and ethical 
practice, a question at the forefront of both Epicurean and Stoic ascesis, but one that Foucault does 
not explore. There is a curious mismatch between his insightful discussion of Stoic conceptions of 
the self as subject (discussed in Ch. 5), where he shows their unitary conception of body and soul, 
and his shallower discussion of the techniques they use in relation to their pleasures and desires, 
where the practices in which this unitary conception – that is to say, where its significance as a 
mode of subjectivation is revealed – is disregarded. In effect, he describes (backing what he says, 
as is his scholarly practice, with detailed presentations) mostly those self-repressive practices that 
                                                 
80 In particular in the three volumes of The History of Sexuality. 
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undoubtedly existed, but formed only a part (the most violent, the least refined, therefore possibly 
for beginners rather than adepts) of the techniques of the self elaborated by Stoics. 
In various texts and interviews, he reiterates the view that, for the Stoics: 
 
the problem is to learn through the teaching of a number of truths and doctrines, some of which are 
fundamental principles while others are rules of conduct. You must proceed in such a way that these principles 
tell you, in each situation, and, as it were spontaneously, how to conduct yourself. It is here that one encounters 
a metaphor that comes not from the Stoics but from Plutarch: “You must learn the principles in such a constant 
way that whenever your desires, appetites and fears awake like barking dogs, the logos will speak like the voice 
of the master who silences his dogs with a single cry.” Here we have the idea of a logos functioning, as it were, 
without any intervention on your part; you have become the logos, or the logos has become you. (ECS, 285-
286)  
 
This view, which presents Stoic practice as a form of self-programming, undoubtedly corresponds 
to one aspect of that practice: that of the necessity, in a basically oral tradition, of committing to 
memory the wise words that one hopes will guide one’s life; but with regard to working with one’s 
pleasures or desires, it is the only aspect of Stoic practice Foucault treats extensively, and the 
relation to the self it determines is one of the imposition of the will on one’s desires – not at all the 
reflective problematization of pleasure he was looking for. Such a problematization did indeed 
exist, the Stoics were indeed concerned with observing the work of the imagination in determining 
what was pleasurable, but their response was not merely one of the superimposition of a set of 
self-programmed principles, thus constraining desire. It was rather one of activating the intellect, 
through reflection on one’s representations of pleasure, in such a way that one’s desire itself would 
change, from the inside, as it were, rather than by imposition of the will, governed by a separate 
reason. In this sense one would become the logos, not by commanding oneself like a dog. This 
particular comment of Plutarch’s, seems to suggest that the Stoics saw the passions as one thing, 
like Plato’s unruly black horse, and the logos (as reason), as the charioteer, but this is not the case, 
and Foucault had elsewhere clarified the differences between the Platonic and Stoic conceptions. 
Plutarch himself wrote in different styles, either for different audiences or with a different focus, 
thus he also writes of the Stoics that: “they affirm that passion itself is reason, but depraved and 
vicious reason, which, as a result of bad and mistaken judgement, grows strong and vigorous.”81 
In this perspective, working with one’s passions was thus construed as self-work that was internal 
to reason, involving reflecting on one’s judgements of pleasure and pain, and reformulating them. 
The memorized principles were of use in this, but in their reflective application to each judgement, 
in all its particularity. Pleasure in what life offered one spontaneously – beauty, health, security, 
                                                 
81 Plutarch, On Moral Virtue, 3, 441c, quoted in Hadot, IC, op.cit, p.108 
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random acts of kindness, etc. – was not a problem for the Stoics; what was problematized were 
precisely those pleasures that were seen as driven by desire, not chosen, and the pains that were 
driven by aversion, and the ethical consequences of succumbing to the unreflective representation 
of such pleasures and pains; for the unreflective life (and the unreflective desire) was not worth 
living.  
There are of course pleasures that occur by chance or through a decision to experiment, that have 
no connection to a pre-existing desire, and Foucault proposes, as a technique of the self, 
experimenting with untried bodily pleasures – to see where it might take you – but if perchance it 
takes you to new desires, he is silent as to how this technique may then evolve. This is of course 
entirely consistent on a practical level with his rejection of the role of philosopher-prophet, of the 
philosopher stipulating solutions;82 and the second step he did envisage was in fact a lateral one, 
into the formation of communities around these pleasures, and forms of friendship. But whereas 
this stance legitimately releases him from offering practical solutions, it does not release him from 
the requirement of theoretical coherence regarding what pleasure not driven by desire can actually 
mean.  
There was, for example, a form of theoretically coherent “pleasure” without desire for the Stoics, 
though this was never an objective in itself, merely a result of pursuing one’s only objective of a 
life lived in virtue83 guided by reason. Seneca says:  
 
Pleasure is not a reward for virtue, nor its cause, but is something added on to it. Virtue is not chosen because it 
causes pleasure, but if it is chosen, it does cause pleasure. (Cited in IC, 240)  
  
The absolute and necessary key to this pleasure without desire was in not seeking it, was freedom 
from attachment; just as the key to pain without aversion was not running from it.84 How is this 
possible? It requires a whole series of techniques, which can also be read, as Foucault tends to read 
them, as techniques of self-mastery within the framework of care of the self. What he calls “the 
Socratic imperative: ‘Take care of yourself’ which means ‘Found yourself in freedom, by 
mastering yourself.’ ” (DE, 1548).  If the ultimate goal is wisdom and virtue however (and not, 
                                                 
82  “I never behave like a prophet – my books don’t tell people what to do. And they often reproach me for not doing 
so (and maybe they are right), and at the same time they reproach me for behaving like a prophet” (WK, 131) 
83 Robin Campbell, in the Introduction to his translation of Seneca’s Letters, writes that through Stoic practice, “we 
shall arrive at the true end of man, happiness, through having attained the one and only good thing in life, the ideal or 
goal called arete in Greek and in Latin virtus – for which the English word ‘virtue is so unsatisfactory a translation. 
This, the summum bonum or ‘supreme ideal’, is usually summarized in ancient philosophy as a combination of four 
qualities: wisdom (or moral insight), courage, self-control and justice (or upright dealing).” pp.15-16 
84 The Stoics loved these paradoxes, see also Seneca’s Letter LXII “the shortest route to wealth is the contempt of 
wealth” Seneca, Letters from a Stoic, p.16 
 105 
clearly, if the goal is mastery over others within the State), then self-mastery means freedom from 
desire and aversion. And in effect, many of what Foucault calls the techniques of the self in 
antiquity were more to do with dismantling the pre-constituted self – with subjecting one’s ideas 
and impulses to merciless scrutiny  – than with constructing a new one. The new self – like 
pleasure that is a by-product of virtue – tends to be conceived more as something that follows upon 
freeing oneself from the notions in which the old self is trapped than something intentionally 
constructed. This desire (if I may use the word) of Foucault’s to envision a process of self-
construction without any acknowledgement of the need, precisely in the interests of that self-
construction, to go through a process of dismantling the old self, comes through in all of his work, 
on sexuality and on other forms of relation to self, in interpretations of ancient philosophy and 
modern movements alike. 
 
 
5. Liberation and self-construction 
 
Foucault regarded sexual liberation movements as right in their immediate objectives of freeing 
one’s self, one’s relations and one’s life from repression, but wrong in overestimating what such 
liberation could achieve. The leading theorists of liberation85 were, he thought, fundamentally 
mistaken in thinking that these immediate objectives would lead to freeing the self of one of its 
major obstacles, because they continued to see sexuality, sex-desire (now liberated, and possibly 
even more demanding) as central to one’s being. He did not deny the fact that the lives of so many, 
homosexual and heterosexual, were blighted by sexual misery, but was reluctant to attribute this to 
repression, and he admits that he has not discussed this in his work. When questioned on it he 
replied “You are right: we all live more or less in a state of sexual misery. That being said, it is 
true that this lived experience is never dealt with in my book [History of Sexuality].” (NSR, 258) 
He goes on to explain that: “It is not a question of denying sexual misery, but nor is it about 
explaining it negatively, by repression. The whole problem is to grasp the positive mechanisms 
which, in producing sexuality in such or such a way, bring about effects of misery.” (Ibid.) 
What he means by this is that the sexual repression of modern times is not the objective of the 
power that brings it about, but rather a kind of by-product of its operations. He gives an example 
from an earlier period of modernity, that of the repression of infantile masturbation which took 
place at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and asks: “Must we admit that children’s 
                                                 
85 He was reluctant to name names other than in the case of Reich, (see WK, 5) 
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masturbation suddenly became unacceptable for a developing capitalist society? This is the 
hypothesis of certain “Reichians” of late. It does not seem to me satisfactory.” (Ibid.) What was 
important in his view was rather the reorganization and intensification of relationships between 
children and adults: “it was childhood as the nursery of future populations. At the crossroads of 
body and soul, of health and morality, of education and training, children’s sex became both a 
target and an instrument of power. […] The sexual misery of childhood and adolescence, of which 
our own generations have not yet freed themselves, derives from this, but this misery was not the 
aim; the objective was not prohibition. It was to constitute, through child sexuality which had 
suddenly become important and mysterious, a network of power over childhood.” (Ibid.)  
This may well be true, and it may have required Foucault to draw attention to it, but the argument 
is strangely “structural” and rigid, as if he was arguing with the Reichians on their own ground of 
primary historical causes and secondary effects – with power and control as the objective, and 
repression as the by-product – instead of adhering to his more usual critical practice of 
undermining the theoretical ground itself by demonstrating the complex interweaving of causes 
and effects of knowledge-power from above, below, sideways and from multiple contingencies. A 
more “Foucauldian” methodology might have given more importance to repression as a 
phenomenon in its own right, regardless of its ancillary role in other mechanisms of power; and by 
the same token, perhaps more importance to liberation struggles in the context of the relations of 
the self to itself. And this without detracting from his main point, that liberating ourselves from 
this repression would not free us from entrapment in reading ourselves as primarily sexual 
subjects. 
  
In pressing home this point, however, he again overlooks the need, in any process of self-
construction, to deconstruct the self that is already there. Underlying the notion of liberation from 
repression (and differing from sister struggles of liberation from oppression in this), he found the 
ontological notion of a “true self” requiring liberation; but unlike a Platonic true self that was free 
of all desire except the spiritual, this psychological true self was still attached to its sexual desire.  
For Foucault there was of course no true self, there was always self in relation to the particularities 
of a life, and the objective was rather a truthful self, conscious and self-directed. Our individual 
subjectivation, or self-formation, could either be dependent on conditioning, on the 
objectifications that our particular historical and social situation inculcate in us, or we could stand 
back from these objectifications (such as sexuality, perversity etc.), liberate ourselves from them, 
and choose other objectifications, (such as “bodies and pleasures”, queerness, etc.), for ourselves. 
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(He did not address the fact that people do not “choose” to be hetero or homosexual.). This latter 
move, the important one if one is concerned with constructing, rather than liberating the self as 
Foucault was, may well have occurred as a consequence of the process of liberation, but by 
chance, rather than intention, in the way that all counter-conduct opens up new existential 
possibilities, and this did not go far enough for Foucault. He wanted to overturn what he saw as a 
limited, negative paradigm of repression-liberation, and replace it with an open-ended, positive 
paradigm of inventive oppressive power, and inventive, transformative resistance. 
 
Self-construction requires that one’s acts, one’s life be determined intentionally, and certainly in 
his own life, Foucault did just that. He was bored by small talk and did not do dinner parties. He 
was interested in intense limit experiences, experiences that threatened to break down the pre-
constituted self, and he did those.86 The manner in which he experienced and intervened in the 
political realities of his time was utterly original, and reflected the values he had chosen for 
himself – the commitment to truth and truth-speaking above all – at whatever cost, and the costs in 
terms of the attacks he was subjected to were high. He was a philosopher in his own terms, almost 
unheard of in his day, which required philosophy to be a constant practice of questioning all 
received views, and of self-questioning. And he meant “bodies and pleasures” to recuperate the 
body – neglected by philosophy, tormented by religion, and colonized by science; and recuperate a 
human interest in sexual pleasures, somehow, but never clearly, detaching them from desire. 
  
But this is the rhetoric, and the only way Foucault in fact recuperated “bodies” theoretically was as 
objects of pleasure, not in the much more profound sense in which the eternally problematic 
mind/body dualism of the West was addressed in Stoic or Epicurean discourse, for example. 
“Bodies and pleasures” therefore really indicates “bodies as or for pleasures”, and the one 
important concept it contains is the Foucauldian notion of pleasure as consciously chosen, not 
driven by desire. The ancillary question of the body’s colonization by science was a separate 
problem which he had analysed in the context of disciplinary and regulatory society. 87 He did not 
however put forward ideas for, for example, dealing with the hyper-medicalization of the body 
                                                 
86 He writes: “some drugs are really important for me because they are the mediation to those incredibly intense joys 
that I am looking for, and that I am not able to experience, to afford by myself. I’m not able to give myself and others 
those middle-range pleasures that make up everyday life. Such pleasures are nothing for me, and I am not able to 
organize my life in order to make place for them. That’s the reason why I’m not a social being, why I’m not really a 
cultural being, why I’m so boring in my everyday life.” (ISR, 129) 
87 Discipline and Punish, Security, Territory, Population, Abnormal, etc. 
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today, as feminist theorists have done and continue to do, nor, having analysed them 
genealogically, did he express continued interest in such specific questions of bio-power.  
His notorious antagonism to the movements of sexual liberation was, however, greatly overstated 
by his political opponents. What he most objected to in relation to these movements was their 
manifestation of the strength of the Freudian-Marxist paradigm he saw as ubiquitous in the time of 
his own intellectual development in the 1950s and 1960s, both in the universities and in the 
theoretical sphere of political opposition to any and all forms of oppression. And he saw Wilhelm 
Reich as pivotal in this: 
  
between the two world wars there was formed, around Reich, the historico-political critique of sexual 
repression. The importance of this critique and its impact on reality were substantial. But the very possibility of 
its success was tied to the fact that it always unfolded within the deployment of sexuality, and not outside or 
against it. The fact that so many things were able to change in the sexual behaviour of Western societies 
without any of the promises or political conditions predicted by Reich being realized is sufficient proof that this 
whole sexual “revolution,” this whole “antirepressive” struggle, represented nothing more, -but nothing less – 
and its importance is undeniable – than a tactical shift and reversal in the great deployment of sexuality. But it 
is also apparent why one could not expect this critique to be the grid for a history of that very deployment. Nor 
the basis for a movement to dismantle it. (WK, 131, my emphases)  
 
I have quoted this passage in its entirety because it shows many things about Foucault’s non-
ordinary use of language, and the trouble he invites upon himself through it.88 A “tactical shift” in 
ordinary language is something that maintains a particular strategy, not reverses it, so how can 
something be both “a tactical shift and [a] reversal in the great deployment of sexuality”? – only 
by having two different subjects for the two objects. He has shown that the “reversal” – sexual 
liberation instead of repression  – still leaves us with a form of subjection based on sex-desire, and 
as such constitutes merely a tactical shift in the deployment of sexuality, but in whose tactics? 
Liberation is the objective of the actual persons in struggle, whereas the “tactical shift” is 
attributable to no one in particular, other, that is, than to the “deployment” itself. But Foucault 
himself has shown us that this “deployment” is an abstraction that covers multiple forms of 
agency, or of power-knowledge, that are uncoordinated among themselves, except by the chance 
coordination of their historical (and therefore epistemic) simultaneity. The linking of “tactical shift 
and reversal” therefore appears to attribute the maintenance of the deployment of sexuality to the 
sexual “revolution” itself, justifying the scepticism about its revolutionary nature that his use of 
inverted commas (“antirepressive”) suggests. This is clearly going to upset a lot of people, straight 
                                                 
88 Edward Said, for example, in The World, the Text, and the Critic (1983), wrote: “Resistance cannot equally be an 
adversarial alternative to power and a dependent function of it, except in some metaphysical, ultimately trivial sense 
[…] The disturbing circularity of Foucault’s theory of power is a form of theoretical overtotalization. […]” Quoted in 
Halperin, op.cit. p.21. 
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and gay, who give so much of their lives to this struggle, and see it as fundamentally life-
changing. The statement that this struggle represents “nothing more, – but nothing less” than this, 
concedes that “its importance is undeniable”, but is structured so as to emphasize the derogatory 
“nothing more”.  
The real target here is not, however, those participating in these struggles, of whom he genuinely 
approved, though he did not make this clear; but the theory which links the changes in “sexual 
behaviour” to “the political conditions predicted by Reich”. In this perspective, “all types of 
subjection are nothing but derived phenomena, the consequences of other economic and social 
processes: the forces of production, class conflict and ideological structures that determine the 
type of subjectivity one has recourse to.”89 But for Foucault, whereas these “mechanisms of 
exploitation and domination” must be taken into account, the “mechanisms of submission did not 
constitute simply the ‘terminal’ […] of other, more fundamental mechanisms. They entertain 
complex and circular relations with other forms.” (Ibid.) In other words, for Foucault, power and 
knowledge do not line up as base structures and superstructures in (dialectically) contrasting 
blocks, but they interact continuously in multiple ways, so that resistance must drop its 
dogmatisms, and instead pay attention to all the apparently minor shifts in knowledge and in 
relations of power.  
From this derives his own criterion of political practice: “I think that the ethico-political choice we 
have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger.” (GE, 256) The example he 
gives of this – from another context, that of psychiatry  – refers to a critique of the anti-psychiatry 
movement (Robert Castel’s La Gestion des risques). He says: “I agree completely with what 
Castel says, but that does not mean, as some people suppose, that the mental hospitals were better 
than anti-psychiatry; that does not mean that we were not right to criticize those hospitals. I think 
it was good to do that because they were the danger. And now it’s quite clear that the danger has 
changed. For instance in Italy they have closed all the mental hospitals and there are more free 
clinics, and so on – and they have new problems.” (Ibid.) This is a political practice that requires 
close attention to the way everything changes everything, adapting strategies to the constantly 
changing dynamics of knowledge-power, domain by domain, rather than interpreting the changes 
through fixed schema applied to all domains. 
In the domain of sexuality, Foucault certainly recognized that there had been “a veritable process 
of liberation at the beginning of the 1970s. This process was very beneficial, as regards the 
situation itself and as regards mentalities, but the situation has not stabilised. We must still, I think, 
                                                 
89 “Le sujet et le pouvoir”, DE, p.1047 
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take a step forward. And I believe that one of the factors of this stabilisation will be the creation of 
new forms of life, of relationships, of friendship, in society, in art and culture; new forms will be 
established through our sexual, ethical and political choices.”90 Struggles against submission, 
marginalisation or abnormalisation have taken myriad forms, but among them there is one 
particular form which does win Foucault’s approval. This is how he describes it: “by taking 
literally the discourses [of their oppressors], and turning them around, we see responses appearing 
in the form of a challenge: all right, we are what you say we are, by nature, sickness or perversion, 
as you wish. Well then, if that’s what we are, let us be it, and if you want to know what we are, 
we’ll tell you ourselves, better than you.” (NSR, 260) He gives as an example of this the 
homosexual literature which appeared at the end of the nineteenth century: “think of Wilde or 
Gide. It is the strategic reversal of the same will to truth.” (Ibid. 261) And with regard to women, 
who have been, he says, told for centuries: “ ‘You are nothing but your sex’ –  […] [n]ow the 
feminist movements  have taken up the challenge, We are sex by nature? All right, let us be so, but 
in the singularity [of that nature], in its irreducible specificity. Let us draw the consequences and 
reinvent our own type of existence, political, economic, cultural […] always the same move: 
starting from this sexuality in which they are colonised and coming through it towards other 
affirmations.” (Ibid.)  
Foucault is surely right to appreciate this creative, self-creative form of struggle against the 
submission of subjectivity; but within the homosexual and women’s movements, this form of 
struggle – involving the creation of a separate life-style – is still relatively marginal compared to 
struggles for assimilation to society. Both women and homosexuals have for the most part rejected 
their marginalisation, rather than made an art of life out of it, denying significant difference in 
favour of equal dignity, equal normality, equal rights. And these paths too lead to important 
changes in the forms of lived subjectivity. Perhaps the link between these two forms of struggle is 
“pride”, holding one’s head up high as what one is, as a political subject and a subject of one’s 
own life, in the sense given to it first by “I am black and I am proud”, and then by gay pride. A 
sense which could be read as remarkably Humean in its connection of the feeling of pride to the 
sense of self. Hume, who already in the eighteenth century held the same view as Foucault on the 
non-existence of a substantial self, differs from Foucault’s anti-naturalism in that he believed that 
our sense of self was coextensive with the passions of pride and humility, which he saw as 
products of our nature, whereas for Foucault the sense of self emerges in our relation to the 
prevailing mode (or modes) of subjection, or to our resistance to this. Hume wrote: 
                                                 
90 DE, p1555 
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we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce 
a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride : To this emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz. that 
of self, which it never fails to produce.91 
 
Hume contrasted “pride” with “humility”, but what he meant by humility is much closer to what in 
twentieth, or twenty-first century English we would now call shame.92 To feel either pride or 
shame was to be conscious of ourselves for Hume, hence it is clearly better if our self-
consciousness is one of pride, and not of shame. And both for women, who for centuries, if they 
showed any intelligence were considered to have a man’s brain in a woman’s (shameful) body, 
and for homosexuals, who for centuries were considered the epitomy of shame, pride in one’s 
identity did indeed herald a major shift in one’s subjectivation; though this political and ethical 
move clearly does require, and was not generally given, a specifically Humean or naturalistic 
perspective.  
Within the homosexual ghettos in the 1970s however, but breaking out, a whole section of the gay 
movement was very much concerned with equality, and civil rights. Of necessity, because in the 
USA the increasing tendency to come out of the closet had provoked a backlash in the shape of a 
forceful, concerted attack on their very survival, taking different forms in different states. In 
California in 1978, this took the form of Proposition 693 – an attempt on the part of homophobic 
“moral” crusaders to have all homosexuals thrown out of teaching and a whole series of other jobs. 
The campaign against it, led by the heroic Harvey Milk, the first openly gay political office-holder 
in the USA (Member of San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors) was a textbook example of a 
struggle against submission. But it required for its success an absolute insistence on normality, and 
it was magnificently fought and won. What this meant, according to so many of those who 
participated in it, was the real possibility of coming out, and holding one’s gay head up high. It 
meant pride in the most wholesome sense of self-respect that Hume gives it, not the facile, 
egotistical pride of those whom society has placed in a position of privilege. This in itself is, of 
course, no justification of Hume’s theory, which is not at issue here, but it introduces an 
interesting dimension to certain forms of subjectivation constructed through resistance. 
Outside the ghettos, gender-identity and identity by sexual orientation were both being 
undermined in the 1970s by androgenous figures implanted in the popular imagination, like David 
                                                 
91Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Prometheus Books, 1992 (1740), Book II, Part I, sec-V, p.287. 
92 Various authors have noted that although the term Hume uses to indicate the opposite of pride is “humility”, given 
the way he describes its functioning, it in fact corresponds more to the passion of shame. See, for example, David 
Wiggins, Ethics. Twelve Lectures on the Philosophy of Morality, London, Penguin, 2006. 
93 A Proposition to change State law, banning homosexuals from a series of jobs. 
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Bowie, and Pattie Smith (as photographed by that extraordinary icon-maker - of the self-possessed 
androgenous woman, and of the gorgeous male body – Robert Mapplethorpe); and in the 80s and 
90s, after Foucault’s death, by “idols” of mass culture, like Prince and Michael Jackson, mixing 
images of pretty boy, prima donna and polymorphous sexuality (as well as racial stereotypes – that 
other identity straightjacket). As Prince’s song, Controversy, puts it so clearly: 
 
Am I black or white? Am I straight or gay? - Controversy 
Do I believe in god? Do I believe in me? – Controversy 
I can’t understand human curiosity – Controversy 
Was it good for you? Was I what you wanted me to be? - Controversy 
 
 
The late twentieth century in the Western world offered so many of these instances of fundamental 
change in the conception of the sexualised subject and mode of subjection (to the increasing horror 
of Islamic and Christian conservatisms, and other identity-fixing modes of subjection), that it 
seems surprising that Foucault commented so little on them, not even, at least on record, on the 
epoch-changing struggle of Harvey Milk and the gay community of San Francisco. It is true, as 
Foucault says, that sexual liberation remains within the discourse on sexuality, but it 
fundamentally changes the way that discourse is put together, and this he did not recognise. In 
particular with regard to the characteristic of guilt, so crucial to the hermeneutic of desire, that 
confession fomented, and psychoanalysis tries to dismantle. If liberation can strike a blow at guilt, 
the rock on which the hermeneutics of desire is constructed, is not this the demolition that will 
allow for the recreation of the self? He asks: “does it make any sense to say, ‘Let’s liberate our 
sexuality’? Isn’t the problem rather that of defining the practices of freedom by which one could 
define what is sexual pleasure and erotic, amorous and passionate relationships with others? This 
ethical problem of the definition of practices of freedom, it seems to me, is much more important 
than the rather repetitive affirmation that sexuality or desire must be liberated.” (ECS, 283) But 
can it not also be argued that definitions of the practices of freedom by which we can define what 
is sexual pleasure and erotic, etc. – are something we can do without? 
Halperin, in taking up Foucault’s theme of freedom as positive, as “freedom to”, rather than 
merely as the liberatory negative of “freedom from”, writes: “If to come out is to release oneself 
from a state of unfreedom, that is not because coming out constitutes an escape from the reach of 
power: rather coming out puts into play a different set of power relations and alters the dynamics 
of personal and political struggle. Coming out is an act of freedom, then, not in the sense of 
liberation but in the sense of resistance.” (SF, 30) Coming out is certainly resistance, but it is also, 
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and not insignificantly, liberation, and both are self-forming acts. Resistance is an exercise of 
courage and political will, liberation is the joy of it, the space in which to be one’s new self. 
 
Ch. 5 The Aesthetics of Existence 
 
1. Love and friendship  
 
Foucault did not thematise “love”, and almost never speaks of it except in reference to its place in 
certain Greek conceptions; instead he speaks of friendship as the ideal form of relationship, in 
which love can flourish, and an aesthetics of existence can be created. The long quotation below, 
from what was considered an authoritative Romantic work on love, Stendhal’s Love of 1821, 
reveals, through Stendhal’s attempts at definition, some important ways “love” was objectified in 
early nineteenth century Europe. Stendhal’s reflections are situated along the same axis as 
Foucault’s discussion of “bodies and pleasures”; they are concerned, that is, with the attitude we 
have to our pleasures seen as shaping the attitude we have to our lives. Here too is an aesthetics of 
existence, but of a very different kind: 
 
I want to establish exactly what this passion is, whose every genuine manifestation is characterized by beauty. 
There are four different kinds of love: 
1. Passionate Love. This was the love of the Portuguese nun, that of Heloise for Abelard […] 
2. Mannered Love, which flourished in Paris about 1760,[ …]  A stylized painting this, where the rosy hues 
extend into the shadows, where there is no place for anything at all unpleasant – for that would be a breach of 
etiquette, of good taste, of delicacy, and so forth. A man of breeding will know in advance all the rituals he 
must meet and observe in the various stages of this kind of love […] Admittedly, if you take away vanity, there 
is very little left of mannered love, and the poor weakened invalid can hardly drag itself along. 
3. Physical Love. You are hunting; you come across a handsome young peasant girl who takes to her heels 
through the woods. Everyone knows the love that springs from this kind of pleasure, and however desiccated 
and miserable you may be, this is where your love-life begins at sixteen. 
4. Vanity love. The great majority of men, especially in France, both desire and possess a fashionable woman, 
much in the way one might own a fine horse – as a luxury befitting a young man. Vanity, a little flattered and a 
little piqued, leads to enthusiasm. Sometimes there is physical love, but not always; often even physical 
pleasure is lacking. […] Although physical pleasure, being natural, is known to all94, it is only of secondary 
importance to sensitive, passionate people. […]  
 Some virtuous and sensitive women are almost unaware of the idea of physical pleasure; they have so rarely 
[…] exposed themselves to it, and in fact the raptures of passionate love have practically effaced the memory of 
bodily delights.95 
 
 Mannered love, by Stendhal’s own admission, virtually collapses into Vanity love, so we have 
three kinds of love: the passionate (rarely physical), the physical (rarely passionate) and, 
                                                 
94 “all” refers, of course, to men, the model of humankind. The sub-category of women may (as follows above), or 
may not be referred to. 
95 Stendhal, Love, London, Penguin, 1975, pp.43-44 
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mannered-vanity love. This latter forms a continuum of which the positive pole is an aesthetics of 
existence, deemed to enshrine “sensibility” and refinement (as does passionate love), the negative 
is its foppish parody. Reading this classification in twenty-first century Europe, what is 
immediately shocking is what amounts to a description of rape presented as the most “normal” of 
practices; the right of exaction of upper caste boys on lower caste girls, made more humiliating by 
the paltry value put on “the act”, and compared to the “passionate” love accorded to women of the 
same caste. Caste, because it is by one’s “blood” that one’s rank is established, but more than that, 
because the lower classes are virtually dehumanized, as they must be to be so treated. The very 
same act that would be a heinous crime against a “lady”, is merely an amusement when committed 
against a “peasant girl”, because “nobility” comes in the blood, without good blood, good family 
stock, one may be hunted as an alternative to grouse. Nonetheless, even the lady may be 
possessed, “as a luxury befitting a young man.” The aesthetics of existence that contains all three 
forms is one in which sensibility to the beautiful, in art, manners and nature, is paramount. Nature 
“red in tooth and claw” is simply excluded, along with any sensibility the poor peasant girl might 
have to being brutalized. This society, a residual version of what Foucault calls the “society of 
blood,” (WK, 147) owed its survival, in transitory form, to the aspirations of the rising bourgeoisie 
to mix their blood and their manners with aristocracy. Before then, Foucault writes, the  
 
blood relation had remained an important element in the mechanisms of power, its manifestations and its 
rituals. For [such] a society […] blood constituted one of the fundamental values. It owed its high value at the 
same time to its instrumental role (the ability to shed blood), to the way it functioned in the order of signs (to 
have a certain blood, to be of the same blood, to be prepared to risk one’s blood), and also its precariousness 
(easily spilled, […] too readily mixed, capable of being quickly corrupted), A society of blood […] where 
power spoke through blood: the honor of war, the fear of famine, the triumph of death, the sovereign with his 
sword, executioners, and tortures; blood was a reality with a symbolic function. We, on the other hand are in a 
society of ‘sex,’ or rather a society ‘with a sexuality’: the mechanisms of power are addressed to the body, to 
life, to what causes it to proliferate, to what reinforces the species, its stamina, its ability to dominate, or its 
capacity for being used. (Ibid.) 
 
As Foucault puts it however, despite the “new procedures of power that were devised in the 
classical age and employed in the nineteenth century”; and “[w]hile it is true that the analytics of 
sexuality and the symbolics of blood were grounded at first in two very distinct regimes of power, 
in actual fact the passage from one to the other did not come about […] without overlappings, 
interactions, and echoes.” (WK, 149) Stendhal lived and wrote in the intermediary period between 
these two societies, with their different symbolics, while the society of blood was in steep 
historical decline, displaced by the rise of democracy and the incursion of the state in the life of 
body and mind. Foucault’s detailed studies of these incursions, of particular genealogical lines of 
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knowledge-power, have meant, inevitably, that he has been able to analyse only some of the 
multifold “overlappings, interactions and echoes”. His methods are premised on the fact that this is 
an inevitable consequence of any choice as to where to draw the (always artificial) boundaries 
around an object of historical study. 
What he does, however, draw attention to, is the nightmare that occurred when the population 
controls of the disciplinary society, in its most advanced form, fused with a revival of the 
symbolics of blood, in Nazism. “Nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naive … 
combination of the fantasies of blood and the paroxysms of a disciplinary power. A eugenic 
ordering of society, with all that implied in the way of extension and intensification of micro-
powers, in the guise of an unrestricted state control (étatisation), was accompanied by the oneiric 
exaltation of a superior blood […] It is an irony of history that the Hitlerite politics of sex 
remained an insignificant practice while the myth of blood was transformed into the greatest 
bloodbath in recent memory.” (WK, 149-50)  
Foucault’s comments on Nazism are brief, and have largely to do with the relevance of the 
analysis of separate genealogical lines and – against currently prevailing notions of predictability 
based on structurally modelled analyses – of the extraordinary alchemy of the historical encounters 
between certain of these genealogical lines. His comments, though brief, reflect his insistence on 
this plurality and contingency in the unfolding of history, and also therefore, of the objectifications 
by which we live. They have to do with our understanding of the monsters, big and small, that 
history creates, and how the sciences – importantly both physical and social – must now count 
Nazi eugenics among their variants. His more detailed investigations tended to concentrate, 
however, on the scientific, legal and administrative texts of specific domains in specific eras, and 
not the literary texts, though often they would support many of his hypotheses.96 In the case of the 
citation from Stendhal above, the concept of “love” presents another facet of the “society of 
                                                 
96 He writes that “For a long time in Western society, everyday life had no access to [literary] discourse except […] 
transfigured by the fabulous; it had to be drawn out of itself by heroism, exploit, adventures, Providence and grace 
[…] marked by a touch of impossibility. [...] The further removed from the ordinary, the more the tale had the force of 
enchantment or persuasion. As of the 17th Century, […] another art of language was born whose task was no longer to 
sing the improbable, but to make appear what had not appeared – what could not or should not appear […] Thus a new 
imperative was formed that would then constitute what could be called the immanent ethic of Western literary 
discourse […:] to seek out what is most difficult to perceive, what is most hidden, what is the most uncomfortable to 
say and show, eventually the most forbidden and scandalous. […] Literature thus forms part of the great system of 
constraint by which the West has obliged everyday life to put itself into discourse, but it occupies a special place in 
this: intent on seeking the everyday beneath itself, on breaking through limits, on brutally or insidiously revealing 
secrets […] it tends to put itself outside the law, or at least to take upon itself the accusation of scandal, transgression 
or revolt.” (DE, 251- 253). Literature is of course, much more than this. For Iris Murdoch, a practitioner, it had more 
to do with freedom than constraint. But it was not an object of study for Foucault, and his remarks are limited to the 
correspondences he sees between literature and the confessing “society of sex”. 
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blood” in decline, in which reverence for the symbolic blood that runs in noble veins is 
accompanied by maintaining a well-guarded distance from the real thing. It is a society that eats a 
lot of meat, but is aware of no slaughterhouses, even to mention such things would be “bad form”. 
Stendhal describes “the debate” on love that pits bourgeois romantic sensibility against aristocratic 
insensibility in the drawing rooms that were the corridors of power of the time. In Love he 
explains this as concerned with “the question of whether it is better to approach women in the 
manner of Mozart’s Don Juan or in that of Werther”97. He writes that “Love à la Werther opens 
the mind to all the arts, to all sweet and romantic impressions, moonlight, the beauty of the woods 
and of painting, in a word, to the feeling of enjoyment of the beautiful, in whatever form it 
presents itself, even the humblest.”98 By contrast: “Don Juan disclaims all the obligations which 
link him to the rest of humanity. In the great market-place of life he is a dishonest merchant who 
takes all and pays nothing. The idea of equality is as maddening to him as water to a rabid dog; 
this is why pride of birthright becomes Don Juan’s character so well. With the idea of equality of 
rights vanishes that of justice – or rather, if Don Juan comes of an illustrious stock, such vulgar 
notions would never have entered his head; and I am ready enough to believe that a man who 
bears a historic name is more disposed than another to set fire to a city for the sake of boiling 
himself an egg.”99  
It is interesting that Stendhal uses “justice” here (ironically) in the same way as Foucault uses it 
analytically in describing pre-modern societies based on the notion of “justice” in the hands of 
kings, their power to take life, and therefore control the lives of their “inferiors” through laws 
made in their own image. And Stendhal’s reaction is indignantly bourgeois (mercantile): against 
the metaphor of Don Juan as a dishonest merchant he defends “fair play”, thus: “a habit of fair-
dealing appears to me to be, bar accident, the surest way to happiness; and our Werthers are not 
rogues.”100 In affirming his belief that the Werthers are happier than the Don Juan’s, he writes: 
“Unlike Werther, for whom realities are shaped by his desires, Don Juan’s desires are imperfectly 
satisfied by cold reality, as in ambition, avarice, and the other passions.”101 Here “desire” is clearly 
an act of the imagination, and the desire that is “love” illuminates all of reality, whereas the desire 
that is lust consumes itself and renders reality banal. 
                                                 
97 Stendhal, op.cit, p.204 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid, p.207. It is also interesting that Stendhal’s (burn a city to boil an egg) version of Hume’s famous comment – 
that a man (any and every man) would rather see the world destroyed than scratch his finger, is attributed by Stendhal 
not to human nature, but to aristocratic culture. 
100 Ibid, p.206 
101 Ibid. 
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Nearly two centuries later, despite all the negative effects of the “deployment of sexuality” 
documented by Foucault, at least the socially sanctioned permission (the other face of obligation, 
not discussed by Foucault) to see oneself as a sexual being has meant that love and lust, separated 
with such exquisite pain by Stendhal, have been allowed to fuse, as this (intentionally Platonic) 
passage, from a novel of Iris Murdoch’s, testifies: 
 
She had never experienced presence so vividly before, the total connection with another being, the 
interpenetration of bodies and souls, the intuitive absolute of mutual giving, the love of two gods. […] Now 
they were living in an ecstasy to which happiness was irrelevant. […] She had been re-created, given new 
being, new pure flesh, new lucid spirit. She could perceive the world at last, her eyes were cleared, her 
perceptions clarified, she had never seen such a vivid, coloured, detailed world, vast and complete as myth, yet 
full of tiny particular accidental entities placed in her way like divine toys. She had discovered breathing, 
breathing such as holy men use, the breathing of the planet, of the universe, the movement of being into 
Being.102 
 
This discovery of oneness with nature, with the universe, takes in and goes beyond young 
Werther’s romanticism, it goes as far as Plato in the Phaedrus – “when someone [the lover] sees 
beauty here on earth and is reminded of true beauty. His wings begin to grow and he wants to take 
to the air on his new plumage … [When we were with the gods, we] were surrounded by rays of 
pure light…” etc.103 The problem, of course, under discussion in this text of Plato’s, is that when 
those feelings are experienced only in and through the sexual act, the sexual act can become one’s 
goal, and one is then chained to its erratic nature and one’s own craving. Whereas, in Greco-
Roman cultures, if one learns to be free of one’s cravings, the intense experience of oneness can 
occur at any moment, and when it passes, it leaves serenity in its wake. 
When asked to comment on the differences between the veiled erotics of “heterosexual” literature 
and the explicit sex of “homosexual” literature, Foucault gave this interesting reply: 
 
The experience of heterosexuality, at least since the Middle Ages, has always consisted of two axes; on the one 
hand, the axis of courtship in which the man seduces the woman, and, on the other hand, the axis of the sexual 
act itself. Now the great heterosexual literature of the West has had to do essentially with the axis of amorous 
courtship, that is, above all, with that which precedes the sexual act. […] 
In contrast, the modern homosexual experience has no relation at all to courtship. This was not the case in 
ancient Greece, however. For the Greeks, courtship between men was more important than between men and 
women. (Think of Socrates and Alcibiades.) But in the Christian culture of the West, homosexuality was 
banished and therefore had to concentrate all its energy on the act of sex itself. Homosexuals were not allowed 
to elaborate a system of courtship because the cultural expression necessary for such an elaboration was denied 
them. The wink on the street, the split-second decision to get it on, the speed with which homosexual relations 
are consummated: all these are products of an interdiction. So when a homosexual culture and literature began 
                                                 
102 Iris Murdoch, The Book and the Brotherhood, Penguin, London, 1988, p. 168-9. (The Heideggerian accent is also 
intentional.) 
103 Plato, Phaedrus, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp.33-34 
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to develop it was natural for it to focus on the most ardent and heated aspect of homosexual relations. (SCSA, 
149-50)  
 
 
In thus explaining this aspect of homosexual culture, Foucault also explains why there is no 
attempt at a reconceptualisation of “love” in his work, but rather a concentration on friendship. It 
also throws light on his reconceptualisation of “pleasure”, and on the links he sees between 
friendship and pleasure as forms of resistance, resistance in which a life-style is created, an 
aesthetics of existence. At times, there is a labyrinthine circularity in this, as when he says that 
homosexuals “have to invent, from A to Z, a relationship that is still formless, which is friendship: 
that is to say, the sum of everything through which they can give each other pleasure.” (FWL, 
136) But then “pleasure” turns out to include: “affection, tenderness, friendship, fidelity, 
camaraderie, and companionship, things that our rather sanitized society can’t allow a place for 
without fearing the formation of new alliances and the tying together of unforeseen lines of force.” 
(Ibid.) He goes on “I think that’s what makes homosexuality “disturbing”: the homosexual mode 
of life, much more than the sexual act itself. To imagine a sexual act that doesn’t conform to law 
or nature is not what disturbs people. But that individuals are beginning to love one another – 
there’s the problem.” (Ibid.) It is interesting that this list of characteristics does not differ radically 
from any contemporary description (even Christian) of what constitutes a good love relationship. 
What Foucault is saying here is that homosexuality is less threatening to the fundamentalists of 
heterosexuality if it is merely about sexual pleasure, not about relationship. But that is exactly 
what sexual liberationists in the gay movement have been saying, in claiming their right to be 
considered “normal”, to marriage, etc.  
Against these claims, what is important for Foucault is non-institutionalised relationship. He asks: 
“What is it to be ‘naked’ among men, outside of institutional relations, family, profession, and 
obligatory camaraderie?” And answers: “It’s a desire, an uneasiness, a desire-in-uneasiness that 
exists among a lot of people.” (Ibid.) Foucault here eloquently expresses his own preference, and 
his feeling that this desire-in-uneasiness is the source of creative and self-creative power is 
implied. He himself was on a path of self-creation which involved the exploration of pleasure on 
the one hand, and on the other, intense philosophical self-questioning and a commitment to truth-
speaking in the political sphere, a truly multi-faceted aesthetics of existence. And yet he seems to 
assume that those who share his commitment to sexual pleasure also share his reading of it as a 
new ascesis, from which those more interested in sexual liberation from the point of view of 
human rights, including the right to adopt the heterosexual model of marriage should they so wish, 
 119 
have excluded themselves. Despite his stated preference for the Stoics over the Epicureans, in his 
writings on sexual liberation he rejected the kind of choice the Stoics made – to practise their 
“techniques of the self” whilst living in conformity with the norms governing ordinary life – in 
favour of experimenting with the more typically Epicurean ascetic choice to live in a community 
that sets itself apart from ordinary life. This was not his own chosen life-style however. He moved 
between the two worlds of conformity and non-conformity, though he never spoke of techniques 
appropriate to a self who is obliged to, or chooses to, move between these two worlds – the reality 
of many. 
 
In “Sexe, pouvoir et la politique de l’identité”104 he says that from Antiquity onwards, friendship 
was a very important social relationship, implying reciprocal responsibilities and deep affection; 
but that “from the 16th and 17th centuries, one sees this type of friendship disappear, at least within 
masculine society. And friendship begins to be something else.” (Ibid., 1563) It was also 
discouraged, regarded as dangerous, in a series of institutional contexts, among which he lists: “the 
army, the bureaucracy, the administration, the universities, the schools, etc.” (Ibid.); contexts in 
which intense friendships disturbed their smooth functioning. Foucault hypothesizes that 
homosexuality became a problem at that time because friendship was disappearing, so that 
relations between men became suspect. The re-establishment of friendship thus becomes a new 
goal, but “it would be contradictory to apply to this end, and to this type of friendship, the model 
of family life […] The question of knowing what type of institutions we must create is a crucial 
one, but I cannot give a response. Our task, I believe, is to try to elaborate a solution.” (Ibid., 
1554-55)  
 
The partial solutions Foucault did come up with involved the reinvention of pleasure, but the 
process is a complex one. Because, on the one hand he says (for once conceding a positive role to 
desire): “We must understand that with our desires, through them, new forms of relationship are 
established, new forms of love and new forms of creation. Sex is not a fatality; it is a possibility – 
that of acceding to a creative life.” (Ibid., 1555) But on the other hand, this new ascesis of pleasure 
seems to revolve around pleasure, to have its beginning and its end in pleasure. In other words, 
this is the exact opposite of the way pleasure is stimulated, but never consumed, in those rare 
ascetic practices that use the risk-laden instrument of sexual pleasure, such as tantric yoga, where 
complex techniques, involving long training, divert the energies so produced to spiritual ends. 
                                                 
104 DE, 358, pp.1554-1565 
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Besides sexual pleasure the other form of pleasure Foucault advocates is that of drugs, which 
“should become an element of our culture.” (Ibid. 1557) He goes on: “We should manufacture 
good drugs – capable of producing very intense pleasures.” Like sex, drugs too have been used in 
many ascetic and spiritual contexts, usually preceded by fasting and other forms of preparation of 
body and mind to offset the deleterious effects that all drugs are known to have. The aim is to 
exploit the altered states of consciousness they produce in order to open out the possibilities of 
other ways of knowing. In this respect, they serve to dismantle the “old self” with its fixed 
convictions, leaving space for a new self to develop, or else shaping that new self. Even in rock 
culture, however, where drugs are extensively and casually used for pleasure, it is well known that 
the price of every high is coming down again, often a lot further down that one was ready for, as 
the death-rate in this culture shows. Some consideration of this aspect of drug-use, the relationship 
between human fragility and powerfully disorientating experience, perhaps needs to be included in 
the hypothesis. Foucault’s comments on this were, however, restricted to a few casual remarks. 
Whereas he was able to study in detail the techniques of the self used in Antiquity, this was clearly 
not possible for contemporary developments that were still indistinct in their outlines, so we have 
very little evidence of the ways in which he saw the pursuit of pleasure as constituting such a 
technique (other than in leading to friendship), or even more than this, as he put it “making 
pleasure the crystallizing point of a new culture.” (STSW, 160) In Saint Foucault, however, 
Halperin describes certain aspects of the practices of the San Francisco  gay community that was 
Foucault’s main point of reference. 
 
 
2. The self in San Francisco 
 
One aspect of the San Francisco gay bathhouse codes, as described by Halperin, is anonymity. 
This means that people can enjoy each other physically, without any of the worries and moral 
responsibilities attached to relationship. It being clear at the outset that this is not love, nor is it 
pretending to be, that reciprocal expectations go no further than this encounter, certainly frees one 
to engage in reciprocal pleasure-making and pleasure-taking. There is freedom to enjoy oneself 
here, and with others, but this is not a freedom that necessarily transforms the self in any other 
way, so in what sense can this be construed as self-constructive? Since these pleasures can be had 
both within relationships and outside of them, and relationship is always a terrain for ethical work, 
on the self and with and through the other; what is gained here seems to be rather the peace of 
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mind that non-relationship gives, saving one’s time and energies for other things. This is in no way 
to be under-valued and may count, at least hypothetically, as a valid motivation for consensually 
anonymous sexual encounters, but more on a pragmatic than an ascetic level. No former society 
has had such arrangements (with the possible and dubious exception of men and temple 
prostitutes, and “temporary” marriage in Islam), and the absence of such a possibility is surely one 
of the main practical reasons for sexual abstinence in almost all known historical forms of ascetic 
practice: relationships tend to be messy and time-consuming. Unless they are seen as part of one’s 
spirituality, or creativity, or intellectual development, they can easily take a great deal of time and 
energy away from one’s intellectual, spiritual or creative interests. Many non-ascetics, very many, 
settle, as they have always done, for relationships of convenience of various kinds, and dedicate to 
them as little time and energy as is necessary for their own purposes. The ethics of this are 
troublesome, and honesty in reciprocal use of each other’s bodies can be seen as morally far 
superior than the traditionally hallowed social practices designed to manage such needs – marriage 
(at least the obligatory and the hypocritical kinds) and prostitution.  
Foucault, however, does not discuss this aspect of bathhouse practice. The anonymity, in a 
relatively small community (and almost anywhere if you happen to be Foucault), is unlikely to be 
rigorous, but it is the principle – of “no expectations beyond this encounter” – that anonymity 
protects, that matters here. Maybe this communitarian semi-anonymity also means that one can 
meet on an anonymous terrain in the bathhouse, and possibly also on an interpersonal terrain 
outside, and thus explore the possibilities of relationship, without prior commitment. It is not 
difficult to see that, as he says, this could contribute to promoting “relations with multiple 
intensities, variable colors, imperceptible movements and changing forms.” (FWL, 137) Certainly 
the “hetero”sexual liberation of the 1960s and ‘70s, which featured a collective decision to replace 
an outmoded moral code of monogamous fidelity with a moral code of “open” relationships, in 
which sexual jealousy was the new arch-sin, floundered on the fact that people experienced 
enormous difficulty in converting a rational decision not to be jealous into an emotional reality. 
Many people, in retreating from this hard frontier of new morality to the more comforting 
principle of “consecutive” monogamy, then suffered from a sense of failure, and related to 
themselves and each other as traitors to the cause; marriage became the greatest betrayal. The 
guilt, by a brutal twist of historical fate, had shifted from recognition of one’s sexual being to 
recognition of one’s emotional fragility in relationship. 
In commenting on the Greek “care of the self” Foucault writes: “The care of the self is ethical in 
itself; but it implies complex relationships with others insofar as this ethos of freedom is also a 
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way of caring for others.” (ECS, 187) And further that “[the] care of the self always aims for the 
well-being of others; it aims to manage the space of power that exists in all relationships, but to 
manage it in a non-authoritarian manner.” It is not difficult to see the correspondences between 
these intentional practices of ancient ascesis, and Foucault’s sketch of the outlines of a modern 
ascesis; what differs radically, however, is the fact that, in the Greek context: “the care of the self 
also implies a relationship with the other insofar as proper care of the self requires listening to the 
lessons of a master. One needs a guide, a counsellor, a friend, someone who will be truthful with 
you.” (Ibid.) Although the relationship of master and disciple or pupil is clearly not one that 
Foucault would see as re-inventable or as in any way desirable, perhaps friendship in this deeper 
sense, of reciprocal care and truthfulness, in a shared perspective of the importance of care of the 
self, constitutes the major, under-developed theme of this new ascesis. 
 
 
3. Asceticism and ascesis 
 
As Arnold Davidson notes, “Foucault thought of ethics as that component of morality that 
concerns the self’s relationship to itself.” (EAF, 126) This is how Foucault himself describes it 
when taking it as axiomatic that “morality” is that domain of our lives most easily recognized by 
modern conceptualisations of human life, and since “morality” tends to emphasize moral codes, 
space needed to be created within it for this “other” aspect, that of the self’s relation to the self. 
But in Foucault’s own conceptualisation, it is rather “morality” that is a component of ethics, 
because one’s relation to oneself determines one’s relation both to others and to whatever moral 
codes regulate the society one lives in. As he says, “The care of the self is ethically prior in that 
the relationship with oneself is ontologically prior” (ECS, 287); which, taking the care of the self 
to mean moral reflection on one’s individual responsibilities, is the position of any ethics which 
places these before, and not after, moral code. But the relation to self may be unlike this, it may be 
one where subjectivity is circumscribed, diminished, by “certain games of truth, whether […these 
are] truth games that take the form of a science or refer to a scientific model, or truth games such 
as those one may encounter in institutions or practices of control” (Ibid. 281); and Foucault 
dedicated many years to studying these more entrapped forms of subjectivation. As he says, “a 
person ‘does not begin with liberty, but with the limit.’ […though] the encounter with the limit 
creates the opportunity for its transgression”. (Ibid.) “Transgression” may begin with some form of 
counter-conduct, and may or may not develop into a more conscious form of rebellion. These are 
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different forms of subjectivation, and the latter may at the same time involve a new, self-formative 
relation to the self. The “care of the self” or “ascesis” that he dedicated his last years to however, 
involved a more conscious, reflective, relation to the self, concerned with its own freedom, and 
hence with a way of working with, overcoming one’s internal limits, not just with the attempt to 
remove or alter external limitations to the development of self. With regard to the relationship 
between (homosexual) ascesis and pleasure, he writes:  
 
Asceticism as the renunciation of pleasure has bad connotations. But ascesis is something else: it is the work 
one performs on oneself in order to transform oneself or make the self appear which, happily, one never attains. 
Can that be our problem today? We’ve rid ourselves of asceticism. Yet it’s up to us to advance into a 
homosexual ascesis that would make us work on ourselves and invent - I do not say discover - a manner of 
being that is still improbable. (FWL, 137)  
 
Here Foucault uses two versions of the same term, attributing the negative connotations (evoking 
gloomy images of self-mortification) to “asceticism” and the positive image of self-work to 
ascesis. This juxtaposition implies, though it is carefully not made explicit, a kind of antithesis 
between self-work (ascesis) and the renunciation of pleasure (asceticism). Whereas lines have 
traditionally been drawn between ascesis on the one hand – Greek, Oriental, Christian, and the 
indulgence in pleasure on the other, Foucault wishes to redraw the lines, placing Christian anti-
pleasure asceticism on one side (which we’ve got rid of), and Greek problematization of pleasure, 
together with Foucauldian exploration of pleasure as a way of life, on the other. Not, certainly, in 
any false terms of a historically impossible correspondence, but in terms of a commitment to 
“work on ourselves” in order to “invent […] a manner of being”. But while it is true that Greek 
ascesis was very different from Christian asceticism, (accepting Foucault’s use of the terms), it is 
not true at all that the renunciation of bodily pleasures was merely a variable historical feature of 
self-work, or that it could be separated from Greek ascesis, as we have seen.  
There have been historical forms of self-work which placed a high value on certain forms of 
pleasure, rather than renouncing it – English Romanticism – think of Blake and Shelley (Byron 
was a more dubious case), nineteenth century aestheticism, etc. Before Foucault, pleasure had 
sometimes been instrumental to ascesis, but it had never been its object. In Oriental forms, the use 
of pleasure is generally associated with theories of energy and its various qualities, and in 
assuming control of these energies, re-channelling sexual energies for spiritual purposes for 
example. In Romanticism, the use of pleasure is often connected with the recuperation of one’s 
natural, animal being, and with freedom from constraint, allowing one to develop one’s full 
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potential. Foucault does not write about these practices105; and historically they are few, far 
between, and not Greek or Roman. Conversely, in myriad forms, the renunciation of that pleasure 
which is construed as inseparable from desire is a persistent feature of both ancient and Hellenistic 
techniques of the self, of almost all Oriental practices; and of many other practices scattered 
throughout Western history.  
Ironically, given Foucault’s preoccupations, there is one very specific reason for the ubiquity of 
this practice within traditions of self-work, and that is precisely to split off pleasure from desire, 
but this pleasure is not generally conceived as sexual. Only when one is free of desire, the 
argument runs, can one experience Platonic bliss, or the Epicurean pure pleasure of existence, or 
Stoic joy, or Buddhist Enlightenment, or cosmic consciousness. The ultimate goal, at least of the 
Stoics, is the good life, and this meant living in virtue. But it also, as if by a glorious paradox, 
meant the freedom to live each moment fully – whatever each moment brings – assenting to the 
way things are and not struggling against them constantly with desires and aversions; and this 
opens the door, closed by our turbulent minds, to what may then be experienced as real, free, 
pleasure. 
In a strong sense this letting things happen and welcoming them, whatever they are, is the opposite 
of intentionally “creating” a way of life, or “constructing” the self; it is just that, since a life not 
moved by desire and aversion is so extraordinary, in effect, the philosophical self is self-
constructed, the philosophical way of life is something out of the ordinary, but this is incidental to 
the goal, it is not the goal itself. It is an art of life, but an art of life without artifice, as it were; like 
the Stoic art of whole-hearted “assent” to the way things are. 
And as to the Epicureans, Hadot says :  
 
philosophy consists in knowing how to seek pleasure in a reasonable way. In fact, this means seeking the only 
genuine pleasure: the pure pleasure of existing. For all people’s misfortune and suffering comes from the fact 
that they are unaware of genuine pleasure. When they seek pleasure they are unable to find it, because they 
cannot be satisfied with what they have; or because they seek what is beyond their reach; or because they spoil 
their pleasure by constantly fearing they will lose it. […] The mission of philosophy and of Epicurus was 
therefore above all therapeutic: the philosopher must tend to the sickness of the soul, and teach mankind how to 
experience pleasure. (WAP, 115)  
 
The way the Stoic, Marcus Aurelius put this was: 
 
Love only the event which comes upon us, and which is linked to us by Destiny. (VII, 57)  
 
                                                 
105 He mentions the case of Dandyism, which he treats very briefly in What is Enlightenment?, where he speaks of 
Baudelaire, but mostly in another connection. See below. 
 125 
The second of these two linked statements of Marcus Aurelius marks the theoretical disagreement 
between Epicureans and Stoics, the first marks their agreement. Epicureans didn’t believe in 
Destiny, their universe was random while that of the Stoics was ordered by the logos that is nature. 
Perhaps in part for this reason, the Epicureans imposed a certain order on their own on their lives, 
ideally living in separate communities dedicated to the practice of their philosophy; whereas the 
Stoics lived – dedicated to the practice of their philosophy – in the midst of ordinary life. But the 
central tenet of their philosophical practice was the same: “Love only the event which comes upon 
us” means to find one’s pleasure in pure existence, in the present moment, and to desire only that, 
because that – one’s judgement in relation to the present moment, the Stoics would say – is the 
only thing that truly depends on us, it is the place where we are free. 
Perhaps the most interesting problematisation in this context, was the Stoic discipline of desire. 
Interesting because, unlike the Christian and psychological hermeneutic of desire, it is not centred 
on guilt and self-blame. It regards our mistaken judgements about what is truly pleasurable and 
painful as a result of the way we have been (mis)taught to read our world; to place, for example, 
an entirely false value on the Imperial purple cloak, as Marcus Aurelius would have it, failing to 
see that it is just the hair of the sheep, dipped in the blood of molluscs. Perhaps the combination of 
the two words which provoked in Foucault an allergic reaction – “discipline” and “desire” – 
prevented him from seeing in this particular pagan column a potentially useful prop in the 
construction of a new self, whatever the epoch. Not with the same historical criteria, of course, but 
as a way of introducing calm reflection to the agitated iconography of desire, as an exercise of 
freedom. Desire, as Foucault himself pointed out, was always more to do with the imagination 
than the body for the Greeks; but in the case of the Stoics, as we have seen, it was part of the 
faculty of reason.  
 
 
 4. An aesthetics of existence 
 
Modernity is often characterized in terms of consciousness of the discontinuity of time: a break with tradition, a 
feeling of novelty, a vertigo in the face of the passing moment. And this is indeed what Baudelaire seems to be 
saying when he defines modernity as “the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent.” But, for him, being modern 
does not lie in recognizing and accepting this perpetual movement; on the contrary, it lies in adopting a certain 
attitude with respect to this movement; and this deliberate, difficult attitude consists in recapturing something 
eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it. (WE, 310)106 
 
                                                 
106 Baudelaire quote is from The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays, London, Phaidon, 1964, p.13 
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 Let us suppose we said Yes to one single instant: we have thereby said Yes not only to ourselves but to the 
whole of existence. For nothing is sufficient unto itself – neither in ourselves, nor among things – and if, just 
one single time, our soul has vibrated and resonated with happiness, like a stretched cord, then it has taken all 
eternity to bring about that single event. And, at that unique instant of our Yes, all eternity was accepted, saved, 
justified and affirmed.107 
 
Becoming aware of the present means becoming aware of our freedom.108 
 
 
That modernity has accelerated our perception of the passage of time is by now a commonplace, 
but amongst poets and philosophers it has a long history. Awareness of life as “nasty, brutish and 
short”, as Shakespeare puts it, has always been the framework within which the value of life must 
be sought, or created, which comes to much the same thing. Foucault here focuses attention on the 
fact that for Baudelaire, it is in capturing the eternal in the only place it can ever be found, within 
the present moment, that defines for us how to live in modernity, just as Nietzsche describes it 
here, and just as Marcus Aurelius made it his practice, in Antiquity. Because in these matters, two 
thousand years slip away when we read the Greeks; whatever and whenever our present moment 
may be, the question of how to live in the present moment, within and in the knowledge of the flux 
of time, returns. Our thinking and our subjectivation, on the other hand, change, radically, as Paul 
Veyne puts it: “From one age to another, problems are not similar, any more than is nature, or 
reason; the eternal return is also an eternal departure (he [Foucault] had been fond of this 
expression of [René] Char’s); only successive valorizations exist.” (FFE, 226) Which is a view 
Foucault shared with Paul Veyne, but he also held that the practice of making those valorizations 
persists, and this practice is ethics. As Veyne himself says “People can no more prevent 
themselves from valorizing than from breathing, and they do battle for their values.” (Ibid. 230) 
This view was shared by Iris Murdoch, who writes, from a different angle: “language itself is a 
moral medium, almost all uses of language convey value. This is one reason why we are almost 
always morally active. Life is soaked in the moral, literature is soaked in the moral.” (LP, 27) This 
ethical awareness was at the root of philosophy in antiquity, of philosophy as a reflective way of 
life, whereas in modernity, its relegation to the status of an optional branch of an academic activity 
marked the kind of philosophy that did not interest Foucault, or Murdoch. But whereas Murdoch 
believed that existence was in any case aesthetic, and ethics had to do with taking responsibility 
for seeing and shaping it, Foucault believed that the aesthetic of existence was to be constructed. 
                                                 
107 Nietzsche, Posthumous Fragments, late 1886-Spring 1887, 7, 38, quoted in Hadot, IC, op.cit, p.144 
108 Marcus Aurelius, Discourses, XII, 26, 2, quoted in Hadot, IC, op.cit p.132 
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With regard to the philosophical life, Arnold Davidson makes a distinction “between the notions 
of a way of life and a style of life. In the ancient world philosophy itself was a way of life, a way 
of life that was distinct from everyday life, and that was perceived as strange and even dangerous.” 
(EAF, 131-32) He cites Hadot’s remarks on the philo-sopher’s literal “love of wisdom”, an 
attitude “which is foreign to the world, that makes the philosopher a stranger in it.” And, Davidson 
continues: “Given this basic characteristic of philosophy itself as a way of life, there were, of 
course, different philosophies, what I shall call different styles of life, different styles of living 
philosophically. Each philosophical school – Stoic, Epicurean, Platonist, and so on – represented a 
style of life that had a corresponding fundamental inner attititude.” (ibid., 132)109 These 
differences in style, in inner attitude, occur at the level of the philosophical schools, and also at the 
level of individuals, with their different intellectual and aesthetic temperaments. Epictetus, Seneca, 
and Marcus Aurelius were very different Stoics, just as Baudelaire, Nietzsche and Foucault are 
very different representatives of the modern world. Elective affinities, however, of intellectual and 
aesthetic temperament, may generate new ideas; and, in remarking on Foucault’s love of Seneca, 
Paul Veyne writes that “indeed there is an affinity between Foucault’s elegance as an individual 
and the elegance that characterized Greco-Roman civilization. In short, classical elegance 
privately served as Foucault’s image of an art of living, a possible ethics.” (op.cit. 225) Now, Paul 
Veyne is clearly not talking about jackets and togas, Foucault’s elegance lies in his gestures, his 
acts, his thoughts, his words, all of which constitute an art of life. And yet Foucault’s insistence on 
the aesthetics of existence has been much misunderstood, as if he might perhaps have meant 
jackets and togas.  
This has partly to do with what is in effect a passing reference to dandyism in What is 
Enlightenment. In this important text, mostly on Kant; after reading Baudelaire’s essay on his 
friend, Constantin Guys, The Painter of Modern Life Foucault writes “modernity for Baudelaire is 
not simply a form of relationship to the present; it is also a mode of relationship that must be 
established with oneself. The deliberate attitude of modernity is tied to an indispensable 
asceticism.” (WE, 310) Baudelaire himself had written that "dandyism in certain respects comes 
close to spirituality and to stoicism” (sic) and defined the dandy as one who elevates aesthetics to a 
living religion, so that the dandy's very existence stands as a reproach to the responsible citizen of 
the middle class.”110 Given Stoic attitudes to responsible citizenship in antiquity it is hard to see, 
                                                 
109  Italics in original. Hadot quote from Critical Inquiry, 16:3 (Spring 1990) 
110 "These beings have no other status, but that of cultivating the idea of beauty in their own persons, of satisfying 
their passions, of feeling and thinking [...] Contrary to what many thoughtless people seem to believe, dandyism is not 
even an excessive delight in clothes and material elegance. For the perfect dandy, these things are no more than the 
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transposed to modernity “reproaching the responsible citizen of the middle class” as a Stoic 
attitude. Certainly the notion of seeing the eternal in the present is a Stoic attitude, but Dandyism, 
with its turning oneself (as opposed to one’s life) into a work of art, is not. Foucault clearly 
appreciated Baudelaire’s anti-conformism, as Baudelaire appreciated that of the dandies, and their 
living out of a desire to recreate themselves, however shallow that may have been; but Foucault 
redefines dandyism in a way that might have surprised and flattered its adherents. He writes: “To 
be modern is not to accept oneself as one is in the flux of passing moments; it is to take oneself as 
object of a complex and difficult elaboration: what Baudelaire, in the vocabulary of his day, calls 
dandysme.” (WE, 311) Foucault’s description of Baudelaire says much of his affinity with the 
poète maudit, who like himself was a parrhesiast, a teller of uncomfortable truths, and not a 
dandy. He writes: “Modern man, for Baudelaire, is not the man who goes off to discover himself, 
his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself. This modernity does not 
‘liberate man in his own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.” (WE, 312) 
Hadot remarks however, in connection with Foucault’s neglect, in his discussion of the Stoics, of 
their commitment to “go beyond the self, and think and act in unison with universal reason” 
(PWL, 207), that “by focusing his interpretation too exclusively on the culture of the self, the care 
of the self, and conversion toward the self – more generally, by defining his ethical model as an 
aesthetics of existence – M.Foucault is propounding a culture of the self which is too aesthetic. In 
other words, this may be a new form of Dandyism, late twentieth-century style.” (PWL, 211). 
The language Foucault, like Baudelaire, uses here is provocative, in the sense of utilizing 
exaggeration, and even the outlandish statement to provoke thought, to disturb complacency. This 
is of course a valid philosophical use of language in the non-academic sense, a standard practice of 
Nietzsche’s, who stands behind Foucault in this respect. But it is a writing technique Foucault did 
not use so often in his extensive academic work, where the hypotheses and analyses are elaborated 
with meticulous rigour. Thus, in The History of Sexuality, and in the courses at the Collège de 
France, Foucault methodically relates what he means by the “aesthetics of existence” to the 
valorizations of the periods he is discussing; so for Classical Antiquity he cites Socrates in the 
Gorgias [506d-507d], thus: “ ‘The virtue of each thing, a tool, a body, and, further, a soul and a 
whole animal, doesn’t come to be present in the best way just at random, but by some structure 
and correctness and craft (taxis, orthotes, techne) […] Then a soul with its proper order is better 
than a disordered soul? It must be. But now the soul that has order is orderly? Of course it is. And 
                                                                                                                                                                
symbol of the aristocratic superiority of his mind." Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life, cited in Wikipedia: 
“Dandyism”. 
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the orderly soul is temperate? It certainly must be.’” (UP, 90) The love of order and harmony, and 
the intellectual conviction that the cosmos is ordered, as is everything in it, shine out from this text 
of Plato’s, that as Foucault notes here, “links moderation with the beauty of a soul whose order 
corresponds to its real nature”. But this order also linked individual moderation – good governance 
of the self – with the role of the Athenian citizen to whom the text is addressed, and hence the 
good governance of the polis. Foucault describes the self-mastery that would achieve the required 
moderation as “this prior condition of ‘ethical virility’ that provided one with the right sense of 
proportion for the exercise of ‘sexual virility’; and he adds that sexual virility in its turn was 
modelled on ‘social virility’, that is to say: “the relationship of domination, hierarchy, and 
authority that one expected, as a man, a free man, to establish over his inferiors.” (Ibid., 83)  
Despite this, in a chapter with the neatly-crafted title of Alcibiades goes Wilde, O’Leary writes: “I 
will present the prima facie case that Foucault ‘aestheticizes’ the Greeks of the Classical period by 
presenting their sexual ethics primarily in terms of their desire to create an aesthetic effect, rather 
than in terms of their desire to achieve and maintain political mastery in the polis.”111 What is 
curious in this statement is that it refers specifically to the chapter in The Uses of Pleasure cited 
above, where Foucault methodically avoids such a false opposition between “’political mastery” 
and “sexual ethics”, speaking rather of their “isomorphic relationship.” Also, whereas Foucault 
was explicitly studying the complementary nature of these different aspects of philosophical 
concern in the classical period primarily from the perspective of the form of relation to the self 
they epitomized, it is suggested here that he made pronouncements about the historical facts, and 
rather silly ones at that – such as suggesting that “aesthetic effect” was more important to Greeks 
of the Classical period than their relation to the polis! Here again, however, some of Foucault’s 
own remarks in interview may be to blame for this type of interpretation, particularly where brief 
comments on the beautiful life serve as asides to the point he is making – as here in contrasting 
Stoic ethics to later, normalizing techniques:   
 
The principal aim, the principal target of this kind of ethics was an aesthetic one. First this kind of ethics was 
only a problem of personal choice. Second it was reserved for a few people in the population; it was not a 
question of giving a pattern of behaviour for everybody. It was a personal choice for a small elite. The reason 
for making this choice was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave others memories of a beautiful 
existence. I don’t think we can say that this kind of ethics was an attempt to normalize the population. (OGE, 
254)  
 
 
                                                 
111 Timothy O’Leary, Foucault and the Art of Ethics, London-New York, Continuum, 2002, pp.39-40  
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There is an etymological problem behind this in that, as O’Leary himself points out that “there is a 
great deal of overlap, particularly in the Classical era, between the ideas of beauty and moral 
worth. Indeed a single word covers both meanings – kalos.”112 He also notes that “English 
translators consistently give ‘fine’ for kalos, whereas their French counterparts prefer 
‘beautiful’.”113 It is true that Foucault is speaking in an unguarded way here, presenting some 
remarkably effete Stoics, and that he is also deliberately playing on this ambiguity, making use of 
a certain “semantic slipperiness” as Andrew Thacker114 put it. But his more considered thoughts 
about the Stoics were expressed elsewhere (and clarify the relation beauty/good). Thus, in 
discussing “the [Stoic] subjects free choice of exercises, when he finds he needs them […] within 
the framework [not] of a rule of life but of a tekhne tou biou (an art of living)”; Foucault says that 
“Making one’s life the object of a tekhne, making one’s life a work – a beautiful and good work 
(as everything produced by a good and reasonable tekhne must be) necessarily entails the freedom 
and choice of the person employing this tekhne.” And explains: “The philosophical life […] as the 
life as defined and prescribed by philosophers as the life obtained thanks to a tekhne, does not 
obey a regula (a rule): it submits to a forma (a form). It is a style of life, a sort of form one gives to 
one’s life.” (HS, 424) Paul Veyne tells us that “Style does not mean distinction here [or elsewhere 
in Foucault]; the word is to be taken in the sense of the Greeks, for whom an artist was first of all 
an artisan and a work of art was first of all a work.” (FFE, 231) No doubt for this reason, “Julia 
Annas insists that the best translation of techne is not ‘art’ but ‘craft’.”115 Though whether or not, 
in these matters of translation, semantic slipperiness is always worse than semantic rigidity may be 
hard to determine. 
 
The variation in the meaning of “aesthetics” from the fourth century B.C.E. Platonic conception to 
the second century C.E. Stoic conception is perhaps best expressed by Hadot, in an essay on 
Marcus Aurelius, with his meticulous attention to gross and subtle conceptual shifts. Thus: 
 
In the place of an idealistic aesthetics, which considers as beautiful only that which is rational and functional, 
manifesting beautiful proportions and an ideal form, there appears a realistic aesthetics which finds beauty in 
things just the way they are, in everything that lives and exists. (PWL, 190)  
  
 
 
                                                 
112 O’Leary, op. cit. p.53. 
113 Ibid. p.55 
114 In “Foucault’s Aesthetics of Existence”, Radical Philosophy, 63, Spring 1993, pp.13-21, cited in O’Leary, op.cit. 
115 Cited in O’Leary, op.cit. p.55 
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5. Stoic “intellectualism” 
 
One case in which Foucault’s occasional semantic slipperiness is unhelpful is that of his comments 
on the Stoic “Experience of a pleasure one takes in oneself. The individual who has finally 
succeeded in gaining access to himself is, for himself, an object of pleasure.” (CS, 66) He did 
acknowledge, a few lines later, that “This pleasure, for which Seneca usually employs the word 
gaudium or laetitia, is a state that is neither accompanied not followed by any form of disturbance 
in the body or the mind”; and also that such pleasure, worldly pleasure or voluptas, is contrasted 
with gaudium by the Stoics. Hadot’s criticism of the rather un-Stoic spiritual onanism of this 
passage is well-known, and his reiteration of the reasons for which such ambiguity is usually 
avoided by translating gaudium as “joy”, and voluptas as “pleasure”. But: “most importantly, it is 
not the case that the Stoic finds his joy in his ‘self;’ rather, as Seneca says, he finds it in ‘the best 
portion of the self,’ in ‘the true good’. […] Seneca does not find his joy in ‘Seneca,’ but by 
transcending ‘Seneca’.” (PWL, 207)  
Hadot describes this self as a “transcendent self”, but, to avoid possible confusion with the 
substantive transcendent self, or soul, of the Platonists, it might also be described as a 
“transpersonal” or “superpersonal” self, in that thinking and acting “in line with universal reason” 
was the same for everyone: “For the Stoics there is only one single reason at work here, and this 
reason is man’s true self” (Ibid.). In either case, it is precisely in escaping from the egoism of 
one’s everyday obsessions with one’s desires, aversions, and concern for one’s reputation that one 
frees oneself to reason from this impersonal perspective.   
After listing Stoic exercises designed to achieve this, Hadot writes: 
 
I can well understand Foucault’s motives for giving short shrift to these aspects, of which he was perfectly 
aware. His description of the practices of the self – like, moreover, my description of spiritual exercises  – is 
not merely an historical study, but rather a tacit attempt to offer contemporary mankind a model of life, which 
Foucault calls “an aesthetics of existence.” Now, according to a more or less universal tendency of modern 
thought […] the ideas of “universal reason” and “universal nature” do not have much meaning any more. It was 
therefore convenient to bracket them. (Ibid. 208)  
  
In this connection, Arnold Davidson writes: “Indeed I would claim, following Hadot, that one of 
the most distinctive features of that care of the self studied by Foucault in volume 3 of The History 
of Sexuality is its indissociable link with this cosmic consciousness; so that one places oneself in 
the perspective of the cosmic Whole.” (EAF, 129) But it can also be argued that Foucault did have 
another option, which he didn’t take, which was to separate those Stoic techniques of the self 
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which no longer have any relevance, those specifically concerned with aligning one’s reason with 
“universal reason”, the perspective of the cosmic Whole, from those other techniques, such as 
Epictetus’ three disciplines: the discipline of assent to the present moment (à la Baudelaire, or 
Nietzsche), the discipline of desire and the discipline of active impulses116, all of which are 
primarily concerned with learning how one’s mind constitutes its representations and acts upon 
them, and with freeing oneself from entrapment in its automatisms in order to make one’s 
conscious choices about them. For the Stoics this freedom will, automatically, draw one’s thoughts 
in line with universal reason, but this does not tie these techniques exclusively to this belief. 
Similar techniques for the contemplation of one’s own thought processes and intentionality exist in 
other traditions, without a necessary link to a concept of universal reason, but the Stoic techniques 
represent possibly the finest exposition of this form of introspection in Western philosophy. At the 
same time, as Davidson also points out, Foucault’s “concern with the history of the present […] 
need not, and should not, lead us to transform the [Stoic] intensity of the relation to the self into 
the modern estheticization of the self” (Ibid. 134); something very different from an aesthetics of 
existence. 
This again raises the question of whether this form of introspection, this self-work, are more 
usefully described as intellectual or psychological. Foucault treated it as intellectual, aligning 
himself in this with a long tradition of Stoic exegesis, and he approved of it for this reason. But 
this question is connected to that of the figure of the sage, as the model of self-work to which the 
Stoics aspired, the model of attainment to which that work was directed. Davidson insightfully 
notes that “[the] figure of the sage is notably absent from Foucault’s writings on ancient 
philosophy, and it is precisely this absence that permits him to pass too smoothly from ancient to 
modern experiences of the self.” (Ibid. 136) Davidson sees this as evidence of the obstacles, 
particularly that of the notion of the cosmic consciousness of the sage, in the way of any 
contemporary reformulation of Stoic techniques. Nonetheless, referring to Hadot’s writing on the 
sage, he notes that along with this aspect, “Hadot does acknowledge that the figure of the sage in 
ancient thought corresponds to a more acute consciousness of the self, of the personality, of 
interiority.” (Ibid. 138) However, Davidson continues, “the internal freedom recognized by all the 
philosophical schools, ‘this inexpungible core of the personality’ is located in faculty of 
judgement, not in some psychologically thick form of introspection.” (Ibid. my emphasis) In 
supporting Foucault’s reading of Stoic intellectualism, Davidson is here using this notion of 
psychological introspection as Foucault does, in such a way that it carries with it the aura, if not 
                                                 
116 See discussion in Hadot, Inner Citadel. 
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the explicit connotation, of the exploration of one’s sinfulness or guilt, of obsession with one’s 
emotions, that figure so greatly in two of the major forms of inner examination that together made 
up the hermeneutics of desire, respectively the Catholic confessional and its secular genealogical 
descendent, psychoanalysis.  
 
But would it not be possible, on this grid, to read certain forms of inner exploration practiced in 
antiquity – that of Epictetus’ discipline of desire for example, and the versions of this to be found 
in Seneca or Marcus Aurelius – as psychologically thin forms of introspection, in that they are 
very much concerned with the psychological, and not merely the logical, life of the mind, but in 
ways in which guilt has no significant place? This “acute consciousness of the self, of the 
personality, of interiority”, to which the sage has attained, is precisely the result of long-self-
observation, of observation of one’s desires and aversions, of fixation with one’s own 
‘personality,’ of the self-justificatory narratives we all create when in doubt about the appropriacy 
of our behaviour, and so forth. One does not free oneself of all this by simply reciting wise words 
to oneself, but by long, patient work, unpicking persistent habits of thinking, feeling and acting 
one by one. This is the work of Epictetus’ disciplines, and they may be worth a second glance as 
indications of possible forms of self-work for modern times. “Even if, as Cicero claimed, the true 
sage is born perhaps once every 500 years, nevertheless, the philosopher can attain at least a 
certain relative perfection.”  (Ibid.)  
 
What Stoic “intellectualism” is taken to mean, tends to be coloured today by the post-Kantian 
habit of distinguishing the psychological realm of human life, from the specifically non-
psychological realm of the intellect; and this is compounded in logical empiricism by a strict 
distinction between the logical and the psychological. And yet none of the various Greek uses of 
“reason/soul”, as distinguished from “body/passions”, share this rigid Kantian distinction, as 
Foucault himself has pointed out. Certainly “the faculty of judgement” is the locus of the higher 
part of the self, the soul, or reason, the Stoic hegemonikon; but this reason is not Kant’s reason, 
devoid of, even antithetical to emotion. Ancient reason tends to contain certain emotions, at very 
least the motivation to the good; and in some schools of thought, all emotions are present in 
reason, as pure or corrupted forms of desire or aversion, as we have seen. For the Greeks to 
separate reason from the psyche made no epistemological sense, as Hadot has amply demonstrated 
in his works, most extensively in his analysis of Epictetus’ “discipline of desire” in The Inner 
Citadel. The inner exploration of one’s representations and judgements – necessary in order to 
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gain mastery over them – was not directed to judgements that were cool and detached, but to 
judgements about what we desire and what we hate. They could not therefore be distinguished as 
either specifically “intellectual” or “psychological,” they derive from a reason that is imbued with 
passions, and attempt to transform vitiated reason into pure reason, from within. Despite his 
extensive reading of Hadot, where this question is frequently addressed (though this detailed 
analysis of Epictetus was published only after his death), Foucault never undertook to deal directly 
with this fundamentally unitary aspect of the Stoic relation to the self. 
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Ch. 6. Hermeneutics and non-hermeneutics of the self  
 
1. Homo antiquus 
 
When Foucault turned his attention fully to Greek and Roman techniques of the self, he discovered 
what he saw as, finally, non-judgemental forms of self-questioning. In discussing the Greek and 
Roman techniques of the self and their relation to underlying philosophical conceptions he 
constantly stresses that they are not directed, as in Christian confession and clinical psychology, to 
discovering dark truths hidden under surface layers of apparently rational thought. In Plato, 
however, in the place of this dark “true” self, behind the daytime ego; he encountered a “true self” 
of pure form and other-worldly beauty. And in his reading of the philosophical discourses of more 
recent centuries he found greatly varying conceptions of the self, some of which acknowledged 
some form of historical or cultural conditioning, but most of which assumed some variant of the 
notion that behind the ego – construed as the immediate sense of who one is – there is an 
“authentic” self waiting to be uncovered and allowed to realise its “true” nature. 
 Underlying all of Foucault’s investigations into philosophical conceptions of the self was his 
strong rejection of this notion that there is some form of a priori self to be discovered behind the 
everyday ego, once the obstacles to that self-discovery have been removed; and it is in this 
investigative spirit that he approached the Hellenistic period of ancient philosophy, that which 
seemed most likely to him to reveal a conception of a self that is not pre-constituted, and thus 
where one might find the elaboration of practices of a philosophical life designed to constitute, or 
perhaps at least reconstitute, the self. 
 
With regard to the self of psychoanalysis, Freud, in comparing psychoanalysis to sculpture as 
opposed to painting, liked to quote Leonardo’s famous antithesis between painting, which operates 
per via di porre, and sculpture, which operates per via di levare: “ ‘Painting, says Leonardo, 
works [by] apply[ing] a substance […] where there was nothing; sculpture, however, proceeds 
[by] tak[ing] away from the block of stone all that hides the surface of the statue contained in it.’ ” 
Taking sculpture as his model for his clinical work, Freud says that the great difficulty in applying 
this technique was the resistance that the stone-block-self puts up against the removal of its 
protective outer strata, as it were, the way “ ‘the patient clings to his disease and thus even fights 
against his own recovery [a point Plato emphasizes in telling the allegory of the Cave] which alone 
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makes it possible to understand his behaviour in daily life.’ ”117 Reading this for Cavell brought to 
mind his own reading of Plato’s allegory of the Cave, and his appreciation of the importance, for 
philosophy, of investigating the interweaving of thought and desire that he finds in both these two 
vastly influential thinkers. Precisely this investigation, with Plato and Freud as its main sources, 
was also a central theme of Iris Murdoch’s philosophical reflection, as we will see. Cavell refers to 
Wittgenstein’s thoughts on the same question, thus: “I should add, in recounting the crossing of 
paths in Freud and Wittgenstein, that I am less satisfied with Wittgenstein’s well-known mottoes 
for understanding the resistances of philosophers to his [Freud’s] methods, as when he speaks, for 
example, of their being misled by grammar. This to my mind obscures what it is that philosophers 
want from their ratiocination, a matter Wittgenstein also wishes, of course, to bring to light.”118 
 
Foucault, a philosopher with great resistances to Freud’s methods, is explicit about what he wants 
from his own ratiocination, and from those of others, especially the Greeks. As he says of the way 
he sees philosophical work: “This transformation of oneself by one’s own knowledge is, I think, 
something rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why should a painter work if he is not 
transformed by his own painting?” (ISR, 131) Though he has chosen painting as his metaphor 
here, he could, of course, equally well have spoken of sculpture, in that it is the work of creative 
self-expression in art that, as in philosophy, he sees as a work of self-transformation; if, that is, it 
is lived in a certain way. Nonetheless, on Leonardo’s definitions, it is the metaphor of the painter 
that works for Foucault (as that of the sculptor works for Wittgenstein), – Foucault’s preferred 
method of self-transformation (experienced as aesthetic) was ‘per via di porre’, by way of creating 
the self; though as a philosophical method, this would, as he says, involve the “transformation of 
oneself by one’s own knowledge.” 
 
In the first lesson of his 1982 course on The Hermeneutics of the Subject, he says: “The question I 
would like to take up this year is this: In what historical form do the relations between the 
‘subject’ and ‘truth’ […] take shape in the West?” (HS, 2) This is the question which gives the 
course its title, but in reality the course is more narrowly focused on the historical form of the 
relations between the “subject” and the “truth of the self” in the ancient world, with a number of 
comparative references to Christianity, and few to the modern West. In this sense, the course title 
                                                 
117 Freud, “On Psychotherapy”, quoted (without further reference) in Cavell, S., Cities of Words, p.294 
118 Ibid. Murdoch agreed with Wittgenstein on the seductiveness of Freud’s theory, and the dangers of the “total” 
vision it presented, quoting W.H. Auden’s comment that “Freud was not so much an idea as a whole climate of 
opinion.”   
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is a complete misnomer, as he saw ancient practices of the self as essentially non-hermeneutic, in 
contrast to the “hermeneutic” practices of Christianity and psychology. This is unlikely to have 
been irony; more probably it had been his original intention to follow the changes through from 
antiquity to modernity. As we have seen, the analytical model that Foucault sets up starts with a 
basic division of philosophical conceptions into those traceable exclusively to the Greek precept 
gnothi seaton, or “know yourself”, and those traceable to the interlacing of this principle with that 
of epimeleia heautou, or the care of the self. The former of these is retained in modern philosophy, 
whereas the latter was predominant in antiquity, though what exactly that means, and how it 
changes, will have to be very carefully delineated.  
The model of relationship of the self to itself that Foucault has studied most intensively is that of 
the Hellenistic Stoics; a model that “comprised a set of practices designated by the general term 
askésis.” But this “ascesis” has no connotation of self-punishment as it often has had in subsequent 
uses. Foucault writes that “philosophical ascesis looks with suspicion on those figures who point 
to the marvels of their abstinences, their fasts, their foreknowledge of the future.” Instead, in 
Hellenistic use it connotes a process of self-training that is directed to learning, in the first 
instance, what we need in order “not to let ourselves be overwhelmed by the emotions”. And he 
asks: “Now what do we need in order to keep our control in the face of the events that may 
occur?” And answers that for the Greco-Romans: “We need ‘discourses’ logoi, understood as true 
and rational discourses. Lucretius [following Epicurus] speaks of veridica dicta that enable us to 
ward off our fears and not let ourselves be crushed by what we believe to be misfortunes.” (HS, 
498) Marcus Aurelius, he tells us, refers to memorised “true discourses” as “a surgeon’s kit, which 
must be always ready to hand.” (HS, 499) The role of these discourses will be Foucault’s main 
point, what he sees as the most important of Hellenistic techniques of the self. Though citing 
Lucretius in this context however he did not study Epicurean techniques of the self in any detail; 
though Hadot and Nussbaum both remark on this curious exclusion, given his interest in 
“pleasure” construed not as a problem but as a potential technique of the self.119  
 
For him the Stoics represented the best example in Western history of self-transformation through 
techniques that were based on an interiority of rational discourse, that, as such, can be set against 
the ‘self-inquisitorial’ interiority of Christianity, and, even more insidiously, of Western science. 
Insidiously because there is no acknowledgement on the part of modern science that it too has 
metaphysical foundations; grounded as it is in sets of principles and methodologies that, though 
                                                 
119 In Hadot, (PWL) and Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, respectively. 
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they have been overturned often enough in the history of scientific thought, are generally held to 
be eternal, transhistorical  – for the duration, that is, of the period of their dominance. The early 
phase of Foucault’s work had dealt with this. And just as religious discourse lays claim to 
“absolute truth”, science claims, with splendidly convincing arguments, to have a direct line to 
“objective” truth; and in this way, the “truths” of contemporary biological, psychological and 
social sciences intrude heavily in contemporary relations of the self to itself. Contemporary 
scientific “truth”, however (unlike earlier periods of modernity), was never fully problematised by 
Foucault from the perspective of subjectivation. In the Course Summary  to The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject, Foucault lists three principle Stoic techniques of the self, and these are:  
 
[firstly listening:] a set of rules for correct listening (the correct posture to adopt, the way to direct one’s 
attention, how to retain what has been said);  
[secondly writing:] taking notes on the reading, conversations, and reflections […]; keeping notebooks […] 
which must be read from time to time so as to reactualize their contents;  
[and thirdly habitual reflection:] taking stock of oneself, but in the sense of exercises for memorizing what one 
has learned. This is the precise and technical meaning of the expression anakhòrèsis eis heauton, as Marcus 
Aurelius employs it: going back into oneself and examining the ‘wealth’ one has deposited there; one must 
have within oneself a sort of book that one rereads from time to time.(HS, 500)  
 
These three techniques can also be read as three aspects of one principal practice – that of listening 
to (and reading), annotating and reflecting on the “true discourse” of the teacher; but whilst there 
is no disagreement among scholars concerning the vast importance of this practice for the Stoics, 
there may be considerable disagreement on his suggestion that Marcus Aurelius’ notion of ‘taking 
stock of oneself’’ implied only, or even primarily, checking one’s thoughts and acts against 
memorised “true discourses”. Foucault’s insistence on this version runs through many of his 
writings on the Stoics120, orienting the descriptions he gives of apparently different practices. With 
regard to these three techniques he says, for example: 
 
There is then a whole set of techniques whose purpose is to link together the truth and the subject. But it should 
be clearly understood that it is not a matter of discovering a truth in the subject or making the soul the place 
where truth dwells through an essential kinship or original law; nor is it a matter of making the soul the object 
of a true discourse. We are still very far from what would be a hermeneutics of the subject. On the contrary, it is 
a question of arming the subject with a truth he did not know and that did not dwell within him; it involves 
turning this learned and memorized truth that is progressively put into practice into a quasi subject that reigns 
supreme within us. (HS Summary, 501, my emphasis.) 
 
                                                 
120 Note, for example: “for the Stoics, truth is not in oneself but in the logoi, the teachings of the masters. […] In the 
philosophical tradition inaugurated by the Stoics, askesis means, not renunciation but the progressive consideration of 
self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunciation of reality but through the acquisition and 
assimilation of truth.” (TS, 258) 
 139 
This appears to be a description of Stoicism as a form of self-programming, and though he does 
explore other Stoic techniques, it is this technique that he constantly returns to, and places at the 
centre of his reconstruction of the relation of the Stoic self to itself. The way in which Foucault 
presents his case here reflects a method of writing that he uses repeatedly. He reminds us what 
Stoic (in this case) practice is not, utilising phrases which encapsulate in shorthand the relevant 
Platonic and Christian conceptions from which he wishes to differentiate that of the Stoics. These 
have been previously established, through meticulous scholarship, and are identified as two forms 
of “hermeneutics of the subject”. He then says what the object of the practice in question is, as if  
this flowed by the logic of contraries from what it is not; when in fact no reason why this third set 
of techniques of the self could not be a third form of hermeneutics is established. It could be 
argued, conversely, that whether or not, for the Stoics, these techniques are: “a matter of making 
the soul the object of a true discourse” – depends on how “soul” (a key word in Foucault’s 
argument here) is defined. If “soul” has Christian, or Platonic, connotations, then certainly not; but 
the Stoic conceptions that are generally translated as “soul” have very different connotations, and 
Foucault himself often uses “care of the self”, which he says is the fundamental Stoic practice, and 
“cultivation of the soul” interchangeably. The Stoics were certainly far from a Christian 
hermeneutics, but it is arguable whether or not they employed no form of hermeneutics at all. The 
only “quasi-subject that reigns supreme within us” for the Stoics is the hegemonikon, the guiding 
principle, which, according to Hadot (referring to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius), is the 
equivalent of the self, the intellect (nous), the power of reflection (dianoia), and the inner daimòn, 
and that all of these terms indicate the soul.121 The “putting into practice” of “learned and 
memorized truth” is certainly one of the activities of the hegemonikon, but it is generally 
considered that it is the hegemonikon which adopts this practice, not the practice that constitutes 
the hegemonikon, or the “quasi-subject” within us. 
 
The “wealth” deposited within the self to which Marcus Aurelius refers can be interpreted, as it is 
by Foucault here, as memorized teachings; but if it is regarded as experiential verifications of the 
truth value of those same memorized teachings, the practice would not then be one of self-
programming, but perhaps something more resembling a hermeneutic of the self.122 Among 
                                                 
121 Cf. Hadot, IC, pp. 113 and 122-123 
122 Note also (TS, 238): “The Stoics spiritualized anakhòrèsis, the retreat of an army, the hiding of an escaped slave 
from his master, or the retreat into the country away from the towns as in Marcus Aurelius’s country retreat. A retreat 
into the country becomes a spiritual retreat into oneself. It is a general attitude and also a precise act every day; you 
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contrasting interpretations, there is that of Foucault himself, during the same course at the Collège 
de France. In referring to Seneca’s letter 52 to Lucilius in which he speaks of “the mental 
restlessness and irresolution with which we are naturally afflicted [… which is] basically what we 
call stultitia” he notes that for Seneca, “no one is in such good health (satis valet) that he can get 
out of (emergere) this condition by himself. Someone must lend him a hand and pull him out”. 
(HS, 130); and this lending a hand and pulling is, he says, the role of the teacher. “Henceforth the 
master is no longer the master of memory. He is no longer the person who, knowing what the 
other does not know, passes it on him […] Henceforth the master is an effective agency 
(opérateur) for producing effects within the individual’s relationship to his constitution as a 
subject.” (HS, 129-130) The implication here is that there are two phases in the Stoic teaching 
process; phases that are not necessarily chronological, this may depend on the progress of the 
student, or aspirant. A phase in which the teacher functions as “master of memory” providing the 
student with gems of wisdom to be learned and mentally reiterated; and a psychagogic phase, in 
which the teacher’s role is basically that of “pulling” the student into wakefulness, by “producing 
effects within the individual’s relationship to his constitution as a subject.” 
But if learning is conceived of in this way, not as memorization of truths revealed by others, as in 
Christian practice, but rather as emerging from that condition of “restlessness and irresolution with 
which we are naturally afflicted,” then that aspect of teaching which involves transmitting “truths” 
can only be an instrumental one; serving the purpose of diverting the mind from its habitual 
mechanisms in order to allow it to know, and therefore transform, itself. Any form of 
“transformation” brought about by the assimilation of other people’s finest ideas, will still be more 
fragile than the more radical form of transformation brought about by the capacity to know how 
one’s own mind works, to know the self. And it is this interpretation which seems to stand in 
logical correspondence with the Stoic texts Foucault is referring to, though he draws different, 
even conflicting, inferences from this at different times. It is also an interpretation which would 
seem to provide for a greater field of operation for the “individual’s relationship to his constitution 
as a subject”, than the mere memorisation and recall of learned truths.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                
retire into the self to discover – but not to discover faults and deep feelings, only to remember rules of action, the main 
laws of behaviour. It is a mnemotechnical formula.”  (emphasis mine. Foucault does not justify this crucial  “only”) 
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Foucault then provides a very lucid and detailed explanation of stultitia, “this morbid, pathological 
condition one must rise above”; which, he says, is a “commonplace in Stoic philosophy, starting 
especially with Posidonius.” (HS, 131) It is the condition we are in: 
 
 when we have not yet taken care of ourselves […] The practice of the self has to deal with stultitia as its raw 
material, if you like, and its objective is to escape from it […] The stultus is open to the external world 
inasmuch as he allows [… unexamined] representations to get mixed up in his own mind with his passions, 
desires, ambition, mental habits, illusions, etcetera, so that the stultus is someone who is prey to the winds of 
external representations and who, once they have entered his mind, cannot make the discrimination, cannot 
separate the content of these representations from what we will call, if you like, the subjective elements, which 
are combined in him. 
[…] The will of the stultus is not a free will […] What does it mean to will freely? It means willing without 
what it is that one wills being determined by this or that event, this or that representation, this or that 
inclination. To will freely is to will without any determinations, and the stultus is determined by what comes 
from both outside and inside […] the stultus wants several things at once […] The stultus wants something and 
at the same time he regrets it. Thus the stultus wants glory and, at the same time, regrets not leading a peaceful, 
voluptuous life, etcetera. (HS, 131-132) 
 
The fundamental point, the foundation of Stoic work on the self, so clearly described by Foucault 
here, is the fact that we are all stultus. Our stultus self is the starting point, and until we have 
cultivated this raw (and frankly, stupid) material of ourselves, we will be constantly prey to the 
winds of representations. If we cannot discriminate our freedom from inner states that are 
determined by “passions, mental habits, ambition” and so forth, we have no freedom, no real 
subjectivity; and it will take much observation of the actual self, in its actual stultitia, or ignorance, 
to learn to discriminate, and thus to free the self. It should already be clear from this small part of 
Foucault’s account of Stoic writings on the ‘pathological’ condition of the unfree, just how much 
work the Stoic philosophers must have done on the “raw material” of their own selves in order to 
come to this understanding of the complex processes by which, in their description, 
“representations” or concepts formulated outside the self are fused with passions, with illusions, 
with mental habits etcetera; forming a trap of “determinations” from which they must liberate 
themselves. And it is by virtue of their own experience that they are in a position to guide other 
aspirants to the happiness of a free and rational life, to take on the role of the “other” who lends a 
hand to those setting out on the path. As Foucault says “Between the stultus individual and the 
sapiens individual, the other is necessary” (HS, 133); and this “other” is precisely the “one who 
lends a hand”, the effective agent. “This effective agent who puts himself forward is, of course, the 
philosopher. The philosopher, then, is this effective agent. And this idea is found in all the 
[Hellenistic and Roman] philosophical tendencies, whatever they are.” (HS, 135) In this 
exposition, Foucault follows the Stoic texts very closely, but then adds a reflection of his own. He 
asks: “Now what object can one freely, absolutely, and always want?” The traditional answer to 
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this, for the Stoics, has always been ‘the good’ – the moral intention to always do what is right, 
and therefore to work on the self in such a way that one will always want the good. Instead 
Foucault answers his own question thus: “It goes without saying that the object, the only object 
that one can freely will, without having to take into consideration external determinations, is the 
self. […] To escape from stultitia will be precisely to act so that one can will the self, so that one 
can will oneself, so that one can strive towards the self as the only object one can will freely, 
absolutely, and always.” (HS, 133)  
What does this mean? That the sapiens self “wills itself” as opposed to willing the good? No 
explanation of this radical redescription of the goal of Stoic philosophical practice, or what it may 
mean to “will the self” is given here or at any point by Foucault, though it is presumably linked to 
his interest in the self-constructive aspects of Stoic practice. There is nothing controversial in 
describing Stoic practice as self-constructive, or at least self-reconstructive; but in suggesting that 
this was the goal of their practice, as opposed to instrumental to, and a welcome adjunct to, the 
pursuit of the good, Foucault distances himself from their texts (and from other interpreters). 
Clearly philosophers will always take what they want from other philosophers, and leave the rest, 
and Foucault is transparent (unlike others) in this aim. What is very curious in Foucault’s chosen 
selection of Stoic techniques is that he emphasizes the technique which seems least reworkable 
(even unthinkable) in a contemporary context – that of memorizing the wise words of the ancients 
– and de-emphasizes those techniques of self-knowledge that would seem to have so much more 
potential in the contemporary world, among which that of prosoche, or attention. 
 
 
2. Prosoche – attention to the self 
 
Both Foucault and Hadot, along with many other scholars, consider the practice of attention to the 
self, or prosoche, as the fundamental Stoic practice, by which thought is made to function as an 
operator of self transformation. Hadot describes this attention as “continuous vigilance and 
presence of mind, self consciousness which never sleeps, and a constant tension of the spirit”; 
thanks to which the philosopher “has ‘at hand’ (procheiron) the fundamental rule of life: that is, 
the distinction between what depends on us and what does not.” This attention, directed to the self 
in the present moment, “is, in a sense, the key to spiritual exercises. It frees us from the passions, 
which are always caused by the past or the future – two areas which do not depend on us”. (PWL, 
84) Foucault presents an example, taken from Seneca’s evening reflections on his day (a practice 
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that was important for Pythagoras, and since then throughout antiquity), of two instances where 
Seneca sees himself not to have been fully vigilant, and therefore to have behaved inappropriately. 
The two cases were those of “arguing too intensely with ignorant people [… and] vexing, through 
reproaches, a friend whom one would have liked to help improve.” (CS, 62) Seneca is dissatisfied 
with what he saw as his own unskilful behaviour in these situations, but his self-examination does 
not serve to fuel guilt, self blame or remorse; on the contrary, it serves “to strengthen, on the basis 
of the recapitulated and reconsidered verification of a failure, the rational equipment that ensures a 
wise behaviour”, as Foucault rightly comments; but this is a statement of objectives, not a 
description of a technique, and with techniques, the important question is how are they supposed to 
work. With regard to this passage from Seneca, he writes that: 
 
For Seneca, the problem is not that of discovering truth in the subject but of remembering truth, recovering a 
truth that has been forgotten. Second the subject does not forget himself, his nature, origin, or his supernatural 
affinity, but the rules of conduct, what he ought to have done. Third, the recollection of errors committed in the 
day measures the distinction between what has been done and what should have been done. Fourth, the subject 
is not the operating ground for the process of deciphering but the point where the rules of conduct come 
together in memory. The subject constitutes the intersection between acts that have to be regulated and rules for 
what ought to be done. (Ibid.) 
 
This is one of the rare passages where Foucault says what for him the subject is, (as well as what it 
is not). This subject as the “intersection” of rules and acts must be among the most skeletal, the 
least active, and the least individual in the entire history of portraits of the subject. It is not even 
“the operating ground for the process of deciphering”, but merely “the point where the rules of 
conduct come together in memory.” However, it is difficult to apply this four-part schema of “the 
subject” to the example above, taken from Seneca, from which Foucault purports to have 
abstracted it. Regarding the first point, he says that “For the Stoics, truth is not in oneself but in the 
logoi, the teachings of the masters. One memorizes the statement one has heard, converting the 
statement one hears into rules of conduct.” (Ibid., 238) So far, so good, but how can Seneca apply 
the rules in this case? It is clear that his “forgetting” of the rules of conduct was momentary; and 
this is all that “memory” can provide him with. It cannot also provide him with rules governing the 
application of these rules, as it were, to the multiplicity of specific cases that he will encounter; 
and it is this that is his problem, as it is in all rule-based cases of moral reflection where the 
appropriate moral choice is not immediately obvious. (For this reason, reflection on the 
circumstances of the forgetting could therefore have been considered useful). Seneca sensed, for 
this is a matter of moral sensitivity (a rigid belief in duty might have seen him complimenting 
himself for reproaching his friend for his misdemeanour), that his attempts to implement the rules 
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were clumsy, unskilled; but it is not measuring the distance between rule and conduct that will 
provide him with the key to improving his conduct in the future. It is rather the case that his self-
training must result in virtue, that is, in a morally transformed character, if his immediate response 
in such situations is to be skilful; and the Stoics certainly saw their philosophical practice as the 
cultivation of virtue, but, it can be argued against Foucault here (and by Foucault elsewhere), this 
requires self-awareness in relation to the precepts, rather than merely committing them to memory. 
 
Foucault also seems to assume, perhaps because Seneca does not speak of it, that there would be 
no emotion attached to this “verification of a failure”, which, unless Seneca is already a “sage”, 
something he himself denied, seems unlikely. He therefore fails to ask himself what place those 
emotions which correspond to mental events, such as self-praise or self-blame in this case, may 
have in Stoic techniques of the self. This is all the more curious in that the Stoic conception of 
“desire” and “aversion” as functions of “reason”123, not as forces opposed to reason, as in other 
philosophical conceptions, would seem to provide a much richer ground for an ethics of self 
constitution than this rather sterile and unconvincing model of trained obedience to rules that 
Foucault presents here. Curiously, though he treats only the Hellenistic Stoics, his descriptions 
often seem to correspond more to the practices of the classical Stoa. In his introduction to Seneca’s 
Letters, Campbell remarks that by comparison with the Hellenistic Stoics, “early Stoicism had a 
forbidding aspect which went far to explain its failure to influence the masses. […] It stifled and 
repressed ordinary human emotions in striving for apatheia, immunity to feeling”124. Modes of 
striving for indifference to indifferent things had become more diversified and approachable in 
Hellenistic times. The Hellenistic Stoic model of reason however, as we will see, precludes the 
binary division of the psychological and the rational dimensions of the human being, a division 
that Foucault appears to cling to and even reinforce, though he reformulates it through a binary 
model of his own construction.  
As to the second point he makes: “Second the subject does not forget himself, his nature, origin, or 
his supernatural affinity, but the rules of conduct, what he ought to have done.” – Let us note what 
Marcus Aurelius has to say about this: 
 
                                                 
123 Foucault uses “Stoic” to refer to the Hellenistic Stoics, and not to the Stoics of classical antiquity; he does not 
therefore consider more “classical” concepts of evil as a distortion or failure of reason, and he makes no reference to 
the exegesis of conceptual differences within “Stoicism”. 
124 Campbell, R. “Introduction” to Seneca: Letters from a Stoic, Penguin, London, 1969, p.17 
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“He who doesn’t know what the world is doesn’t know where he himself is, either. He who doesn’t know for 
what purpose the world exists, doesn’t know who he is himself. Whoever doesn’t know the answer to one of 
these questions is unable to say for what purpose he himself exists.”125  
 
In other words, for Marcus Aurelius, and this is something all Stoics shared, the “rules of conduct” 
would be empty and meaningless if they did not reflect one’s knowledge of the world. Without 
that knowledge of the world, which includes the “nature”, “origin” and “supernatural affinity” of 
the subject, the subject “is unable to say for what purpose he himself exists;” that is to say, there 
can be no notion of “rules of conduct” in isolation from an understanding of one’s place in the 
larger scheme of nature. The practice of evening reflection on one’s conduct throughout the day 
that is so important to the Stoics is equally important in many other traditions; but what makes it 
particularly Stoic, is perhaps not so much the reflection in itself, but the presence of mind 
(prosoche) that is brought to that reflection. The practice of evaluating one’s actions in the light of 
one’s concepts of moral right and wrong, (and one cannot not have such concepts) tends, for all 
non-sages, to lead to a feeling of satisfaction or of dissatisfaction with the self, and this feeling 
tends to translate into self-praise or self-blame. Only that “continuous vigilance and presence of 
mind, self consciousness which never sleeps, and a constant tension of the spirit” to which Hadot 
refers, will allow one to watch these feelings in their arising, and therefore to intervene between 
the feeling and the resulting self-judgement  – a perturbation in itself, whether positive or negative  
– thus exercising one’s freedom. Foucault speaks of Seneca’s dissatisfaction as if it were 
emotionless. But it is this that is the result of prosoche: Seneca’s capacity to use self-approvation 
or disapprovation judiciously in the present moment of his evening reflection, without becoming 
embroiled in self-love or self-hatred for what he has done that morning, in past time, is what 
reveals the constancy of his attention.  
 
Another exercise which reflects this attention more closely, is what Foucault describes as “the 
necessity of a labour of thought with itself as object [which …] should have the form of a steady 
screening of representations”; and as he says, this “represents both a general principle and an 
attitudinal schema”  (TS, 238). He notes that, in order to formulate this requirement, Epictetus 
refers to Socrates’ aphorism that “An unexamined life [anexetastos bios] is not worth living”, and 
comments:  
 
In reality, the examination Socrates was talking about was the one to which he intended to subject both himself 
and others apropos of ignorance, knowledge and the non-knowledge of ignorance. The examination Epictetus is 
                                                 
125 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 8.52, quoted in Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, p.197 
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talking about is completely different: it is an examination that deals with representations […] it should be made 
clear that the control point will not be located in the origin or in the very object of representation, but in the 
approval that one should or should not give to it. (CS, 63-64)   
 
The affirmation here that this practice is completely different is both very strong and arguably 
misleading, in that Socrates’ objective, through his dialogues, is to demonstrate not only that we 
are ignorant in general (and ignorant of our ignorance), but precisely that the specific 
representation, or expressed thought, that is the object of any one dialogue derives from our 
ignorance, and is therefore, as Epictetus would put it, not worthy of approval. Socrates teaches a 
dialogical method of examination of concepts or representations (by whatever name), and 
Epictetus an introspective one, but both demonstrate the non-adherence to reality of the 
representations under examination. Both are intellectual techniques, and the difference is more in 
method and cultural context than in objective, though the life-styles they relate to are indeed very 
different. Uncharacteristically, Foucault is here using a difference in terminology to radicalise a 
difference in the form of examination that clearly exists, but that may be more technical than 
substantive. 
To take an example dear to both Socrates and Epictetus, the representation of ‘death’ as an ‘evil’, 
is merely ignorance (false judgement). We do not know if death is a good thing or a bad thing, and 
in judging it as bad we express our ignorance. Both Socrates and Epictetus want to help their 
interlocutor to free themselves of this false judgement about death, or to “withdraw approval” or 
“assent” from it, in Stoic terms. In Socrates the technique is that of discourse between two (or 
more) people – a spiritual teacher and an aspirant philosopher; whereas in Epictetus this “external” 
discourse is maintained through the schools, but the main purpose of the schools themselves is to 
teach the aspirant philosopher to hold this dialogue with herself, to develop an inner discourse 
between parts of the self, in which the role of spiritual guide is taken by the highest part of the self, 
moral reason. 
 As Foucault goes on to say: “When a representation enters the mind, the work of discrimination, 
of diakrisis, will consist in applying to it the famous Stoic canon that marks the division between 
that which does not depend on us and that which does” (CS, 64); and death is clearly in the 
category of representations of ‘that which does not depend on us’. Rather than “completely 
different”, it might be more appropriate to say that Epictetus’ teachings were an elaboration of 
techniques for putting Socrates’ aphorism, to know oneself, into practice in relations of the self 
with itself. As Epictetus himself put it: “Just as Socrates used to say that an unexamined life is not 
worth living, so we must never accept an unexamined representation.” (Cited in IC, 97)  
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But Foucault goes on to say: 
 
In the former case [of what does not depend on us] the representations will not be accepted since they are 
beyond our understanding; they will be rejected as not being appropriate objects of ‘desire’ or ‘aversion’, of 
‘attraction’ or ‘repulsion.’ This inspection is a test of power and a guarantee of freedom: a way of always 
making sure that one will not become attached to that which does not come under our control. (CS, 64)  
 
This rather equivocal affirmation complicates the picture. As we have seen, the Stoics do not set 
apart “what does not depend on us” by virtue of the fact that this is “beyond our understanding”; 
but rather because, unlike what does depend on us, we need to recognise that there is nothing we 
can do about what is independent of us (wealth and illness, inspiring desire and aversion 
reciprocally, being two of the typical examples offered by the Stoics of this category). In other 
words, the problem is not merely a cognitive one, it is desire and aversion, as part of reason, that 
produce “unexamined representations”, and this fundamental Stoic technique of discrimination 
serves to truly understand, to see, case by case as these come into our mind, that aversion to the 
way things actually are, and the desire for them to be different (unless making them different is 
truly a possibility of ours) is a foolish waste of energy. Coming to a full understanding of this may 
indeed lead to self-mastery, but to describe this process as “a test of power” has a very un-Stoic 
ring to it. It seems to suggest that strengthening the self is an objective in itself, as opposed to a 
means to serving the moral reason. And further, if as he says freedom guarantees that we “will not 
become attached to that which does not come under our control”, one wonders whether this 
implies that it is appropriate to become attached to what does come under our control, to what is 
within our understanding.  
The impression that this is Foucault’s reading is further reinforced in that at no point hitherto (or 
throughout this book, The Care of the Self) does he discuss the fact that “what does depend on us” 
for the Stoics, is the value judgement that we attach to each simple representation. On this view, 
there is no such thing as a representation which is “beyond our understanding”. Representations 
are the cognitive response to impressions received passively from our senses (which do not depend 
on us – they are given), to which we apply value judgements which may be true or false. It is these 
value judgements that depend on us; and in this sense we may have ‘understood’ (judged 
correctly), or ‘misunderstood’, (judged incorrectly); but in neither case is “attachment” to a 
representation ever “appropriate”. “My father has disinherited me.”, for example, is one of 
Epictetus’ examples of a representation that is objective (does not depend on us) and requires 
assent (not attachment). Adding “this is terrible”, on the other hand, would constitute a value 
judgement that does depend on us; and on this theory it is this, the value judgement that we are 
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afflicted by, not the simple representation of the event, and therefore we should not assent to this 
subjective representation. “I accept this as fate has determined it for me” would be the more 
appropriate response.  
On Foucault’s version, the “screening of representations” to which Epictetus refers (using the 
metaphors of the vigilance of the night watchmen or the coin tester) means “to keep constant 
watch over one’s representations, or to verify their marks the way one authenticates a currency” 
(CS, 64). Epictetus uses the metaphor to apply to the judgements we make concerning our 
representations, and in many of the examples given by him, like the one regarding the disinherited 
person above, these are of an emotive order. Foucault on the other hand seems to imply, backed by 
many statements like the one above, that this process of verification is purely cognitive; that it 
refers, in some unexplained way, to the accuracy of the representation itself. But what can it mean 
not to accept a representation? At the cognitive level, the choice as to whether we ‘accept’ a 
representation or not is limited to the values that we attribute to an empirical representation; we 
cannot, as humans, not accept, not have a representation of ‘death’ for example, which is part of 
our human world. Certainly its meaning is beyond our understanding, but what this means is that 
all we can accept or reject are the negative (or positive) values we attribute to it. The evaluation is 
cognitive, but the cognition is evaluative, and it is evaluation that requires attention. 
 
For the Stoics, the attribution of value is connected in human beings with the emotions, with fear, 
desire, aversion, etc. And it is in coming to an understanding of the role of emotion in judgement 
that we can become free of its power. It is not by a merely cognitive process, or by exercising will-
power to impose learned precepts on ourselves, that we achieve self-mastery. The parts of the self 
that take part in our inner dialogue may be metaphorically separated, for the Stoics, into “reason” 
and “passions”, but not if ‘reason’ is construed along current Western lines as emotionless 
ratiocination. It seems strange that Foucault has chosen not to thematise this important relation 
between concept and feeling in Stoic thought. It is as if he is trying to intellectualise a practice of 
the self which instead uses the intellect to work on another level of consciousness; a practice that 
encourages attention to one’s mental state, experienced as the locus of much more than just the 
intellectual faculties. It is detailed attention to one’s interiority, prosoche, that is the key to the 
Stoic disciplines of assent and desire, and the key to freedom from the oppressive hold of the 
passions. Hadot says that even in the midst of suffering (a mental state with which we will 
inevitably have to work), if attention is focused just on the present moment, then in “the miniscule 
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present moment, which, in its exiguity, is always bearable and controllable, attention increases our 
vigilance” (IC, 85); and increases our freedom. 
 
Attention is precisely the practice, par excellence, that holds one in the present moment, and, 
essentially, is itself a factor of what happens in that present (just as its absence, in inattentive 
reactivity, is a factor, and the principle component of unfreedom). If I am attentive to the anger 
that I am experiencing, for example, the anger becomes the object of my attention, simultaneously 
therefore my attention is removed from the object of my anger, and returned to myself, to the 
movement of my mind.126 Focusing on the object (which the angry mind interprets as the “cause” 
of its anger) augments the anger. The angry mind is known for its tendency to go into overdrive, 
adding reason after reason to justify itself and stoke up the anger; it is a mind that is unstable and 
unfree. All this is diffused, at least in part, if one’s attention is shifted to the anger itself, viewed as 
an aspect of the self in the present moment. So one’s anger is part of “what comes under one’s 
control”, but attachment to it would be one’s moral downfall, the failure of reason in the face of 
irrationality.127 
Intellectual activity is an essential exercise of reason, an essential part of Stoic self-work, but it is 
something that automatically takes the mind away from attention to the unfolding of the present 
moment, even if it is to thinking of its implications. Attention inserts a pause between what the 
Stoics call impulse to action (hormè) and action itself, into which reason can enter. Attention and 
thinking are different and complementary mental practices, even though the latter will usually 
come into play as soon as the former has provided it with new representations. And this reflection, 
the intellectual activity that follows upon the practice of attention to the self, is a self-transforming 
practice. Without the practice of attention, however, the proliferation of thoughts produced by the 
angry (jealous, anxious, etc.) mind can result in strengthening the conviction that the anger is 
justified, and sometimes in taking the further step of giving one’s anger the moral status of 
                                                 
126 Cf. Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IX, 42 
127 When Foucault deals with Stoic texts on anger, he notes that “When you look at these treatises on anger you see 
that the question of anger is always a question of the anger of the head of the family towards his wife, his children, his 
household or his slaves. Or it is the anger of the patron towards his clients or those dependent on him, or of the general 
towards his troops, and of course, of the Prince towards his subjects. That is to say, the question of anger, of being 
carried away by anger or of the impossibility of controlling oneself – let’s say more precisely: the impossibility of 
exercising one’s power and sovereignty over oneself insofar as and when one exercises one’s sovereignty or power 
over others – is situated precisely at the point of connection of self-control and command over others” (HS, 374). This 
is valuable historical comment. Clearly, in patrician society, inferiors were not allowed to express anger against 
superiors, therefore patrician anger is the most compelling model of it for the Stoics, and it is necessarily connected to 
power, because of their commanding position in society. Nonetheless, their interest in dealing with anger was also, in 
fact, primarily, for the sake of their own souls, and only as a result of this work with themselves would the expression 
of anger through power be modified, and society benefit. Foucault does not explore this.  
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“righteous indignation”. A practice that may reinforce the self-deceiving character structure 
(locked in false judgement of indifferent things), not transform it. This is not in any way to suggest 
there is no moral place for righteous indignation, but it is to suggest that attention needs to be paid 
to what that indignation is composed of as well as reasoned argument. Whether or not rational 
analysis would also condemn the ‘cause’ of the anger is not relevant here – rational reflection on 
what action to take in the face of injustice was another fundamental Stoic principle –  but it is only 
the person who knows how to transform her own anger that is truly capable of such moral 
reflection.  
 
Hadot provides us with what can be read as a possible clue to Foucault’s interpretation of 
Epictetus. He writes: 
 
As is well known, the Stoics held that only those representations should be accepted into the mind which they 
called kataléptikai, a term which is usually translated as ‘comprehensive’. This translation gives the impression 
that the Stoics believed a representation to be true when it ‘comprehends’, or seizes the contents of reality. In 
Epictetus, however, we can glimpse a wholly different meaning of the term: for him, a representation is 
kataléptiké when it does not go beyond what is given, but is able to stop at what is perceived, without adding 
anything extraneous to that which is perceived. Rather than ‘comprehensive representations,’ then, it would be 
better to speak of ‘adequate representations.’ (IC, 84)  
 
Foucault’s interpretation then, would seem to correspond to the notion of “comprehensive 
representation”, which suggests that the judgement made of the reality in question must be 
accurate, must leave nothing out; whereas on Hadot’s version – “adequate representation”, 
suggests rather that all that one can truly say about death, for example, is that it is death; not that it 
is good or bad, final end or rite of passage, or whatever; for all of these are value judgements. 
Given that all such judgements pertain to “what does not depend on us”, and that philosophical 
practice for Epictetus requires that we be concerned only with what does depend on us, that is: 
“the acts of our soul, because we can freely choose them,” (Ibid.) Hadot’s gloss seems closer to 
the central theme of Epictetus’ Discourses, than whatever translations Foucault is using.128 In an 
earlier text of Hadot’s, however, that Foucault had read (the citation above is from Inner Citadel, 
which was published after Foucault’s death), he himself had used “objective” rather than 
“adequate” for kataleptike, though clearly with the same gloss: “The Stoics’ notorious phantasia 
kataleptike – which we have translated as “objective representation” – takes place precisely when 
we refrain from adding any judgement value to naked reality”. (PWL, 187-88) Hadot gives us a 
                                                 
128 Foucault refers to : Souilhé, Collection des universités de France, but not in direct quotation.   
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clear illustration, taken from the Discourses of Epictetus, of how “the soul develops an inner 
discourse [that …] constitutes judgement.” (IC, 84): 
 
In the same way as we train ourselves in order to be able to face up to sophistical interrogations, we ought also 
to train ourselves to face up to representations (phantasiai), for they too ask us questions.129 
For example, let’s say we formulate within ourselves the contents of the representation. “So-and-so’s son is 
dead.” 
 
This representation is asking you a question, and you should reply: 
“That does not depend on the will, and is not something bad.” 
“So-and-so’s father has disinherited him. What do you think of that?” Reply: “That doesn’t depend on the will, 
and is not something bad.” 
“He was very hurt by it.” Reply: “That does depend on the will, and is something bad.” 
“He put up with it bravely.” “That depends on the will, and is something good.” 
Epictetus continues:  
If we acquire this habit, we will make progress; for we will give our assent only to that of which there is an 
adequate (kataléptiké) representation. (Ibid. 84-85)  
 
This is a training exercise, what Epictetus calls (in Hadot’s translation), an “exercise-theme”, and 
it is interesting to note that Epictetus does not suggest that it is in any way easy to adopt this 
attitude in the face of human tragedy and suffering. The ‘good’ response to a grave personal 
problem is not described as indifference, but rather as “He put up with it bravely”, which is a much 
more humanly imaginable response than the unattainable indifference to “indifferent” things (i.e. 
things determined by fate, not moral will) of the sage. Epictetus’ comment with regard to progress 
indicates an underlying assumption that the trainee, the aspirant to wisdom, will many times 
respond to human suffering, her own and that of others, by saying ‘This is a bad, sad, or tragic 
thing”. What will happen, however, with practice, is that the aspirant, by firstly practising attention 
to her own representations, that is to say, the concepts through which her feelings (bad, sad, tragic) 
are given expression, will learn to enter into discourse with herself regarding these representations, 
and see them as attributing value judgements to things determined by fate or chance, and therefore 
not as adequate representations of the way things are in themselves. There is no knowing, to take 
another of Epictetus’ examples here, whether losing an inheritance is a good or bad thing, it may 
be just the wake-up call so-and-so needed to reorient her wayward life, and discover happiness. 
Hadot has written elsewhere that: “The Stoic experience consists in becoming sharply aware of the 
tragic situation of human beings, who are conditioned by fate. […] The result of this is that people 
are unhappy, because they passionately seek to acquire things which they cannot obtain, and to 
flee evils which are inevitable. There is one thing, and only one, which does depend on us and 
                                                 
129 Note the reference to Platonic-Socratic philosophical training given as standard practice, and its extension with 
respect to representations. 
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which nothing can tear away from us: the will to do good and to act in conformity with reason.” 
(WAP, 127)  
 
Interestingly, Foucault cites exactly the same passage (above) from the Discourses of Epictetus in 
The Hermeneutics of the Subject, in the context of distinguishing Christian techniques of the self 
from Stoic ones. He comments on this passage: “It can be seen that the aim of this control of 
representations is not to decipher a hidden truth beneath appearances, which would be the truth of 
the subject himself. Rather he [Epictetus] finds in these representations, as they appear, the 
opportunity for recalling a number of true principles concerning death, illness, suffering, political 
life, etcetera. By means of this reminder we can see if we are capable of reacting in accordance 
with such principles – if they have really become, according to Plutarch’s metaphor, that master’s 
voice which is raised immediately the passions growl and which knows how to silence them.” 
(HS, 503-04) It is hard to imagine what Foucault thinks this means in reality. Does he think the 
Stoics did not mourn their loved ones; or if they did, did they see themselves as hopelessly lacking 
in self-mastery? There seems to be some lack of imagination complementing the intellectual 
sophistication of Foucault’s methods, some disconnection between his grasp of their words and 
lack of grasp of their practices. Reading Seneca, or Marcus Aurelius, directly, one feels oneself in 
the company of fellow human beings; extraordinary ones, but with recognisable feelings that are 
absent from Foucault’s accounts of them. 
  
 Foucault’s presentation of Stoic techniques in The Hermeneutics of the Subject is more subtle than 
that in the earlier History of Sexuality, (though still in the service of the distinction between 
Christian (and scientific) “psychological” and Stoic “intellectual” practices), but still doesn’t put 
the meat on the bones, as it were, of how these practices were carried out by actual human beings. 
In the midst of mourning for a loved one, and, to Stoic thinking, non-sages will mourn, one might 
draw strength from reflecting on the necessity of death, and the absurdity of railing against it; but 
it is hard to imagine one calmly reciting principles to oneself, and attempting to verify whether one 
is capable of reacting in accordance with them. Foucault expresses greater sympathy with 
Hellenistic concepts of the therapeutic function of philosophy when it is more directly concerned 
with the body. He describes Epictetus’ attitude to his disciples thus: “He takes them to task for 
coming to him not in order to be treated (therapeuthèsomenoi) but in order to have their 
judgements amended and corrected (epanorthòsontes). ‘you wish to learn syllogisms? You must 
first attend to your ulcers, and stay your flux, and arrive at peace in your mind.’ ” (CS, 55) And yet 
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Foucault himself continues to insist on the absolute primacy of “correcting judgements” in Stoic 
practice. He notes that there is “something paradoxical” about this Stoic concern for the body, in 
that “it is inscribed, at least in part, within an ethics that posits that death, disease, or even physical 
suffering do not constitute true ills and that it is better to take pains over one’s soul than to devote 
one’s care to the maintenance of the body. But in fact the focus of attention in these practices of 
the self is the point where the ills of the body and those of the soul can communicate with one 
another and exchange their distresses”. (CS, 56) Precisely. Because the paradox lies not in the 
Stoic concern, but in the reality of the lives about which we must be concerned. 
 
 
3. Stoic reason and providence. 
 
The accounts of Foucault, Hadot, and other scholars concur in affirming that the presuppositions 
underlying the Stoic conception of nature are that it is ordered by the precise logic and harmony 
that they call the logos, or “universal Reason”; that “God is nothing other than universal Reason,” 
in Hadot’s words, and that “Human Reason is an emanation or part of this Universal Reason.” (IC,  
This being the case, Foucault asks the following question: “What can the Stoics mean when they 
insist on the need to organise all knowledge in terms of the tekhnè tou biou, to direct the gaze on 
the self, and when, at the same time, they associate this conversion and inflection of the gaze onto 
the self with the entire course of the order of the world and with its general and internal 
organization?” (HS, 260) And he seeks for answers to this problem in Seneca’s Natural Questions. 
In this text Seneca sees an initial obstacle to an understanding of the place of the self in the world 
in the prevailing myths of what constitutes human greatness in the popular imagination of the 
time: “only seeing human greatness in what are always fragile victories and uncertain fortunes.” 
(HS, 264)  
Seneca asks: 
 
What is great down here? Is it crossing the seas in fleets, planting our flags on the shores of the Red Sea and, 
when we lack land for our devastation130, wandering the ocean in search of unknown shores? No: it is seeing 
the whole of this world with the eyes of the mind and having carried off the most beautiful triumph, triumph 
over the vices […] What actually is there to wish for when our eyes return to earth from the sight of celestial 
                                                 
130 Alexander the Great described as a forerunner of George Bush. In his letters to Lucilius also, Foucault says, “he 
regularly expressed his opposition to the verbosity of chronicles and their praise of great men like Alexander, who he 
particularly detested”. Against these, he puts forward exemplars of self mastery, “Cato’s modesty is an example. 
Scipio too is an example, leaving Rome in order to secure his town’s freedom, and retiring modestly, without glamour, 
to a villa.” (HS, 264)   
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bodies, and find only shadows, as when one passes from a clear sun to the dark night of dungeons? What is 
great is a steadfast soul, serene in adversity, a soul that accepts every event as if it were desired […]. What is 
great is to see the features of fate fall at one’s feet; it is to remember that one is a man; it is, when one is happy, 
saying to oneself that one will not be happy for long. What is great is having one’s soul at one’s lips, ready to 
depart; then one is free not by the laws of the city but by the laws of nature.131 
 
In this passage the metaphor for the return to earth from the contemplation of the celestial bodies 
is that of “the dark night of dungeons”. What is great down here in the shadows is to know that if 
one is happy, one will not be happy for long. This is a description of a world that is hard, and of 
the glory of freedom from obsessive preoccupation with its hardness. A few pages later Foucault 
gives the contrasting description of the “Stoic need to know nature” as a form of knowledge that 
“involves grasping ourselves again here where we are, at the point where we exist, that is to say of 
placing ourselves within a wholly rational and reassuring world, which is the world of a divine 
Providence”. (HS, 278). At first glance, though it is easy to substantiate this perspective with 
citations from Stoic texts, this sounds more like the “best of all possible worlds” of Voltaire’s 
Candide than the Stoic awareness of suffering. What sense can be made of this apparent 
contradiction? 
Foucault appears to regard it as a kind of logical failing, and moves on to arguments that are more 
central to his investigation, but a further exploration may have shed light on the matter for him. 
That nature has its own logic, in which humans have their place, is clear in all Stoic writings; as is 
the notion that the contemplation of nature will reveal to us our true, very tiny, place in the grand 
scheme of things. But what characterizes human beings is this capacity for contemplation, which 
reflects the logic of nature. Reason, the faculty which allows for contemplation, thus paradoxically 
teaches us our cosmic insignificance, and our grandeur, at one and the same time (recalling Kant’s 
“sublime”). The world is thus wholly rational for the Stoics, as Foucault says, but if this is held to 
be reassuring, access to this highly refined reassurance132 comes only through the understanding 
that behind the apparent chaos of contingency, behind the pain of perceived injustice and tragedy, 
there is yet order. This is very far from the more densely emotional reassurance of a Christian 
notion of “Providence”, the reassurance that, though this life is punishment for our sins, there will 
be a better life beyond death, a thought which provides some spiritual comfort in this life. 
Nonetheless, there are points in common in the Stoic and Christian uses of the word “providence”. 
In addition to a certain overlap between the notion of providence and that of destiny, Hadot points 
out that the Stoics also needed to respond to contemporary religious and socio-political needs, in 
                                                 
131 Seneca, Natural Questions, cited in HS, pp.264-265 
132 With which the emotion known in contemporary English as “stoical” shares some, but not all, connotations. 
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that “the daily life of people in antiquity was punctuated by religious ceremonies. Moreover, 
prayers and sacrifices would have no meaning if there were no current and individual providence”. 
However, he also points out that the references made to “the figures of the gods deliberating over 
the fate of an individual, or the figure of the daimòn, are nothing but mythical, imaginative 
expressions, intended to render the Stoic conceptions of Reason and Destiny more alive and 
personal.133” Along with a careful juxtaposition in relation to popular mythology, Stoic writings 
also expressed an ongoing polemic with other philosophical schools, in particular with the 
Epicureans. In this context “providence” figured as the notion of a rationally ordered universe in 
competition with the ‘dust of atoms’ which is how Marcus Aurelius described, or derided, 
Epicurean cosmology. He asks: 
 
Are you unhappy with the part of the All which has been allotted to you? Then remember the disjunction: either 
providence or atoms. (Meditations, IV,3,5, in IC, p.147) 
 
Hadot remarks that this disjunction was used by the Stoics to assert that whether you believed in 
cosmic order or cosmic chaos, you still had to live like a Stoic. Marcus, addressing the Epicurean, 
writes:  
Consider yourself fortunate if, in the midst of such a whirlwind, you possess a guiding intelligence within 
yourself (XII, 14, 4) 
 
But within the notion of an ordered universe, the Stoics entertained various hypotheses about how 
providence might actually function. Again, from the Meditations: 
 
Either the universe’s thought exercises its impulse upon each individual. If this is so, then accept this impulse 
with benevolence. 
Alternatively, it gave its impulse once and for all and everything else occurs as a necessary consequence. Why 
then, should you worry? 
Finally, if the all is god then all is well. If it is random, don’t you, too, act at random. (IX, 28, 2, in IC, p.151) 
 
Three splendid lines, three cosmologies, one ethics. The disjunction occurs between the first two 
which presuppose some form of “providence”, and the third, the Epicurean vision of a random 
universe. Hadot notes that the first two are both compatible with the Stoic system, and that 
between them the relationship is not one of disjunction, “but are what historians of logic call 
‘subdisjunctions’” (IC, 152) In other words, the two hypotheses are not absolutely, but only 
relatively exclusive of each other. This constitutes a form of recognition that a line cannot be 
                                                 
133 Hadot, (IC, 159-60) “He lives with the gods who constantly shows them a soul which greets that which has been 
allotted to it with joy; it does everything that is willed by the daimòn which Zeus has given each person as an overseer 
and a guide, and which is a small parcel of Zeus. It is nothing other than each person’s intellect and reason.” Marcus 
Aurelius, Meditations V,27, in (IC, p.160) 
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firmly drawn between what is a direct result of providence, and what is merely indirect and 
derivative. For example it was a Stoic belief that malevolence was a necessary consequence of the 
gift of freedom, and not directly planned (Meditations, XI, 18, 24). However, what this providence 
is, in both cases, is an ordering principle inherent in nature, in the cosmos, and therefore in human 
life. It is a “providence” that is entirely without a “provider”. The preference for this term, rather 
than something like “the principle of order”, may thus have to do with making one’s own the 
perspective that everything that happens must happen, accepting – welcoming – the way things are 
as right, and therefore ultimately good. Describing the “ordering principle” as “providence” 
provides an accessible metaphor for this normative correspondence of ethics and physics. There is 
no god in Stoic theory, but there is much use of god as a metaphor for the agency of this agent-less 
ordering principle that is the logos; and also as a useful conceptual bridge for those who remain 
attached to notions of godhead. Though god’s role in the texts is metaphorical, not theoretical, in a 
world in which there were believers and non-believers, belief in the gods was seen as neither an 
advantage nor an obstacle to ethical practice, to the practice of philosophy.  
 
 
4. Conversion to self 
 
In the Hermeneutics of the Subject, Foucault describes the ‘nucleus’ of the Hellenic care of the self 
thus: “We must turn away from everything that turns us away from our self, so as to turn ourselves 
around towards our self. This is the great image of turning around towards oneself underlying all 
the analyses I have been talking about until now. […] All these images, then, of turning around 
towards the self by turning away from what is external to us – clearly bring us close to what we 
could call, perhaps anticipating a bit, the notion of conversion”. (HS, 206-07). With this he 
constructs a first step to the identification of “conversion” with “the care of the self”. The next 
(exegetical) step is to cite various terms employed in Greek and Latin, such as epistrephein pros 
heautou and convertere ad se, both of which can be used for “turning towards the self [or] 
converting to the self” ” , (Ibid. 207). He then constructs a bridge between these concepts and 
modern conceptions of conversion thus:  
 
“it would be quite wrong to view and gage the importance of the notion of conversion only in connection with 
religion. […] the notion of conversion is also an important philosophical notion [… and] is also crucially 
important in connection with morality. And finally we should not forget that from the nineteenth century the 
notion of conversion was introduced into thought, practice, experience, and political life in a spectacular and we 
 157 
can even say dramatic way. One day the history of what could be called revolutionary subjectivity should be 
written. (Ibid. 208) 
 
 
That there are links between political and religious conversion, as practice and as concept, is not a 
new idea, one of which a thorough-going genealogical analysis, might indeed prove interesting. 
But what seems surprising here is the suggestion of a continuity between the Greek concept of 
“conversion to self”, read as “care of the self”, and the religious and political concept of 
conversion, though the apparent discontinuity in the use of the term seems so forceful. This 
(having sown the seed of the idea of continuity) he acknowledges, immediately returning to the 
question of the discontinuity between the ancient and Christian concepts of conversion. “Christian 
conversion”, he writes, “for which Christians use the word metanoia, is obviously very different 
from the Platonic epistrophè [and the Hellenic convertere ad se]. You know that the word itself, 
metanoia, means two things: metanoia is penitence and it is also radical change of thought and 
mind.” (Ibid. 211) The point about this radical change is firstly that it is sudden and drastic; and  
 
“Second, in this conversion, this Christian metanoia, this sudden, dramatic, historical-metahistorical upheaval 
of the subject, there is a transition: a transition from one type of being to another, from death to life, from 
mortality to immortality, from darkness to light, from the reign of the devil to that of God, etcetera. And finally, 
third, […] there is an element that is a consequence of the other two […], and this is that there can only be 
conversion in as much as a break takes place in the subject. A fundamental element of Christian conversion is 
renunciation of oneself, dying to oneself, and being reborn in a different self and a new form which, as it were, 
no longer has anything to do with the earlier self in its being, its mode of being, in its habits or its èthos. (Ibid. 
213)  
 
This major discontinuity in relations of the self to the self may occur in conversion to Christianity, 
but also, for the Christian believer, in conversion to a newer, more profound vision, engendering a 
radical break with one’s old self. Conversely, in ancient philosophy one finds references to 
(Foucault lists): self-correction, transfiguration, transformation etc. but not to a radical break with 
self. He writes: “If there is a break – and there is – it takes place with regard to what surrounds the 
self. The break must be carried out with what surrounds the self so that it is no longer enslaved, 
dependent, and constrained.” (Ibid.) On the contrary, the gaze must be constantly turned to the 
self, observing the self. It remains the case, however, as Foucault observes, that the tension 
involved in this notion of turning to the self which is also a ‘return’, means that it is never  
 
completely clear or resolved whether the self is something to which you return because it is given in advance or 
an objective you must set for yourself and to which you might finally gain access if you achieve wisdom. Is the 
self the point to which you return through the long detour of ascesis and philosophical practice? Or is the self 
an object you keep always before your eyes and reach through a movement that in the end can only be 
bestowed by wisdom? (Ibid. 213-14)  
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And here he is referring to Hellenistic antiquity, where the question, so dear to Foucault, was a 
more fluid one – as to whether the ‘self’ is a pre-constituted, an a priori self – or whether it is 
constituted through practice, and ultimately only attainable through “wisdom”, a concept that 
opened lots of interesting spaces. It was a question that Foucault did not find a definitive answer to 
in his extensive readings of the texts. Perhaps he considered it irresolvable, or perhaps he chose to 
steer clear of taking a position in philological debates among Classical scholars, which was not 
within his sphere of expertise. Certainly he recognised that there were many individuals in 
Antiquity, Platonists and others, committed to these practices of the self, who did believe in a pre-
constituted self to which they must find their way back. But he wished to keep open the possibility 
that there may have been others without such pre-conceived ideas, who believed rather that 
understanding how to live came through a relationship to the self that involved certain practices – 
practices that had been tried, tested and recommended by men (mostly) of proven wisdom, who 
were exemplars of how to live and, no less importantly, of how to die, like Socrates himself. 
Though the pre-constituted self to which one returns had been of fundamental importance to Plato; 
for Stoics, Epicureans etc. Foucault surmised that whatever opinion they may have held on the 
matter, this was not really the main point. The point was rather the philosophical life, the moral 
life, to which concepts were a useful support, or else they got in the way. 
 Foucault then makes a useful distinction (in daunting neologisms):  
 
If conversion (Christian or post-Christian metanoia) takes the form of a break or change within the self, if 
consequently we can say that it is a sort of trans-subjectivation, then I would propose saying that the conversion 
of the philosophy of the first centuries of our era is not a trans-subjectivation. […] Conversion is a long and 
continuous process that I will call a self-subjectivation rather than a trans-subjectivation.(Ibid. 214)  
 
Foucault attributes this analysis of the difference between epistrophè and of metanoia to his 
reading of Hadot’s work on the question (despite differences in terminology). Both scholars, 
whilst working from different perspectives, and with different objectives, concur in seeing the 
separation of philosophy from spirituality, from the necessity of work on the self, as the end result 
of a long process begun in the first centuries of the Christian era. Both engage in meticulous 
analysis of the way in which changes in the meaning and use of single concepts figure in the larger 
picture of historical change. Hadot in particular demonstrates the way in which the use of the word 
Logos enabled what he describes as a messianic religion to present itself, and in part transform 
itself, as ‘philosophy’:  
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Since Heraclitus, the notion of the Logos had been a central concept of Greek philosophy, since it could signify 
‘word’ and ‘discourse’ as well as ‘reason’. In particular, the Stoics believed that the Logos, conceived as a 
rational force, was immanent in the world, in human beings, in each individual. This is why, when the prologue 
to the Gospel of John identified Jesus with the Eternal Logos and the Son of God, it enabled Christianity to be 
presented as a philosophy. The substantial Word of God could be conceived as the Reason which created the 
world and guided human thought. (WAP, 238)  
 
Starting with the Logos, many of the key concepts, and practices of Greek philosophy underwent 
conceptual sea-changes in the imperial Roman period of Christianity. In particular, “With this 
assimilation of Christianity to a philosophy, we see the appearance within Christianity of spiritual 
exercises – practices that were proper to secular philosophy” (Ibid. 241) This being the case, 
Hadot poses exactly the same question that preoccupied Foucault: “If ancient philosophy 
established such an intimate link between philosophical discourse and the form of life, why is it 
that today […] philosophy is usually presented as above all a discourse, which may be theoretical 
and systematic, or critical, but in any case lacks a direct relationship to the philosopher’s way of 
life?” The answer he gives is, in the first instance: “The causes of this transformation are primarily 
historical: it is due to the flourishing of Christianity.” (Ibid. 253) Clearly, his exploration of this 
involves the analysis of a whole series of historical events and processes, and of conceptual shifts 
that cannot be recalled here; but the guiding line is that “Christianity, particularly in the Middle 
Ages, was marked by a divorce between philosophical discourse and way of life.” Some of the 
spiritual exercises of Antiquity had been incorporated-transformed into the way of life of 
monasticism, but this was increasingly separated from the practice of theoretical discourse, even 
within the monastery itself. What remained of theory: 
 
in particular the discourses of Platonism and Aristotelianism […] separated from the ways of life which 
inspired them, […] were reduced to the status of mere conceptual material which could be used in theological 
controversies. ‘Philosophy’ when placed in the service of theology, was henceforth no more than a theoretical 
discourse; and when, in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century, modern philosophy conquered its 
autonomy, it retained the tendency to limit itself to this point of view. (Ibid. 254)  
 
These developments were amply treated by Foucault in his early work, as has been said, and the 
recuperation of philosophy as not just discourse, but as the central practice of a way of life was his 
mission, in which the notion of “conversion to self” played its role. He cites Marcus Aurelius on 
this turning to self thus: “It is in order not to let ourselves be carried away by the eddy of futile and 
vicious thoughts. If we must turn away from others, it is so as better to listen solely to the internal 
guide.” (Meditations, III, 4, cited HS, 222) This, as he notes, is clearly an exercise in 
concentration, “an exercise by which all the subject’s activity and attention is brought back to this 
tension that leads him to his aim.” And he goes on: “In no way does it involve either opening up 
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the subject as a field of knowledge (connaissances) or undertaking the subject’s exegesis and 
decipherment.” (HS, 222) Certainly Marcus Aurelius was neither a Christian nor a Freudian, but 
Foucault (habitually) fails to comment on the significance of this “internal guide”; not in terms of 
whether it is an entity or not, the metaphysical question is not at issue here, but what it means as 
ethical practice. Instead, he interprets Marcus Aurelius as proposing a “teleological concentration. 
[…] It involves keeping before our eyes, in the clearest way, that towards which we are striving 
and having, as it were, a clear consciousness of this aim, of what we must do to achieve it and of 
the possibility of our achieving it.” (Ibid.) This reads rather like a version of Stoicism written for 
an American course on “how to achieve your goals in life”, such is his determination to insist that 
it does not involve “taking oneself as an object of knowledge.” (Ibid.)  
Foucault’s own goals were of course very un-American. These goals always involved the creation 
of a non-conformist life-style, but what was at the centre of this “aesthetics of existence” changed 
over the years; the principle shift being from an orientation to questions that involved society as a 
whole to questions affecting groups of people on the fringes of society, which is where he always 
situated himself. This may have to do with the link he wanted to establish between “conversion” 
and “care of the self”. Bernauer and Mahon134, in discussing Foucault’s ethics, note the enthusiasm 
he expressed for the work of Deleuze and Guattari thus:  
 
Foucault calls their work “a book of ethics, the first book of ethics to be written in France in quite a long time,” 
and by ethics he means a stylization, “a life style, a way of thinking and living.” The distinctiveness of Deleuze 
and Guattari’s ethics of stylization at our peculiar juncture in history is to incite us to struggle against fascism – 
certainly fascism of the historical variety which so successfully moved so many, “but also the fascism in us all, 
in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing 
that dominates and exploits us. As the Christian was provoked to drive sin from the soul, our distinctive task, 
our modern ethical task, is to ‘ferret out the fascism’”. 135 
  
Deleuze and Guattari, supported by Foucault, set out to invent an ethics, a life-style that would 
implicitly counter our “interior fascist”, construing this fetishisation of power historically rather 
than psychologically (thus the title Anti-Oedipus), in direct contrast to Freud’s construal of it as 
part of the human condition. For her part, Murdoch, whilst rejecting the possibility of any 
ontological or biological status for “evil”, sees much that is useful to ethical reflection in the Plato-
inspired Freud’s analyses of the empirically evident, and ubiquitous, human propensity to badness 
(which clearly takes on different historical forms). Whether, historically, we read our interior 
badness as error, or sin, or fascism, the ethical problem of how to deal with it remains. For 
                                                 
134 Bernauer, J., and Mahon, M., “Michel Foucault’s Ethical Imagination.”, in CCF, pp.149-175. 
135 Cited, CCF, p. 163, from: Foucault, “Preface to Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. 
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Murdoch, remarkably Stoic in this, though she never made the connection, this must be done 
through developing attention, and essentially – attention to both self and other. Her description of 
this practice, as we will see, bears considerable resemblance to the Stoic prosoche. For Foucault 
on the other hand, this must be done through inventing a life style. Through a series of exegetical 
moves: from “know yourself” to “take care of the self” to “conversion” to “an aesthetics of 
existence”, he attempts to draw parallels between his own ethical thinking and that of the 
Hellenistic Stoics. Both Murdoch and Foucault however, were keen to stress the relativity of the 
“truths” of science, and counter the enormous capacity of the current domination of knowledge-
power to biologise the subject, shaping one’s mode of relating to oneself. As Bernauer and Mahon 
eloquently put it, paraphrasing Foucault: “An ‘esthetics of existence’ resists a ‘science of life.’ To 
think human existence in esthetic categories releases it from the realm of scientific knowledge.” 
(MFEI, 163) Thus far Murdoch would agree. They go on: “It liberates us from endless self-
decipherment and from subjecting ourselves to psychological norms.” The Foucauldian 
perspective they are describing here corresponds, in this respect, to what Murdoch calls 
“existentialist” in the broadest sense. A perspective which sets “total freedom” against the 
“determinism” of scientific thinking. Against both these perspectives, in defence of an idea of 
freedom from our own bad habits, inside and outside of the self, and all they represent, Murdoch 
will pose a third alternative, of attention, as we will see. But for Foucault, within the life-style he 
wanted to create and did create, the technique of the self which concentrates his vision of ethics is 
that of parrhesia, construed as speaking the truth, at whatever the cost, to which we must now 
turn.  
 
 
5. Parrhesia  
 
In commenting on Foucault’s last course at the Collège de France, a few months before his death 
in June 1984 (published 2008)136, its editor, Frédéric Gros, writes of the temptation that will be felt 
to see it as his philosophical testament, affirming that it does indeed lend itself to such an 
interpretation. For Gros, Foucault situates the whole of his own critical work in the practice of 
which Socrates, “at the very roots of philosophy” (CV, 314), was the first and greatest exemplar, 
                                                 
136 Foucault, Le Courage de la Verité. Le Gouvernement de Soi et des Autres II, Cours au Collège de France, 1984, 
Paris, Gallimard Seuil, 2008, hereafter: original French edition, all translations mine: (CV); Translated English 
edition : The Courage of Truth, Palgrave MacMillan, Hampshire, U.K., 2011, hereafter: (CT) 
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that is, the commitment to the particular form of truth-speaking137 denoted by Foucault with the 
term parrhesia. The key to Foucault’s understanding of this term, and the philosophical way of life 
to which it refers, is given in the title of this last course: The Courage of Truth. It is a commitment 
to speaking the truth no matter what, which goes beyond the commitment to finding the truth, or 
truths. The parrhesiast will lose friends, influence, status, freedom, and even her life, rather than 
lie, or go against what she believes in. Of Socrates’ consistent refusal, regardless of the notorious 
consequences, to have anything to do with the underhand political power games of fifth century 
Athens, Foucault says that it is “an example of parrhesia that will long remain a model of 
philosophical attitude in the face of power: the individual resistance of the philosopher.” (GSA, 
199, my emphasis.) Foucault also read Plutarch’s account of Plato’s encounters with the harsh 
political realities of Sicily as another demonstration of the individual resistance of the philosopher, 
in this case Plato himself; and Plato’s own writings on this, especially in his Letter VII, as an 
important reflection on parrhesia. (GSA, Lessons 9th-23rd February). Despite Plato’s avowed 
pessimism regarding the possibilities for truth-speaking in political systems – disallowed under 
tyranny, and dangerously collapsing into demagogy and chaos in democracy – when called upon 
to take the role of adviser to Denys, Tyrant of Syracuse (the elder Denys first, and subsequently 
the younger), Plato at first saw it as an opportunity “to bring truth-speaking into play in the 
political order”; and also, Foucault notes, to show that he was capable not only of logos, of 
philosophical discourse, but also of ergon, of action. (GSA, 201) However, after a series of 
daunting vicissitudes, lies and malevolence, when forced to choose between flattery (false-
speaking), and risking his life, Plato remained true to the model of courageous truth-speaking of 
Socrates, his teacher. Foucault records that when “invited” to an audience with Denys, the Tyrant 
of Syracuse, and asked to comment on his rule, Plato “told him a number of true things […] which 
so upset the tyrant that he conceived a plan, which he did not carry out, to kill Plato. But Plato had 
understood this, and had accepted the risk.” (CV, 13) (Though he then wisely decamped hastily 
from Sicily!)  
 
Foucault’s study of parrhesia spanned the three courses at the Collége de France from 1981-1984, 
the last three years of his life. It is the last of the long series of studies undertaken by Foucault on 
the relation of the subject to truth, which he claimed as, in all its facets, the central concern 
                                                 
137 Foucault translates parrhesia sometimes with dire-vrai, sometimes with franc-parler, roughly with ‘truth-
speaking’ or with ‘frankness’. Truth-speaking is clearly the overriding concept, of which frankness is one variant in 
particular circumstances. My own use will attempt to adhere to the particular connotation relevant to context. See also 
Latin translation: libertas, (HS, 382-88). 
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throughout his work. Parrhesia appears briefly in The Hermeneutics of the Subject, which was 
more concerned with “inner” than “outer” discourse, in the form of a discussion of the “true 
discourses” that the aspiring Stoic pupil must learn from his master. This discourse, however, must 
be taken on trust, and accepted passively, the master standing as guarantee of its truth. Therefore it 
is only when we turn to the master, Foucault says, that the question of what to actually say, what 
constitutes true discourse, appears. It is in this context that the question of parrhesia arises, of 
speaking the truth that matters, the truth that arises from inner freedom and is necessary “for 
conveying true discourse to the person who needs it to constitute himself as a subject of 
sovereignty over himself and as a subject of veridiction on his own account.” (HS, 372) Thus 
Foucault outlines two distinct sets of techniques for master and disciple in Stoic practice. Clearly, 
until the disciple has mastered inner discourse, she will not be in a position to teach others. But 
there is one sense in which the aspirant philosopher must already behave like a master, in that in 
relation to non-philosophers, she must constantly endeavour both to speak the truth, and to gauge 
the appropriateness of her words to the circumstances in which she speaks, or chooses to keep 
silence. 
 
Although the master must be a parrhesiast, Foucault points out that it is not a pedagogic method. 
Interestingly, though Socrates’ life was the ideal model for parrhesia, he made much use of irony 
as a teaching method. Foucault describes this as “a game in which the master pretends to know 
nothing in order to lead the disciple to formulate that which he didn’t know he knew. In parrhesia 
on the other hand, as if it were a real anti-irony, the truth-speaker throws the truth into the face of 
his interlocutor; a truth so violent, so abrupt, uttered in such a cutting and definitive way that the 
other can do nothing but stay silent, or choke with rage, or else completely change register, which 
meant, in the case of Denys faced with Plato, attempted murder.”(GSA, 54) In effect, as Foucault 
says, this is not only anti-ironic but also anti-pedagogic, as the interlocutor will not only not be led 
to discover the truth, but is presented with it in a form “he will not be able to accept, that he will 
reject, and that may lead him to further blindness and injustice, even madness.”(Ibid.) What 
Foucault describes here is obviously a limit-case, and certainly there are non-violent cases of 
parrhesia, but he speaks of it in such a way that this element of challenge, even of aggression, 
comes to the fore138; and most importantly, in such a way that the consideration of the effects of 
                                                 
138 Of the Cynics, his main model of parrhesia, Foucault writes: “We can say that the Cynic is a sort of benefactor, but 
he is essentially, fundamentally, and constantly an aggressive benefactor, whose main instrument is, of course, the 
famous diatribe. We have a number of texts, examples and descriptions of this: the Cynic gets up in the assembly  – 
whether this is a theatre, a political assembly, in the middle of a festival, or just simply on the street corner, or in the 
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true-speaking has no real bearing on the practice of it. To use a philosophical language alien to 
Foucault, he sees parrhesia as a form of deontological and anti-utilitarian, anti-consequentialist 
practice, though not in the way that this dichotomy is usually presented. As a practice that can be 
extrapolated from the historical forms in which it arose (which are in any case various), in 
Foucault’s reading, this is a deontology that maintains that no effects are ever truly predictable; 
and therefore that the contingent in history may include, as ethical practice, the throwing of a truth 
into the arena, as it were, and allowing it to do whatever work it will do. This notion that truth 
hurts, but is ethically necessary, is of course central to much provocative art, used by authors such 
as Bataille, Blanchot and the “Theatre of Cruelty” of Antonin Artaud, all of whom were important 
reference points for Foucault. 
 
In looking at early expressions of parrhesia in Greek literature, Foucault analyses Euripides’ Ion 
from this perspective. Ion is the illegitimate son of Creusa, the fruit of her being raped by Apollo. 
She abandoned the child to his fate, but Apollo saved him and took him to Delphi where he grew 
up as a temple slave, in ignorance of his parentage. Before the dramatic events which reveal this 
and restore her son to her, Creusa, indifferent to the risk she incurs, castigates Apollo – himself the 
child of his father Zeus’ rape of a mortal woman – for what he has done. Foucault describes her 
brave protest as a ritual proclamation of injustice, of the recrimination of the weak against the 
injustice of the powerful, as a disregard for prudent self-protection. “[P]ublicly, before all, in the 
light of day, in the face of the light that shows them up, [the victim] addresses the strong man, and 
declares the injustice he has perpetrated.” (GSA, 124) He says that this ritual act of the weak 
against the injustice of the strong resembles other rituals, not necessarily verbal, in other societies, 
giving the example of hunger-strikers in contemporary India. He describes this as “the ritual act 
whereby he who can do nothing, faced with he who can do everything” (Ibid.) gives due 
importance to the fact that he, as a powerless human being, has been the victim of an injustice 
perpetrated by he who can do everything. In this, Creusa’s action can also be read as a form of 
counter-conduct, of individual resistance to power. Such demonstrations of “the courage of truth” 
were central to Foucault’s idea of ethical-political practice in general, and also of the “individual 
resistance” that he believed should be the role of the philosopher. 
   
                                                                                                                                                                
market  – and he speaks out and attacks. He attacks his enemies, that is to say, he attacks the vices afflicting men, 
affecting those  he is speaking to in particular, but also humankind in general.” (CT, 279) 
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The whole of Foucault’s 1982-1983 course at the Collège de France, on The Government of Self 
and Others, situates the question of subjectivation and truth-speaking in the context of political 
power, mostly in relation to classical antiquity through to Plato. Speaking, as Foucault says, is a 
public act, and as such “the notion of parrhesia […] is in the first instance fundamentally a 
political notion.” (CV, 9) Foucault divides the early history of the concept into two periods which 
he calls “the Periclean moment of parrhesia”, situated in the second half of the fifth Century, and 
the “Socratic-Platonic moment”, which he situates in the first half of (and throughout) the fourth 
century B.C.E. (GSA, 312) What he calls the Periclean moment is primarily one of political 
discourse, on the values and dangers of freedom of speech (for aristocrat and hoi polloi), and on 
the relations of the individual with the State and its institutions. Clearly much of Plato’s work is 
directly concerned with these themes, but it is also in Plato, often through the words of his 
Socrates, that a major shift in the conception of parrhesia occurs; a shift towards the 
ethopoietic139, as it were. Foucault identifies this discussion of philosophical parrhesia in Plato’s 
Letters VII and VIII, and in the Phaedo and the Gorgias; as well as most obviously in The 
Apology. He describes this as “a displacement of the spaces and forms of exercise of parrhesia 
[…which is] no longer the political scene in itself […] it is philosophy.” (Ibid.) Not at all in the 
sense that politics is lost to view; but in the sense that this progressive displacement “brings about 
a certain inflection in philosophical discourse, in the practice of philosophy, [and] in the 
philosophical life.” (Ibid. 313) This move is one that sets the philosopher apart, as atopos, “he is 
no longer simply, no longer only, no longer exactly a citizen among others and a little ahead of the 
others[…]; parrhesia, this function which consists in saying freely and courageously what is true, 
is displaced, little by little […] towards the exercise of philosophy.” (Ibid. 313-14)  
This displacement also implies (elaborated by Plato-Socrates in the Phaedo) a new relationship 
between truth and discourse, such that “truth must be not so much a sort of psychological 
prerequisite to the art of oratory, but, at each instant, that which the discourse relates to.” (Ibid. 
304) And this means that rhetoric, rather than persuading by force of argument, must function 
instead as a form of psychagogy; that is to say, as a means of leading souls through discourse: “(la 
conduite des ậmes) dia tôn logôn (par les discours)” (Ibid.) This discussion appears at the end of 
the 1982-83 course, preparing the way for his next and last course, Le courage de la verité. In 
introducing this he says that the political theme had to some extent distanced him from his 
“immediate project: the ancient history of practices of truth-speaking in relation to oneself.” But, 
he goes on: 
                                                 
139 For Foucault ethopoiesis (from Plutarch) is “the transformation of truth into ēthos”. (“Self Writing” in EWF1, 209) 
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on the other hand, this drawback was compensated for by the fact that the return to parrhesia in the field of 
political practices brought me back to a theme that had, after all, been constantly present in my analysis of the 
relations between the subject and truth: that of the relations of power and their role in the game of subject and 
truth. With the notion of parrhesia, originally rooted in political practice and in the problematization of 
democracy, and subsequently developed in the sphere of personal ethics and the constitution of the moral 
subject […] we have, putting it very schematically, […] the possibility of posing the question of the subject and 
truth from the point of view of the practice of what we can call the government of oneself and of others. […] 
The articulation between the modes of veridiction, the techniques of governmentality, and the practices of the 
self, is basically what I have always tried to elaborate. (CV, 9-10140) 
 
 
In this lifelong project, analysis of the modes of veridiction under consideration has taken two 
basic forms, the epistemological (to which the early years were largely dedicated)141 and what 
Foucault calls the alethurgic (alèthurgique). The former, Foucault says, has to do with “the 
structures pertaining to the different discourses that are given and received as true”; while the 
latter has to do, “in its conditions and forms, [with] the type of act by which the subject, speaking 
the truth, manifests herself, and by this I mean: she represents herself to herself and is recognized 
by others as speaking the truth.”(CV, 4). In other words, his focus is no longer on the internal or 
situated logic that gives credibility to any given discourse, but on the form in which “the 
individual constitutes herself and is constituted by others as a subject holding a truthful discourse.” 
(ibid.) This focus, as will by now be evident, requires a methodology that is more hermeneutic 
than structural, but in the sense that Foucault accepted – with regard to the texts, not as a 
hermeneutics of the self. In his treatment of the only Epicurean text he discusses at any length  – 
Philodemus’ Peri parrhésias  – one reason for his disinterest in the Epicureans emerges in 
connection with his rejection of hermeneutic practices of the self, which he sees as “confessional.” 
He stresses the vertical transmission of the “truth” in this tradition, in the shape of the words of the 
master, going right back to Epicurus (reference to a body of texts, transmitted orally or in writing 
through a series of masters, is of course common to many spiritual/philosophical traditions); but 
says that here this is accompanied by “a series of intense, compact, and strong horizontal 
relationships within the group. [...] Parrhésia circulates in this double, vertical and horizontal 
organization [… and] becomes the practice and mode of relationship between the students 
themselves.” (HS, 390) The students are encouraged, or required, to meet as a group before the 
master, and “to say what they are thinking, what is in their hearts, to tell of the faults they have 
committed and the weaknesses for which they still feel responsible or to which they feel 
                                                 
140 Translations from this book are mine. 
141 Foucault’s “archeology” as Gros says “consisted in bringing to light the discursive organization structuring 
constituted bodies of knowledge.” (CV, 314) 
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exposed.”142 Foucault comments: “And this is how we find – for the first time, it appears, quite 
explicitly within this practice of the self of Greco-Roman Antiquity – the practice of confession.” 
(HS, 390) Though he recognizes that it is “completely different from the ritual, religious practice 
of confession [… by which] you acknowledged your guilt. No, here it is something completely 
different: it is an explicit, developed, and regular verbal practice by which the disciple must 
respond to this parrhèsia of the master’s truth with a certain parrhésia, with a certain open-
heartedness, which is the opening of his own soul that he puts in contact with the others’ souls.” 
(Ibid., 390-391) What is important in this practice is not blaming self or others, “but also 
encouraging the others not to have an attitude of refusal, rejection, and blame towards themselves, 
but one of eunoia (benevolence).” (Ibid.) Even so, it is not one of the techniques of the self which 
Foucault appreciated.  
 
Foucault writes that there are four basic modalities of truth-telling in antiquity: prophecy, wisdom, 
teaching, and parrhesia. The prophet, by definition, does not speak in her own name; and the sage 
is not required to speak at all: “nothing obliges him to share his wisdom, to teach it, or 
demonstrate it. This accounts for what might be termed his structural silence.143” (CT, 17) 
(Foucault takes Heraclitus, who lived in silence, as a model here.) On the other hand the teacher or 
technician, who has learned a tekhnē, “is obliged to speak the truth, or at any rate to formulate 
what he knows and pass it on to others” (Ibid., 24) But Foucault points out there is no risk-taking 
in this pedagogic discipline, no courage of truth. None of these three modalities of truth-speaking 
are, therefore, that of parrhesia; although the parrhesiast, as in the case of Socrates himself, may 
also be a sage. However, whereas the sage may choose to remain silent because he knows, 
“Socrates remains silent by saying that he does not know, and by questioning anyone and 
everyone in the manner of the parrhesiast.”(Ibid. 27) The point about this philosophical truth-
telling, is that the truth it is concerned with will only be that which is “relevant for, is able to 
articulate and found a truth-telling about ethos in the form of parrhesia. And to that extent, we can 
say that, only up to a certain point, of course, wisdom and parrhesia merge.” (Ibid. 28) They may 
however, also come together in as far as the courage of truth need not be reckless, it is unwise to 
take risks that serve no ethical purpose. Foucault notes that Socrates repeats this many times in the 
Apology: “By encouraging you to take care of yourselves I am useful to the whole city. And if I 
                                                 
142 This might appear as an antecedent to the “confessional” practice of the Cultural Revolution in China, were it not 
for the fact that it was not intended to shame the fallen, but as a benevolent aid to self-discovery. 
143 Foucault tends to allow for many forms of parrhesia, but only one form of sage. 
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protect my life, it is precisely in the city’s interest.” It is important to note here of course, that this 
caution may, and was so dramatically in his own case, be overridden by parrhesiastic 
considerations. However, the care Socrates takes of himself, “leads him to concern himself with 
others, but in such a way that he shows them that they in turn have to be concerned about 
themselves, about their phronēsis, about alētheia, and their psukhē (reason, truth, and the soul.)” 
(Ibid., 90) In fact, Foucault says, Socrates defined his “courageous truth-telling, as a truth-telling 
whose final objective and constant concern was to teach men to take care of themselves.” (Ibid. 
110).  
 
In the Laches, Socrates questions eminent political and military leaders, Laches and Nicias, men of 
proven physical courage, and also of courage in their speech. Foucault notes that this is one of the 
few texts in the whole of Western philosophy “to pose the question of courage, and especially of 
the courage of truth.” (Ibid. 124) He says that the ethics of truth is frequently thematised, but 
usually with regard to the purity or purification of the subject: “From the Pythagoreans to modern 
philosophy, there is a whole cathartics of truth.” And the cathartic (a choice of term which in this 
context sounds unpleasantly purgative) he defines as “the subject’s purification as condition of 
being able to be subject of truth”. (Ibid. 125) But he says that there is another question of the 
struggle for the truth, which is different from purification, and has to do with “[w]hat type of 
resolution, what type of will, what type of not only sacrifice but battle is one able to face in order 
to arrive at the truth?”(Ibid.) Although Foucault is setting up a distinction here, in effect, much of 
the philosophical discourse he classifies as “purification” as a means of access to truth uses the 
same type of battling terminology for the struggle with the self, but Foucault does not comment on 
whether or not he sees these as compatible aims. Or rather, at a certain point he says: “There is, of 
course, a history of the metaphysics of the soul. There is also – which is, up to a point, the other 
side and also alternative – a history of the stylistics of existence”. (Ibid. 162) In other words, he 
concedes that the two philosophical pursuits may be two aspects of the same pursuit, but they may 
also be alternatives; and the general tenor of his writing clearly suggests a preference for the latter 
hypothesis, or rather for the latter as a choice of philosophical life. 
 
The Laches, he writes (much of which consists of a dialogue regarding the education of children), 
is a good starting point for an exploration of the question of the ethical relationship of courage and 
truth. In his lengthy discussion of the text however, there is in fact very little on parrhesia. Instead 
he moves on to a discussion of the themes of the care of the self and of the metaphysical reality of 
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the soul in the Laches and the Alcibiade respectively, pointing out that where the soul is the object 
of the Alcibiade, it is the bios, our lives, that is the object of the Laches. As such, he considers this 
text to be “the starting point for a whole philosophical practice and activity, of which Cynicism is, 
of course, the first example”. (Ibid, 128) Here Foucault is beginning to outline this philosophical 
genealogy that most interested him, and grounding it, perhaps surprisingly, in a particular reading 
of Plato. He notes that “the Alcibiades, starting from the principle of the need to give an account of 
oneself, proceeds to the discovery and establishment of oneself as a reality ontologically distinct 
from the body […] explicitly designated as the soul.” (Ibid. 159) In this context, taking care of 
oneself means taking care of one’s soul. “In the Laches, on the other hand, […] the establishment 
of oneself no longer takes place in the mode of discovery of the psukhē as a reality ontologically 
distinct from the body, [but] as a way of being and doing […] of which one has to give an account 
throughout one’s life. What has to be accounted for, and the very objective of this activity of 
accounting, is how one lives and has lived.” (Ibid. 160) Clearly Plato himself saw these two texts 
as expressions of different aspects of the same vision of the care of the self, but different texts 
inspire different developments, and the Laches will serve Foucault as an antecedent to the thinking 
of the Cynics, and to the radical stylisation of their lives, that was so close to his heart. With 
regard to the exposition in the text of the “courage of truth”, he presents this in the form of 
Socrates’ courage in questioning such eminent men, and the courage of the latter in submitting to 
his questioning, knowing, as they do, his reputation for not letting go “until his interlocutor has 
been led (periagesthai: led as by the hand, taken around) to the point where he can give an account 
of himself. […] He will be asked to give an account of himself, that is to say, to show the 
relationship between himself and logos (reason). […]” (Ibid. 143-44) In other words, the form of 
parrhesia presented here is the courage of allowing your life to be put into question, and of putting 
that of others into question. What this represents, Foucault says, is “the emergence of life, of mode 
of life as the object of Socratic parrhesia and discourse, of life in relation to which it is necessary 
to carry out an operation which will be a test, a testing, sifting.” (Ibid. 145)144 This mode of truth-
telling therefore “does not mark out the site of a possible metaphysical discourse”, but rather its 
“role and end is to give some kind of form to this bios (this life, this existence).” (Ibid., 160) He 
summarises the distinction he is making thus: 
 
                                                 
144 The only other reference to courage is the fact that, questioned by Socrates, neither Laches or Nicias could define 
what courage is.  
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In this comparison of the Alcibiades and the Laches we have the point of departure of the two great lines of 
Socratic veridiction in Western philosophy. From this first, fundamental, and common theme of didonai logon 
(giving an account of oneself), a [first] line will go to the being of the soul (the Alcibiades), and the other to 
forms of existence (the Laches). […] And this famous ‘accounting for self’ which constitutes the objective 
stubbornly pursued by Socratic parrhesia – and here is its fundamental ambiguity, which will leave its mark in 
the entire history of our thought – may be and has been understood as the task of having to discover and tell of 
the soul’s being, or as the task and work which consists in giving some kind of style to existence. I think this 
duality of ‘being of the soul’ and ‘style of existence’ signals something important for Western philosophy. 
(Ibid. 161) 
 
Foucault goes on to say that he is trying to uncover some of the archaic features of “what could be 
called, in a word, the aesthetics of existence. […] I wanted to try to show you, and myself, how, 
through the emergence and foundation of Socratic parrhesia, existence (bios) was constituted in 
Greek thought as an aesthetic object, as an object of aesthetic elaboration and perception: bios as a 
beautiful work.” (Ibid., 161-62) He remarks that this aspect of the history of subjectivity has 
always been overshadowed in philosophical discourse by the metaphysics of the soul; and, on the 
other hand, also by the “privileged study of those aesthetic forms devised to give form to things, 
substances, colors, light, sounds, and words.” (Ibid., 162) At this point he goes on to write, so 
shortly before his death, a response to these conceptions of aesthetics which could also be read as 
his own epitaph: 
 
we should recall that man’s way of being and conducting himself, the aspect his existence reveals to others and 
to himself, the trace also that this existence may leave and will leave in the memories of others after his death, 
this way of being, this appearance, this trace have been the object of his aesthetic concern. They have given rise 
to a concern for beauty, splendour, and perfection, a continual and constantly renewed work of giving form [to 
his existence], at least as much as the form that the same men have tried to give to the gods, temples or the song 
of words. This aesthetics of existence is a historical object which should not be neglected in favour of a 
metaphysics of the soul or an aesthetics of things or words. (Ibid.) 
 
He traces the care of the self in this sense back through the Greek tradition, to long before 
Socrates, affirming that, in the form of a concern for a beautiful existence it was already a 
dominant theme in Homer and Pindar. What he wanted to identify however is the point where he 
believes the concern for truth-telling fundamentally modified the concern for living a beautiful 
life. This point, for him, is Socrates: 
 
what I would like to recover is how truth-telling, in this ethical modality which appeared with Socrates right at 
the start of Western philosophy, interacted with the principle of existence as an oeuvre to be fashioned in all its 
possible perfection, how the care of the self, which, in the Greek tradition long before Socrates, was governed 
by the principle of a brilliant and memorable existence, […] was not replaced but taken up, inflected, modified, 
and re-elaborated by the principle of truth-telling that has to be confronted courageously, how the objective of a 
beautiful existence and the task of giving an account of oneself in the game of truth were combined. (Ibid., 163, 
my emphasis.) 
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I have quoted extensively here because it seems to me that these few pages recording the Lesson 
of the 29th February contain Foucault’s manifesto; and of the frequent summations of the purpose 
of his work that he gave, this seems to me the most heartfelt. Nonetheless, the thesis that appears 
here is sketched in rather than established. He has not before (to my knowledge) presented this 
view of pre-Socratic Greece as so dedicated to “the principle of a brilliant and memorable 
existence”. What he does here, with one bold Foucauldian stroke, is to compound Homeric 
heroism, care of the self, and parrhesia with his own conception of the stylisation of life (perhaps 
Achilles-Foucault rather than “Saint Foucault”). At this juncture he neither attempts to substantiate 
this nor calls upon scholarly reference to back him up; the exploration of this idea, of course, was 
work still to be done, and tracing the genealogy would, as he says “require a whole series of 
studies”. (Ibid.) It must have been very hard for him to know that just when he has finally got to 
the point his life’s work seems to have been leading to he would be unable to develop it further. 
He does acknowledge that the two lines of philosophical development he outlines here are often 
linked, but stresses the fact that the relationship between them is never a necessary one, that rather 
it is “sufficiently flexible for it to be possible to find a whole series of completely different styles 
of existence linked to one and the same metaphysic of the soul.” (Ibid. 164) And the reverse, of 
course, is equally true. 
  
In the rest of the course he refers to various moments in the heritage of philosophy as a style of 
existence, in the Stoics, and in Christian asceticism, but the development that most interested him 
was that of the earliest Cynics. Because it is for the Cynics that creating a very particular and anti-
conformist mode of life is explicitly centred on the absolute requirement of speaking the truth; and 
it is to this that he now turns his attention. Foucault notes however, that in fact, “at the beginning 
of Christianity there was a noticeable interaction between Cynic practice and Christian ascetism.” 
(Ibid. 182) He gives the example of the Cynic philosopher Peregrinus, who was also a Christian, 
and who, Foucault says, (according to the Emperor Julian) was by his own choice, “burnt alive at 
the Olympic Games […]. So Peregrinus is a Cynic who passed through Christianity, or a Christian 
who has become a Cynic.” (Ibid., 181) He also describes the Franciscans, with their poverty, 
wandering and begging, as in some ways the Cynics of medieval Christendom; and he outlines 
some other lines of development within Christianity, but mostly in the form of rough drafts for 
possible future studies. Foucault also makes some mention of other modes of life, of more recent 
history, where the courage of truth is central to an “alternative” life-style, such as those of 
revolutionary and militant activity. In its various post-Enlightenment forms revolutionary activity 
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has never been only a political project but always also a mode of life; one which rejected excessive 
wealth and the superfluous and valued simpler life-styles, and it has also been a fierce form of 
truth-speaking. He does not, however, explore these avenues further. (Ibid., 182-186) 
 
The available evidence on Cynic lives and thinking is mainly from the narratives of commentators, 
especially from later, Greco-Roman writers: Diogenes Laertius, Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus, all 
in some way looking back to classical antiquity as a kind of Golden Age of philosophical thinking 
and practice. This attitude was, Foucault says, also evident in satirical or critical texts, such as 
those of the Emperor Julian. The Cynics themselves were mostly not writers. In fact, Foucault tells 
us, their “connecting up of truth-telling and mode of life […] is all the more noteworthy for taking 
place immediately as it were, without doctrinal mediation, or at any rate with a fairly rudimentary 
theoretical framework.” (Ibid. 165) Or rather, there is a framework, but it is of much less 
importance than in Platonism, or the Hellenistic schools; what is always clear however is that “the 
Cynic is constantly characterised as the man of parrhesia.” (Ibid., 166) According to an anecdote 
of Diogenes Laertius, Foucault relates that when asked what is most beautiful in men, Diogenes 
(the Cynic) replied that it is parrhesia. This notion is paramount too in Epictetus’ famous 
Discourse 22, where, Foucault says, Epictetus’ depiction of Cynicism, read through the filter of his 
own Stoic thinking, takes it to what could be seen as the “extreme consequence [of both 
disciplines] (radical asceticism)”. (Ibid. 167). Foucault notes, however, that Epictetus’ description 
is idealised, not really an account of what was an under-documented historical reality of several 
centuries beforehand. He appreciates Epictetus’ metaphor for the Cynic as a kind of spy, however, 
“sent ahead as a scout, in advance of humanity, to determine what may be favourable or hostile to 
man in the things of the world [… because he will return to tell the truth, without] letting himself 
be paralysed by fear.” (Ibid.) 
Foucault says that the stereotypical picture of the Cynic – without worldly goods or shoes, with a 
minimum of food and clothing, unwashed and sleeping, like the iconic Diogenes, in a barrel in the 
street – does in fact seem to be in accordance with what we know of their thinking. He says that 
the Cynic mode of life is characterised by very precise rules of behaviour that manifest the virtues 
of courage, temperance and wisdom; and that this “mode of life as the reduction of all pointless 
conventions and all superfluous opinions is clearly a sort of general stripping of existence and 
opinions in order to reveal the truth. For example, there is Diogenes’ famous gesture, recounted so 
frequently in Antiquity, of masturbating in public and saying: But why are you so scandalized, 
since masturbation satisfies a need, just as eating does. I eat in public, so why should I not satisfy 
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this need also in public?” (Ibid. 171) As with all anti-conformist provocateurs, the Cynics were, 
not surprisingly, vilified as much as they were admired, precisely because they revealed truths 
about human beings that are generally masked by convention. And convention, or conformity, 
provide a way of believing in the truth of the mask, which is precariously maintained; so that 
threats to it are fiercely rejected. At the same time, this simplified way of life reveals, Foucault 
says,  
in their irreducible nakedness, those things which alone are indispensable to human life or which constitute its 
most elementary, rudimentary essence. In this sense, this mode of life simply reveals what life is in its 
independence, its fundamental freedom, and consequently it reveals what life ought to be.  
[…] In short, Cynicism makes life, existence, bios, what could be called an alethurgy, a manifestation of truth. 
(Ibid. 171-72)  
 
 
As an exemplar of a less radical brand of Cynicism Foucault recalls the Roman, Demetrius, of 
whom Seneca spoke so highly, and who was known for rejecting large sums of money offered him 
by Caligula. Demetrius was however, “a man of culture [and Seneca says, of great eloquence], 
certainly far removed from all those street preachers to which the image of the Cynic was often 
reduced.” (Ibid., 194) Despite living very simply, Demetrius’ world was that of the Roman 
aristocracy. He was spiritual counsellor to one Thrasea Paetus, and when the latter was ordered by 
the Emperor to commit suicide, Demetrius went into exile with him, and stayed with him through 
his dying. (Ibid.) At the other extreme was someone like Peregrinus, a traveller and vagabond who 
would preach in Rome “to the idiotai (those without culture or social and political status)”. (Ibid. 
195) This variation in life-styles is reflected also in the accounts of the Cynics, which often 
contrast an “ostentatious, noisy and aggressive Cynicism which denies the laws, traditions and 
rules, [… with] the value and merits of another, measured, thoughtful, well-bred, discreet, honest, 
and really austere Cynicism.” (Ibid. 198) Interestingly, as Foucault points out: “One of the 
important themes of Cynicism was that the impulse towards philosophy basically did not require 
culture, training or apprenticeship. One is essentially a philosopher by nature, and is born a 
philosopher.” (Ibid. 198) This notion, perhaps more than others, grounds Foucault’s argument 
regarding the divergence of philosophical development. Though philosophy is always in the first 
place the philosophical life in antiquity, it is generally the case that philosophical discourse is 
central to that life. Only in the case of the Cynics is speaking the truth so separable from 
philosophical discourse145; and this minimising of the requirement of discursive capacity, and 
maximising of the commitment to a truthful way of life, regardless of intellectual capacity or 
                                                 
145 Foucault writes: “Cynicism […] seems to have been, at least to a large degree, a popular philosophy. And to that 
extent we can understand its theoretical poverty.” (Ibid. 204) 
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erudition, was of course so important to the form of spiritual democratisation brought about in the 
Roman world by early Christianity. The words of the Cynics were more about how to live than 
about metaphysics, and even the critical Emperor Julian said of the early Cynics, referring to 
Diogenes and Crates: “Their deeds preceded their words. Those who honoured poverty […] 
demonstrated that they were the first to despise their patrimony [a reference to the fact that Crates 
gave away all the goods he had inherited from his family; M.F.]: those who prized modesty [still 
Diogenes and Crates; M.F.] were the first to practice simplicity in everything”. (Ibid. 200).  
There is a sub-theme here which Foucault does not take up regarding the fact that erudition itself 
can be such a fascinating game that it becomes not only not helpful, but actually an obstacle to the 
philosophical life, as further erudition becomes instead the goal. For Murdoch, Plato’s discussion 
of the dangers of writing, as opposed to the spoken word, in his Seventh Letter, was precisely to 
do with writing as a distraction from the primary goal of living in virtue; which was also one 
reason why, in his own teaching, he made such use of (memorable) parables or myths: the cave, 
the black and white horses, etc. (as is the case in many spiritual traditions.)146 Foucault notes too 
that the Cynics “are less concerned with teaching a doctrine than with passing on schemas, then to 
pass on these schemas of life the Cynics make use not so much of a theoretical, dogmatic teaching 
as of above all models, stories, anecdotes, and examples.” (Ibid. 208) 
 
In this context, what Foucault does take up, and this will be his last “problematization”, to which 
the Cynics are crucial, is what he calls the question of the “two ways” of philosophical practice. 
He mentions earlier conceptions of two ways of life, for example (and differently), in Parmenides, 
and Xenophon (cf. p. 206); but these pose a philosophical or virtuous way of life against a non-
philosophical or non-virtuous counterpart; whereas the Cynics evaluate two philosophical ways 
against each other. Thus, for the Cynics: 
 
There are two ways, one of which is lengthy, relatively easy, and does not call for great effort, which is the way 
by which one achieves virtue through the logos, that is to say, through discourses and learning them (through 
school and doctrinal apprenticeship). Then there is the other, short way, which is the difficult, arduous way 
which rises straight to the summit over many obstacles and which is, as it were, the silent way. Anyway it is the 
way of exercise, of askesis, of practices of destitution and endurance. (Ibid. 207)147 
 
 
                                                 
146 Another reason is, as Murdoch also says: “Certain parables or stories undoubtedly owe their power to the fact that 
they incarnate a moral truth which is paradoxical, infinitely suggestive, and open to continual reinterpretation.” (V&C, 
91)         
147 These two ways: often characterised as that of the householder and that of the ascetic, constitute a basic spiritual 
choice in Eastern (Hindu and Buddhist) philosophy; where it is recognised that the “short way” is too tough a choice 
for most people. 
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Foucault notes that this distinction is frequently attributed to both Diogenes the Cynic, and to 
Crates, his first and most important disciple, the “short cut” also being known as the way of the 
dog – “a dog’s life” always having been a favoured metaphor for the Cynic choice of life on the 
streets, without possessions.148 The longer way he calls that of the “traditionality of doctrine”, 
which was so important “for passing on philosophical doctrines like Platonism and Aristotelianism 
– and for Stoicism to a certain extent”. Foucault says that alongside this way, “Cynicism – and, it 
should be said [rather unwillingly], Epicureanism to a certain extent – practiced what could be 
called, not a traditionality of doctrine, but a traditionality of existence.” (Ibid., 209) Whereas the 
traditionality of doctrine is concerned with “reactualising a core of original thought in the present”, 
the traditionality of existence recalls  
 
elements and episodes of lives – of the life of someone who really existed or of someone who existed 
mythically, without it really mattering which – , elements and episodes which are now to be imitated, to which 
life must be given again, not because they have been forgotten, as in doctrinal traditionality, but because now, 
today, we are no longer equal to these examples, because a decline, a decadence have removed the possibility 
of our doing as much. (Ibid.)  
 
 
Foucault says that what emerges from this is the picture of the philosophical hero. That the Cynics 
produced philosophical heros there is no doubt; but up until now, Foucault has shown us that this 
was through the possibility of our observing directly the heroism with which the Cynics could lead 
a life of destitution and humiliation; through the paradox of the great dignity involved in their 
humiliation (also a spiritual lesson of Christ). Perhaps, just as the Emperor Julian despaired of the 
possibility of such heroism in the Roman Empire, and harked back to classical Greece, so Foucault 
despairs of such a possibility in the present; so that for both it is historical, rather than actual 
figures which must be the models. This philosophical hero, he says “is no longer the sage, but he is 
not yet the Christian holy man or ascetic.” (Ibid. 210.) He says that Cynicism, “as the essence of 
philosophical heroism ran through the whole of Antiquity and made it, whatever its theoretical 
poverty, an important event not only in the history of forms of life, but in the history of thought.” 
However, he also goes on to say: “This philosophical heroism formed what could be called a 
legendary dimension, a philosophical legend which modelled in a particular way how the 
philosophical life has been conceived of and practiced in the West up until now” (Ibid.) It is 
perhaps not so easy to see to what, or to whom, he is referring here. Certainly many philosophers 
have been persecuted for their parrhesia, their absolute commitment to truth, throughout the 
                                                 
148 And as with “blacks”, “niggers”, “queers”, and other terms used to insult particular groups of people, the Cynics 
were probably the first (recorded), to adopt an insult and make of it a reference to self to be proud of. 
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history of philosophy. But with the exception of a few more ascetically inclined, these are not 
philosophical heros in the “tradition of existence” as outlined by Foucault, but rather “heros” in 
the tradition of doctrine (and whereas some may have liked the idea of “philosophical heroism”, 
others may have heartily disliked it). Their lives have largely been dedicated to the reactivating 
and reformulating of doctrine, or even drastically rewriting it; and preferably from the comfort of 
their armchairs. This being said, it takes away nothing from the valid and interesting proposition 
he is making here: to create  
 
a history of philosophy which would not be a history of philosophical doctrines, but a history of forms, modes, 
and styles of life, a history of the philosophical life as a philosophical problem, but also as a mode of being and 
as a form of both ethics and heroism. (Ibid.) 
 
Foucault says that all of this obviously comes to an end at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
when philosophy becomes a teaching profession. Though when this happens, “with the result that 
the philosophical life, philosophical ethics, philosophical heroism, and the philosophical legend no 
longer have a raison d’être, the moment when philosophy can no longer be entertained except as 
an historical set of doctrines, is also the moment when the legend of philosophical life receives its 
highest and last literary expression.” (Ibid., 210-11) And this, he writes, is Goethe’s Faust. Sadly, 
he takes it for granted here that his readers know exactly what he means; his explanation might 
have proved interesting. (In Hadot’s fine essay on Faust149, it is the intensity of life lived in the 
present moment, heightened by love, that comes to the fore, in relation to the Stoic practice of 
living in the present (as the only thing that depends on us); in direct opposition to any illusory 
preoccupation with heroism or how one might be remembered. But as we saw earlier, Foucault 
underplayed this aspect of Stoic practice.) Nonetheless, he concludes that “[p]hilosophical 
heroism, philosophical ethics, will no longer find a place in the practice of philosophy as a 
teaching profession, but in that other, displaced and transformed form of philosophical life in the 
political field: the revolutionary life. Exit Faust, and enter the revolutionary.” (Ibid. 210) 
 
The theme that he has identified in Cynicism, that of “manifesting the truth, of practising 
alethurgy, the production of truth in the form of a life” (Ibid, 218), Foucault now redescribes as the 
theme of the “true life”. This, he says, was important in ancient philosophy, but is no longer 
important in contemporary philosophy; and it has now, since the nineteenth century, been taken up 
instead in political ethics. In analysing the components of the original Greek conception of a “true 
                                                 
149 Hadot, “ ‘Only the Present is our Happiness’: The Value of the Present Instant in Goethe and in Ancient 
Philosophy”, in PWL pp.217-38. 
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life”, in his penultimate lesson he goes back to Plato and discovers there, that the concept of “true 
love” – alēthēs erōs, (without citation150) is inextricably linked with the concept of “true life” 
(alēthēs bios). He has time only to mention this here however, noting that “it would be a very 
interesting and vast domain to study.” (Ibid. 221) (In a different philosophical context and 
language, and for different purposes, this will in fact be an important theme of Murdoch’s). 
Among the reasons he lists for the effective loss of the bios philosophikos, the philosophical life, 
in modernity – besides the developments internal to philosophy itself and its institutionalisation as 
a teaching profession – there is the fact of “the confiscation by religion of the theme and practices 
of the true life”, of which, as we have seen, Hadot had also spoken at some length. Furthermore, 
he writes, the “institutionalisation of truth-telling practices in the form of a science (a normed, 
regulated, established science embodied in institutions) has no doubt been the other major reason 
for the disappearance of the theme of the true life as a philosophical question, as a problem of the 
conditions of access to the truth.” (Ibid. 235) Even though, for so many philosophers the problem 
of the philosophical life has been of cardinal importance – Foucault mentions, Montaigne, Kant, 
Spinoza151, – it has certainly been, in general, “neglected; it has constantly appeared as surplus in 
relation to philosophy, to a philosophical practice indexed to the scientific model.” (Ibid. 236) The 
final legacy of Cynicism was, he says, that  
 
it raised the grave problem, or rather, it seems to me that it gave the theme of the philosophical life its cutting 
edge by raising the following question: for life truly to be the life of truth, must it not be an other life, a life 
which is radically and paradoxically other? […] Maybe – and again forgive the schematism, these are 
hypotheses, dotted lines, outlines of possible directions for work – it could be said that with Platonism, Greek 
philosophy since Socrates basically posed the question of the other world (l’autre monde). But, starting with 
Socrates, or from the Socratic model to which Cynicism referred, it also posed another question. Not the 
question of the other world, but that of an other life (vie autre). It seems to me that the other world and the 
other life have basically been the two great themes, the two great forms, the two great limits within which 
Western philosophy has constantly developed. (Ibid., 245) 
 
Everything that leads up to this suggests that what he means by “other life” on the Cynic model, 
and as he reluctantly acknowledges, also of the Epicureans, is a radically alternative life-style; and 
as we have seen, wherever he has encountered these, in Antiquity or on the fringes of modernity, 
they have signified for him a commitment to living in the truth. In this bipartite schema of Western 
                                                 
150 In The Uses of Pleasure, Ch.5, he had discussed the relation between “true love” and “true being” in Plato in an 
ontological, not in an existential sense.  
151 In Hermeneutics of the Subject Foucault, commenting on “the first nine paragraphs of Spinoza’s Treatise on the 
Correction of the Understanding, notes that it is clear here “how in formulating the problem of access to the truth 
Spinoza linked the problem to a series of requirements concerning the subject’s very being: In what aspects and how 
must I transform my being as a subject? What conditions must I impose on my being as subject so as to have access to 
the truth, and to what extent will this access to the truth give me what I seek, that is to say the highest good, the 
sovereign good?” (HS, 27)  
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philosophy however, there would seem to be no place for the Stoics, who fit into neither category, 
though he spent more time in their company than that of any other ancient philosophers.152 In 
agreement with prevailing scholarly opinion on this, he himself has shown, in The Hermeneutics 
of the Subject, that they were not focused on the other world but were committed to living in truth 
in this life, bios philosophikus; yet at the same time they rejected the other specifically anti-
conventional life. For the Stoics it didn’t matter what form one’s life took, that was not the point. 
On the contrary, accepting one’s life for whatever it was, and living it as well as possible was a 
first principle (in the case of the Stoic Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, for example, he looked up to the 
slave, Epictetus, who had been the teacher of his own teacher, Rusticus, as a spiritual master153). 
But again as Foucault has shown, the Stoics lived in a completely other way, a philosophical way. 
Their philosophical way of life was about living truthfully, and attention to the self and the care of 
the self were also first principles. As Foucault had previously shown, there is a strong aesthetics of 
existence here, but at the same time the deliberate adoption of a radically other life style was 
excluded.  
 
At this juncture however, Foucault seems quite sceptical of the Stoics level of commitment to the 
philosophical life, and for precisely this reason. He compares Stoic recommendations to practice 
frugality and moderation rather than poverty and destitution with the “other life” commitment of 
the Cynics unfavourably. Referring, for example, to Seneca’s advice to Lucilius to: “For a few, 
three or four days, sleep on a pallet, and eat as little as possible [… he writes: it] is, if you like, a 
virtual exercise. Cynic poverty is a real poverty which carries out a real stripping of possessions.” 
(Ibid. 257, my emphasis.) What is interesting is that here, as elsewhere, Foucault never records 
having actually experimented with any of these practices, to gain some idea of what really happens 
to the subject in the process; in order to determine whether they do add up to just a virtual game or 
may actually have some transformational role in the relation of the self to itself. Asceticism, as he 
knows in theory, does not reveal its truths to thought experiments. Clearly this would not be the 
investigative strategy of those classicists who situate their interests in the “doctrinal tradition”, 
making no pretence of an experiential interest in techniques of the self; but this is not the case of 
Foucault. He goes on, in a phrase in which both adjectives and rhythms indicate where his 
approval and disapproval lie: “You can see that the typical poverty of the Cynic life is not the 
                                                 
152 To take a modern example, Empiricism might also be hard to fit in to this schema.  
153 And as Foucault notes, “Seneca, an extremely rich swindler, expounds at length on the idea that the true life is a 
life of virtual detachment with regard to wealth.”! (Ibid. 257) 
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virtual poverty of an attitude, as in Seneca. Nor is it a middling poverty of the kind Socrates 
accepted. It is a real poverty of dispossession, an indefinite poverty endlessly at work on oneself.” 
(Ibid.) This is undeniable, though poverty is of course not an end for any of these philosophers, but 
rather a means; as he says, a way of working on the self. And in all spiritual traditions, because 
what he is talking about here is philosophy as spirituality, it is generally recognised that the less 
one has of possessions and entanglements the more devoted one can be to transforming the self, to 
a virtuous life. But it is similarly recognised that the most extreme path is beyond the capacity of 
most people, and democratising spirituality means elaborating paths, and techniques of the self, 
that are accessible to all those who wish to live in truth, but also in their societies. As with 
erudition, there is also a risk of self-satisfaction in great ascetic achievement,154 which different 
forms of engagement with the other may attenuate. In discussing the variegated “unselfing” 
spiritual force of Eros in this respect, Murdoch writes that, for example: “Falling in love made you 
discontinuous from yourself”. (MGM,  547) 
 
Foucault began his studies of ancient philosophy with a tripartite division of forms of reflexivity 
which he denoted as memory (largely Platonic), meditation (on the Stoic model), and method 
(roughly scientific modernity). This was a first move away from a predominantly epistemological 
and genealogical orientation towards alethurgy; that is to say, from a philosophical preoccupation 
with truth as impersonal knowledge to a philosophical preoccupation with truth as the relation of 
the self to itself. At the point when his work in progress was interrupted by his untimely death, it 
centred on a bipartite division between the tradition of doctrinality, linked to the metaphysics of 
the soul, and the tradition of existence, linked to philosophy as a life-style centred on parrhesia, 
the courage of truth. Foucault would certainly have anticipated all sorts of crossovers between the 
two traditions he delineates here, which would be interesting to examine as such. And  – given his 
general preference for tripartite schemas  – had he been able to explore the “two great themes, 
forms, and limits of Western philosophy”, they may well have generated at least a third form, able 
to better accommodate the “meditation” model of the Stoics. Murdoch says that “To do philosophy 
is to explore one’s own temperament, and yet at the same time to attempt to discover the truth.” 
(OGG, 337) This was so clearly true of Foucault, but more than this his work was his mode of self 
transformation. While he clearly did not place himself in the other world line of philosophy, the 
                                                 
154 This is why Socrates near contemporary, the Buddha, who had lived an even more extreme version of the Cynic 
life-style for many years, as a result of his Enlightenment, invented the Middle Way – between extreme asceticism 
and full immersion in the world. 
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other life tradition would have to be broadened considerably from the description he gives here if 
it is also to include himself. In fact he does broaden it out, but only by placing it outside of 
philosophy; and also by quietly dropping from the picture the particularly difficult requirement of 
radical asceticism, retaining only the requirement of forceful, proselytising, truth-telling. Thus, in 
the contest of what he calls Cynic “militancy” (recognising the anachronism), he writes that it: 
 
 
will employ harsh, drastic means to shake up the people. […] it claims to take on conventions, laws, and 
institutions. It is a militancy that claims to change the world. […] What gives this Cynic activity its historical 
importance is also the series in which it is inserted: the activism of Christianity, which is at the same time 
spiritual battle, but battle for the world; other movements which have accompanied Christianity: the mendicant 
orders, preaching, movements which preceded and followed the Reformation. In all these movements we find 
the principle of an open militantism. Revolutionary militantism of the nineteenth [century]. The true life as an 
other life (une vie autre), as a life of combat, for a changed world.” (Ibid., 303n) 
 
 
In the parrhesiastic descent however, though not philosophical heros, many of the heroes of our 
own times – the journalists, the magistrates, the bloggers and other activists who risk all to tell the 
truth – are clearly parrhesiasts, in Foucault’s definition, as he was himself; and in reality he was as 
close to them, operating in opposition, but from within society, as he was to the communities 
creating radically other lives on the outside. As Han says: “Later Foucault spoke in his own name 
and addressed his readers as a parrhesiast, whose life, personal engagement, and even the manner 
in which he handled the coming of his own death testified to its authenticity.” (AF, 202) 
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PT.II:  Iris Murdoch 
 
Ch. 1. The Subject of Knowledge and the Subject of Ethics 
 
1. Fact and value 
  
Much of Iris Murdoch’s work, like that of Foucault, was concerned with the artificial divisions 
wrought by philosophy in its study of the human being between, in his terms, the subject of 
knowledge and the subject of ethics. But whereas Foucault’s first concern for many years was with 
how ethics figured in the relationship between knowledge and social practice, Murdoch’s centre of 
philosophical gravity was always the moral individual, and the possibilities of deepening our 
moral understanding. The particular formulation of the divided self which was her immediate 
starting point was the fact/value debate in analytic philosophy, that is, the separation of fact 
(knowledge of, therefore proper to epistemology), from value (construed as belonging to 
experience, not ‘knowledge’, and proper to ethics – the latter having been rendered almost a 
sideline of mainstream philosophy in twentieth century Britain155). “Facts” themselves were never 
matters of certainty on the prevailing view in Anglo-American philosophy at the time. This was 
reserved, in the words of A.J. Ayer, whom she quotes, to “relations of ideas”, that is “the a priori 
propositions of logic and pure mathematics, and these I allow to be necessary and certain only 
because analytic.” The quotation from Ayer continues thus: 
 
Propositions concerning empirical matters of fact, on the other hand, I hold to be hypotheses, which 
can be probable but never certain. And in giving an account of their validation I claim also to have 
explained the nature of truth […] I require of an empirical hypothesis, not indeed that it should be 
conclusively verifiable, but that some possible sense experience should be relevant to the 
determination of its truth or falsehood. If a putative proposition fails to satisfy this principle, and is 
not a tautology, then I hold that it is metaphysical, and that, being metaphysical, it is neither true nor 
false, but literary senseless.156  
 The broad thrust of Ayer’s analytic broom sweeps out from the realm of sense all “ethical” 
propositions (apart from any descriptive reference they might contain to empirically ascertainable 
“facts”), and along with them go the vast mess of “senseless” utterances that make up so much of 
human life. He was much less ruthless with “empirical matters”, however. Having thus despatched 
metaphysics, and established that only the analytically – or logically – necessary can be “true”, he 
admits a form of “determination of truth or falsehood” for those matters with which natural 
                                                 
155 Despite the Aristotelean ‘Virtue ethics’ of one current within that community 
156 Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (1936), quoted in Murdoch, MGM, p.41 
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science concerns itself, strictly speaking only as probability, but in its continued development, 
mainstream analytic philosophy has drawn closer and closer to regarding the scientific world of 
probability as very probable indeed. Certain recent ‘analytic’ passions for ethology and the 
neurosciences would rather seem to have fallen into the epistemic trap Wittgenstein describes in 
Tractatus, 6.371: “The whole modern conception of the world is founded on the illusion that the 
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural philosophy.”  
As regards the task of philosophy proper, Ayer goes on “The propositions of philosophy are not 
factual, but linguistic, in character […] We may say that philosophy is a department of logic.” 
(Ibid.) The resulting abdication of philosophical responsibility for ethics, and the consequent de 
facto shifting of the grounding of that responsibility onto the broad shoulders of natural science, 
with its “probable” theories of “the facts”, clearly runs the risk of granting philosophical 
credibility to the “scientific” theory of the moment; the respectability and the gravitas given to 
behaviourism in its multifold applications being a case in point. In her tracking of twentieth 
century philosophical developments, Murdoch notes that this formal, linguistic, foundational 
stance of analytic philosophy was “before their time, often suggestive of structuralist aims and 
modes of reflection” (MGM, 42). However, in the form given by Ayer, above, she sees it as 
deriving from what was then a very common misreading of Wittgenstein, and particularly of his 
injunction at the end of the Tractatus (7), that “What we cannot speak about [including the ethical] 
we must pass over in silence”. Of this she writes (among the first commentators to perceive or 
clarify this): “Wittgenstein’s silence indicates the area of value. Ayer’s use of the distinction 
between fact and value deliberately removes value.”(MGM, 43). In the same way, Wittgenstein’s 
observation at P.I. 580 that “An inner process stands in need of outward criteria” says something 
about the inner process, it doesn’t discard it. For her, Wittgenstein uses these words 
metaphorically, whereas many took them as determinative. As she says “Wittgenstein has had 
many followers in the analytical tradition, most of whom he would regard as having 
misunderstood him.” (Ibid., 41) And further: “Immediate followers of Wittgenstein, including 
Gilbert Ryle translated his admittedly obscure reflections into a form of behaviourism: only the 
outer is real.” (Ibid., 157) She feels that, with regard to the “inner”, Wittgenstein is warning us that 
“in attributing roles to it [we may] make philosophical mistakes.” And with regard to literal 
interpretations of Wittgenstein’s metaphors, giving rise to theoretical constructions claiming his 
patronage, she notes “As often in philosophy a growth of mutually supporting metaphors may 
seem to add up to a position which has been argued for.” (Ibid., 156-57) Of Ayer, a major 
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contributor to the making of the Anglo-analytic picture of morality, she writes that he “divides the 
mental region between overt public conventions (which govern that inward utterance of words 
which is all that ‘thinking’ can properly consist in) and obscure private phenomena, devoid of 
‘meaning’, except possibly as material for psychological study.” (NP, 46-7). On this argument, the 
public conventions can, through their necessary expression in language, be thoroughly analysed, 
and where errors in logic occur in them these can be shown. At the same time psychology must 
find ever more scientific methods for making some sense of the messy area of the phenomena it 
attempts to study. “One of Wittgenstein’s aims” on the other hand, as Murdoch writes, “was to 
remove philosophy from the vicinity of science, particularly of psychological science”. (MGM, 
158)  
Early in the twentieth century however, some years before both Wittgenstein and Ayer, G.E. 
Moore had already overturned the traditional philosophical preoccupation with how value is 
determined, the question of what can be said to be ‘good’; and this time not solely from an 
epistemological perspective, but as simultaneously an argument within moral philosophy. In 
Principia Ethica, 1903, he set out to show that ‘good’ has no fixed meaning, it is definable only 
according to specific and varied types of evaluation. Although Moore himself still “treated moral 
remarks as expressions of moral insight […] and he had clung to the idea that they were in some 
sense factual” (ME, 62), Murdoch says that his argument “transformed the central question of 
ethics from the question, ‘What is goodness?’ – where an answer was expected in terms of the 
revelation of some real and eternally present structure of the universe – into the question – ‘What 
is the activity of “valuing” (“or commending”)?’, where what is required is to see what is in 
common to people of all ages and societies when they attach value to something.” She notes “This 
phrase ‘to attach value’ is itself significant of the change of attitude”, indicating that the 
philosopher’s attention is now directed to “the familiar human activity of endowing things with 
value.” This, she says, represents a definitive breach with metaphysical ethics. It also absolves 
moral philosophers of any obligation to defend or live by a particular conception of ethics; on the 
contrary it requires their professional neutrality. Reflection on “What things are good?” then 
became “a matter for the moralist, and not for the philosopher.” (Ibid., 60).  
Murdoch was concerned to identify and scrutinise the moves in this development, which for her 
did indeed eliminate an old source of confusion, but at the heavy cost of devaluing philosophical 
ethics. The next major step, on Ayer’s view, and in alignment (and interaction) with the views of 
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the Vienna school of “logical positivism”, was the conclusion that, since no ethical or 
metaphysical statement is ultimately verifiable, and since such statements do not constitute 
empirical hypotheses, they cannot be considered cognitively meaningful. Only cognitive meaning 
is the direct concern of philosophy, therefore “ethics” takes on the status of, at best, a dependent 
relative. A further development from this was the idea that what ethical statements expressed was 
merely emotion. As Murdoch says: “They did not have descriptive, or factual meaning [cognitive], 
they had emotive [noncognitive] meaning” (ME, 61); a notion that was pivotal to the development 
of ‘noncognitivism’ in contemporary ethics. This dualistic notion was far from Murdoch’s own 
view. She herself speaks frequently, as we will see, of “the moral content of cognition and the 
ubiquity of evaluation” (SZ, 97). Paradoxically perhaps, whilst contesting the notion of the mind 
as something separate from the body, this rigid analytic separation of the realms of the cognitive 
and the noncognitive nonetheless demonstrates a real affinity for the sensible/intelligible divide. 
The difficulty of squaring this position with both the rationality and the relationship to facts that 
were evidently at work in moral reasoning subsequently found its way back into analytic 
philosophy, Murdoch says, largely “as a result of two other philosophical developments: first, the 
notion that meaning should be analysed not in terms of method of verification, but in terms of use, 
and second what might roughly be summed up as ‘the disappearance of the mind’.” (ME, 61).  
The notion of meaning as use obviously calls to mind Wittgenstein, but Murdoch thinks that it also 
“arose independently in the field of ethics, as a development and refinement of the emotive theory. 
Ethical statements were now said, not to express emotion, but to evoke emotion and more 
generally to persuade.” (Ibid.). This, however, represents a conceptual shift in the use of “use” 
itself, from Wittgenstein’s analysis of the way the meaning of particular words changes according 
to particular uses, to the supposition that a whole group of moral concepts are used 
psychologically, both to express emotion (therefore noncognitively) and also to persuade, calling 
the cognitive faculty into play in the service of emotion. (Reason as slave to the passions, as it 
were).  Alisdair MacIntyre, who sees “emotivism” as the most pernicious trend running right 
through twentieth century philosophy, says that Stevenson (for MacIntyre its principal advocate) 
“asserted that the sentence ‘This is good’ means roughly the same as ‘I approve of this; do so as 
well’, trying to capture by this equivalence both the function of the moral judgement as expressive 
of the speaker’s attitudes and the function of the moral judgement as designed to influence the 
hearer’s attitudes (Stevenson, [Facts and Values] 1945, ch.2)”157 The moral judgement is thus seen 
                                                 
157 MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, 2004 (1981), Duckworth, London, p.12.   
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as simultaneously emotive and ‘prescriptive’. Murdoch herself refers only in passing to 
Stevenson’s work in marking its place in this genealogy of moral concepts. The view it put 
forward however, which reduces the huge area of ethical thought and conduct to one aspect of it, 
was a cornerstone of R.M. Hare’s more sophisticated version of ‘prescriptivism’, and it was this 
more complex theoretical structure she was most concerned to dismantle, as will become evident.  
A further development in modern philosophy that Murdoch felt to be significant in this respect 
was what she describes as a “revolution in our attitude to psychological concepts”, and among 
these, principally the concept of ‘mind’ itself, which was rather ruthlessly “disappeared”. She 
writes: “The arguments in The Concept of Mind [Gilbert Ryle]  are largely demonstrations that we 
are not really referring to inner mental happenings when we speak of intelligent activity; it is 
assumed almost by the way that there are no such happenings.” (NP, 43). In effect, Ryle’s book, 
famous for caricaturing the Cartesian mind/body dualism as that of “the ghost in the machine”158, 
contains many statements in which the mind is pictured as a kind of epiphenomenon of behaviour. 
He writes: “It is being maintained throughout this book that when we characterize people by 
mental predicates [e.g. as thoughtful, imprudent, judicious] we are not making untestable 
inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred 
from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their 
predominantly public behaviour.”(Ryle, p.50)159 And further: “I am arguing that in describing the 
workings of a person’s mind we are not describing a second set of shadowy operations. We are 
describing … the way in which parts of his conduct are managed.” (Ibid, p.49) Ryle’s intentionally 
provocative statements are indicative of the two reasons Murdoch gives for the abandonment of 
the notion of “mental event”, that is: “because we cannot find it”: (Ryle’s “shadowy operations” 
and “ghostly processes”); and because: “we do not need it”. (NP, 43). Before the philosophical 
advent of the notion that meaning lies in use, the ‘mental event’ was needed to create the 
“meaningful entities which should also be the basis of language.” (Ibid). But this function of mind 
in the production of images, representations, etc., this active role in the production of language, 
was more or less dispensed with once it was seen, from this perspective, “that what determines the 
                                                 
158 Though in fact, as Hacking points out, although for Descartes mind and body were indeed distinct substances, and 
he wondered how they interact, he was nonetheless “very cagey about the relationship of mind to body. He did not 
like the ancient formulation that ‘I am in my body as a pilot in his ship.’ Instead he wrote that “I am most tightly 
bound to my body, and as it were intermingled with it, so that it and I form a unit.’” (Quoted HO 223) 
159 Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, Penguin, 2000 (1949). 
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use of words about the mind are features of the overt context; the rigidity that creates meaning lies 
in the social framework and not in the relation to an inward utterance.” (NP, 44). 
For Murdoch, Ryle demonstrates effectively those public conventions that govern certain 
‘cognitive repertoires’, such as the function of naming (through which one also identifies one’s 
“feelings” in relation to observable sensations), and other features of what he calls the “silent 
soliloquies” that constitute thinking. The act of meaning is here equated with a matching of the 
public symbol, particularly linguistic, with the private ‘feeling’. However, if the available public 
symbols do not seem adequate, Ryle presents this as simply a problem of insufficient vocabulary, 
resolved by further learning (construed as a more extensive assimilation of public symbols). In 
focusing in this way on the act of meaning, Murdoch points out that no distinction is made 
between this and the mental event, which is simply allowed to disappear. Against this, she 
contends that “there are mental events which have a perfectly definite character and one which is 
not to be either scattered into the context or identified with a physical concomitant.” In responding 
to some of Ryle’s examples she observes that though there may indeed be no significant mental 
event when recognising something as red, or even possibly when feeling jealous160; in the case of 
feeling morally responsible for “a particular thought” what is at issue is precisely a specific mental 
event. She gives the example of Gwendolen, in George Eliot’s Daniel Deronda, who hesitates 
before throwing a lifebelt to her detested husband, who subsequently drowns. Murdoch comments 
that “it matters very much to her to know whether or not at that moment she intended his death.” 
(TL, 36). No such troubling mental events occur in the amiable world of The Concept of Mind 
however. Here Ryle is set on establishing that “consciousness is a myth”, not, he says, in the sense 
that we live unconscious lives; on the contrary, with regard to “specifically human behaviour – 
behaviour, that is, which is unachieved by animals, infants, and idiots [sic!] – we should … notice 
the fact that some sorts of actions are in one way or other concerned with, or are operations upon, 
other actions.”(p.182) These actions he often refers to as “higher order actions” (a kind of 
evolutionary super-attribute?), and they include all forms of ‘conscious’ response to others acts 
and all ‘reflection’ (though he dislikes and would not use this word, a metaphor he attributes to 
Locke; he also avoids use of all terms of ‘thinking’, or places them in inverted commas, in a way 
that recalls Derrida’s use of “deconstructed” words sous rature161. “Self-consciousness” he writes, 
“if the word is to be used at all, must not be described on the hallowed para-optical model, as a 
                                                 
160 Though Murdoch says this she would probably, along with Shakepeare’s Othello, have regarded jealousy as 
something of a mental event. 
161 See § p. 205 
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torch that illuminates itself by beams of its own light reflected from a mirror in its own insides. On 
the contrary it is simply a special case of an ordinary more or less efficient handling of a less or 
more honest and intelligent witness.”(p.186) This reduction of self-regarding moral reflection to 
the ‘more or less efficient handling of a less or more honest and intelligent witness’ may seem all 
the more remarkable in that it was published just four years after World War II, and the holocaust; 
though, as Murdoch notes “The Concept of Mind does not discuss sincerity and self-deception.”162 
(IM, 128).  
What Murdoch is saying with the example from Daniel Deronda is not at all that consciousness, or 
the mind, has the kind of ontological existence Ryle is so concerned to demolish, but that what is 
crucial in human moral life is precisely our experience of the activity of Ryle’s undefined 
‘witness’; and further - what it can mean for this metaphorical ‘witness’ to be “less or more 
honest”. As she says “The further we move away from the situation where the descripta are 
‘ordinary’ experiences, the harder it may be to find suitable descriptive terms in the public 
language. And this will be the case whether the experiences concerned are ‘thoughts’ or inward 
bodily sensations or sensation of the ‘external world’. (NP, 49). In fact, for her there are no clear 
borderlines: “Sensations” she says, “considered as experiences, may of course approximate toward 
being ‘thoughts’.” (Ibid., 48) 
 
Ryle, however, is equally scathing of these concepts: “experiences” he writes, is “a plural noun 
commonly used to denote the postulated non-physical episodes which constitute the shadow-
drama on the ghostly boards of the mental stage.” (Ryle, p.63) The question of performing an 
action is resolved, in this perspective, in the same way, whether the action is a technical or moral 
one. Giving the example of a boy who ties the wrong kind of knot (a boy-scout activity), Ryle says 
the question “had nothing to do with the occurrence or non-occurrence of any occult episode in the 
boy’s stream of consciousness; it was the question of whether or not he had the required higher-
level competence, that of knowing how to tie reef-knots.” (p.69) Ryle draws a parallel between 
this type of mental operation and moral “higher-level competence” thus: “The fears expressed by 
some moral philosophers that the advance of the natural sciences diminishes the field within which 
the moral virtues can be exercised rests on the assumption that there is some contradiction in 
                                                 
162 Murdoch writes: “The world of The Concept of Mind is the world in which people play cricket, cook cakes, make 
simple decisions, remember their childhood and go to the circus, not the world in which they commit sins, fall in love, 
say prayers or join the Communist Party.” (SRR 78-79) The latter of course describes aspects of how she saw herself 
(except the prayers). Since she too was an Oxford don, the limitations of the range of moral concern of Ryle and other 
colleagues was particularly apparent to her. 
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saying that one and the same occurrence is governed both by mechanical laws and by moral 
principles, an assumption as baseless as the assumption that a golfer cannot at once conform to the 
laws of ballistics and obey the rules of golf.” (p.78) This bold statement is an example of what 
Murdoch calls the technique, common in both everyday thinking and much of philosophy, of 
suppressing a premise in order to reach an apparently “logical” conclusion. The premise 
suppressed here appears to be that what “morality” consists in is sets of rules governing actions, 
the learning and application of which, like all “higher-order” operations, is relatively 
straightforward, perhaps involving the assimilation of something like what Hume calls the “steady 
and general point of view”.  
 
Another key theoretical device used to separate the dimension of fact from that of value in the 
empiricist tradition that Murdoch refers to also derives in its contemporary form from Moore, who 
in turn explicitly reworks another notion taken from Hume. Moore took up the argument from 
Hume to the effect that an “ought”, or a moral judgement, cannot, logically, be derived from an 
“is”, or a description of a state of affairs. Moore looked at the specifically linguistic aspect of this 
operation: the equation, for example, of a descriptive “this is pleasurable, legitimate, etc.” with an 
evaluative “this is good” (in so far as these “descriptive” terms relating to “facts” can be 
considered non-evaluative). This notion, that a given state of affairs – the facts – leads directly to a 
conclusion about what “ought” to be done, Moore called the “naturalistic fallacy”, though this 
name is misleading, giving the impression of the rejection of any stance grounded on a conception 
of nature, whereas it simply champions one conception of nature against another, again following 
Hume. Hume had attacked the Aristotelean and teleological concept of Nature, prevailing in 
Europe until the seventeenth century, for which the way something is, its “nature”, does indeed 
indicate how it ought to be, and by extension what it ought to do; and similarly Nature is that 
universal entity in whose own “nature” the nature of all the single entities of which it is composed 
are manifest. On this view, therefore, the determination of what was morally right had to be based 
on the relevant ontological dogma. Against this Hume invoked the biological/psychological nature 
of human beings (investigated in his aptly named Treatise of Human Nature), which included a 
capacity for moral reflection made manifest in the habits and customs of human societies. Moore’s 
notion of “naturalistic fallacy” supported the latter conception of nature over the former, though 
Moore parted from Humean tradition in attributing a particular status to moral concepts like the 
“good”. 
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Murdoch writes that the argument “to the effect that we cannot derive values from facts is the most 
important argument in modern moral philosophy”. (ME, 64) It is, however, an argument that has 
been put to very different uses. One form of the argument which appears in Wittgenstein is the 
following: “The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, 
and everything happens as it does happen: in it there is no value” Tractatus, 6.41. Wittgenstein’s 
argument (here and elsewhere) draws attention to the preponderance of this mistake, Moore’s 
“naturalistic fallacy”, of believing our values to be somehow inherent in the substance of the 
world; and yet Wittgenstein believed this logical error to be so common among us that the making 
of the error might need to be considered as part of what it is to be human, and therefore in itself to 
be a “fact” of some importance, even though the values that people consider to be inherent in the 
world differ, and are articulated in a multiplicity of ways. If this is the case, however illogical the 
premises of moralities may be, there can be no unified account of what morality is, only of what 
moralities are, and possibly of what they do appear to have in common, of their family 
resemblances as Wittgenstein might put it. Murdoch points out that the very different use to which 
the fact/value argument is put in “the stripped and behaviouristic account of morality” functions 
by connecting the strictly logical argument “with a much more general and ambiguous dictum to 
this effect: that you cannot attach morality to the substance of the world.” (Ibid., 65). This 
argument was presented as ‘anti-metaphysical’, something Murdoch saw as more a statement of 
intention than an achieved result. Though attractively cogent on the logical plane, that is: you 
cannot find morality in the substance of the world, the argument contains the prescriptive: “you 
cannot attach morality to the substance of the world”. An argument that leaves out of account the 
fact that “many people who are not philosophers … do think of their morality in just this way… 
They think of it as continuous with some sort of larger structure of reality, whether this be a 
religious structure, or a social or historical one.” (Ibid., 65) An interpretive structure which does 
indeed, in their view, allow them to find value in the substance of the world. (She also remarks 
elsewhere that “The ordinary person does not, unless corrupted by philosophy, believe that he 
creates values by his choices. He thinks that some things really are better than others and we are 
capable of getting it wrong.” (SGOC, 380) 
 
Contemporary moral philosophy (she says, writing in 1957) saw the view of one’s “moral system 
as a sort of fact, and not as a set of values which only exist through … [one’s] own choices” (ME, 
66) as retrograde, pre-scientific or overtly ideological (whether religious or political). The only 
antidote to this that would preserve the overarching contemporary values of freedom and 
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reciprocal respect was held to be the view of morality as grounded on individual autonomy and 
choice. In effect, the predominant forms of contemporary philosophy, the deontological and 
utilitarian theories that underpin the social and judiciary systems of the modern democracies, all 
hold to the principle of autonomy; and regard morality as centred on the individual (who is 
enjoined to consider the interests of others from various perspectives), and as fundamentally a 
question of the choices we make regarding our actions. The individual “is entirely free to choose 
and responsible for his choice. His morality is exhibited in his choice, whereby he shows which 
things he regards as valuable.” (Ibid., 70) Should these be informed for us, as individuals, by one 
metaphysic or another that is our personal right, but such reflections belongs to the private sphere. 
 
What she sees as happening here is that the philosophical arguments have been meshed with a 
moral argument that was particularly forceful in those post-Holocaust, Cold War times. There was 
an understandable fear of totalitarian moralities, a fear that, Murdoch says, “ is to be found … in 
many existentialist writers – and it may be found [earlier], at what I take to be one of its sources, 
in that great pamphlet of Liberalism, Mill’s Essay on Liberty.” (Ibid., 66). She notes that in “our 
own liberal society”: 
 
we approach the world armed with certain general values which we hold simpliciter and without the assistance 
of metaphysics or dogmatic theology – respect for freedom, for truth, and so on. We study the facts and we 
make our choices in the light of the facts and our values. Our disagreements among ourselves concern the 
application of principles – our disagreements with other societies concern what principles to hold. There are, of 
course, persons and groups among us whose morality is not conceptually simple, but metaphysical and 
dogmatic (for instance some Christians and all Communists) – but these people are in the minority.” (ME, 67). 
 
Here she contrasts two views of morality. That prevailing in modern democratic societies, indeed 
the ethical basis of these societies, she calls “the Liberal view”, an ethical view based on the 
epistemological distinction which took root in the seventeenth century between a public, scientific 
and verifiable “truth” and a private metaphysical “truth”. A view which has become a norm that is 
both epistemic163 and ethical in “our” society. Against this, the view of morality as integral to, and 
inseparable from, a wider vision of reality she calls “the Natural Law view” (ME,  70), a view 
which prevailed in the West before the seventeenth century, where it remains as a (variable, but 
often powerful) minority perspective, and one that still prevails throughout the non-Western 
world. On this view: “The individual is seen as held in a framework which transcends him, where 
what is important and valuable is the framework, and the individual only has importance, or even 
                                                 
163 See discussion of Foucault’s analysis of conceptions of truth in seventeenth century, § p.xx  
 191 
reality, in so far as he belongs to the framework.” Within such a framework, the moral task of the 
mere individual is to transform his or her being in accordance with the “reality which transcends 
him. To discover what is morally good is to discover that reality, and to become good is to 
integrate himself with it.”(Ibid.) For the Christian the transcendent reality is God, and the Natural 
Law is God’s Law; for the Marxist, what is good is the teleological goal of history itself, the 
ultimate withering away of the state and the realization of human freedom, which required a 
dedication to that end so total that the freedom of the present individual must be sacrificed to it. 
Self-sacrifice, even martyrdom, may in both cases be seen as the highest good. For Murdoch, the 
problem with the liberal view is that whilst it may indeed be the most appropriate ethical stance for 
our society in our time, a stance which includes the desire to render universal, in a global society, 
the values of freedom, both individual and collective, and of reciprocal respect, it cannot be said to 
define what morality is. At the time Murdoch was writing, the Soviet Union – whose ideology, 
though no longer identifiable with that of Marx, was nonetheless clearly included in her ‘Natural 
law’ category – dominated half of Europe and other parts of the world with a distinctly non-liberal 
morality. She says that “What the modern moral philosopher has done is what metaphysicians in 
the past have always done. He has produced a model. Only it is not a model of any morality 
whatsoever. It is a model of his own morality.” (ME, 67)   
The distinction she is outlining here is not just one of philosophical perspective, she says “it is a 
difference between two types of moral outlook”; noting that in our society people often do not fit 
squarely into one or the other type of outlook. Many, who prize reciprocal respect and tolerance as 
conducive to peace within society, at the same time do hold that “moral values are real and fixed”, 
and one or other “Natural law” view may best represent them. The ethical view that “we are 
unable to discriminate between different types of morality, except in terms of difference of act and 
choice”, rests on the questionable epistemological view for which “all moral agents are seen as 
inhabiting the same world of facts”. Against this view of morality she argues that: 
 
it is possible for differences to exist as total differences of moral vision and perspective… The Liberal 
concentrates his attention on the point of discontinuity between the chosen framework and the choosing agent – 
and it is this moment of discontinuity which the modern philosopher has tried to catch in a formula. But for the 
individual, whether he be a Marxist or a Christian, who takes up a Natural Law point of view … there is no 
axiom of discontinuity. The individual’s choice is less important, and the interest may lie in the adoration of the 
framework rather than in the details of conduct. And here if the Liberal philosopher just goes on insisting that 
the moral agent is totally free by definition and is responsible for endowing the framework with value, and that 
‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is’, this merely results in a colossally important difference of outlook being left 
unanalysed. (ME, 71)  
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What Murdoch concludes from this is that the current preoccupation with analysing moral 
concepts through the words they find expression in is indeed the correct task of moral philosophy, 
but that the task “has been too narrowly conceived. We have not considered the great variety of 
concepts that make up a morality.” (ME, 73) And in the first instance, the supposition that the 
‘facts’ can be established from a neutral perspective is fundamentally mistaken. “Moral 
differences” she writes, “can be differences of concept as well as differences of choice. A moral 
change shows in our vocabulary. How we see and describe the world is morals too – and the 
relation of this to our conduct is complicated.” (Ibid.) 
 The central moral concept of freedom is a case requiring particular attention in this regard. 
Whereas for the liberal thinker “freedom” implies “an open freedom of choice in a clear situation” 
for the adherent of a Natural Law perspective “it lies rather in an increasing knowledge of his own 
real being, and in the conduct which naturally springs from such knowledge.” (ME, 70) 
Interestingly, this latter description could also apply to Kant’s rational agent, the very individual 
whose morality is defined by her autonomy, and yet who, in discovering herself to be an 
autonomous subject, finds herself free to obey the dictates of Reason in the form of the Moral 
Law. Murdoch notes this Kantian authorship of these two different strands of moral philosophy, 
the former embraced by liberals, the latter rejected. “Kant” she writes, “who says that the moral 
will is autonomous, and that morality cannot be founded on anything but itself [… describes] only 
one type of view of morality – roughly a Protestant; and less roughly a Liberal, type of view.” 
(Though in fact, whereas all liberals uphold some concept of moral autonomy, only Kantians see 
this as implying that morality is founded on nothing but itself). However, she goes on, “Kant 
himself is the source not only of this Liberal morality, but also of a modern version of its opposite, 
which I shall call, with an old name, Natural Law morality” (ME, 68), by which she means, as said 
above, the view that “the individual is … held in a framework which transcends him”, and to 
which his moral self must respond; whether this framework be God, or cosmic harmony or the 
Logos, as in earlier forms of her category of “Natural Law”, or Kant’s Moral Law, or some other 
deep structure of the universe. Whereas Kant’s “autonomy” is of Reason, and specifically excludes 
desire as constitutive of mixed or heteronomous (therefore not moral) motivation; other concepts 
of autonomy, the utilitarian, for example, specifically include desire in moral reflection. In the 
intervening centuries since Kant, his titanic attempts to give shape to “the Moral Law” in the form 
of maxims that were universalisable has resulted in principles which have become part of the 
framework of democracy and the constitutions of modern states, but in the process these principles 
have become detached from Kant’s metaphysics.  
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This detachment, or displacement of important concepts, Murdoch saw in the context of a more 
general process both of changes in moral outlook, and of the reworking of privileged themes in 
moral philosophy. With regard to the latter she writes: “It seems fairly clear that much of the 
criticism of traditional metaphysics, which modern philosophy has made its task, must stand.” 
(VC, 71) In particular she considered legitimate “ the elimination of hypostatised and non-
observable ‘qualities’, ‘sentiments’ or ‘acts of will’ which might have been thought to be bearers 
of moral value [and were often polemically juxtaposed]” (Ibid., 79). She felt that useful work in 
undermining these concepts, with their pretension to have identified some deep structure of human 
life, had been done, but that (then) recent developments in linguistic philosophy had taken a 
different direction from that set out by Wittgenstein. The “lesson of Wittgenstein”, she writes, is 
that there “may be no deep structure”. A lesson which “has not yet been taken enough to heart by 
those who want to reduce morality to a single formula.” (ME 74) The reduction of morality to a 
single formula - to choices or acts of will, to normative mechanisms, whether they are based on a 
deep structure of “sentiments” or of Reason, for example, makes it easily manageable in theory, 
but it does so by leaving out of account aspects of the moral life which don’t fit the chosen 
formula. Taking Wittgenstein’s lesson seriously would also mean applying it to other, more 
contemporary theories however: “In addition there is the task of criticising types of modern quasi-
philosophy or semi-scientific metaphysics which seek to present the human mind as enclosed 
within social, historical, or psychological frames. I have in mind a great variety of views deriving 
from a study of Marx, Freud, the behaviour of calculating machines, and so on.” (ME, 71) Yet 
again, the pictures that these theories produce may be extremely insightful, the interpretive grids 
they place on reality may result in impeccable analyses leading to laudable moral practices, but if 
they are thought of as constituting a framework of inevitable laws then the unintended 
consequences of the constraints imposed on human freedom by all such determinisms can be, and 
have been seen to be, frightening. Her own broader definition of moral freedom does not, 
however, deny these systems of belief their place: “our freedom is not just a freedom to choose 
and act differently, it is also a freedom to think and believe differently, to see the world 
differently, to see different configurations and describe them in different words. Moral differences 
can be difference of concept as well as of choice.”  (ME, 72-3). 
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2. Moral Concepts 
 
Murdoch writes:  
when we leave the domain of the purely logical we come into the cloudy and shifting domain of the concepts 
which men live by – and these are subject to historical change. This is especially true of moral concepts. Here 
we shall have done something if we can establish with tolerable clarity what these concepts are. We should, I 
think, resist the temptation to unify the picture by trying to establish, guided by our own conception of the 
ethical in general, what these concepts must be. (ME, 75) 
 
This reads like a plea for genealogical clarification and vigilance in the use of theoretical models, 
or at least for recognition of just how difficult it is not to create unified pictures from our own 
particular selection of what is morally relevant in the world of facts. Her stress on what concepts 
are does not, however, imply what they are as fixed signs; it is linked, as here, to the fact that they 
“are subject to historical change”, and as such they need to be clearly delineated. (That she also 
insisted on the importance of elements of ahistorical continuity in the moral preoccupations of 
human beings, that may in fact be masked by the concepts, does not change this. She writes: “At a 
superficial level history fashions morals, at a deep level morals resist history.” (MGM, 223). As a 
method focusing on language at the empirical rather than the structural level, analytic philosophy 
should, in theory, allow one to circumvent the search for universal formulae and the attempt to 
determine “what these concepts must be”; but, as we have seen, Murdoch did not feel it had 
altogether resisted this temptation.  
She describes, with apologies to those who did not hold it, as “the current view” in philosophy in 
Britain (her own historical starting point), one that holds that “the moral life of the individual is a 
series of overt choices which take place in a series of specifiable situations. The individual’s 
‘stream of consciousness’ is of comparably little importance, partly because it is often not there at 
all (having been thought to be continuous for wrong reasons), and more pertinently because it is 
and can only be through overt acts that we can characterise another person, or ourselves, mentally 
or morally.” (VC, 77) The notion that the stream of consciousness is “not there at all” she traces 
back to Hume, and we have seen how Ayer, Ryle and others constructed the behaviourist or act-
centred view of morality she describes here. These elements, she believed, were then compounded 
in the Anglo-American mainstream - seminally in Hare’s The Language of Morals, (1952) - with 
the Kantian notion that “a moral judgement, as opposed to a whim or taste preference, is one 
which is supported by reasons held by the agent to be valid for all others placed as he [is].”  (VC, 
77). In other words, the criterion of universalisability (which has separate antecedents in the 
empiricist tradition) is essential if any moral judgement or prescription is to be counted as such. 
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This, she writes, “has been powerfully argued, especially by Mr. Hare […]. Here we may get the 
full force of what is meant by a philosophical model. We are being asked to conceive of a structure 
of would-be universal reasoning as lying at the core of any activity which could properly be called 
moral.” (Ibid., 85)  
Murdoch did not accept this view. She cites as just one interesting case causing problems for this 
and any universalist model of morality that of Napoleon, who does not think that others should do 
as he does. Whatever the reasons for this (and there may be several – a sense of destiny, a sense of 
the need to act despite incomprehension, etc.) he comes to the conclusion that what is morally 
correct for Napoleon is not so for anyone else. It may be argued that this is an anachronistic or 
Homeric exception, but there can be no conclusive evidence that no valid moral reflection guided 
his actions; the virtues of courage and prudence are, after all, often at odds with each other, 
different societies favouring one or the other, and conceptualising them differently. It would 
however, Murdoch writes, be possible to “force the situation into the model … but” she asks 
“whatever is the point of doing so? To do so is to blur a real difference, the difference between 
moral attitudes which have this sort of background and those which do not.” (Ibid., 86) The 
blurring of differences, was philosophical anathema to Murdoch, as it had been to Wittgenstein. 
But leaving aside cases of this kind which simply do not fit the philosophical model, she points out 
that there are also cases of forms of moral outlook, some of which can claim philosophical 
expression, that are “unconnected with the view that morality is essentially universal rules.”  
(Ibid., 87) Among these she lists: “moral attitudes which emphasize the inexhaustible detail of the 
world, the endlessness of the task of understanding, the importance of not assuming that one has 
got individuals and situations ‘taped’, the connection of knowledge with love and of spiritual 
insight with apprehension of the unique.”(Ibid)  
The moral language she is using here immediately takes one into a different world of imagery and 
thought, and inevitably into a different philosophical universe, and yet one developing across the 
same post-Kantian years (though not to any significant degree in Britain). She cites as moral 
attitudes of this kind, though differing greatly among themselves: “certain idealist views, certain 
existentialist views, certain Catholic views”. The fact that such moral outlooks have largely been 
connected with the idealist descent from Kant has meant that they have received little attention in 
England, which she finds not only regrettable, but bound to skew any analysis of what may be 
considered to fall within the bounds of ‘morality’ and what to lie outside. Views of morality 
focusing primarily on inner struggle, of the relationship of the self to itself as Foucault would put 
it, are frequently attacked, or dismissed, by philosophers defending a universalist perspective (she 
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cites Gellner who regards moral universalism as rational, and existentialism, for example, as 
irrational, and connected with “disreputable things such as the Führerprinzip, credo quia 
assurdam, and romantic love.” She notes, however, that even Gellner does admit that such 
philosophies must nonetheless count as moralities. (VC, 89n) This poses a problem for moral 
universalism in its attempt to generate rules (its necessary expression) that are sufficiently general 
(and sufficiently liberal) to be incorporative of differing conceptions of ethics, and yet sufficiently 
specific not to be mere tautologies. She notes, for example, Hare’s expression of irritation with “ 
‘the oldest and most ineradicable vice of moralists – the unwillingness to make moral decisions’. 
(Hence the search for Golden Rules and other such simplifications.)” (quoted VC, 83) For 
Murdoch on the other hand, universalism is itself part of a particular vision of the way the world 
ought to be, rather than the way it is. A vision in which “[t]he insistence that morality is essentially 
rules may be seen as an attempt to secure us against the ambiguity of the world.” (VC, 90) Against 
this, she argues: “There are times when it is proper to stress, not the comprehensibility of the 
world, but its incomprehensibility, and there are types of morality which emphasise this more than 
is customary in utilitarian Liberal moralities.” (Ibid.)  
That moral codes functioning in this regulatory way have always been essential to human societies 
(both in practice and psychologically) is not at issue here; the philosophical problem she is 
concerned with is the reduction of the vast sphere of the moral life to this codifiable dimension of 
it; as if morality in the form of rules could somehow also secure us against the ambiguities of the 
inner life. Not surprisingly, the whole conceptual area of the “inner life” is fraught with difficulty, 
and that throughout history it has been congenial to the talking of nonsense is something with 
which Murdoch agreed. (She felt that, although Wittgenstein’s statement, at Investigations 580, 
that “An inner process stands in need of outer criteria” was clearly a logical, and not a moralistic 
dictum, it may also have had moral implications. She says that “ ‘Do not try to analyse your own 
inner experience’ (Investigations, II xi, p.204) may be seen also as a suggestion that one should 
not attach too much significance to (probably egoistic and senseless) inner chat! Silence becomes 
the inner as well as the outer person.” (MGM, 157) Cavell – who believed that the Tractatus, 
written as it was before and after the First World War, had to do with “taking the measure of one’s 
sense of compromise with injustice, or rather with imperfect justice, in one’s life within actual 
institutions” – expressed this intuition of Murdoch’s more fully: “Philosophical Investigations 
may be seen […] as a further way of responding to the, let’s say, absolute responsibility of the self 
to itself – not now as the fixed keeping of its counsel of silence in and about what cannot be 
asserted or explained (‘said’), but through the endless specification, by exemplification, in the 
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world (of and with others) of when words are called for and when there are no words. Call this the 
absolute responsibility of the self to make itself intelligible, without falsifying itself”. (CHU, 
xxvii) 
The analytic distinction between the spheres of the logical and psychological, aiming at clarity and 
avoiding nonsense, has, Murdoch says, tended to associate the concept of ‘inner life’ with “private 
psychological phenomena, open to introspection”  (VC, 78), about which nothing verifiable can be 
said. On this view, the concept of “verification” is itself fixed in relation to “outer” criteria, and 
thus as inapplicable to inner events. There is however, she goes on, another possible conception of 
the “inner life”, as involving a “private or personal vision which may find expression overtly or 
inwardly. There has, I think, been some tendency for the discrediting of the ‘inner’ in the former 
sense to involve the neglect of the ‘inner’ in the latter sense.” The data she is interested in are not 
blind psychological urges of the former type, but rather phenomena of the second type. These are 
“either overt (conversation, story-telling), or if introspectable [they] are identifiable and in 
principle exposable (private stories, images, inner monologue)”.  (VC, 80). Here she introduces 
what in her own thinking about ethics will be a key concept, that of “personal vision”. The shift in 
focus she is proposing, from moral choice to the moral vision underlying our moral choices, also 
implies a shift in the concept of “verification”, which can no longer be tied to the “outer”. We 
have truth-criteria for our own thoughts and feelings and those of others. “We have various 
methods of verification. We can examine our own states of mind and test them, […] we need not 
accept them at their face value (do I really intend this act, do I really love this person?) […] Our 
‘innerness’ may be elusive or hard to describe but it is not unimportant or (necessarily) shadowy. 
Of course these inward happenings are not (in the sense attacked by Wittgenstein) significance-
bestowing processes of meaning, or intermediaries, prior to or essential to thinking or speaking.” 
(MGM, 265)  
In other words, while she has always considered the denial of any ontological status to these inner 
processes to be a useful move, this does not, and for Murdoch must not, imply that they are no 
longer of philosophical interest. On the contrary, in allowing the question of the metaphysical 
status of “innerness” to be put aside, its moral importance may come more clearly into focus. The 
moral agent, as the free and autonomous author of her own choices, is in the first place a particular 
human being, and neither the theoretical problem of determining what morality is, for all humans, 
nor the practical problem of determining what it should be, can be resolved by leaving all this 
particularised complexity out of account. This is rendered evident in our mode of evaluation of 
other people, which, she says, is not just based on their actions and pronouncements. Instead “we 
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consider something more elusive which may be called their total vision of life, as shown in their 
mode of speech or silence, their choice of words, their assessment of others, their conception of 
their own lives, what they think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny: in short the 
configurations of their thought which show continually in their reactions and conversation.”  (VC, 
80-81) All this, she writes, may be summed up using two metaphors, which “making different 
points in the two metaphors, one may call the texture of a man’s being or the nature of his 
personal vision.” (VC, 81, my emphases) The different points indicated here in the two metaphors 
refer to the particularity of the individual synthesis in the “texture” of one’s being, and to the fact 
that this may be imbued with a broader, more public, and more fully articulated vision (or visions). 
For Murdoch “these activities are themselves direct expressions of a person’s “moral nature” or 
“moral being” and demand a type of description which is not limited to the choice and argument 
model.” (Ibid).  
Attempts at definition of the concept of “thought” are also frequent in this latter model; and again, 
just as learning to think was for Ryle based on concepts taken from the public domain, so the 
validity of the activity of thought, its operation on those concepts, is limited to what is outwardly 
directed, at least in Stuart Hampshire’s version in Thought and Action (1970), from which 
Murdoch quotes the following: “ ‘Thought cannot be thought, as opposed to day-dreaming or 
musing, unless it is directed towards a conclusion, whether in action or judgement […] the idea of 
thought as an interior monologue… will become altogether empty if the thought does not even 
purport to be directed towards its issue in the external world […] Under these conditions thought 
and belief would not differ from the charmed and habitual rehearsal of phrases or the drifting of 
ideas through the mind.’ ” (cited: IP 314, ellipses Murdoch’s) Among the “configurations of 
thought” pertaining to our evaluations of other people listed by Murdoch above, it would be hard 
to establish which of these would here merit classification as “thinking” in Hampshire’s definition, 
and which would count as “musing” or “the drifting of ideas through the mind”. That Hampshire’s 
own introspection allows him to make such clear distinctions could be seen as a laudable feat, but 
on Murdoch’s view, not only are the borderlines between these different types of mental activity 
not so easy to define, but to incorporate such distinctions into a philosophical theory is to eliminate 
by fiat a whole area of moral reflection she considers to be of crucial importance. In describing a 
case164 of a change of attitude (of a person she calls M), a change in the way another person (D) is 
seen, which depends on the way that person is viewed, she describes the considerable moral work 
upon the self (M’s self) that this change of view entails. She comments: “the idea we are trying to 
                                                 
164 The famous case of M and D, discussed in The Idea of Perfection. 
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make sense of is that M has in the interim [between one attitude and another] been active, she has 
been doing something, something which we approve of, something which is somehow worth doing 
in itself. M has been morally active in the interim: this is what we want to say and to be 
philosophically permitted to say.” (IP 314) On Hampshire’s picture, one is not philosophically 
permitted to say this. Work on one’s own conceptions, especially in relation to others, the 
awareness that the conceptions themselves may be morally suspect and require investigation, is for 
Murdoch an important moral activity, inner activity. Transforming our conceptions also means 
transforming ourselves in relation to our world. 
When viewed from Murdoch’s perspective, many of the other key terms of analytic epistemology 
also lose their fixity. She writes “I would argue that we cannot accommodate this aspect of morals 
without modifying our view of ‘concepts’ and ‘meaning’; and when we do this the idea of choice 
becomes more problematic.” (VC, 82) This must be the case if, as she says, “We differ not only 
because we select different objects out of the same world but because we see different worlds.” 
(Ibid). This experience is tied up for us with our sense of our own truthfulness to ourselves. As she 
puts it  
[t]he concept of ‘fact’ is complex. The moral point is that ‘facts’ are set up as such by human (that is moral) 
agents. Much of our life is taken up by truth-seeking, imagining, questioning. We relate to facts through truth 
and truthfulness, and come to recognise and discover that there are different modes and levels of insight and 
understanding. In many familiar ways various values pervade and colour what we take to be the reality of our 
world; wherein we constantly evaluate our own values and those of others  (MGM, 26) 
 
 
It follows from her general argument that if what gives meaning to my life is a particular vision, 
outside of which my vision is a mere blur, then I cannot hold myself, as an individual, free to 
choose what goes against that vision.165 From the liberal viewpoint however this may seem 
dangerous: “it may seem that our conception of moral freedom is in danger”; and yet, according to 
Murdoch, “there is no need to equate the freedom needed to ensure morality with a complete 
independence of deep conceptual attitudes.” (VC, 84) On the contrary, the idea that such 
independence is even possible “ignores an obvious and important aspect of human existence, the 
way in which almost all our concepts and activities involve evaluation” (MGM, 26). Already 
however, as she points out “the notion that moral differences are conceptual (in the sense of being 
                                                 
165 One case of conflicting moral visions concerning the same “facts” which evoked moral horror, from both sides of 
the major moral-conceptual divide in Italy a few years ago, was that of a Catholic mother of three, pregnant with a 
fourth, who had a cancer that could not be treated unless she aborted. She chose to renounce treatment and have the 
baby, who lived, and as expected, she died. For many, choosing to leave four children without a mother, instead of 
aborting the foetus, accepting treatment, and staying alive to look after the three small children she already had was a 
morally abominable choice. She was immediately put forward for sainthood by the Catholic Church. The “facts” were 
not seen as the same from the different perspectives.  
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differences of vision) and must be studied as such is unpopular in so far as it makes impossible the 
reduction of ethics to logic, since it suggests that morality must, to some extent at any rate, be 
studied historically.” But, she goes on: “This does not of course imply abandoning the linguistic 
method, it rather implies taking it seriously.”(VC, 84). If what constitute “facts” for us are already 
imbued with value this breaks down any notion of facts as constituting a reality that is accessible 
to all rational human beings in the same way, and of values as private. In a broadside turning the 
tables on ethical systems based on particular philosophical conceptions of human nature she says 
that nonetheless, “[a] proper separation of fact and value, as a defence of morality, lies in the 
contention that moral value cannot be derived from fact. That is, our activity of moral 
discrimination cannot be explained as merely one natural instinct among others, or our ‘good’ 
identified with pleasure, or a will to live (etc.)”( MGM, 26)  
 
This brings her into the fraught conceptual area of what is “natural”, and of what is “naturalism” 
as the notion that “naturalism” was based on a logical fallacy had important consequences for 
analytic moral philosophy. She therefore attempted to unpack its constituent arguments in the 
following way. She delineated four central tenets of this theory thus: the anti-metaphysical 
argument, the distinction between descriptive and evaluative meanings, the logical argument (the 
incomplete syllogism), and the moral argument. The first two and the fourth of these arguments 
have been discussed above. To summarize them briefly, with regard to the first, the anti-
metaphysical argument, she rejects the stronger analytic position: “that all concepts of 
metaphysical entities are empty”, but supports the weaker form: “that the existence of such entities 
cannot be philosophically established.” With regard to the second argument distinguishing 
descriptive from evaluative meanings she argues firstly that meanings are not so easily sorted into 
these two camps, and secondly, as above, that “moral concepts show moral differences as 
differences of vision not of choice.” Behind these two arguments, she writes, “lie the assumptions 
of British empiricism, and behind the fourth [the moral argument] lie the moral attitudes of 
Protestantism and Liberalism.” The whole package is presented as logically cohesive, and yet, she 
says, only the third of the four arguments “has a strictly logical air.” This, she writes, affirms that 
“any argument that professes to move from fact to value contains a concealed evaluative major 
premiss.” (VC, 92-93) 
  
Now, methodologically, the exposure of concealed premises she considers to be an analytical tool 
that is extremely useful for the purposes of getting a better understanding of a moral view. As an 
 201 
example of how this method can be applied she takes the not uncommon view that: “ ‘Statistics 
show that people constantly do this, so it must be all right.’ ” This is of course, in its even more 
basic form of ‘Well, everybody else does’, a form of moral justification that is frequently heard, 
usually of something that the person concerned is not really convinced is all right. As such it is a 
classic case of the kind of unreflective and opportunistic adjustment to conformity that is seen 
from Sartre’s moral position as mauvaise foi, or bad faith. The suppressed premise here is clearly 
that “ ‘What is customary is right’ ”. But from a logical perspective, she argues, the person making 
this case should realise, or be made to realise, “that ‘What is customary is right’ is a moral 
judgement freely endorsed by himself and not a definition of ‘right’.” As she says, in many cases, 
“the exposure of the premises destroys the appeal of the argument […] and I would certainly want 
to endorse many arguments of [this] type […] whose purpose is solely to achieve such an 
exposure.” (VC, 93-94) 
Cora Diamond writes of this argument that here, in Murdoch, we can see: 
 
a particular limited kind of agreement with the analytical philosophers of the 1950s and a more important 
disagreement. She and they can agree that an important kind of flaw in some arguments that proceed from fact 
to value is the suppression of premises. But, for the analytical philosophers, the need for a further premise is 
tied to the supposed existence of a logical gap between fact and value; for Murdoch, the need for the further 
premise and the point of exposing it are tied to a quite different conception of moral rationality, in which there 
is no logical gap between fact and value, but there is the possibility of a kind of failure in moral thinking, the 
criticism of which is not an abstract, logical matter. (WPM, 81) 
 
For Murdoch therefore, the suppressing of premises is important precisely as a shadowy aspect of 
varying forms of moral reflection and behaviour, and this is something that requires investigation. 
The analytic philosopher may demonstrate that the argument is illogical, but is it not more 
important to note that it may be, as Diamond put it, “a kind of evasion, a kind of refusal to take 
responsibility.” Diamond sees a direct connection here between this argument and “Stanley 
Cavell’s discussions of moral rationality in Part III of The Claim of Reason (1979) For Cavell”, 
she writes “moral rationality centrally includes coming to understand what we are doing (or plan 
to do, or have done), what we are committing ourselves to, what responsibility we are taking.” 
(Ibid.) She further notes that these terms - evasion, responsibility - that she has used in describing 
Murdoch’s views “are terms of evaluation that are as much moral as cognitive”; in accordance, 
therefore with a central theme of Murdoch’s that “thinking is always an activity of ours as moral 
beings. This is the theme of the cognitive as always moral.” (Ibid, 82)  
One consequence of this is that we require a considerable range of concepts, or “ramifications of 
more specialised concepts” as Murdoch puts it (VC, 92), in order to be able to express our moral 
views. What Bernard Williams famously calls “thick” moral concepts, like “evasiveness” and 
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“responsibility”, which tell us so much more in that they are both descriptive and evaluative than a 
simple commendatory “thin” concept such as “good”. If, as Murdoch says, we don’t see moral 
concepts as favourable (or unfavourable) judgements of neutral “facts”, but rather as expressions 
of a moral outlook or vision that requires concepts which, in context, are simultaneously 
descriptive and evaluative, then there can be no “philosophical error which consists in merging 
fact and value.”(VC, 95) The notion that this is a philosophical error, Murdoch argues, is tied to a 
particular moral attitude, which holds that “moral terms cannot be defined in non-moral terms 
because the agent freely selects the criteria.” (VC, 94). In other words, this notion defends a 
particular idea of freedom which requires the “facts” to be neutral and the language used to 
describe them to be publicly shared, whilst the language of moral judgements is a matter of private 
choice. Whereas, Murdoch writes,  
 
if moral concepts are regarded as deep moral configurations of the world, rather than as lines drawn around 
separate factual areas, then there will be no facts ‘behind them’ for them to be erroneously defined in terms of. 
There is nothing sinister about this view; freedom here will consist, not in being able to lift the concept off the 
otherwise unaltered facts and lay it down elsewhere, but in being able to ‘deepen’ or ‘reorganise’ the concept or 
change it for another one. On such a view, it may be noted, moral freedom looks more like a mode of reflection 
which we may have to achieve, and less like a capacity to vary our choices which we have by definition. I 
hardly think this is a disadvantage. (VC, 95)   
  
In an illuminating footnote to this passage Murdoch writes “In certain cases, whether we speak of 
deepening or of changing a concept will be a, not necessarily unimportant, question of words. 
When we deepen our concept of ‘love’ or ‘courage’ we may or may not want to retain the same 
word.” (VC, 95n). This gives an indication of the kind of exploration of ordinary uses of language, 
and the perplexity, and the seeking for accuracy that occur in everyday moral reflection, that she 
believes require detailed philosophical attention. In The Sovereignty of the Good she elaborates on 
this theme, whereby “deepening our notions of the virtues” occurs as a result of real attempts to 
understand what “the good” may mean in any given situation. In such a context, she writes, 
“Courage, which seemed at first to be something on its own, a sort of specialised daring of the 
spirit, is now see to be a particular operation of wisdom and love. We come to distinguish a self-
assertive ferocity from the kind of courage which would enable a man coolly to choose the labour 
camp rather than the easy compromise with the tyrant.” (SGOC, 378) Here she is employing, she 
requires, the kind of thick concepts Williams refers to. She also notes that not only do different 
individuals see fundamentally different moral pictures, but also the same individuals at different 
times; and that, in this particularly, the relation of words to concepts is complex: “Words may 
 203 
mislead us […] since words are often stable while concepts alter; we have a different image of 
courage at forty from that which we had at twenty.” (IP, 322).  
Even from moment to moment however, another factor she saw as shaping “facts” for us is our 
state of mind. A line from Wittgenstein that she cited frequently was “The world of the happy is 
unlike the world of the unhappy.” (MGM, 35); and the type of elucidatory work she is suggesting 
here also recalls Philosophical Investigations, p. 174e, where Wittgenstein discusses experiences 
such as that of hope, or grief, noting that “the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated 
[human] form of life”; and that grief “describes a pattern which recurs, with different variations, in 
the weave of our life.” As do the concepts with which we describe other patterns that are woven 
(into the texture) of our life. In Vision and Choice in Morality she asks “Why should philosophy 
be less various, where the differences in what it attempts to analyse are so important. Wittgenstein 
says that ‘What has to be accepted, the given, is – so one could say – forms of life.’ For purposes 
of analysis moral philosophy should remain at the level of the differences, taking the moral forms 
of life as given, and not try to get behind them to a single form.” (VC, 94).  
 
 
3. Language and Experience 
 
“Language” as Murdoch says, referring to what is known as the ‘linguistic turn’ in twentieth 
century philosophy, “is now a prime philosophical concept” (MGM, 153), both in analytic 
(including ‘ordinary language’) philosophy, predominantly Anglo-American, and differently in the 
European development of structuralism. Unlike, it would seem, many of her more insular Oxford 
contemporaries, Murdoch was aware of the importance of this other genealogical line in European 
thought, and of the need to understand its appeal and its widespread power of influence. Analytic 
studies made no particular distinction between the spoken and the written word, whereas she felt 
that contemporary realities required this.166 Derrida’s “deconstruction”, which does make this 
distinction, was therefore of interest to her, and she takes it (though generally considered ‘post-
structuralist’) as the major contemporary (1980s) representative of a more general structuralist 
trend which began early in the twentieth century in linguistics, with Saussure, and was then taken 
                                                 
166 She writes: “Any dictator attempts to degrade the language because this is a way to mystify. And many of the 
quasi-automatic operations of capitalist industrial society tend also toward mystification and the blunting of verbal 
precision. […] we have to realise that, in our world, the quality of words is the quality of printed words. Of course 
Plato is right that words are best understood, are most precise and profound, when used in particular face to face 
contexts. The printed word has inevitable ambiguities. […] But since we do not live in a city-state we have to use 
print, and though this is a danger it can also be an inspiration and a challenge.” (SW, 241)  
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up in anthropology by Levi-Strauss and by Lacan in psychology. Lacan too later came to be 
regarded as a ‘post-structuralist’ (a very loosely knit category), as was Foucault, despite his dislike 
of any such collocation. The considerable complexity of the arguments within and around 
structuralism was not Murdoch’s, and is not our, concern here; what is essential to note however is 
that its multi-disciplinary authority came to constitute an inescapable reference point in the post-
war France of Foucault, and though it was largely ignored in philosophy in Britain and America it 
was influential in other disciplines. The disinterest among philosophers was in general reciprocal, 
and the two lines therefore developed separately. In fact, Murdoch observes, certain structuralist 
insights, hailed as original, were already to be found in Wittgenstein. She notes that “Lacan 
produced as novel, in 1956, ideas (for instance about ‘inner processes’, and words not being 
names) which were current in Cambridge before the 1939 war.” And comments: “In general, for 
those trained in the analytical philosophical tradition, structuralist writings seem singularly lacking 
in detailed philosophical reflection.” (MGM, 49)  
Murdoch appreciated the work of Saussure, the linguist, who did not, she says, whilst elaborating a 
groundbreaking instrument of analysis, create a metaphysic, something she thought that Derrida 
did set out to do. She writes: “Saussure separated language conceived as a general system from its 
particular local use by individuals. He retained however the idea (which belongs with 
‘presence’167, consciousness, experience) that speech, not writing, was the basis of language and 
meaning. […] Derrida reverses this. What is primary is writing [archi-écriture], thought of in a 
(metaphysical) sense as a vast system or sign structure whereby meaning is determined by a 
mutual relationship of signs which transcends the localised talk of individual speakers.” (MGM, 
188) It can be argued of course that Derrida’s “reversal” of the primacy of speech over writing was 
more part of a strategy of provocation, designed to unseat old certainties, than an attempt to 
substitute these with new ones. His concept of Archi-écriture contested the deep-rooted idea, first 
expounded in Plato’s Phaedrus, that speech guaranteed an immediacy of communication, direct 
from the soul, as it were, of which writing was a (poor) copy. Instead, if all language comes from 
‘outside’, from the web of signs, then speech and writing are at the same distance from a real or 
imagined originating consciousness, and speech can equally well be ‘read’ as a form of writing. 
Hence, he may have agreed with Murdoch that the notion of a sign-structure, though 
methodologically useful in debunking other illusions, constituted a danger in itself of creating a 
new metaphysic. This being said, it remains true that for Derrida “primal writing”, archi-écriture, 
                                                 
167 ‘Presence’ is in inverted commas here in reference to Derrida’s attack on “what he calls Heidegger’s ‘metaphysics 
of presence’, the use of concepts of present being, consciousness, experience”. (MGM, 187)  
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weaves the web of signs – the structure – in that speech, as Murdoch points out, has for him the 
disorderliness of being “uttered in present moments by individual local historical incarnate 
speakers.” (MGM, 201)   
 
Derrida’s deconstructive attack on moral concepts that he sees as hopelessly drenched in 
metaphysics was indeed fierce. Murdoch translates from his De la Grammatologie (1967, p.89, 
cited MGM, 191) a long passage which begins: “As for the concept of experience, it is certainly an 
embarrassment here. Like all ideas we are dealing with, it belongs to the history of metaphysics 
and we can only make use of it under erasure [Sous rature]. ‘Experience’ has always indicated a 
relationship to something present, whether or not this relation takes the form of consciousness.” 
Derrida’s bêtes noires – experience, presence, consciousness – are precisely those concepts that 
Murdoch sees as necessary regulative ideas of moral reflection, that is to say, concepts of which it 
makes no sense to ask if they are true or false. Derrida, on the other hand, says that deconstruction 
requires “the putting into brackets of regions of experience, or of the totality of natural experience, 
[and this] must uncover a transcendental field of experience.” (Ibid.) Language, with its vast field 
of overlapping differentiations and deferrals, speaks us. Murdoch does not dispute that language is 
“of course a huge transcendent structure, stretching away out of our sight” (MGM, 188), but she is 
wary of a mode of philosophical expression which “involves a deconstruction of experience so 
radical that the concept can only be used sous rature, under erasure. This ‘embarrassing’ device, 
of using a crossed-out word, is intended to alert us to an unusual, stripped, deconstructed sense of 
a concept which no better words can at present be found to exhibit. It is a term of art designed to 
be stronger and more specialised than what is often achieved by putting a word in inverted 
commas.” (MGM, 192)  
She sees this as a clever form of trickery in which the bracketing of actual experience will reveal 
the ‘transcendental field’ that is “the great sea of language itself”. She writes: “On this view, 
almost all language-use is an unconscious subjection to system”. (MGM, 193) What she does 
appreciate in Derrida’s system is the recognition of the vastness and endless possibilities of 
language, but this seems to her to be accessible only if we can free ourselves of the old constraints 
on meaning that deconstruction entails. Then we can fully open to contingency, “conceptualising 
what confronts us, ‘making’ it into meaning.”(Ibid., 196) For Murdoch this potential for creativity 
in the notion of language as “play” may seem attractive as “a philosophy for our age”, and “may 
be welcomed by clever people who are, perhaps understandably as they survey the present world, 
fed up with ‘all the old solutions’” (Ibid., 197) The moral problem with this view, as she sees it, is 
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that it seems that only “in the activity of some minds” (Ibid. 193) can language be seen to emerge 
as conscious play. The insidiousness of a certain implicit romanticism of the (superior) intellect, 
sadly common in philosophy, was always something that disturbed Murdoch. 
 
As to Wittgenstein, he suffered no such illusion. Hacking remarks that “he detested philosophers 
who feel good being quick, clever and flashy”168. Considered a major catalyst of the linguistic 
turn, “under whose shadow” Murdoch says, she “grew up as a student” (SW, 244), what brought 
him to the study of language was the conviction that the primary philosophical task  –  to bring 
clarity to confused thinking, both ordinary and philosophical – had to do with words. He notes (in 
1931) that: “People say again and again that philosophy doesn’t really progress, that we are still 
occupied with the same philosophical problems as were the Greeks. But the people who say this 
don’t understand why it has to be so. It is because our language has remained the same and keeps 
seducing us into asking the same questions.” (CV 15e) His own analyses of the logic of language 
however, which manifests in this structural and lexical “sameness”, also revealed its irrepressible 
differences. In 1937 he writes: “[T]hat is the difficulty Socrates keeps getting into in trying to give 
the definition of a concept. Again and again the use of a word emerges that seems not to be 
compatible with the concepts that other uses have led us to form.” (CV 30e) As we have seen, it 
was this “slipperiness” of language, as she calls it, that interested Murdoch, and therefore 
Wittgenstein’s later explorations of concepts in relation to the “forms of life” in which particular 
uses arise. Conversely however, where Wittgenstein was initially concerned to clear up the logical 
problems generated by the “sameness” and “seduction” of language across centuries, she wished 
to explore the ethical aspects of that sameness, of why it is that “We today have no great or 
essential difficulty in understanding plays written by the Greeks in the fifth century BC.” (E&M, 
229) 
 
Crucial in ethical thinking, for both Wittgenstein and Murdoch, is a quest for ‘sense’ or purpose, 
which makes itself manifest in our language, an attempt to discover in (or impose on) the world a 
system of meanings, which attributes value to human life. Clearly religion is one form this quest 
takes, but it has also been the endeavour of science, and lies at the roots (if not along all branches) 
of philosophy. The linguistic turn in philosophy in itself represents a new system of meaning, an 
epistemic change, and Wittgenstein’s description in Culture and Value of the great difficulty 
                                                 
168 Hacking, I., Historical Ontology, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 224 
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experienced in attempting to see something differently throws light on the power of a system of 
thought to hold us in: 
 
Getting hold of the difficulty deep down is what is hard. 
Because if it is grasped near the surface it simply remains the difficulty it was. It has to be pulled out by the 
roots: and that involves our beginning to think about these things in a new way. The change is as decisive as, 
for example, that from the alchemical to the chemical way of thinking. The new way of thinking is what is so 
hard to establish. 
Once the new way of thinking has been established, the old problems vanish; indeed they become hard to 
recapture. For they go with our way of expressing ourselves and, if we clothe ourselves in a new form of 
expression, the old problems are discarded along with the old garment. (1946) (CV 48e) 
 
 
The more discursive mode of expression employed here also sheds light on what Wittgenstein 
meant, more cryptically, by “the vanishing of the problem” in the famous citation from the 
Tractatus (6.521) cited by Murdoch and reproduced below. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein 
describes this reading the world through a particular system of meanings as seeing it as if from a 
point of view that is in fact inaccessible to us – the point of view of eternity: “To view the world 
sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole – a limited whole” (Tractatus, 6.45) This concept, 
epistemological in its original use here, was important for Murdoch; but she also made use of it 
with reference to ethical systems, in the context of the way of seeing, of the vision, which infuses 
our world and our words with value; and as such it became one of the key operational concepts in 
her work. For her all metaphysical systems were “limited wholes” whose “unsayable” assertions 
were indeed neither verifiable or falsifiable. But she believed that in the cases of some of the most 
interesting metaphysical systems a literal interpretation was never the intention of the author; and 
even if it had been, the ethical implications in the texts would now still need to be read as 
metaphor. She writes: “The element of metaphor is unavoidable in philosophy, especially in moral 
philosophy; […] Some theories of will, for instance, may avoid speaking of leaps, but constantly 
use metaphors of movement.” (MGM, 177) Wittgenstein himself, in The Conference on Ethics, 
says that the language of ethics and religion is full of similes, allegories etc., and necessarily so, 
but he did not further explore this. For Murdoch, on the other hand, this whole important area of 
language was one that was neglected in philosophy generally, and consequently misunderstood; 
that is, the function of metaphor in our thinking, particularly in moral thinking, has remained 
largely unexplored, and our thinking about our thinking is therefore skewed. She felt that Plato, for 
example, had had the misfortune to have been taken too literally, by both supporters and 
opponents. She writes: “Failure to understand how thought constantly works in moral living 
supports a popular misrepresentation of Plato as an ‘intellectualist’ philosopher who (in the 
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ordinary sense) puts the highest value on intellectual skill, and (in the metaphysical sense) thought 
that nothing was real except objectified abstract ideas lodged somewhere in heaven.” (MGM, 177) 
Conversely, she herself believed that “The Platonic myths are an explicit resort to metaphor as a 
mode of explanation” (Ibid). And this she explored in detail in, especially, The Sovereignty of 
Good. Against Wittgenstein, therefore, she saw the investigation of ethics as still a primarily 
philosophical question. She quotes Wittgenstein’s famous denial of this – a kind of early position 
statement – from the Tractatus (6.522, 6.53), where he says:  
 
“The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem … There are, indeed, things that 
cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest.” […6.521, 6.522]  
“The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said i.e. 
propositions of natural science - i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever 
someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning 
to certain signs in his propositions.” [6.53](cited MGM, p.30)  
 
The Tractatus sets out to establish this ‘correct’ method, this way out of philosophical confusion 
that involves a clear separation of what is logical from what is metaphysical or psychological. 
Nonetheless, Wittgenstein had a clear understanding of the particular experience of that conflicting 
philosophical desire precisely to do the impossible: to reject, to go beyond, the very same sober 
self-limitation in the use of language he is here proposing; the desire which constantly threatens 
this rigorous separation. To draw attention to Wittgenstein’s sense of this paradox running through 
the activity of philosophy Murdoch juxtaposes these didactic statements from the Tractatus with 
the following more reflexive citation from his conversations with Friedrich Weissman, 
Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle (p.68). 
 
Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that 
anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no 
answer whatsoever. Anything we might say is a priori bound to be mere nonsense. Nevertheless we do run up 
against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he 
referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). This running up against the limits of 
language is ethics. I think it is definitely important to put an end to all this claptrap about ethics – whether 
intuitive knowledge exists, whether values exist, whether the good is definable. In ethics we are always making 
the attempt to say something which cannot be said, something that does not and will not touch the essence of 
the matter. … But the inclination, the running up against something, indicates something. (MGM 29)  
 
For Wittgenstein the something that is indicated – ethics – is what is most important (the unwritten 
part of the Tractatus)169, and the paradox we live with is that of this we cannot speak. But what he 
                                                 
169 Murdoch also cites the letter to Ficker of 1919, where he says “The book’s point is an ethical one. …My work 
consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part [the 
ethical] that is the important one.” Quoted in MGM, pp.28-29. 
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really appears to be demonstrating in the Tractatus is that we cannot speak of ethics 
epistemologically: “whether intuitive knowledge exists”, or ontologically: “whether values exist, 
whether the good is definable”, or metaphysically: why “anything at all exists”. Nothing in his 
work suggests, however, that we cannot speak of ethics ethically (though for him this means 
outside philosophy), that is to say, within a language-game regarding the concepts by which we 
live our lives, or regarding the forms of life in which we formulate our concepts. In placing all talk 
of ethics outside of philosophy (in literature, for example, and elsewhere) Wittgenstein’s own 
usage of the concept of “philosophy” here is itself in alignment with the current (then and now) 
view of it as primarily an epistemological discipline, a view to which he contributed with the 
Tractatus, both through what he said there, and through what his silences said. From this it is 
evident that the disagreement between Wittgenstein and Murdoch is not so much about the 
contents of their theories  as about whether “philosophy” is primarily a logical or an ethical 
discipline. In his later work however, Wittgenstein too acknowledges, and is more concerned with, 
the way experiences, thoughts, life can force (ethical, nonsensical) concepts on us. (see esp. CV 
86e).  
 
Murdoch notes that it has “been properly pointed out by both Saussure and Wittgenstein that 
language develops and depends upon internally related groups of concepts, wherein sense is 
modified in relation to the group”. Given their disciplinary preoccupations however, Saussure the 
linguist’s concern was with the former – the internal relations between groups of concepts, 
whereas Wittgenstein’s primary concern was with the latter – with how sense is achieved or fails 
to be achieved, and with how it is modified. This perspective includes an analysis of the internal 
relations of specific languages, rather than language in general, as inseparable from the production 
of sense. Conversely, Saussure excluded mental contents from his analysis, but this exclusion was 
a technical one, in order to allow access to those formal structures of language that were universal, 
thus ahistorical, acultural and impersonal. For Saussure however, as has been said, this entailed no 
metaphysical conclusions about the primacy of language itself in shaping our thought and being. 
Murdoch notes that the “second sentence of the Tractatus, ‘The world is the totality of facts, not of 
things’, resembles a structuralist insight”: what counts as a fact is established by human beings, 
through meaningful webs of signs, mostly linguistic, things (in themselves, as it were – it also 
evidently resembles a Kantian insight) not being directly inaccessible. The statement is clearly 
metaphysical, and therefore for Wittgenstein serves to establish or clarify a way of picturing 
reality, and not of determining how reality is; but – she goes on – “Structuralism however makes a 
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further metaphysical move from which Wittgenstein wisely abstained. If we cannot see, or say, 
how language is able to refer to the world […] then it seems a simple philosophical feat … to 
remove the world.” (MGM, 48). Her greater sympathy with Wittgenstein in this reflects her 
suspicion of foundational stances disguised as ‘methods’, something she shares with Foucault, 
who acknowledged having to battle with himself with regard to this temptation. She reads the 
structuralists (post-structuralists, deconstructionists) as offering “a metaphysic which offers a new 
model of language as a structure of reality” (MGM, 5), such that “[r]eality, it is argued, lies in the 
linguistic medium itself, in the various (including scientific) languages of the planet…”(MGM, 6),  
Foucault, as we have seen, attempted to explore these regions of language, especially disciplinary 
languages, as active structures of reality, whilst wishing to avoid falling into the trap of drawing 
metaphysical conclusions about them from the results of his analyses. 
Murdoch saw this unidirectional perspective – from language to thought – as an unhelpful 
constriction of the space of thought. In her own work on language she points out that thought is 
not simply “the uttering of mental words. […] Words do not occur as the content of thought as if 
they were cast upon a screen and there read off by the thinker.” (TL 33-34) And just as “uttered 
speech often demands an awareness of gesture, tone, and so on, as well as of context, for its full 
understanding”, so too “for inward speech. The thought is not the words (if any) but the words 
occurring in a certain way with, as it were, a certain force and colour.”(TL, 34) She acknowledges 
the usefulness of that common picture of the mind which distinguishes “at two extremes the vague 
floating images which are pliant and indescribable […] and the fully verbalised thought, ready for 
exposure to someone else, the formulation of which was perhaps a development of some vaguer 
reflection”, but she lays emphasis on this important and oft-neglected space of “vaguer reflection” 
“where words occur but in a more indeterminate imaging manner […] and not at all like a 
rehearsed inner speech.” Clearly “the former are the most private, the latter the most public, i.e. 
readily exposable, parts of any inner monologue” (TL, 34). She agreed with all those she is 
arguing with here – structuralists, logical behaviourists, verificationists – on the importance of 
considering the public symbols which constitute our ordinary language, noting in particular “the 
crystallising role which the occurrence of words, and the determining role which the availability of 
names, may play in thought.” (Ibid). What she objected to however was the reduction of thinking 
to language, and of language to “a set of grooves into which we slip”. She annotates this according 
to analytic method thus: 
Language cannot be considered as saying itself; it is not ‘p’ that says p, but I who say ‘p’ meaning p. 
Language is a set of occurrences. (TL, 35) 
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She does not see this ‘I’ as some kind of substantive subject that is separate from language but it 
does not follow from this that there is any reason to denounce “the inner” as illusion, “as nothing, 
or at best shadowy and nameless.” At the same time, though language and thought for her are not 
co-extensive, she nonetheless felt it equally important not to take this fact to the opposing 
metaphysical conclusion that “ ‘consciousness is the gaps in language’.” (TL, 35). Instead, she 
says that what is required and should be attempted is a new description: “Not all our new concepts 
come to us in the context of language; but the attempt to verbalise them may result not in 
frustration but in the renewal of language. This is par excellence the task of poetry. So there is 
give and take; words may determine a sense, or a fresh experience may renew words. (I am not 
distinguishing here between words which I originate, and the words of another which I think 
through and make my own)”. (TL, 36) It is precisely in the context of this dynamic circularity of 
language and experience that “we need and use the idea that thoughts are particular inner 
experiences.” (TL, 38). And she notes that this idea, and the need of it, are directly “observable”, 
as an idea that is connected to the notion we have of ourselves as unique and private beings, as 
“personalities”.  
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Ch.2 Moral Being 
 
1. Philosophical pictures of the self 
 
In her essay “Consciousness and Thought”, Murdoch asks:  
 
How do the concepts ‘self’, ‘experience’, ‘consciousness’ relate? […] Philosophically, should ‘self’ be taken as 
an initial problem, or simply assumed or postulated as a carrier of experience or consciousness, or should we 
take something else, society or language or genes, as fundamental? Is the self part of the world, or should it be 
seen as constructing the world. (MGM, 147-48)  
 
The concept of “self” which was of primary interest to her was that of “moral being”, referring to 
the moral individual engaged in an inner dialogue which both starts from experience and shapes 
experience, through consciousness. In her work, these concepts, construed empirically, can always 
be taken to be evocative of each other and they will here be treated as such. As we will see, on her 
view, “consciousness or self-being” (MGM, 147) refers to our everyday awareness of our 
experience as well as to the metaphorical locus of our reflections. As such, and though indefinable 
(but variously describable), it is the filter through which we experience and act in the world; there 
is no ‘pure’ perception, uncoloured by our consciousness. For her, the ‘self’, indefinable, is part of 
the world and constructs its world, (and the world). There is therefore no clear foundation – as 
sought for in the questions posed above – that could be established in this circularity of what is. 
Her own use of the term ‘self’ (which is relatively rare, to avoid misinterpretation) never signifies 
a substantive “self”, except where she is using it to refer to someone else’s concept. These, what 
she describes as philosophical pictures of the self, she was very interested in; a category which 
included for her what contemporary philosophy made of the moral individual in the absence of a 
concept of a substantive self. 
 
She frequently uses the metaphors of “picture” and “picturing”, originally taken from the 
Tractatus (2.1 and following) where they refer to the logical correspondences between words and 
the ‘facts’ they “picture”, and the way these are woven together into bigger logical pictures. 
Murdoch uses the metaphors to refer mostly to these bigger logical pictures and their various 
imaginative accoutrements (she tends to use ‘picture’ and ‘vision’ interchangeably, according to 
the aspect under consideration). With regard to explicitly metaphysical pictures of the self she did 
not see the fact that a philosophical argument presented such a picture as an obstacle to exploring 
what that argument had to say about ethics, about how we live our lives; and she certainly felt that 
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philosophers who rejected whole bodies of philosophy in toto, as “metaphysical”, therefore 
nonsense, because they held such conceptions, were wasting important opportunities for 
expanding and enriching their own thinking. 
  
Each of the questions she raises in the citation above were the focus of differing foundational 
positions adopted by one or another strand of modern philosophy, from which, in her 
reconstruction of the uses of these concepts, she draws out sometimes surprisingly interlocking 
themes, starting, inevitably, with Descartes. Of Descartes she writes that he “pictures a solitary 
mind having certain knowledge only of its immediate apprehensions, from which (helped by a 
belief in God) it is able to find itself in a world grasped as ‘external’ and real” (MGM, 148). With 
regard to this picture she says she welcomes modern philosophy’s response to the old question 
facing this solitary mind, this “self”, (or “soul”), the question: “How do I reach the world?”; and 
she caricatures the various answers as coming together in the idea: “You are in the world, it is your 
world”, commenting: “For this relief much thanks.”! (MGM, 147). Despite this relief, she was also 
concerned that “in removing old Cartesian errors, [… these philosophical arguments] may indeed 
seem to render problematic the common-sense conception of the individual self as a moral centre 
or substance.” (MGM, 153). She observes that Hume – the first to seriously challenge Descartes’ 
notion of the interaction of “mind” and material world (and its conception of the human body 
responding in some unknown way to the commands of the spirit) – in putting forward his own 
ontological picture of a non-substantive (and biological) self as a sensory (and motor) apparatus 
giving rise to a bundle of perceptions, nonetheless retained this sense of the individual as “a moral 
centre or substance”. Murdoch points out that, however discontinuous, this “bundle” was for 
Hume “endowed with innate awareness of association and order”. In this way at least, and in 
despite of his radical rejection of the notion of the self as “soul”, Hume’s “self”, she writes, was 
actually rather “like that of Descartes”. (Ibid.) What she is doing here is challenging the 
stereotyped assumptions about those matters which constitute the important philosophical 
differences between the founding fathers of modern philosophy, in order to get at the ways the 
conceptual lines of descent from them have crossed and recrossed. Similarly therefore, in 
commenting on the heritage Descartes may well not have wanted to leave behind, she notes that 
“Cartesians seem on the whole to have taken the attractive clarity of the certain starting point as 
founding an empiricism more friendly to science than to ethics or religion.” (MGM, 149) 
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Continuing to dig beneath the surface of these established notions of the mind – roughly sketched 
as either the Cartesian reason-producing-experience or as the Humean experience-producing-
reason – she cites Hume’s famous broadside against Descartes’ rational soul, to the effect that 
reason “ ‘is and ought to be the slave of the passions’ […] (Treatise of Human Nature II iii 5 and 
III i I)”. But she does so in order to point out that “[t]his ‘slave’ is nonetheless to be seen more as a 
friendly adviser, an old family solicitor as someone has suggested” (Ibid.); in other words as an 
eminently reasonable, however passionate, man. Ironically therefore, the philosopher renowned 
for his scepticism about the very existence of a “self” paints a picture, in opposition to Descartes’ 
substantive but divided self, of an integrated individual for whom “similar habits and movements 
of imagination set in order both the factual and the moral.” (Ibid). As ever, she picks up on the 
way in which the philosophers’ aesthetic use of language colours (and therefore modifies) the 
starker declared picture, as of course does historical reconstruction.  
Though Murdoch reads Hume viably in this way, in the interceding centuries it is Hume’s 
sceptical negation of the substantive self, rather than his regard for the reality of the moral self, 
that has dominated Humean studies, and much of empiricist philosophy. In other words, Hume’s 
epistemological picture dominates and conditions subsequent reconstructions of his ethical picture, 
and that of his philosophical descent line. Murdoch writes: “It is from him more than anyone else 
that we have derived a philosophical tendency, which is still with us, to see the world in terms of 
contingently conjoined simples, to see it as a totality of ultimately simple facts which have no 
necessary connection with each other. In so far as we imagine that the world does contain 
necessities, and that real connections exist between these simple elements, this is merely the result 
of habit and custom, which are themselves the work of Nature. […] It is habit which gives us, 
according to Hume, both our objective material world, and our moral world.” (ME, 68-69).  
Murdoch cites the key passage in Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature in which he paints one of 
philosophy’s most extraordinary and compelling pictures of the self, construed as the bodily 
situated mind: 
 
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble upon some particular 
perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any 
time without a perception, and can never observe anything but the perception … [Someone else] may perceive 
something simple and continued which he calls himself; though I am certain there is no such principle in me. 
But setting aside some metaphysician of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable 
rapidity, and are in a perpetual state of flux and movement. (Book I,Part IV, section 6, quoted MGM, 287) 
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Hume’s description is empirical, but his own speculation thereon does not contain a reflection on 
whatever it is that is doing the perceiving, this witness with whose voice he speaks, and which he 
accuses the “metaphysician” of claiming to perceive; whereas for Descartes, whose view he is 
addressing, it is the fact that something which is precisely not perceivable, but nonetheless in some 
sense present in his cogitating, that allowed him to conclude ergo sum. Descartes’ empirical 
observations thus led to the metaphysical conclusion that there is this conscious subject, and 
Hume’s empirical observations led to the opposite, but for Murdoch equally metaphysical, 
conclusion that there is no such thing. What Murdoch found particularly useful in Hume’s picture, 
shared, she says, by some contemporary empiricists and existentialists, was its attempt, while 
demystifying consciousness, to capture certain of its qualities: “the elusive, fragmentary or messy 
nature of the so-called stream.” (MGM, 251) Though when he moved from informative 
description to ontological conclusion she refers to this unflatteringly as “Hume’s ramshackle and 
unsatisfactory idea of consciousness as a continuum of units, fused by association and habit and 
containing certain morally tinged items such as feelings of approval”. (MGM, 221)  
 
The third of the great founding fathers of modern philosophy she discusses in this regard, and the 
one whose portrait of “rational man” she found to be the backbone of most subsequent pictures of 
the self in modern philosophy (in guises he could not have imagined), was Kant. She writes:  
 
Kant’s conclusive exposure of the so-called proofs of the existence of God, his analysis of the limitations of 
speculative reason, together with his eloquent portrayal of the dignity of rational man, has had results which 
might possibly dismay him. How recognisable, how familiar to us, is the man so beautifully portrayed in the 
Grundelgung, who confronted even with Christ turns away to consider the judgement of his own conscience 
and to hear the voice of his own reason. Stripped of the exiguous metaphysical background which Kant was 
prepared to allow him, this man is with us still, free, independent, lonely, powerful, responsible, brave, the hero 
of so many novels and books of moral philosophy. (SGOC, 365)  
 
Among the results which may have dismayed him Murdoch is thinking of Anglo-American moral 
philosophies and of continental existentialism. Despite great differences in the ways in which the 
individual freedom described here is thought to be experienced in these traditions, and is therefore 
normatively articulated (as, for example, responsible common sense, or as an anguished 
commitment to authenticity), she maintains that these different forms of post-Kantian philosophy 
both have at their core “the notion of the will as the creator of value. Values which were 
previously in some sense inscribed in the heavens and guaranteed by God collapse into the human 
will” (Ibid., 366). For Kant of course, listening to the voice of one’s own reason was not in itself 
morally problematic in that in his conceptual system this was necessarily guided by “Reason” 
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(what Murdoch calls one of the “metaphysical substitutes for God” (Ibid., 365); but this is a saving 
grace which is no longer available to modern moral philosophy and its loss has occasioned very 
different forms of problematisation of freedom, though for Murdoch, the grounding of all these 
developments remains this Kantian conception of “rational man”. Thus, in the wake of Kant, the 
heros of post-Kantian literature have qualities, and anguishes, which are characterised by this 
autonomy.170  
Conversely however, what remained as morally problematic for Kant was, shall we say, the older 
voice of unreason, of the sensual, empirical “lower” part of a self that was for him, as Foucault too 
points out, radically divided. Not only does Kant posit a radical and antagonistic separation of the 
material being from the super-sensible ‘self’ of reason (what Foucault calls Kant’s empirico-
transcendental doublet) (OT, 329), but also a further separation that is internal to reason itself: 
“Kant’s man as knower of the phenomenal world (exercising theoretical reason) is to be 
distinguished from his man as moral agent (exercising practical reason).” Again the intentions of 
the founding father – for Kant, she says, this separation served to “elevate and purify moral 
philosophising” and therefore ultimately to re-forge the links between theoretical and practical 
reason – were not always reflected in the historical development from his philosophy. And once 
again as Foucault has pointed out, this separation of the spheres of reason further fuelled the trend 
towards the predominance of epistemology in philosophy, and to some extent to the requalification 
of moral philosophy, eventually to the point where, Murdoch writes, ethics could “be considered 
as a ‘special subject’ wherein the philosopher worked as a neutral technician”. (MGM, 150) 
  
Converging in this direction, Murdoch notes that, once the Cartesian picture of the solitary knower 
in the “private theatre” of the mind, had been generally abandoned in philosophy, there was a 
further tendency to assume “that all private, inner reflection was in some sense incoherent, 
inaccessible and vague. [And that with this …] ‘self’ theories, whether psychological or 
metaphysical, were to be ‘eliminated’.” (MGM, 150)171 As noted, in distancing herself from this 
attitude however, Murdoch did not wish to defend any metaphysical conception of either self or 
non-self. On the contrary, she writes: “the choice must be rejected between logical behaviourism 
and the private theatre. An ontological approach, which seeks for an identifiable inner stuff and 
                                                 
170 By contrast, Hamlet’s moral dilemma, for example, had to do with a “free will” conceived in relation to “God’s 
will”. Steiner wonders if it may be Shakespeare’s playing with theological evil which so disturbs Murdoch “in 
Hamlet’s decision not to dispatch Claudius when at prayer”. (E&M xvi). 
171 MGM, p. 150. She notes that more recently (in the latter half of the twentieth century) some forms of Aristotelian 
moral philosophy “have given much needed attention to the inner life”. Among these she mentions Philippa Foot 
Virtues and Vices, and Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. 
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either asserts or denies its existence must be avoided.” (TL, 38, my emphasis) Here she is 
contesting the illusion (which she attributes to logical behaviourists) that to categorically deny the 
existence of such “inner stuff” is somehow a less metaphysical stance (whatever its ‘anti-
metaphysical’ atmosphere) than that of philosophers who uphold the notion of a metaphysical 
subject. For her the idea of the self, as the (metaphorical) locus of our thinking and feeling and 
hence of our moral being, was not one that could be dismissed as philosophically irrelevant simply 
on grounds of its non-verifiable status. “What is observable” she writes, “is that we need and use 
the idea that thoughts are particular inner experiences. This is an idea which connects up with our 
notion of the privacy and unity of our ‘selves’ or ‘personalities’.” Murdoch suggests that a 
possible description of an idea having these apparently contradictory characteristics – as both 
“needed” and non-verifiable – might be as “an important and necessary ‘illusion of immanence’; 
only” she says “to call it an ‘illusion’ risks giving the description an ontological flavour.” In view 
of this risk, she clarifies further in this way:  
 
It is rather a necessary regulative idea, about which it makes no sense to ask, is it true or is it false that it is so? 
It is as if for us our thoughts were inner events, and it is as if these events were describable either as verbal 
units or in metaphorical, analogical terms. We constantly recover and fix our mental past by means of a 
descriptive technique, a sort of story-telling, whose justification is its success. We know too of ways in which 
to adjust and check, in ourselves and others, the accuracy of this technique. And if a philosophical precedent be 
needed for this important as if, we have only to look to Kant’s use of the regulative idea of freedom, which 
seems to me essentially similar and equally empirical. (TL, 39, emphasis in original). 
 
In this important passage Murdoch does many things. She introduces the important concept of 
inner narrative and its active relation to public use of language. She elaborates theoretical criteria 
which allow the metaphysical debate about the existence of ‘inner events’ and of a self to be put 
aside, so that discussion of the relation of thought and experience may proceed without being 
deviated along ontological paths. And in order to do this she takes up (from another context) 
Kant’s notion of the regulative idea – an idea that is necessary to our lives as human beings even 
though it cannot be proved true or false – and applies it to the present discussion. This is important 
methodologically, but also substantially in that for Kant it is the regulative idea of freedom that 
allows (obliges) us to assume moral responsibility, and for Murdoch the regulative idea of the self 
(as locus of inner events) grounds our intuitive sense of ourselves as moral beings. She is also 
keen to note that there are good empirical grounds for this supposition, and – perhaps as an aside 
addressed to those suspicious of any notion originating in Kant – that he too had his empirical 
reasons. On her view however, something like the regulative idea of the self had already been 
provided by none other than Hume. She notes that “Hume (as philosopher) held that the self was a 
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sort of ‘illusion’, just as the material object was an ‘illusion’; that is, it was, both as empirical 
knower and as moral agent, a lot of fragmentary experiences held together by strong habits of 
imagination.” (MGM, 164) Nonetheless, Hume distinguished among the illusions we live by those 
that were in some way necessary to our capacity to live in the world, and among others, she writes: 
“Hume’s ‘self’ and ‘object’ illusions may be thought of as natural necessities, necessary though 
perhaps scarcely justifiable ideas.” In support of this view she quotes the following section from 
Hume’s Treatise:  
 
‘I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible and universal, 
such as the customary transition from cause to effect and from effects to causes; and the principles which are 
changeable weak and irregular. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their 
removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin.’ (Treatise of Human Nature I iv 4.) 
 
Along with causality, Hume included the existence of persons and objects among “the foundations 
of our thoughts and actions”, and Murdoch comments on this, “We must believe in causality, in 
persons and objects and in the substantial continuity of our own being. What would it be not to?” 
(MGM, 164) This question (rhetorical or not) poses both epistemological and ethical problems. 
Her answer to the former is given above, in her evident agreement here with Hume’s conclusions 
on the matter. With particular regard to our belief in persons, she takes this notion of our necessary 
belief in their existence to include their having an inner life: “We constantly reflect upon the inner 
life of others, we are driven to do this. The concept is forced upon us.” (Ibid., 294) The latter idea 
expresses – as do Kant’s regulative idea and Hume’s “permanent, irresistible and universal 
principles of the imagination” – the way in which certain concepts appear to be an essential part of 
what it is to live as human beings. This notion she took from Wittgenstein [“A concept forces 
itself on one. (This is what you must not forget.) Investigations, 204e], who uses it here in a 
different context in his discussion of how our concepts are wrought into our visual experience. 
(And, she points out, in Culture and Value, in connection with the idea of God.) She was 
particularly struck by this discussion: “Does perception include interpretation? (Pure perception, 
pure cognition?) ‘Was it seeing or was it a thought? [again citing Investigations 204e]’ ” (MGM, 
277). What and how we see, the quality of our attention, our looking,  the metaphors of moral 
seeing, were central to Murdoch’s own moral vision, and Wittgenstein’s reflections here had for 
her immediate ethical significance: “our perceptions, which so largely constitute our experienced-
being, are intensely individual and polymorphous. Seeing, thinking and interpreting are mixed. 
And, for instance, instinctive value judgements and intuitions are involved.” (MGM, 278)  
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Conversely however, whilst reworking this notion for her own purposes, she felt that in his case, 
“Wittgenstein’s urgency, his anxiety as he poses these questions is related to his wish to keep the 
‘individual’ and ‘value’ out of the picture. (This would continue the metaphysic of the Tractatus)”. 
Though he himself explicitly recognised the presence of this metaphysic in the Tractatus and 
rejected it, therein and later in the Investigations, she felt that it tended to resurface even in his 
later work. Murdoch repeatedly remarks on the debt philosophy owes to Wittgenstein for his 
attack on the notion of private language and “on the otiose dualism, for instance, the ‘inner 
process’ which is supposed to articulate and present the finished outer speech”, but she felt that 
this clear and useful argument opened up philosophical space (exploited by others) for a more 
general and blurred dismissal of everything that has to do with the “idea of ‘processes’ as stream 
of consciousness, inner reflection, imagery, in fact our experience as inner (unspoken, 
undemonstrated) being. It is this huge confused area which is being threatened, even removed.” 
(MGM, 273)  
This is not a view that is shared by all scholars of Wittgenstein (though it was held by the logical 
positivists she claims misunderstood him). She herself also said that Wittgenstein’s intention was 
to protect this vital, ethical area of life, through his silence, his refusal to paint a philosophical 
picture of the self. However, such a picture of what she calls our “experience as inner being” at 
least as the locus of learning, using, misusing and recreating language, and of learning and re-
elaborating a human form of life, is something which can be said to emerge through certain other 
readings of Wittgenstein, particularly that of Cavell (see below). The ‘outer’ has for Wittgenstein 
to do with language, with language-games and with Lebensformen (forms of life), concepts 
Murdoch feels are “rather rigid, and indeed not clearly explained” (Ibid.); and yet, she says, the 
forms of life “are finally referred to as to be accepted as the given [Investigations, II, p. 226]” 
(MGM, 276) She questioned what Wittgenstein meant at Investigations 241: “It is what human 
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in 
opinions but in forms of life.”; caricaturing this as the setting up of an essentially rule-bound and 
constraining “machinery” of language, for which “the imagined ‘assent’ of postulated ‘groups’” 
establishes “correctness and intelligibility” (MGM  281). She argued that this picture doesn’t 
sufficiently take into account that “Truth and falsehood are in perpetual engagement with 
meaning. Meaning is slippery and free, language is a huge place” (Ibid., 281) 
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Murdoch does not seem to have been aware of Cavell’s early work on Wittgenstein172, in which he 
points out that the “language game”, with its discernable rules, was not at all the “rigid” structure 
she complains of here, but rather a carefully fashioned metaphorical device. Cavell writes: 
“Wittgenstein invokes and invents games not as contexts in which it is just clear what ‘observing 
rules’ amounts to, but contexts in which the phenomenon can be investigated.” (MMWS 49) For 
Cavell the “game” is an analogy which throws light precisely on the fact that no game could ever 
be “everywhere circumscribed by rules” (PI, 68), and this fact in itself “tells us something about 
‘what being governed by rules’ is like” (MMWS, 49). And what it is like turns out to be a lot less 
rigid, and more variable, than is suggested by the rules, which nonetheless give the game its form. 
Cavell is here elucidating Wittgenstein’s (more cryptic) method of elucidating. He goes on:  
 
‘Following a rule’ is an activity we learn against the background of, and in the course of, learning innumerable 
other activities – for example obeying orders, taking and giving directions, repeating what is done or said, and 
so forth. The concept of a rule does not exhaust the concepts of correctness or justification (‘right’ and ‘wrong’) 
and indeed the former concept would have no meaning unless these latter concepts already had. Like any of the 
activities to which it is related, a rule can always be misinterpreted in the course of ‘following’ it. […] There is 
no one set of characteristics – and this is the most obvious comparison – which everything we call ‘games’ 
shares, hence no characteristic called ‘being determined by rules.’ Language has no essence.” (MMWS, 49-50).  
 
As a description of our experience, of the human form of life, this is certainly not “power 
generates resistance”, but it is at least “rules generate insidious variation”, which begins to put the 
kind of flesh Murdoch would prefer to see on the more skeletal picture Wittgenstein’s paints. 
There are language games, and indeed other human practices, with rules, and there is learning, 
misinterpreting, breaking, bending and extending the rules. Many of these activities of the human 
form of life are not necessarily culturally specific, not tied to (governed by) specific human groups 
as Murdoch feared (though others clearly are). These activities involve both introjecting and 
projecting language, receptivity and creativity; dimensions which Cavell explored further, through 
his reading of Wittgenstein, in The Claims of Reason (cf. esp. Ch. VII). Cavell’s interpretation 
here is remarkably similar to Murdoch’s own account, in The Idea of Perfection, of the play of 
words in our moral understanding; of what Cavell calls “the extent to which my relation to myself 
[Murdoch would add: and others] is figured in my relation to words” (MMWS xxiv). Illustrating 
this, Murdoch here sets up an imaginary case of a mother-in-law ‘M’, “who feels hostility to her 
daughter-in-law” ‘D’ (IP, 312), this hostility finds (mental only) expression in words like “vulgar”, 
“noisy” etc. Murdoch comments: “By means of these words there takes place what we might call 
‘the siege of the individual by concepts’. Uses of such words are both instruments and symptoms 
                                                 
172 Stanley Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say, Cambridge University Press, 1976 (1969). 
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of learning.” (Ibid., 324).  She is keen to point out that it is through the fixing of such words 
“either aloud or privately, in the context of particular acts of attention” that learning takes place. 
But the individual can and does resist the siege, and in so doing will find other words. M, through 
a more open attention to D, achieved through self-reflection, comes to see D as not “vulgar” but 
“spontaneous”, as not “noisy” but “gay”. Similarly, with regard to the development of vocabulary 
in public space, Murdoch writes: “Uses of words by persons grouped around a common object is a 
central and vital human activity.” (Ibid., 325) (A form of life, Wittgenstein might say.) What 
Murdoch wished philosophy to encourage however (and what Wittgenstein left to itself), was the 
enrichment of moral vocabulary, of moral discourse, as “relevant to our ability to move towards 
‘seeing more’, towards ‘seeing what he [the other] sees’.” (Ibid.)  
 
 
 
2. Will, imagination and freedom 
 
 
We have seen that early noncognitivist arguments largely confined the expression of value to the 
realm of the emotions, and consequently, for Murdoch, were faced with the problem of giving 
some account both of the cognitive dimension of moral judgement and of freedom. In a later and 
more complex development from this theme, under the auspices of “philosophy of mind”, Stuart 
Hampshire (in Freedom of the Individual, 1966, reviewed by Murdoch in Encounter, July 1966) 
challenges earlier philosophical separations of fact from value for which value is seen as a product 
– not of the emotions – but of some form of transcendent will. For Hampshire, she writes, such a 
notion “presents freedom as an ‘ideal’ movement of thought which does not ‘factually’ occasion 
conduct, since the domain of value is entirely separate from the domain of empirical fact.” Against 
this, Hampshire maintains that the “will is a function of desire” (DPR, 193). This would seem to 
deny to “Reason” any transcendent authority over the will; however, his binary concept of “desire” 
appears to let reason in – by the back door, as it were – through the distinction he draws between 
active “thought-dependent” desires, on which reasoned argument may and does operate, and those 
passive biologically driven desires which manifest directly in behaviour and are thus revealed by 
observation. In Murdoch’s account of his views, the former desires are based on belief, which can 
be altered, they are normatively regulated, and generally result in intention. The rational beliefs 
one holds enable one to “step back” from the forces rendering one the “passive” instrument of 
desires; scientific knowledge (particularly from experimental psychology, but also from Freud) 
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may therefore contribute to this capacity. In this way, our freedom as moral agents consists in 
“being realistic enough (holding enough rational beliefs) to be able to achieve what we intend. It is 
the normative (objective, impersonal, unwilled) nature of the formulation of belief which rescues 
the active (uncaused) side of the mind from its passive (caused) side.” (Ibid., 196).  
 
Not surprisingly, Murdoch writes of this theoretical construct that “it is not easy to see why 
Hampshire rejects in toto” any notion of the transcendent will “since he himself holds, as I shall 
argue, a version of this same doctrine.” (DPR, 195) On Hampshire’s view, she says “What I am 
‘objectively’ is not under my control … What I am ‘subjectively’ is a footloose, solitary, 
substanceless will. Personality dwindles to a point of pure will.” (IP, 311) For her, the active-
passive mind dualism Hampshire operates is “as strict as Kant’s (and its close relation)” (DPR, 
195). What she sees as the important difference here however is that where, in the Kantian system 
for example, freedom has to do with the whole field of moral activity, of value in relation to fact; 
the fact-value dualism that Hampshire adopts serves instead, she maintains, “to isolate, not value 
as such, but simply the value of freedom.” (Ibid., 197) Freedom is seen as the primary value, and 
“what freedom chooses – the secondary values –” do not figure in the mechanism he sets up. This 
freedom is not construed as given, it is achieved in the world, but it is seen as “a fairly simple and 
intelligible achievement, since the drama of attempt and motivation is something ‘recorded in our 
ordinary language’.” (Ibid.) On this view, failure to be free has to do with inadequacies in the 
formulation of rational belief (pivotal to the whole mechanism of, shall we say, “rationalised” will 
as a function of desire), and not with any more complicated kind of moral failing. Though what 
this results in, Murdoch writes, is “doing what you intend, not doing what is right” (Ibid.). Of 
course, once this freedom is established, and she sees it as indeed a vital political freedom, other 
criteria will be taken into account to establish what is right. Murdoch, however, holds that “a 
moral (as opposed to a purely political) definition of freedom” cannot separate out freedom from 
other values in this way. (DPR, 198) Why this is so is what she had set out to address a few years 
earlier in the essay The Idea of Perfection, discussed below. 
Another key feature of Hampshire’s work however, one which for him serves to further 
differentiate his system from any purported echoes of Kantianism, is his insistence on the role of 
“ordinary language”. He maintains that this enables us “to see transparently the mechanism which 
connects reason (the formulation of sensible beliefs) with will and allows of the ‘stepping back’ 
movement.” (DPR, 195) This injunction on ordinary language however apparently only applies 
within the system, in that viewed from outside the system as a whole seems to depend on a 
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somewhat contorted philosophical, and not ‘ordinary’, use of the word “desire”. The grounding 
function of ordinary language had been elaborated further by Hampshire in Thought and Action 
(1959); and Murdoch quotes from this thus: “ ‘it is the constructive task of a philosophy of mind to 
provide a set of terms in which ultimate judgements of value can be very clearly stated’.”173 (IP, 
300). She notes that philosophy of mind is here put forward as the background to moral 
philosophy; and she comments on this rather caustically that “in so far as modern ethics tends to 
constitute a sort of Newspeak which makes certain values non-expressible, the reasons for this are 
to be sought in current philosophy of mind and in the fascinating power of a certain picture of the 
soul.”174 (Ibid.) This “picture of the soul” is essentially that of the reasonable “moral agent”; who, 
liberated from the power of any pre-constituted notion of what is “good” – since value is now seen 
to be not a feature of the world but a (personal) evaluation of it – enjoys a true freedom of the will, 
the only constraint on which is to express one’s choices in ordinary, intelligible language. On this 
view therefore, Murdoch says, “Goodness is not an object of insight or knowledge, it is a function 
of the will.” (Ibid., 301). In The Sovereignty of the Good of which this essay forms part, she sets 
out to establish that although the good indeed cannot be defined, the idea of goodness (which may 
be variously formulated), and the related cognitive practice of continually seeking to understand 
what is good and what is right, in each of the circumstances of our lives, is fundamental to moral 
growth, and it is essential to this that the good is precisely not seen as a function of the will. 
‘Moral growth’ is of course itself another concept that sits uneasily with this conception of the 
freedom of the will; and we saw earlier how she considers the values attached to working on the 
self, to transforming one’s attitudes,175 to be among those that what she calls this philosophical 
“Newspeak” renders “non-expressible”. 
The two main features of Hampshire’s176 picture of the self that Murdoch focuses on are the public 
nature of introjected concepts (therefore the moral, as well as epistemological, need for clarity and 
                                                 
173 Carla Bagnoli writes that Murdoch seems “strikingly unfair” to Hampshire, in that, in relating moral philosophy to 
philosophy of mind he was “attempting to restore the mind and its workings to their legitimate place in philosophical 
debate, and recognise dignity to ethics. Like Murdoch, he is sensitive to the inexhaustible descriptions of realities, and 
holds that the world is open to conceptual rearrangements.” (EML 205n) Nonetheless, she may have chosen to target 
Hampshire precisely because, though modifying the model of linguistic empiricism, at its core she saw Hampshire’s 
version as essentially the same.  
174 Moran notes that here and in the other essays which make up The Sovereignty of the Good, “the Prescriptivism of 
Richard Hare and the Emotivism of A. J. Ayer and others are the central objects of her attack, which she assimilates to 
the common element of non-naturalism in Kant and existentialism.” (IM&E 186) Here however, she refers more 
narrowly to the British tradition. 
175 As in the case of M and D, cited earlier and taken from this essay, The Idea of Perfection. 
176 Broackes points out that though this essay centres on Hampshire’s work, Hare’s Language and Morals (1952) was 
also her target here. (IMP 38, n79) 
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agreement in the use of ordinary language), and the identification of the (private) individual with 
the will. Murdoch  observes that  
 
Immense care is taken to picture the will as isolated. It is isolated from belief, from reason, from feeling, and is 
yet the essential centre of the self. ‘I identify myself with my will.’ [citing Hampshire] It is separated from 
belief so that the authority of reason, which manufactures belief, may be entire and so that responsibility for 
action may be entire as well. My responsibility is a function of my knowledge (which tries to be wholly 
impersonal) and my will (which is wholly personal). (IP, 305).  
 
The will is of course also here separated from reason, because it is a function of desire, though of a 
desire which has the noteworthy capacity to “stand back” from itself. This metaphor of the will as 
“stepping back” in order to then step forward in intention, is an interesting, but apparently not 
fully clarified one. (What occurs during the stepping back? How does this requalify “desire”?) 
What it clearly does not refer to, however, is any process of self-transformation, as, for example, 
in the Stoic “discipline of desire”, where cultivating attention to one’s desires allows one to 
understand more clearly their morally errant nature, if that is what they are seen to be, and 
gradually weaken them, becoming wiser in the process, and therefore having “wiser” desires. 
(“Wisdom” may however be another concept that is seen as “not expressible” on this view). In 
fact, according to Murdoch, “Hampshire permits no machinery in between the passive states, 
which he surrenders to empirical psychology, and the active disengaged states which manufacture 
the free will as he sees it”; the latter seeming, she remarks, “(surely transcendental enough)” 
(DPR, 196)  
 
As Murdoch sees it therefore, the freedom of the will for Hampshire has to do with the two 
features of his system she describes above: the public nature of our concepts and, crucially, the 
identification of the self with the will. These are necessarily interrelated: the inner, or mental 
world, is seen as shadowy and “inevitably parasitic on the outer world” (IP, 302); therefore it is 
only in intention and action, in the freedom of the will, that the individual self finds expression. 
On this she cites Hampshire thus: “ ‘The play of the mind, free of any expression in audible speech 
or visible action is a reality, as the play of shadows is a reality.  But any description of it is derived 
from the description of its natural expression in speech and action.’” (Ibid.) Murdoch recognises 
that examples, and they are plentiful, of the public origin of our “thinking” can be persuasive. She 
illustrates the relevant argument in this way: “How do I learn the concept of decision? By 
watching someone else who says ‘I have decided’ and then who acts. […] How do I distinguish 
anger from jealousy? Certainly not by distinguishing between two types of mental data. Consider 
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how I learned ‘anger’ and ‘jealousy.’ What identifies the emotion is the presence not of a 
particular private object, but of some typical outward behaviour pattern.” (IP, 309) Murdoch sees 
much truth in this type of observation (despite the behaviouristic over-simplification of what 
learning actually involves). She agrees that “Inner words ‘mean’ in the same way as outer words; 
and I can only ‘know’ my imagery because I know the public things which it is ‘of.” (Ibid. 310) 
She also holds that, in their favour, these arguments “really do clearly and definitely solve certain 
problems which have beset British empiricism. By destroying the misleading image of the 
infallible inner eye they make possible a much improved solution of, for instance, problems about 
perception and about universals.” (Ibid. 311) The problem she sees with this argument is that it is 
not only the infallibility of the inner eye that they found to be cumbersome, but any concept of 
“inner eye”. Since this rejection of the old metaphor leaves the new picture of the self without an 
image, Murdoch says, “Hampshire suggests that we should abandon the image (dear to the British 
empiricists) of man as a detached observer, and should rather picture him as an object moving 
among other objects in a continual flow of intention into action. Touch and movement, not vision, 
should supply our metaphors … Actions are, roughly, instances of moving things about in the 
public world. Nothing counts as an act unless it is ‘a bringing about of a recognizable change in a 
public world.’ ” (Ibid).  
One further consequence of this is that as “the ‘inner life’ is hazy, largely absent, and anyway ‘not 
part of the mechanism’ it turns out to be logically impossible to take up an idle contemplative 
attitude to the good. Morality must be action since mental concepts can only be analysed 
genetically.” (Ibid.) That is to say, as shadowy, and parasitic upon the ‘outer’. In the case of 
concepts of emotion too, anger and jealousy as mentioned here for example, it is clear that I learn 
the names for these emotions from outside myself, but one wonders how many experiences of 
private struggle with these emotions it takes before I can confidently distinguish anger from 
jealousy; before I can see how these emotions run into each other, feed each other; before I can see 
these emotions as what Wittgenstein describes as patterns recurring “with different variations, in 
the weave of our life” (PI, 174e); or what Murdoch describes, with the same metaphor, as “inner 
acts … forming part of a continuous fabric of being.” (IP, 316). Murdoch gives the further 
example of a man “trying privately to determine whether something which he feels is repentance 
or not.” She says that his investigation is of course “subject to some public rules”, but that it 
remains a highly personal activity. She writes: “Here an individual is making a specialised use of a 
concept. Of course he derives the concept initially from his surroundings; but he takes it away into 
his privacy.” (Ibid., 319) The use that he makes of this concept will depend in part on his personal 
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history, and, she says “once the historical individual is ‘let in’ a number of things have to be said 
with a difference. The idea of ‘objective reality’, for instance, undergoes important modifications 
when it is to be understood, not in relation to ‘the world described by science’, but in relation to 
the progressing life of a person.” (Ibid., 319-20). 
 It may be useful to recall at this point, that for Foucault ‘subjectivation’, the ethical process by 
which one becomes the subject of one’s own life, is a process which is individualised when some 
contingency opens a breach in one’s ‘objectification’, that is to say, when the form of public 
discourse which has shaped one’s sense of one’s own identity has weakened its hold on one for 
some reason, opening up other possibilities. Murdoch describes what “objective reality” means in 
“the progressing life of a person” as inevitably historical, Foucault goes further, treating “the 
world described by science” as also inevitably historical. This idea does not contradict, but 
reinforces Murdoch’s argument. The process itself may involve setting one public discourse 
against another, one set of concepts against another, in any case it involves what Murdoch here 
describes as deriving a concept from one’s surroundings, and taking it away into one’s privacy.177 
She writes “we have private insights and cognitions which go beyond what could be described as a 
private saying of public sentences; and even when we speak aloud may we not to some extent 
‘make the language our own’? Men dream when they are awake too. The outer and the inner are in 
a continual volatile dynamic relationship. Such is the creation and growth of the individual, the 
person who is in innumerable ways special, unique, different from his neighbour.” That this person 
lives a reality that is historical is important to her, but perhaps even more so she says: “belief in 
this person is an assertion of contingency, of the irreducible existence and importance of the 
contingent. (MGM, 349) for her it is to the contingent, even more than to the historical, that we 
owe our individuality and our individual subjectivity. 
 
With regard to the aforementioned case study of M at the heart of The Idea of Perfection, Murdoch 
notes that M’s activity, her internal struggle to overcome her negative attitude to D, “is peculiarly 
her own. Its details are the details of this personality; and partly for this reason it may well be an 
activity which can only be performed privately. M could not do this thing in conversation with 
another person.” (Ibid. 317) With regard to what this activity is, for Murdoch the metaphor of 
vision, disliked by Hampshire, is necessary here: “M looks at D, she attends to D, she focuses her 
attention. … She may for instance be tempted to enjoy caricatures of D in her imagination.” (Ibid. 
                                                 
177 Clearly Foucault’s ‘subjectivation’ and Murdoch’s “moral being” differ greatly in other ways. 
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317) These two mental concepts, of attention and imagination, and of attention to one’s own 
imagination, to what it is doing, are essential to the development of Murdoch’s picture of moral 
being. She explains:  
What M is ex hypothesi attempting to do is not just to see D accurately but to see her justly or lovingly. Notice 
the rather different image of freedom which this at once suggests. Freedom is not the sudden jumping of the 
isolated will in and out of an impersonal logical complex, it is a function of the progressive attempt to see a 
particular object clearly. (Ibid.) 
 
 According to Richard Moran, the notion of attention Murdoch is employing serves also to counter 
the atomistic picture of moral change “as if it were something made possible by isolated acts of 
instantaneous conscious choice.” He goes on, “For attention, by contrast, is in its very nature 
answerable to something outside oneself, and the action of attention does not produce its results 
instantly or by fiat, but is rather part of the arduous, progressive, piecemeal business of moral 
growth.” (IM&E, 186) For Murdoch, there is no neutral stance from which to see “accurately” 
(The world of the happy is not the world of the unhappy), and bad moods poison our vision178. 
Therefore our attention must focus on what Moran calls “the Real outside oneself” (Ibid., 181), but 
also on our own state of mind, on what our imagination is doing. If this is indeed the case, then to 
give the object of our moral judgement a fair chance of being seen accurately, we must attempt to 
see them benevolently, so that for M to see D “justly or lovingly” is not intended as an either/or 
here. This may not always be the case – much moral philosophy denies that it is ever the case, 
contrasting (impartial) justice and (partial) love – and the point is a complex one (see below); but 
for the moment let us say that on Murdoch’s view, there are cases, indeed many cases, where this 
must be true. To take as given ones’ own “rational” impartiality in judging others is an illusion; 
impartiality is in reality extremely hard to achieve (people can “hate” others because of the clothes 
they wear, their accent, or other remarkably trivial things). And since our imagination is constantly 
at work, impartiality is not to be achieved by either ignoring or denying it. A different strategy is 
required.  
 
Referring to an analysis of the imagination she found useful in her own reflections (without 
sharing the theoretical foundations) Murdoch writes that “Kant [in the Critique of Judgement] tells 
us that ‘the imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for creating, as it 
were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature … By this means we get a 
                                                 
178 Another example of this she draws attention to is that “in Anna Karenina, we learn not only the intensity but the 
quality of Levin’s joy from his finding a tiresome meeting delightful, of Anna’s misery from her seeing inoffensive 
people as beastly.” (SRR, 84)  
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sense of our freedom from the law of association (which attaches to the empirical employment of 
the imagination).’ [her italics …] This idea can go very far, farther perhaps than its author 
intended. […Though Kant here refers to art,] we may want to maintain that the world around us is 
constantly being modified or ‘presented’ (made or made up) by a spontaneous creative free faculty 
which is not that of ‘reason’ thought of as ‘beaming in’ upon purely empirical situations not 
otherwise evaluated.” (MGM, 314) (Kant’s notion of ‘reason’ conjured up for her the image of it 
as light ‘beaming in’ to empirical darkness.) This is not of course how Hampshire sees it. On the 
contrary, she writes, he “regards imagination as a side issue”; relegating it “to the passive side of 
the mind, regarding it as an isolated non-responsible faculty which makes potentially valuable 
discoveries which reason may inspect and adopt.” (DPR, 198) He implies, she says, that 
“imaginings” are just drifting ideas which he has chosen to leave out of his main argument, and 
out of his operative vocabulary. He sees the imagination as a “passive condition which may 
impede freedom by making thinking unrealistic” (Ibid.). Murdoch sees it instead as “something 
which we all do a great deal of the time”, which is not so easily separated out from “thinking”. She 
regards any attempt at definition of the imagination as unhelpful, but she does suggest a possible 
description, seeing it as: “a type of reflection on people, events, etc., which builds detail, adds 
colour, conjures up possibilities in ways which go beyond what could be said to be strictly 
factual.” (DPR, 198) She also notes that the “bad” activity of the imagination is often called 
‘fantasy’ or ‘wishful thinking’, and for her it is evidently true that the imagination can cloud 
judgement. The case of M’s original attitude to D illustrates a more subtle instance of this, and 
murderous revenge fantasies, to take just one example of bad imaginings (not rare among human 
beings) represent a worst case scenario. Between these, the “normal” fantasy life of human minds 
is not generally marked by nobility of spirit. Murdoch remarks that Plato for one was “well aware 
of the lying fantasising tendency of the human mind and that it would be hard to exaggerate our 
capacity for egoistic fabrication.” (MGM, 317)  
Despite all this, she questions whether or not the imagination, which remains nonetheless a “great 
human activity”, should be thought of only in these terms. She asks: “Is there not also a good 
constructive imagination which plays a part in our life?” (Ibid. 198-199) She says that Hampshire 
would not wish to accept this for one important reason; that is: “He can readily admit imaginings 
which are unwilled, isolated, passive. But if we admit active imagination as an important faculty it 
is difficult not to see this as an exercise of the will.” (Ibid 199). His theory requires thought to be 
untainted, to be able to see the world of facts “objectively”. For Murdoch on the other hand, “The 
world which we confront is not just a world of ‘facts’ but a world on which our imagination has, at 
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any given moment, already worked; and although such working may often be ‘fantasy’ and may 
constitute a barrier to our seeing ‘what is really there’, this is not necessarily so.” (Ibid.) The point 
in question though, and a very old one in philosophy, is how does one rid oneself of “egoistic 
fabrication” in order to genuinely achieve rational judgement? Even the most unimaginative 
people have an active imagination, so ignoring its function, as opposed to exploring it, hardly 
seems “wise”. Murdoch’s answer to this question is unorthodox however. She writes:  
 
Each of us lives and chooses within a partly private, partly fabricated world, and although any particular belief 
might be shown to be ‘merely fantastic’ it is false to suggest that we could, even in principle, ‘purge’ the world 
we confront of these personal elements. Nor is there any reason why we should. To be a human being is to 
know more than one can prove, to conceive of a reality which goes ‘beyond the facts’ in these familiar and 
natural ways.  
This activity is moreover, usually and often inevitably, an activity of evaluation. We evaluate not only by 
intentions, decisions, choices (the events Hampshire describes), but also, and largely, by the constant quiet 
work of attention and imagination. (Ibid., 199-200) 
 
 
She is saying that there is no point in developing a philosophical fantasy of morality which 
pretends to be able to resolve the “problem” of the imagination by putting it aside, or by repressing 
it. But though we cannot, and therefore should not, purge the world of our imaginings, she is not 
saying that we should accept them the way they are. Far from it, she holds that the imagination is 
active, and develops according to what it is confronted with, both habitually and in the present 
moment. This is why it is so important on the one hand to confront it, and regularly, with the idea 
of the good, or the beautiful, or truth, or the perfect, with exemplars; and on the other to turn the 
attention to the imagination itself, to look very carefully and honestly at one’s bad objects, one’s 
egoistic dreams, prejudices, etc.; to look at what goes into one’s ways of classifying what (and 
who) is bad and good. Attention is a cognitive instrument which requires much honing if it is to 
cut through the continual egoistic fabrication to get to the reality. The practice of attention she is 
suggesting here is of course a distant cousin of certain similar practices of the Greeks; practices 
that, as Hadot has shown, were unfortunately (for secular philosophy) transformed through 
centuries of Christianity to become expiation for one’s sins. Since these were construed as 
infractions of Christian moral codes, the techniques themselves have thus become unusable in 
other ethical contexts. Nonetheless, for Murdoch we must find new ways of looking, and of 
looking deep, into the cognitive (not merely “psychological”) exercise of the imagination. She 
writes: “We are obscure to ourselves because the world we see already contains our values and we 
may not be aware of the slow delicate processes of imagination and will which have put those 
values there. This implies of course that at moments of choice we are less free than Hampshire 
pictures us as (potentially) being”. (Ibid 200) 
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On Murdoch’s view therefore, choice (choosing), deciding, intending, are in themselves 
experiences requiring investigation. Of course the experience of choice is something much 
explored by the existentialists179, who do, she says, “account for a peculiar feature of moral choice, 
which is the strange emptiness which occurs at the moment of choosing.” (IP, 328) Though she 
acknowledges that there may be simple decisions to be made in which only logic and preference 
come into play, more difficult and painful choices, she says “often present this experience of void 
[…] : this sense of not being determined by the reasons.” (Ibid.) She quotes Sartre as saying: “ 
‘Quand je délibère les jeux sont faits’ ” (Ibid.). This notion, that the die is cast, that the 
deliberation is governed by “[f]orces within me which are dark to me” (Ibid.), can result in a kind 
of fatalism, a feeling that everything is determined, and that freedom is mere illusion. Murdoch 
finds this view “if anything less attractive and realistic” than the viewpoint of the rational will, and 
asks, rhetorically: “Do we really have to choose between an image of total freedom and an image 
of total determinism?” (Ibid.) Her answer to this is that it is the idea of attention that can provide a 
way out of this impasse. How we make our choices has to do with how we see, so the question 
then is how do we see? Can we trust in the serene impartiality of our perception, or is serene 
impartiality something to achieve, through moral effort and moral imagination? Murdoch holds 
that this is precisely what is required in order to see (another person, for example) clearly, and this 
– the moral effort of trying to see clearly – is what she means by “attention”. It is true of course 
that where any present deliberation comes from is largely from everything that has previously 
taken place in the mind (which is why moral activity must also create good mental habits), but that 
still leaves space for the activity of the present moment. She writes:  
 
If we ignore the prior work of attention and notice only the emptiness of the moment of choice we are likely to 
identify freedom with the outward movement since there is nothing else to identify it with. But if we consider 
what the work of attention is like, and how continuously it goes on, how imperceptibly it builds up structures of 
value round about us, we shall not be surprised that at crucial moments of choice most of the business of 
choosing is already over. This does not imply that we are not free, certainly not. But it implies that the exercise 
of our freedom is a small piecemeal business which goes on all the time and not a grandiose leaping about 
unimpeded at important moments. The moral life, on this view, is something that goes on continually, not 
something that is switched off in between the occurrence of specific moral choices. What happens in between 
such choices is indeed what is crucial.(Ibid., 329) 
 
                                                 
179 Murdoch in fact classifies “together as existentialist both philosophers such as Sartre who claim the title, and 
philosophers such as Hampshire, Hare, Ayer, who do not. Characteristic of both is the identification of the true person 
with the empty choosing will, and the corresponding emphasis upon the idea of movement rather than vision.” (IP, 
327) 
 231 
To return to her example of the moral work that M is doing in looking at D and at herself, in 
focusing her attention, Murdoch says that this is “something progressive, something infinitely 
perfectible. So far from claiming for it a sort of infallibility, this new picture has built in the notion 
of a necessary fallibility. M is engaged in an endless task. As soon as we begin to use words such 
as ‘love’ and ‘justice’ in characterising M, we introduce into our whole conceptual picture of her 
situation the idea of progress, that is the idea of perfection”. (IP, 317-18) This idea of perfection, 
the idea of a progression in our mode of conceptualising, undermines the confident notion of what 
Taylor calls “disengaged reason” employed by analytic moral philosophy. By “disengaged 
reasoning” he means “reasoning which can turn on its own proceedings and examine them for 
accuracy and reliability.” (IMMP, 6) It takes away the ‘outer’ standard of reference, in that, 
Murdoch writes, “Moral tasks are characteristically endless not only because ‘within’, as it were, a 
given concept our efforts are imperfect, but also because as we move and as we look our concepts 
themselves are changing.” (IP, 321) 
Murdoch does not elucidate further on the connection she establishes here between “love and 
justice” and “perfection”, which leaves her reader with a problem, as these concepts figure 
prominently in other moral theories with which, as they are crucial to modern democracies, we are 
generally more familiar. With regard to these concepts, Taylor notes that Anglo-Saxon moral 
philosophy has mostly focused on what things we ought to do. “One theory says that they [the 
things we ought to do] all involve maximising human happiness; another says that they all involve 
our not acting on maxims which are not univerzalisable.” (IMMP, 10). These theories he calls 
“single-term moralities”, the former focusing on “benevolence” (a synonym of “kindness”, which 
may be taken as one of the – more public – faces of “love”), the latter on “justice”. In practice, 
both these theories, the utilitarian and the deontological, form the ethical underpinning of modern 
democracies, together creating what he calls the domain of “justice-benevolence”. Nonetheless, 
Taylor continues, “There is an internal tension that can arise here between the two terms. The 
issue can arise: When should we override justice in the name of benevolence? Should we ever 
override it at all? Traditionally put this is the issue of justice versus mercy.” He comments on this 
type of dilemma that the idea that it can be resolved internally, with some kind of “calculus of 
obligated action” is an illusion, and one that “only makes sense on condition that their 
homogenous domain exhausts the moral.” Clearly for Taylor, as for Murdoch, this is not the case. 
On the contrary, he says, “Ethical thinking, to use this term for the broader domain, sometimes 
also requires deliberation about what it is good to be in order to determine what to do in certain 
circumstances.” (IMMP, 11-12). As pointed out, Murdoch affirms but does not thematise the 
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connection between justice and perfection; but the following passage from one of her novels, The 
Nice and the Good, is an illuminating illustration of an imperfect “perfectionist” reflection on 
justice, on the part of one of its institutional protagonists, the barrister Ducane: 
 
It is impossible to be a barrister without imagining oneself a judge, and Ducane’s imagination had often taken 
this flight. However, and this was another reason for Ducane’s ultimate disgust with life in the courts, the whole 
situation of ‘judging’ was abhorrent to him. He had watched his judges closely, and had come to the conclusion 
that no human being is worthy to be a judge…. Ducane’s rational mind knew that there had to be law courts 
and that English law was on the whole good law and English judges good judges. But he detested that 
confrontation between the prisoner in the dock and the judge, dressed so like a king or a pope, seated up above 
him. His irrational heart, perceptive of the pride of judges, sickened and said it should not be thus; and said it 
more passionately because there was that in Ducane which wanted to be a judge. 
Ducane knew … that there were moments when he had said to himself, “I alone of all these people am good 
enough, am humble enough, to be a judge.” … He did not rightly know what to do with these visions. 
Sometimes he took them … for a sort of harmless idealism. Sometimes they seemed to him the most corrupting 
influences in his life. 
What Ducane was experiencing, in this form peculiar to him of imagining himself as a judge, was, though this 
was not entirely clear in his mind, one of the great paradoxes of morality, namely that in order to become good 
it may be necessary to imagine oneself good, and yet such imagining may also be the very thing which renders 
improvement impossible … To become good it may be necessary to think about virtue; although unreflective 
people might achieve a thoughtless excellence. Ducane was in any case highly reflective and had from 
childhood quite explicitly set before himself the aim of becoming a good man; and although he had little of the 
demoniac in his nature there was a devil of pride, a stiff Calvinistic Scottish devil, who was quite capable of 
bringing Ducane to utter damnation, and Ducane knew this perfectly well. (pp. 74-75) 
 
 
If Foucault has brilliantly analysed the symbolic trappings of power (and its counterpart in 
humiliation) of the judicial systems of earlier centuries, this fine literary passage could stand as an 
illustration of the power-game in its most discreet, most English (in the self-representation of 
English), twentieth century form. Murdoch explores many things here. In the first place it is a 
description of the mental proliferation in which we all live, with its muddy moral contours. 
Whatever our present experience, interlaced in it there is usually future projection, with ourselves 
as hero or victim of the developing story, depending on the way in which our present mental state 
colours that projection. In Ducane’s case, this particular fantasy veers between pride and shame, 
equally incapacitating, as a genuine desire for the good gets lost in the middle. The narrative of the 
self, as she presents it here, also runs backwards from the present, as we insert an edited version of 
each experience into the belief we have about who we are: a would-be good man with a devilish 
Scottish pride, or whatever. But the point she is most concerned to express is that of the difficulty 
of working out how to be good – one of the great paradoxes of morality. It requires reflection (its 
occurrence as mere chance is to be welcomed, but cannot be counted on), and yet reflection does 
not occur in an imaginative vacuum, and the imagination has a problem with the ego. For this 
reason the moral progression she envisages is both “endlessly perfectible” and endlessly fallible.  
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Murdoch complains that “it is a shortcoming of much contemporary moral philosophy that it 
eschews discussion of the separate virtues, preferring to proceed directly to some sovereign 
concept such as sincerity, or authenticity, or freedom, thereby imposing, it seems to me, an 
unexamined and empty idea of unity, and impoverishing our moral language in an important 
area.”(OGG, 347) Nonetheless, when she asks: “What is it like to be just?”, she immediately 
replies that “We come to understand this as we come to understand the relationship between 
justice and the other virtues.” (Ibid.) Despite appearances, there is no contradiction here. What she 
means is that any unity that is theoretically derived and imposed on reality will be false. That it is 
necessary to look at the virtues separately, in a whole range of circumstances, but that in the 
process of doing this the way each virtue involves others, the fact that there are no clear 
borderlines between them, becomes apparent empirically. 
To return to the will, now from this Murdochian perspective, as with other moral concepts, she 
sees its hypostatisation (or false unity) in various philosophical formulations as problematic and 
confusing. “Will” she writes “can be a term which, seeming to deal with or explain a large matter, 
halts reflection at a crucial point. It may be better … to restrict the term will, as ‘willing’ or 
‘exercise of will’, to cases where there is an immediate straining, for instance occasioned by a 
perceived duty or principle, against a large part of preformed consciousness.”  (MGM, 300) From 
this position, one crucial point at which Hampshire’s reflection would seem to have halted here is 
precisely in relation to those moments of internal conflict in which we experience “willing”, when 
we feel our “will” to be engaged in such “straining”; those moments in which some interaction 
must (presumably) occur between active, thought-dependent desires, and passive desires. Murdoch 
pursues this line of thought thus: 
 
What moves us – our motives, our desires, our reasoning – emerges from a constantly changing complex; moral 
change is the change of that complex, for better or worse. Herein intellectual experiences, states of reflective 
viewing of the world, are continually moving in relation to more affective or instinctive levels of thought and 
feeling. Experience, awareness, consciousness, these words emphasise the existence of the thinking, planning, 
remembering, acting moral being as a mobile creature living in the present. … The problem of freedom of the 
will must be thought of as lying inside such a picture. Freedom (in this sense) is freedom from bad habit and 
bad desire, and is brought about in all sorts of ways by impulses of love, rational reflection, new scenery, 
conscious and deliberate formation of new attachments and so on. (MGM, 300) 
 
It appears here, as in the discourse of “virtue ethics”, that Murdoch holds that the only thing which 
will guarantee that the “freedom of the will” does not lead to the bad is freedom from – or at least 
striving to be free from – bad habit and bad desire; and that to achieve this freedom it is necessary 
 234 
to cultivate the virtues. This is indeed part of, but not the whole of, her own picture of what moral 
being requires. 
 
 
3. Existentialism. 
 
 
Existentialism and [linguistic] empiricism … share a number of motives and doctrines. Both philosophies are 
against traditional metaphysics, attack substantial theories of the mind, have a touch of Puritanism, construe 
virtue in terms of will rather than in terms of knowledge, emphasise choice, are markedly Liberal in their 
political bias, are neo-Kantian. But in other ways they are very different. (S&BR 267) 
 
[Existentialism] is also a natural mode of being of the capitalist era. It is attractive, and indeed to most of us still 
natural, because it suggests individualism, self-reliance, private conscience, and what we ordinarily think of as 
political freedom, in that important sense where freedom means not doing what is right but doing what is 
desired.” (E&M, 223-24) 
 
Murdoch over-generalises in these compressed sketches partly in order to draw attention to the 
Kantian concept of the autonomy of the individual, shared by these two philosophies, and the 
ensuing political freedom this concept guarantees. It is a concept that is structural to the Western 
democracies (less so to capitalism, though historically they have so far more or less coincided), 
and as such is to us “a natural mode of being”. She insists on this Kantian core of both 
contemporary philosophies, though in expanding the argument she is equally concerned to map the 
different genealogies which have helped to produce the very different images of who we are that 
they present. Murdoch’s classification of linguistic empiricism as “existentialist” on grounds that 
the two separate lines of philosophical development both paint a neo-Kantian picture – with these 
important variations – of the self as an isolated choosing will, may however seem strange in one 
who is generally so keen to mark differences. Among these differences she notes that whereas for 
Kant, “We respect others, not as particular eccentric phenomenal individuals, but as co-equal 
bearers of universal reason” (Ibid., 262, my emphasis); in the British empiricist tradition, in “the 
world as envisaged by Hobbes, Locke, and Hume there is a plurality of persons, who are quite 
separate and different individuals and who have to get along together. Moreover, implicitly for 
Hobbes, and explicitly for Locke, that which has a right to exist, that which is deserving of 
tolerance and respect, is not the rational or good person, but the actual empirically existing person 
whatever he happens to be like.” (Ibid., 265) This tolerant, commonsensical attitude, even love of 
eccentricity and human variation, has also allowed a tolerant attitude to oneself and one’s moral 
failings to arise, favoured, as Murdoch notes, by the “phenomenal luck of our English-speaking 
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societies.”180 (Ibid., 266) Murdoch labels the person viewed from this perspective as “Ordinary 
Language Man”, one “who is not overwhelmed by any structure larger than himself, such as might 
be represented by a metaphysical belief or an institution. … it has been a major preoccupation of 
empiricist moral philosophy to depict the agent as totally free and self-sufficient. Even the 
presence of others is felt, if at all, simply as the presence of rational critics.” (Ibid., 268).  
 
The (pre and post-Kantian) historical and philosophical development of continental Europe was 
very different, and at its heart, for Murdoch, was Hegel181. Whereas Kantian subjects were 
endowed with the same, atemporal, acultural faculty of reason, “in the Hegelian world reason has 
a history, that is the subject has a history” (NM, 103). There is no sustained Murdochian study of 
Hegel, but his presence is felt in her writings, though not in the pervasive way that it was felt, in 
her view, in the work of his Hegelian – and anti-Hegelian – successors.182 Noting this, Denham 
says that Murdoch’s writings “venture into the territory of traditional a priori metaphysics and 
epistemology, but their beating heart is her exercise in descriptive, experiential phenomenology, 
where she explores the details of what it is like to engage seriously with ethical problems from a 
first-person, experiential point of view.” (PEMM, 328). Murdoch saw a constant tension in 
Hegel’s work between detailed attention to contingent reality, to phenomena, and at the same time 
the relentless absorption of all contingency into the totality of the Absolute (“In Hegel contingency 
progresses into the ideal totality” (MGM, 370) ). She saw this tension continually reappearing in 
many guises, idealist, romantic and existentialist, as well as in Marxism, whether as concept or as 
counter-concept. On the one hand, she says, “[w]hat Hegel teaches us is that we should attempt to 
describe phenomena… What we are all working upon, it might be said, is le monde vécu, the lived 
world, what is actually experienced, thought of as itself being the real, and carrying its own truth 
criteria with it – and not as being the reflection or mental shadow of some other separate mode of 
being which lies behind it in static parallel.” (EPM, 131) On the other hand, and despite this anti-
                                                 
180 Revolutionary, and more importantly, totalitarian, fervour having been relatively short-lived in England, since 
cutting off the head of one king, a return to more gradual methods of change, and of accommodation of difference, has 
generally been favoured. 
181 She writes: “It is almost mysterious how little Hegel is esteemed in this country. This philosopher, who, while not 
the greatest, contains possibly more truth than any other, is unread and unstudied here.” (HMD, 146) 
182 For Murdoch Sartre, like all metaphysicians, was obsessed with the need to elaborate a conceptual system that 
would provide the key to everything, tempered by the painful knowledge that this is illusion. However “The model 
which seems to prove that such a total philosophical synthesis can be, very nearly, achieved is Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Mind, and it has been the dream of more than one metaphysically minded thinker, after and 
including Marx, to rewrite this book and get it right. Sartre attempted it twice. l’Être et le Néant was a huge non-
historical revision of the subject-object dialectic, in which the prime value, and motive force, replacing Hegel’s Geist, 
was freedom (individual project) … Sartre here portrayed the dialectic psychologically as the human soul; later he 
portrayed it socio-politically as human history.” (SRR, 11) 
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Kantian stance, his concept of “consciousness … (as belonging to a supra-personal whole) has the 
same effect of displacing the vitality and significance of the individual”. (MGM, 153) “Hegel’s 
Geist” she writes, “is the energy which perpetually urges the ever-unsatisfied intellect (and so the 
whole of being) onward toward Absolute reality. Everything is relative, incomplete, not yet fully 
real, not yet fully true, dialectic is a continual reformulation. Such is the history of thought, of 
civilisation, or of the ‘person’ who, immersed in this process, is carried on towards some 
postulated self-consistent totality.” (MGM, 488) Murdoch labels the picture of the self which 
emerges from this vision as “Totalitarian Man” (S&BR, 268). She means this in a more generally 
ethical, rather than a political sense; the one may, though not necessarily, lend itself to the other. 
One aspect of this vastly influential picture was the requirement of continual work on this self, the 
requirement of self-knowledge. She says of Kierkegaard, for example, that though he hated Hegel, 
he “is profoundly Hegelian. He retained and used with wonderful versatility the clear, dramatic, 
solipsistic picture of the self at war with itself and passing in this way through phases in the 
direction of self-knowledge.”183 (Ibid., 265). This task is his life’s work, which is to say that his 
life is his life’s work. 
  
As Moran remarks, there are many references, but not many actual citations from texts generally 
recognised as existentialist in much of her work (outside of her early monograph, Sartre Romantic 
Rationalist). He surmises that “our philosophical interest may be in something ‘existentialist-
sounding’ rather than actually defended by Sartre, Kierkegaard, or others” and also that “there are 
obvious dangers in this ‘assimilating’ approach.” (IM&E, 184) The main danger being, he says, 
not so much that anyone would be led into confusion regarding the views of these authors, “but 
rather that we fail to see that in criticizing this or that element of this combined image, Murdoch is 
resourcefully deploying several of the defining insights of certain Existentialists themselves.” 
(Ibid.) He points out that “Existentialism arises as a reactive movement of thought (a stance 
embodied in the familiar existentialist figure of rebellion)” (Ibid., 187); and that what these 
philosophers have in common has more to do with what they are opposed to than what they 
defend. In particular, like Murdoch, they put forward “various rejections of any positivist idea of 
‘fact’ which defines it in opposition to the ‘evaluative’. [… Moreover] no one could reasonably 
accuse these writers [he refers to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Heidegger], of all people, of 
restricting moral attention to single, overt, and public actions, and leaving out of account the moral 
                                                 
183 Though, she writes: “Sartre praises Kierkegaard for maintaining against Hegel that what I crave from the world is 
the recognition of my being as an individual, and not as an abstract truth.” (SRR, 127) 
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importance of the ‘inner life’, including emotional life and habits of attention.” (Ibid.) Moran goes 
further, making the interesting point that it is from “within a broadly Existentialist framework that 
we can break the hold of another opposition which Murdoch seeks to overcome: seeing any 
‘serious’ or ‘cognitive’ moral change in the person as grounded exclusively in a change of belief, 
with the rest of the mental life confined to mere sensations, and thus lacking any understanding of 
the moral difference made by such things as changes in attitude, feeling, attention, or habits of 
thought.” (Ibid.) Therefore, he argues, the form of freedom presented in existentialist literature is 
never that of the isolated will, but is always of the situated individual: “we are told that the person 
is always engaged in some situation or other (or rather in an interlocking set of situations); that the 
person does not exist and then come to acquire a situation, but is always ready to be found within 
one. […] The fate of situatedness as such is not escapable, but at the same time the situation does 
not itself dictate one’s orientation to it.” (Ibid., 190). In other words, our freedom has to do with 
the different possibilities of response within any situation.  
What Moran calls the “Sartrean” conception of freedom that emerges here he describes as “both 
finite and unbounded.” Finite in as far as the circumstances we find ourselves in are what they are, 
they cannot be bent to our will; unbounded in as far as there are always all sorts of ways in which 
we can and do choose to respond to the situation: “The ‘facticities’ which make up my situation 
may be said to be ‘given’, but there is always the question of what the person makes of them”. 
(Ibid.) This freedom cannot therefore be construed as that of the isolated will, or ‘empty self’; it is 
only through the kind of close attention to what is given in the situation, the ‘facticities’, that it 
comes into play, and importantly, through “refusing to reify or take for granted the given attitudes 
with which it [the situated self] approaches the situation.” He goes on, 
 
We could call this self ‘empty’ only in the following sense: when it confronts such a situation calling for 
thought, the ideal it holds itself to is that any core belief or other attitude is sustained in the self only by the 
continued endorsement of the self. (This is the sense of Sartre’s slogan ‘There is no inertia in consciousness’ 
(BN 61/104) (Ibid., 194)    
 
From such a perspective, “empty” is not then a passive condition, but a result of the activity of the 
wakeful consciousness of emptying the self of habitual views. Moran is drawing on Sartre here, 
but this image also recalls Heidegger’s image of consciousness as a clearing (as in a forest), as 
Murdoch presents it (see below). As Moran points out, Murdoch’s metaphor of “vision” could also 
stand for “the very dimension of action that Existentialists like Kierkegaard and Sartre are fairly 
obsessive in insisting on.” (Ibid.) In fact, he explains, when we look closer at this metaphor of 
vision, and the practice of attention, which Murdoch puts forward as “a correction to the exclusive 
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concentration in moral thought on action and agency” (Ibid., 186), we see that the metaphor “is not 
in any simple opposition to the idea of action, but in fact contains it. Indeed it is the morally 
difficult activity of imagination that Murdoch uses the metaphor of vision to draw our attention to, 
not a matter of passive receptivity, but rather the endless effort to see clearly. […] So, contrary to 
the impression we might have received before, the metaphor of vision is not intended as 
competitor to the self as agent, but is rather in the service of rejecting a particular impoverished 
picture of agency.” (IM&E, 189). She herself says that “It seemed from L’Être et le néant that 
what Sartre meant by ‘freedom’ was the reflective, imaginative power of the mind, its mobility, its 
negating of the ‘given’, its capacity to rise out of muddy unreflective states, its tendency to return 
to an awareness of itself.” (SRR, 96). 
 
All this being said, why then does Murdoch persist in targeting existentialism? In Sartre, Romantic 
Rationalist, she characterises Sartre’s most clarified picture of the self thus: 
 
The metaphysical imagery of L’Être et le Néant, Being and Nothingness, was, for popular purposes, easily 
grasped. The pour-soi, for-itself, a spontaneous free consciousness, was contrasted with the en-soi, in-itself, 
inert, fixed, unfree. The en-soi was the world experienced as alien, senselessly contingent or unreflectively 
deformed. The heroic consciousness, the individual self, inalienably and ineluctably free, challenging and 
confronting the ‘given’ in the form of existing society, history, tradition, other people. (SRR,  9) 
 
Here she is drawing attention to the fact that, as with Kant’s pure practical reason, in Sartre’s view 
consciousness is active and free but, in contrast to the imposition of constraints on the self 
produced by Kant’s free-to-be-dutiful Reason, for which conformity was generally valued, Sartre’s 
freedom echoes rather the rejection of constraints and the anti-conformism of Nietszche; it is 
romantically free to create itself. The dark side of this consciousness however is the passive in-
itself of the unfree, unreflective life. This en-soi is what is “given”, and it appears “as inert, 
conventional opinions, dead traditions, illusions.” (SRR, 11). Murdoch speaks often of Sartre’s en-
soi as the “horror of the contingent”, as “contingent matter, our surroundings, things, experienced 
as senseless and awful” (SRR, 12,10); the metaphors he uses for it are of a gluey, opaque viscous 
mess. The portrait of this self emerges most clearly in what Murdoch considers one of Sartre’s 
finest works (though at the same time she sees it as “a hate-poem”), the novel La Nausée. Here 
Roquentin, the hero, “yearns for logical necessity in the order of the world [… but] feels the vanity 
of these wishes.” She goes on: 
 
What Roquentin has in common with Hume and with present-day empiricists is that he broods descriptively 
upon the doubt situation, instead of moving rapidly on to the task of providing a metaphysical solution. 
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Roquentin does not feel so sure that rational knowledge and moral certainty are possible; he examines 
piecemeal the process of thinking, the commonplaces of morality, and accepts the nihilistic conclusions of his 
study. A further result of his brooding over the doubt is the neurotic distress about language which then assails 
him; in this respect too Roquentin is of his age. But what marks him out as an existentialist doubter is the fact 
that he himself is in the picture: what most distresses him is that his own individual being is invaded by the 
senseless flux; what most interests him is his aspiration to be in a different way. (SRR, 43) 
 
 
This is a description of the pour-soi in conflict with the en-soi construed as inside the self but 
shaped by outside, by language and therefore by others. But the awful paradox, isolating this 
individual even further, is that the same struggle experienced by ‘the other’ stands, not in 
solidarity with, but against oneself. The other may thus be seen as an alien being “whose freedom 
contradicts one’s own, and whose unassimilable Medusa gaze turns one’s pour-soi into an en-
soi.”(SRR, 11) Clearly, if this is our image of “the other”, then indeed l’enfer c’est les autres. As 
she points out, the lovers in Sartre’s novels “are engaged in perpetual speculation about the 
attitude of the other” (SRR, 130), where they are not in much more destructive interaction; but 
even friendship is doomed. Murdoch writes that in his trilogy, Les Chemins de la liberté, “There is 
only one hint of deep commitment, of real emotion, in the personal sphere, and that is in the 
relationship of Brunet and Schneider”. Schneider dies however, and Sartre, commenting on this 
friendship, says that it was, after all “un drôle d’amitie.” (SRR, 60-61). Despite this bleak view of 
human relationships, Murdoch says that love as a value does emerge from the death of Schneider, 
of which Sartre writes that “ ‘No human victory can efface this absolute of suffering.’ ” Murdoch 
says this loss of love, in death, is presented as a “ ‘paradise lost’ – a paradise of human 
companionship – and of a final isolation.” She notes that “here something more is affirmed, 
namely that the moment of human love had its absolute value, and that its loss is absolute loss.” 
(Ibid., 62). The existential situatedness of which Moran speaks appears in this picture as a very 
lonely situatedness (like Hegel’s ‘unhappy consciousness’ to which she frequently refers). 
Accordingly the virtues here are lonely virtues: “sincerity, courage, will: the unillusioned exercise 
of complete freedom”, Murdoch says, while “the ordinary bourgeois social virtues, which take 
society for granted, are cases of bad faith.” (S&BR, 269) The labelling of many of these 
“ordinary” virtues as “bourgeois” (and the celebration of anti-conformism as such) was something 
Murdoch saw as rather slack historicity, and morally problematic. 
Murdoch distances her own picture of moral being, in which attention to others, and love, figure so 
largely, from both this picture and from that of linguistic empiricism thus: “whereas Ordinary 
Language Man represents the surrender to convention, the Totalitarian Man represents the 
surrender to neurosis: convention and neurosis, the two enemies of understanding, one might say 
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the enemies of love; and how difficult it is in the modern world to escape from one without 
invoking the other. Sartre’s man is like a neurotic who seeks to cure himself by unfolding a myth 
around himself. Ordinary Language Man is at least surrounded by something which is not of his 
own creation, viz. ordinary language.” (S&BR, 268) 
This is an advantage, but not a game-changing one, because, she continues: “Neither pictures 
virtue as concerned with anything real outside ourselves. Neither provides us with a standpoint for 
considering real human beings in their variety, and neither presents us with any technique for 
exploring and controlling our own spiritual energy.” (Ibid., 269) and finally: “The philosopher 
often clarifies and crystallises something which exists in a less coherent form in the general 
consciousness: that is, I take the general consciousness today to be ridden either by convention or 
by neurosis; and there are many features in both these current philosophies in which we can 
recognise ourselves.” (S&BR, 270) Anxiety regarding self-image abounds in the West today, 
which is something very different from an ethical self-questioning. The particular existentialist 
form of this anxiety, this Angst, may occur, Murdoch says “when there is any felt discrepancy 
between personality and ideals. Perhaps very simple people escape it and some civilisations have 
not experienced it at all.” (IP, 330) (In fact, the present Dalai Lama, and other Eastern spiritual 
guides to Western souls, have frequently commented on the ubiquity of self-obsessed anxiety and 
of guilt in the West, both syndromes almost unknown in traditional Eastern societies.) “Extreme 
Angst, in the popular modern form, is a disease or addiction of those who are passionately 
convinced that the personality resides solely in the conscious omnipotent will: and in so far as this 
conviction is wrong the condition partakes of illusion.” (Ibid., 330-31)  
According to Murdoch, Sartre (and Derrida) “were of course influenced by Heidegger, adopting 
from him his ‘heroic’ distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic life” (MGM, 158), the 
latter category all too often accommodating the lives of ordinary individuals. Despite this, and the 
reason for her interest in his early work, she says of Heidegger, that he “(in Sein und Zeit) takes his 
stand ‘in the middle of experience’, a place avoided by other philosophers. Existentialists 
professed to do something of the sort, but without much success. Perhaps in his attempt to explain 
what it is to be a here and now experiencing person, (early) Heidegger is the only true 
existentialist. His Dasein, being-there, self-being, makes its first appearance as an individual. The 
views of later Heidegger are another matter.” (MGM, 160) 
She often said that the two philosophers who had “most deeply disturbed philosophical thinking” 
in the twentieth century were Wittgenstein and Heidegger, and, also that “[i]t is a sad, interesting 
comment on the general state of philosophy that there are so few thinkers who are equally 
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interested in both.” (SZ, 94) The book she herself wrote on Heidegger, late in life, she felt was 
unsatisfactory, and she was not able to complete its correction. For this reason it has never been 
published; except, very recently, for the first chapter (of five drafted) cited below184. His work was 
important to her, however, in relation to the question of selfhood construed as moral being. She 
says that a fundamental move for both him and Wittgenstein was “the retirement of the old 
metaphysical subject. […] Heidegger” she writes “uses the term Dasein, ‘being there’, to indicate, 
in the most general and initially vague sense, human awareness, consciousness, something there; 
Dasein is also primordially Being-in-the-World. It is its world. [… Dasein] is not a subject, or an 
‘individual’ or an entity, but rather a sort of relation, or world-awareness, or being-there of a 
world. (Wittgenstein, […] without fuss, and in terms of the nature of language, makes the same 
move, Tractatus 5.62 and following and Investigations passim.)” (95-96). Heidegger thus 
distinguishes Daseins from: “Being, which is that from which, or by which, they are given, and 
(roughly) what surrounds Dasein on every side.” (SZ, 97) She describes the way that this 
“awareness” finds itself in a world which is “essentially contingent, its Being.in-the-World (In-
der-Welt-Sein) is accidental [...] and so, limited, temporal, historical”.  
For Murdoch, Dasein, though not an entity, nonetheless required an image, one for which 
Heidegger was inspired, she believes, by “clearings” in his beloved Black Forest: “Dasein is not a 
thing, but more like an open space, or absence, which permits or encourages manifestations of 
Being. Only in human existence, consciousness, is Being disclosed” (97); and then only fleetingly, 
moments of “presence” appearing, as in a clearing, and slipping back into absence. What she 
appreciated in Heidegger’s picture is evident from the following brief account she gives of it: 
 
Heidegger holds no theory of a transcendent systematised order of spiritual reality, or true knowledge, which it 
is man’s proper destiny to realise. The word ‘Being’, in Heidegger’s parlance, indicates the infinite availability 
of beings to each Dasein, ‘thrown’ as it is into contingent surroundings, where it always confronts ‘more’ and 
‘other’. ‘Being is the transcendens pure and simple’ (62:68). This is what must be taken as absolutely primary; 
and not the old metaphysical subject who was always busy constructing, or argumentatively seeking, or 
dialectically pouncing upon, the objects of which its ‘external world’ was to consist.(97) 
 
 
Here as elsewhere her appreciation of philosophical arguments which shift attention from the self 
construed as some kind of entity to a self construed as a centre of experience is evident, as is her 
capacity to see through the thickets of what she considered unhelpful philosophical terminology to 
“the clearing”. She saw Heidegger’s coming at the problem from a different angle as opening up 
                                                 
184 Cf. Iris Murdoch, Philosopher, ed. Justin Broackes, OUP, Oxford, 2011, “Sein und Zeit: Pursuit of Being”, pp.93-
109. Broackes notes: “It is a work caught literally in progress, half-corrected. It occupies sheets 1-26 of the full 224-
sheet typescript on Heidegger”. 
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the possibility of a greater exploration of experience, with its inevitable affective qualities, and she 
sympathises with his claim “(178:139) that ‘the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life 
in general has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle. On 
the contrary, affects and feelings come under the theme of psychological phenomena, functioning 
as a third class of these, usually along with ideation and volition. They sink to the level of 
accompanying phenomena.’” (SZ, 96) Murdoch shared this objection to the sidelining of affect as 
“psychological”; she did not see the emotions as something separate from cognition (or ideation), 
nor from volition (including the moral will). But for her, Heidegger’s work did not fulfil the 
promise hinted at here, moving off in a different direction. In a footnote to the passage cited 
above, Heidegger (quoting Pascal on the relation of love and knowledge) “here notices” she 
writes, “and at once abandons, an idea of immense importance, that of the moral content of 
cognition and the ubiquity of evaluation. […] The implication of his lack of interest is that at an 
‘everyday’ level, proximally and for the most part [in Heideggerian terminology], human life has 
no in-built moral aspect. In his system, moral insight or inspiration is a later, or farther, or special, 
or specialised, narrowly defined, achievement.” (SZ, 97)  
This introduces a qualitative distinction between Daseins, and between, on the one hand Dasein’s; 
“everyday (alltäglich), provisional, incomplete, not yet authentic, ordinary state” (SZ, 97), which 
she says Heidegger portrays as “curiously bereft of values”; and on the other, the more fully-
fledged “authentic” being, “which consists of higher and enlightened forms of what are already 
represented as fundamental structures.” (Ibid., 98). “Everyday Dasein” Murdoch writes, “the fuzzy 
and confused state of our ordinary awareness, is analysed by Heidegger in terms of various 
structural levels. Heidegger repeatedly insists that there is no correspondence between the level to 
which a Dasein attains – along the path from inauthentic to authentic – and individual human 
beings and their cultural levels (the ‘honest peasant’ being a lauded figure in his human 
panorama), but the coincidence of the higher qualities of Dasein and various high cultural 
attributes make this insistence slightly suspect for Murdoch. 
She was particularly interested in the way that Heidegger speaks of the “understanding 
(Verständnis) and state of mind (Befindlichkeit, how we find ourselves)” as those primary 
structures that are constitutive of Dasein; with the further qualification that “Mood (Stimmung) 
characterises both states of mind and understanding as primary cognition. Fear, for instance, is a 
mode of state of mind.” (Ibid.). If states of mind have emotional qualities, or “modes”, such as that 
of fear, she suggests that an analysis of such fundamental structures would seem necessary to the 
further development of the theory; and yet she quotes Heidegger admitting that “ ‘the different 
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modes of state-of-mind and the ways in which they are interconnected in their foundations cannot 
be interpreted within the problematic of the present investigation’ ” (Ibid.). Nor, she thought, were 
they thoroughly investigated elsewhere in his work. Despite this, Murdoch says, he uses these 
relatively unexplored concepts as the basis of his analysis of our “awareness” or “consciousness”. 
“Such an analysis” Murdoch writes, “cannot but be arbitrary, and in this case is designed by 
Heidegger to offer a primary support, in ‘inauthentic’ being, for his later theory of ‘authentic’ 
being. In fact, each Dasein in creating its own world as it responds to Being, is subject to multifold 
illusions and, she says, temptations to error: “ ‘Being-in-the-world is in itself tempting 
[versucherish]’ (221: 177). A prime temptation is represented by They: public opinion, conformity, 
society. ‘Idle talk [Gerede] and the way things have been publicly interpreted.’ (221: 177).” 
(Ibid.). It is not that “everyday chatter” is necessarily bad for Heidegger. Though “inauthentic”, he 
says repeatedly that “ ‘the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any “less” Being or any 
“lower” degree of Being. Rather it is the case that even in its fullest concretion Dasein can be 
characterised by inauthenticity – when busy, when excited, when interested, when ready for 
enjoyment.’ (68: 43).” It is at this point, Murdoch says, that we may wish to question Heidegger’s 
account, “which often in fact seems realistic and capable of being explained equally well without 
philosophical jargon” (SZ, 99). In this regard, she acknowledges that everyday chatter is clearly 
not “a manifestation of human greatness or virtue”, and also that, though possibly trivial, it is not 
seen by Heidegger as necessarily bad. What she objects to is that his distinction of authentic and 
inauthentic “in effect leaves the ordinary world of human activity, when we are busy, interested, 
enjoying something, without any signs of moral activity or moral orientation. […] There is a kind 
of contempt for human existence if not in some way ‘exalted’ implied in Heidegger’s 
condescension towards Gerede and similar ‘inauthentic’ activities.” (Ibid.).185  
Cavell, who like Murdoch took Heidegger very seriously, also felt this. He cites, as an example, 
Heidegger, from What Is Called Thinking?, talking about the “abbreviation of words, or 
combination of their initials”, such as “Uni” for “University” and “Kino” (movies) for the cinema, 
as “[a] symptom, at first sight quite superficial, of the growing power of one-track thinking 
…(p.34).” (QO, 159) Reading this, Cavell asks himself: “When I use the word ‘movies’ (instead 
of ‘motion pictures?’ ‘cinema’) am I really exemplifying, even helping along, the annihilation of 
human speech, hence of the human? [Heidegger’s point]. And then I think: Heidegger cannot hear 
                                                 
185 For Sartre too ‘talk’ is suspect. Murdoch writes. “The notion that talk is false and only action is true … can also be 
deduced from the psychology of L’Être et le Néant. Talk is mauvaise foi, choice reveals the man, and is the truth. 
(SRR 34) 
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the difference between the useful non-speak or moon-talk of acronyms (UNESCO, NATO, MIRV, 
AIDS) and the intimacy (call it nearness) of passing colloquialisms and cult abbreviations (Kino, 
flick, shrink, Poli Sci). […] as to his evoking of popular language and culture, Heidegger hasn’t 
the touch for it, the ear for it.” (Ibid., 159-60).  
Murdoch sees the notion that “Daseins inhabit (experience, make-to-be) a precognitive, and 
prelinguistic world, which demands or prompts interpretation” (SZ, 100), as a useful starting point 
for examining levels of consciousness, but for her his system-building gets in the way of the 
promise it contains of a deeper understanding of the passage from inauthentic to authentic being, 
of what it means for this to be mediated by truth. She writes: “in order to glorify the contrast, 
Heidegger unobtrusively downgrades Alltäglichkeit, everydayness, by treating its various 
manifestations as quasi-factual and unworthy of being paid the compliment of discriminating 
moral criticism.” (Ibid., 101). (Interestingly, as Conradi notes, one of the questions Murdoch had 
hoped to address in her work on Heidegger was why it was that he “and Plato alike were attracted 
to tyrants.” (IML, 111)  
But to return to the discussion that most interested her, the question of state-of-mind as 
constitutive of primary cognition, she notes that “Dasein’s fundamental and ubiquitous form of 
apprehension is described as care (Sorge) or concern (Besorgen), our restless practical state of 
being concerned with our world, which is also a sense of contingency and mortality.” (SZ, 98). 
This is also, and primordially, a concern for truth. There is an affinity here with what Crisp calls 
Murdoch’s belief “that attending to detail, and bringing out the nuances of what was observed, was 
the way to truth” (IMN, 276); and of course, attention to any object of our world for Murdoch 
always implied an awareness of its temporary and accidental nature, its “contingency and 
mortality”. She notes that consciousness for Heidegger, as for Husserl, is always consciousness of 
something, “any perception makes something be”, but this is not “an introduction to a 
phenomenalist sense datum theory of knowledge. Perception as something which may be 
distinguished from cognition, is not to be taken as providing original elements out of which 
cognition is to be constructed. A more general primary concept here is Mood (Stimmung), Dasein 
is always attuned to something.” (SZ, 102). Here too, as we have seen, there is a certain affinity; 
perception at least, for Murdoch, could be described as always “attuned to something”, but she 
found that little was made by Heidegger of the potential implicit in these concepts for exploring 
our relationships with our worlds. He does, however, make a distinction she finds useful between 
good and bad moods. (175: 136) In bad moods, “‘Dasein becomes blind to itself, the environment 
with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern goes astray.’ ” Of this she 
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writes that it “sounds like a promising description of ordinary selfish untruthful behaviour, but is 
not explored as such by Heidegger, who treats these distinctions as if they concerned ‘low-level’ 
psychological conditions, unconnected with the really important moral orientations.” (SZ, 101). 
(And this despite his protestation, cited earlier, that philosophy had for centuries relegated ‘affect’ 
to such psychological conditions.) She cites Heidegger as saying: “ ‘The possibilities of disclosure 
which belong to cognition reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure 
belonging to moods.’ (210: 168)”  
The case envisioned by Murdoch (and referred to above), of the mother-in-law ‘M’, “who feels 
hostility to her daughter-in-law” ‘D’, could easily be redescribed in the Heideggerian terms cited 
here: M’s Dasein, in her hostility (bad mood), “becomes blind to itself”, and so “the environment 
[or object, in this case D] with which it is concerned veils itself, the circumspection of concern 
goes away”.186 But M is also described as intelligent, capable of self-criticism and of concern (in 
the ordinary sense) for others, and she therefore “observes D, or at least reflects deliberately about 
D, until gradually her vision of D alters”. (IP, 312-13) The “ordinary selfish untruthful” original 
view held by M manifests, as we have seen, in the use of adjectives which in effect convey the 
moral judgements of bad moods: vulgar, undignified, noisy; and these are eventually replaced by 
adjectives which convey those of good moods: straightforward, spontaneous, vivacious. What is 
“truthful” here is therefore not something which can be established objectively; but a subjective 
attempt to get to a clearer, more truthful vision is important, and it is not one that can be 
undertaken in a bad mood. This is not something which is morally insignificant in Murdoch’s 
view; but nor is it to suggest that a facile optimism takes one closer to truth. On the contrary, she 
felt that “evil” too was a concept that had been lost, leaving us unable to fully conceptualise the 
manifest evil of recent history :”Our inability to imagine evil is a consequence of the facile, 
dramatic, and, in spite of Hitler, optimistic picture of ourselves with which we work. We need to 
turn our attention […] towards the real impenetrable human person. That this person is substantial, 
impenetrable, individual, indefinable, and valuable is after all the fundamental tenet of 
Liberalism.” (AD, 294)  
There is no coincidence of philosophical vision between Heidegger and Murdoch, though there are 
certain affinities. With regard to the theory of ‘moods’, which she describes as “another 
philosophical way of characterising consciousness”, she asks: “Heidegger suggests that we are 
always in a mood. Is a mood then any state of mind?” She describes as somewhat dubious and 
                                                 
186 “the world, and moment-to-moment experience, of the kindly, loving person is unlike that of the malicious, 
vengeful person. (Of course we may all of us be such persons at different times.)” (MGM 261) 
 246 
arbitrary his selection of moods to include (care, angst, guilt, fear), and to exclude – those 
associated with love, for example (Heidegger’s ‘care’ does not seem to have any quality of love) – 
from his system. And furthermore, she doubted it was possible, or wise, to attempt “to create, for 
philosophical purposes, any systematic structure out of the innumerable concepts which may be 
used to characterise states of mind”; affirming rather that “it is important, I think essential, in 
philosophy, to handle these great ambiguous ideas, doing the best one can with them in particular 
contexts. Philosophy should be able to do this.” (SZ,101). 
 
 
4. Wording the world. 
 
Words constitute the ultimate texture and stuff of our moral being, since they are the most refined and delicate and 
detailed, as well as the most universally used and understood, of the symbolisms whereby we express ourselves into 
existence. We become spiritual animals when we become verbal animals. (SW ,241) 
 
 
It is clear from this that “moral being” here refers to our being human, as verbal animals, in a 
much broader sense than that of animals with logos, if this is construed as the rational capacity to 
produce an intelligible, worded, ordering of the world from the mass of sensory data perceived. 
Unless, that is, logos itself is conceived as including the imagination as an active faculty, 
something which many philosophers have feared, not least Plato, who both loved and feared the 
imagination, for reasons Murdoch would explore187. Nonetheless, she writes that “[a] deeper 
realisation of the role of symbols in morality need not involve (as certain critics seem to fear) any 
overthrow of reason. Reason must, however, especially in this region, appear in her other persona 
as imagination.” (VC, 92n) Murdoch contested dualist pictures of the mind, like that of Kant, 
which allowed for a subordinate role for the imagination in the formation of concepts188, but 
specifically excluded it from moral reasoning. For her the symbolisms whereby we express 
ourselves into existence were drenched in metaphor, the principle instrument which verbalises 
images, and the imagination is involved at all levels of concept formation and concept change. 
More than this, she says, “The development of consciousness in human beings is inseparably 
connected with the use of metaphor. Metaphors are not merely peripheral decorations or even 
                                                 
187 With regard to his dismissal of art Murdoch comments: “Artists are famous for not knowing how it is done, or for 
perhaps rightly feeling that at their best they do not know what they are up to. (This darkness of aesthetic inspiration 
worried Plato.) (MGM, 169) 
188 She writes: “Kant (in the Critique of Pure Reason) establishes imagination as a mediator between sense perception 
and concepts, something between sense and thought. Knowledge of the phenomenal world, empirical knowledge, is 
made possible by the imagination as a power of spontaneous synthesis operating at the transcendental barrier of 
consciousness.” (MGM, 308) 
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useful models, they are fundamental forms of awareness of our condition: metaphors of space, 
metaphors of movement, metaphors of vision.” (SGOC, 363) As moral beings therefore, our 
narrower, normative conceptions form part of, and derive from, the interweaving of symbolisms – 
those in word-form and those in other forms – in the texture of our being. 
 Murdoch’s investigations of how we word the world took two main directions: that of ordinary 
language, and that of philosophical language in as far as this contributes so greatly to creating the 
pictures of ourselves (and of our institutions) by which we live, returning in this way to ordinary 
life. Few citizens of Western democracies are aware of the immense debt they owe to Kant and 
Locke189 (and others) for the formulation of concepts  – such as that of the moral obligation to 
treat every other human being as an end, and not as a means  – on which the human rights that we 
enjoy, and that we consider “natural” are based (“natural” in the sense of “self-evident”, a very 
recently acquired concept in history, and a remarkable one to have gained a degree of familiarity, 
at least as rhetoric, in the public domain). Philosophical terms often require translation before they 
can be assimilated (often through metaphor, as in the case of ‘means and ends’); but, as Murdoch 
says: “Great philosophers coin new moral concepts and communicate new moral visions and 
modes of understanding” (VC, 82-83); and for her this implies a further rich conceptual 
proliferation, both at the level of philosophical theory and beyond. More than this, these concepts 
have allowed modes of being to come into existence which previously, as inconceivable, were a 
fortiori unliveable. The obverse of this however is that powerful new concepts can mesmerise the 
world for generations, creating what Foucault calls new objectifications through which we read 
ourselves, and live our lives. Philosophy suffers from the temptation, valiantly fought by linguistic 
empiricism – to its great credit for Murdoch – “to take over all new knowledge and organise it into 
a pattern of what is deepest. The metaphysic of Freud, for instance, now so familiar, might be put 
forward (by some), refined and altered perhaps, as a structure fundamental to the mind, beyond 
and beneath which one cannot go.” (MGM, 159) A temptation she says which was not “resisted by 
philosophers in the past, and [was] deified by Hegel” (Ibid.) And of course Marx set out 
unashamedly to create the definitive system, adapting and displacing Hegel’s words into a brilliant 
and spellbinding new language for the purpose (The metaphor of “structures”, so solid, and yet in 
dialectical relation, was particularly compelling, especially to the modern science-infatuated 
                                                 
189 “We are still using the language of Locke and Tom Paine, concerning ‘natural rights’, ‘toleration’, the ‘rights of 
man’. Politicians assert ‘human rights’, law courts listen to pleas for ‘natural justice’. The Nuremburg courts (after 
Hitler’s war) used the authority of ‘natural law’.” (MGM, 360) 
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mind). Where Foucault studied primarily the intellectual construction of discourse, Murdoch 
tended to focus more on its powerful appeal to the imagination.  
Again, in Murdoch’s youth, Paris was still the centre of the western world, and Sartre its lumière, 
for whom, as we have seen, the “dull gluey jumbled unfree … nature of the inner life … is taken 
as an image of, and then as a case of, mauvaise foi, bad faith, failure to reflect, spiritless 
acceptance of habits, conventions and bourgeois values”; and contrasted with “the clean clear light 
agile movement” of free authentic thought and action. The reliance on metaphor in this account (in 
L’Etre et le néant) struck her forcibly: “Our mind is required to run with instant unnoticed speed 
along this persuasive line of juxtaposed ideas. Deep instinctive metaphors are at work [here]”. 
(MGM, 155-56) What Murdoch is drawing attention to is the way in which the picture of the en-
soi (and contrastingly free pour-soi), put together with metaphors, may hold us captive here. (The 
mind, despite the evident difficulty with the grey areas, seems so often captivated by binary pairs). 
It is not a description of any realities bearing these names, but we may (and many did) try to 
model ourselves accordingly, with a certain disdain for those who did not. 
As to ordinary language, though Murdoch learned much from Wittgenstein in this regard, she 
notes that “Wittgenstein’s examples and reflections include, but he does not discuss as such, our 
everyday, every moment use of metaphors which carry so many shades and evidences.” (MGM, 
281). Wittgenstein does in fact discuss metaphor logically, in terms, for example, of primary and 
secondary instances of meaning; the logician’s (or anatomist’s) eye taking the meat off the bones, 
as it were. But Murdoch felt that, in paying too little attention to the image-making and concept-
forming function of metaphor in language, what tended to get lost was the fact that all language is 
“full of art forms, full of values” (Ibid.); and therefore an important aspect of our moral being was 
being ignored.  
What she constantly comes back to is that our ‘experience’, our thoughts, are “riddled with the 
sensible.” She writes, “Language itself, if we think of it as it occurs ‘in’ our thoughts, is hardly to 
be distinguished from imagery of a variety of kinds – hardly distinguished at times, one might add, 
from sensations, in the sense of obscure bodily feelings.” (TL, 39). One of the important functions 
of new metaphor, as it expresses the spontaneous, or studied, creativity of language (incisive, 
lyrical, comic and so forth), is that of translating feeling into language. One simple, ordinary 
language example she gives of thinking instead with old (no doubt sometimes paleolithic) 
metaphors is that of the word ‘bond’, when used to describe a form of human relationship (or the 
less ancient relationship with money, which she doesn’t mention). This she says is “typical of our 
use of language to fix in a semi-sensible picture some aspect of our activities – and such fixing is 
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using, or creating, concepts.” What she is pointing to here is that how a word is used does not and 
cannot exhaust the philosophical interest of words. Metaphor is, she says, “not a peripheral 
excrescence upon the linguistic structure, it is its living centre.” (TL, 40). (Note here that all the 
seven meaning-carrying words in this one sentence, whether abstract or concrete: peripheral, 
excrescence, upon, linguistic, structure, living, centre, are either directly metaphors, or, in the case 
of ‘linguistic’, a ‘buried’ (sic) metaphor, that is, it stands at one remove from the bodily instrument 
of language: lingua = tongue). She goes on to say that if we think of conceptualising as “grasping, 
or reducing to order, our situations with the help of a language which is fundamentally 
metaphorical …[it] will operate against the world-language dualism which haunts us”. (Ibid.) It 
would also operate against the time-hallowed mind-body dualism – in philosophy and in ordinary 
conceptions of mind – at the point where the problem presents itself most forcefully, at the 
conjunction of bodily sensation, image and thought. Murdoch touched upon this, but never fully 
developed it: “Seen from this point of view, thinking is not the using of symbols which designate 
absent objects, symbolising and sensing being strictly divided from each other. Thinking is not 
designating at all, but rather understanding, grasping, ‘possessing’.” (TL, 40-41)  
This “grasping” (an ordinary language metaphor describing the moment when one gains access to 
an idea one has been striving for), is crucial, for Murdoch, to the development of consciousness; to 
the fixing of “semi-sensible” pictures that ground (sic) these mental concepts. The word refers to a 
bodily-situated image of thought which, when set against voluntarist conceptions of human agency 
as located in an autonomous “will”, suggests a different picture of mind, and therefore of morality. 
(Other everyday metaphors of the understanding for example, include that of making clear what is 
opaque, or that of confused things “falling into place”.) She spoke of Kant’s “Reason” as shedding 
a beam of light from elsewhere (“from a distant, thereby invisible, God, or spiritual principle 
better called Freedom and Reason”, MGM ,34) into the dark matter of being. Another metaphor 
“voluntarist” philosophies suggest to her is that of “The moral agent […] pictured as an isolated 
principle of will, or burrowing pinpoint of consciousness, inside, or beside, a lump of being which 
has been handed [on the behaviourist picture] over to other disciplines, such as psychology or 
sociology.” (OGG, 338). The latter portrait also provides the unflattering metaphor of “lump of 
being” for the “other half” of the human: the matter, the body, with its biological and 
psychological urges and its entrapment in social forms that certain views of homo sapiens imply. 
  
In his foreword to Existentialists and Mystics,(p. xi), Steiner says of Murdoch that she “possesses, 
in the rarest measure, a gift … that of dramatising, of making figurative, the act of thought.” One 
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other novelist Murdoch acclaimed for precisely this capacity was Henry James. We have seen her 
objection to the common philosophical practice of regarding introspection as a merely 
psychological practice, therefore fraught with the risk of inaccuracy and self-deception (which of 
course she knows it is); and her insistence that there are nonetheless forms of introspection – that 
are morally significant – which are able to focus on thought-processes truthfully (and which, as 
such, resemble what Foucault describes as the meditative form of reflexivity). In her essay 
Consciousness and Thought, she quotes this lengthy passage from James’ The Golden Bowl, in 
which he describes the heroine’s inability to think what is for her the unthinkable, the world-
devastating – her husband’s secret affair with her best friend. James records the tiny, almost 
imperceptible movements in her consciousness, as it moved from the unthinkable to the (almost) 
thought: 
It was not till many days had passed that the Princess began to accept the idea of … having listened to any 
inward voice that spoke in a new tone. Yet these instinctive postponements of reflection were the fruit, 
positively, of recognitions and perceptions already active; of the sense, above all, that she had made, at a 
particular hour, … a difference in the situation so long present to her as practically unattackable. The situation 
had been present to her for months and months, the very centre of the garden of her life, but it had reared itself 
there like some strange tall tower of ivory, or perhaps rather some wonderful, beautiful, but outlandish 
pagoda… She had walked round and round it – that was what she felt; she had carried on her existence in the 
space left her for circulation, a space that sometimes seemed ample and sometimes narrow; looking up, all the 
while, at the fair structure that spread itself so amply and rose so high, but never quite making out, as yet, where 
she might have entered if she wished. She had not wished till now – such was the odd case … At present, 
however, to her considering mind, it was as if she had ceased merely to circle and to scan the elevation, ceased 
so vaguely, so quite helplessly to stare and wonder: she had caught herself distinctly in the act of pausing, then 
in that of lingering, and finally in that of stepping unprecedentedly near… (quoted from James’ The Golden 
Bowl, MGM, 170-71)  
 
 
Murdoch cites this as a description of a state of consciousness that we can recognise: “We are able 
to think of the imagery both as something which the character is continually, like the author, 
coining as she goes along, and as something ‘deeper’ or ‘beyond’, which the imagery evokes or 
points to. This may be seen as two levels of a region where we can discern many levels. Figurative 
language is everywhere in our thinking, apprehended by the thinker as ultimate or as pointing 
beyond.” It may be impossible for us, reading this passage in an era where the influence of Freud 
is ubiquitous,190 not to read it in the first instance as a description of Freudian negation, but be that 
as it may, for Murdoch the description in psychological terms does not exhaust, or displace, the 
philosophical interest in such empirical descriptions of occurrences in consciousness, of the 
relation of concept to image and of the creating of a narrative of our lives. As she says, this is a 
region where we can discern many levels (and the metaphors of “levels”, “depth and surface”, 
“beyond”, etc. are clearly indispensable to our thinking about thinking.)  
                                                 
190 Murdoch quotes Auden’s remark that Freud was not a position, but a whole climate of opinion. 
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Her interest in phenomenological and existential philosophy, as we have seen, had much to do 
with the exploration of consciousness, a concept that had been more or less killed off in Anglo-
American philosophy.191 She says “I want there to be a discussable problem of consciousness 
because I want to talk about consciousness or self-being as the fundamental form of moral being.” 
She repeatedly contrasts this with notions such as that of Kant “for whom phenomenal awareness 
(the mess of actual consciousness) is without value”; but also, she adds, with “theories in the style 
of Husserl or of Freud which depend upon technical terminology.” (MGM, 171-72) Though 
phenomenology192 was concerned with consciousness and experience, with the inner life, she felt 
that its reliance on philosophical jargon masked a pressure to structure it in some way (or identify 
its presumed patterns or structures), to universalise it. The question of the language used in 
philosophical discourse was not only (though it was also) an aesthetic problem for her. Though 
some use of vocabulary that is internal to a certain discourse is inevitable in philosophy she 
believed that it was necessary to keep it to a minimum, given the paradox that the search for truth 
produces systematic set of concepts that must to some extent falsify. In this she agreed with 
Wittgenstein that philosophy may augment the spell-binding tendency already present in our “one-
making” and its expression in words. She writes:  
 
“The idea of a self-contained unity or limited whole is a fundamental instinctive concept. We see parts of 
things, we intuit whole things. […]  The urge to prove that where we intuit unity there really is unity is a deep 
emotional motive to philosophy, to art, to thinking itself. Intellect is naturally one-making.” (MGM, 1) 
 
 
And one of the great culprits, the great worders of our world, the great unifiers, not mentioned 
here but always part of her awareness of the problem, is of course science. Unlike Foucault, she 
did not explore scientific discourse in either detail or depth, though its power, on a par with that of 
metaphysics, to shape our understanding, to create an enormously convincing “limited whole” 
through which we read the world and ourselves, was for her a constant preoccupation. Though she 
saw Wittgenstein’s exposure of the unifying tendency of thought as necessary, the resulting “loss 
of conceptual tissue” brings up other problems. She writes, “The contemporary challenge to unity 
                                                 
191 “Being and Nothingness is a very long and almost totally Hegelian work concerning the nature of human 
consciousness – a subject which no longer exists in British philosophy.” (HMD, 146) 
192 She refers in particular to Husserl’s use of the concept of consciousness, and his belief that “it was possible by a 
special kind of introspection to isolate contents of consciousness and to study their transcendental (logical, category-
bearing) structure.” MGM, p.158. This aspect of phenomenology, as an epistemological study of consciousness, 
already seeking (universal) structures, Murdoch saw as one of the genealogical antecedents of structuralism. 
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affects […] ideas as diverse as God, the self, virtue, the material object, the story. The conceptual 
loss involved poses moral and theoretical problems […] Can and should what is lost be recovered 
in some other way? In such contexts we see how deep metaphysical imagery goes down into the 
human soul” (MGM, 85) In a striking and much-quoted image of the way in which words entrap 
us, applied to any system of thought, to science as much as to philosophy, Wittgenstein wrote: “A 
picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it inexorably.” (PI, 115) The notion of the limited whole and the metaphor of 
picturing taken from Wittgenstein were central to Murdoch’s conception of consciousness (a word 
he was suspicious of, and she valued), as was another metaphor of his, that of the net. Wittgenstein 
had set up a thought experiment in the Tractatus (6.341- 6.342), using the example of Newtonian 
mechanics, to show that while scientific pictures, constructed using theoretical grids through 
which to read reality, were indeed useful instruments of knowledge, often capable of 
extraordinarily detailed and accurate description of their objects, they were nonetheless pictures.193  
 
Murdoch took the title of her first novel Under the Net, from this passage. In this book her hero, 
Hugo Belfounder an unworldly, unpretentious thinker who uttered Wittgensteinian insights with 
no apparent sense of their profundity, says194: “All theorizing is flight. We must be ruled by the 
situation itself and this is unutterably particular. Indeed it is something to which we can never get 
close enough, however hard we may try as it were to creep under the net.” (UTN, 92). Against 
him, the other main character argues: “What you say goes against our very nature. We are rational 
animals in the sense of theory-making animals” (Ibid.) A.S. Byatt, who draws attention to this 
passage195, also notes the view of reality Murdoch shares to some extent with Sartre. Murdoch 
                                                 
193 6.341. Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a unified form on the description of the world. Let us imagine 
a white surface with irregular black spots on it. We then say that whatever kind of picture these make, I can always 
approximate as closely as I wish to the description of it by covering the surface with a sufficiently fine square mesh, 
and then saying of every square whether it is black or white. In this way I shall have imposed a unified form on the 
description of the surface. The form is optional, since I could have achieved the same result by using a net with a 
triangular or hexagonal mesh[….] The different nets correspond to different systems for describing the world. 
Mechanics determines one form of description of the world by saying that all propositions used in the description of 
the world must be obtained in a given way from a given set of propositions – the axioms of mechanics. […] 
6.342. […] The possibility of describing a picture like the one mentioned above with a net of a given form tells us 
nothing about the picture. (For that is true of all such pictures.) But what does characterise the picture is that it can be 
described completely by a particular net with a particular size of mesh. 
Similarly the possibility of describing the world by means of Newtonian mechanics tells us nothing about the world: 
but what does tell us something about it is the precise way in which it is possible to describe it by these means. We are 
also told something about the world by the fact that it can be described more simply with one system of mechanics 
than with another. 
194 In the persona of Annandine, in the novel within the novel written by the other protagonist Jake, who personifies 
himself as Tamarus, setting up a fictional framework for their conversations. 
195 Byatt, A.S., Degrees of Freedom: The Early novels of Iris Murdoch, London: Vintage, 1994 
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writes of Sartre’s Being and Nothingness that in it: “What does exist is brute and nameless, it 
escapes from the scheme of relations in which we imagine it to be rigidly enclosed, it escapes from 
language and science, it is more and other than our descriptions of it.” (SRR, 39) But Byatt points 
out that one of her disagreements with Sartre is over his own fascination with building “pleasing 
intellectual schemes and patterns”; such that, despite his interest in the details of contemporary 
life, what he lacks is “an apprehension of the absurd irreducible uniqueness of people and of their 
relations with each other.” (SRR, 75)  
These passages, as with many others throughout Murdoch’s work, stand as testimony to her 
concern for the particular, that theory ignores at its peril. Her work was taken as seminal in the 
development of particularism, but Bagnoli argues that she was not a “particularist” herself, if that 
is taken to imply “claims that universal moral principles are dispensable in accounting both for 
moral knowledge and moral reasons: such principles are epistemologically inert or simply 
unavailable. These claims do not follow from Murdoch’s conception of concrete universals, and 
are not the core of her view.” (EML, 222-23) (Just as Newtonian mechanics is not 
epistemologically inert because of its limitations.) Bagnoli argues that in this Murdoch follows 
Hegel, for whom, as she says, concepts have a history. Bagnoli writes: “According to Hegel we do 
not merely select and apply fully formed, static and fixed concepts. Concepts alter and develop as 
we use them. […] Their content derives from the role they play in articulating experience and this 
is progressively determined over time.” (EML, 221). Murdoch gave as one example of the way a 
concept’s meaning changes and deepens that of “courage”, mentioned earlier, Bagnoli uses the 
same framework for “love”:  
 
At twenty we have (not just a different) but a more abstract and empty concept of love than we have at forty. 
Life teaches us what love is, in concrete. This is not because at forty one has loved more, so to speak. The 
change in concepts does not occur merely because an abstract concept has been instantiated so many times. 
Rather, change occurs in virtue of the intimate relation that the abstract concept stands to its embodiments. 
Abstract and empty universals are enriched, and therefore changed, by their embodiments, that is, by the ways 
in which they are expressed and manifested. On this picture, moral concepts are concrete universals. (EML, 
221-22) 
 
 Murdoch herself had written: “My view might be put by saying: moral terms must be treated as 
concrete universals” (IP, 322). Bagnoli points out that this means that such concepts exhibit both 
authority and history, a notion which marks the divergence of opinion on moral concepts between 
Murdoch and her colleague and friend, Elizabeth Anscombe (to whom Metaphysics as a Guide to 
Morals is dedicated). Both philosophers insisted on the historicity of moral concepts, but 
Anscombe (in Modern Moral Philosophy in Philosophy 33, No. 124, January 1958) claimed that 
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the transposition of such concepts from one historical context to another deprived them of 
authority, a conclusion Murdoch did not share. In this ground-breaking essay, Anscombe claims 
that Aristotle did not fully clarify the differences between non-moral and moral uses of certain 
concepts, particularly those having to do with obligation. She gives, as an example of non-moral 
use of the modal verbs of obligation, the case of a machine which “needs oil” or “should be oiled”. 
Instead, she writes, with regard to the moral connotations of these same words: “The ordinary (and 
quite indispensable) terms "should," "needs," "ought," "must"- acquired this special sense by being 
equated in the relevant contexts with "is obliged," or "is bound," or "is required to," in the sense in 
which one can be obliged or bound by law, or something can be required by law.” Therefore, 
Anscombe asks:  
 
“How did this come about? The answer is in history: between Aristotle and us came Christianity, with its law 
conception of ethics. For Christianity derived its ethical notions from the Torah. […]   
To have a law conception of ethics is to hold that what is needed for conformity with the virtues failure in 
which is the mark of being bad qua man (and not merely, say, qua craftsman or logician) - that what is needed 
for this, is required by divine law. Naturally it is not possible to have such a conception unless you believe in 
God as a law-giver; like Jews, Stoics, and Christians. But if such a conception is dominant for many centuries, 
and then is given up, it is a natural result that the concepts of "obligation,” of being bound or required as by a 
law, should remain though they had lost their root; and if the word "ought" has become invested in certain 
contexts with the sense of "obligation," it too will remain to be spoken with a special emphasis and special 
feeling in these contexts. (Ibid.) 
  
Anscombe describes this situation as “the interesting one of the survival of a concept outside the 
framework of thought that made it a really intelligible one.” (Ibid.) Her conclusion is that, 
deprived of this sense, these concepts have become meaningless, and the use of them in modern 
philosophy (her target is “every single English academic moral philosopher since Sidgwick”) is 
conceptually distorted and therefore illegitimate. She is here defending a deontological against a 
consequentialist view of ethics. Consequentialism is clearly “quite incompatible with the 
Hebrew-Christian (preceptive) ethic. For it has been characteristic of that ethic to teach that there 
are certain things forbidden whatever consequences threaten, such as choosing to kill the innocent 
for any purpose, however good.” (Ibid.) As a Catholic, what she is thinking of here is abortion, not 
war (and the concept of ‘innocence’ already excludes the death penalty from this precept).  
Murdoch’s historicity goes much deeper however, as she never sees moral concepts as either fixed 
or fixable. Their changeable nature requires rather constant attention to the way in which each 
concept is being used, and this will always have to do with the vision by which the user lives. She 
saw concepts as so unfixed that their perpetual modification was itself part of our form of life, and 
whereas Anscombe was expressing her fear of the moral degeneration implied in concept loss, 
Murdoch saw both degeneration and moral progress as involving conceptual shifts. Another anti-
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Liberal thinker Murdoch took to task was T.S. Eliot, who, like many conservatives, believes that 
humans are fundamentally bad, or sinful, discipline must be strict, and the world of liberalism is 
chaos. She writes, paraphrasing Eliot: “Liberalism […] destroys tradition through challenging 
authority. In a society where every man’s opinion is equally valuable there is no unity of outlook.” 
TSEM, 164). As with Anscombe, perhaps even more so with Eliot, she shares a profound concern 
for the power of words. Of his poetry she writes that one of its deep characteristics “is a continual 
concern, in the midst of difficulties, for the referential character of words. (This one most 
movingly feels in the Four Quartets.) […] He is aware, and shares this concern with certain 
contemporary moral philosophers [e.g. Hare], that a deterioration in morals is a destruction of 
concepts. If our convictions part company with our vocabulary of justification, our controversies 
become empty. ‘We are living at present in a kind of doldrums between opposing winds of 
doctrine, in a period in which one political philosophy has lost its cogency, though it is still the 
only one in which public speech can be framed.’ ” (Ibid., 165) Or, as he superbly expresses this 
disconnectedness in an image she quotes from his poetry, we have become “ ‘Men and bits of 
paper, whirled by the cold wind.’ ”(Ibid., 166). Again however, her rejection of his conclusions is 
a defence of what was for her the enormous good on which liberalism is based: “Mr. Eliot plays 
dangerously when he rejects in toto the moral content of liberalism and appeals over its head to a 
conception of dogma and authority [tradition, the Anglican Church] which can itself play an 
ambivalent role. In 1933 Mr. Eliot remarked that ‘it was better to worship a Golden Calf than to 
worship nothing.’196 And in 1939 he said that we should object to fascism because it is pagan. […] 
To argue in this way is to belittle that naked respect for the human person as such which one may 
connect with Locke and with Kant, and which one hopes has become part of the English political 
tradition.” (Ibid.) Interestingly Murdoch, like Eliot, bemoaned the loss of concepts from political 
discourse, but from the other end of the political spectrum. Noting that the Welfare State was “a 
result, largely of socialist thinking and socialist endeavour”, the achievement of which has given 
rise to a certain “lassitude about fundamentals”, she notes the shift from serious theoretical 
endeavour to short-term pragmatic ends in the Labour Party (and long before Blair): “we see an 
impoverishment of thinking and language which is typical. […] We have suffered a general loss of 
concepts, the loss of a moral and political vocabulary. We no longer use a spread-out substantial 
picture of the manifold virtues of man and society.” (AD, 289-90)  
 
                                                 
196 In Criterion (April 1933). 
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With regard to the concept of “duty” Anscombe in effect argues that it was now epistemologically 
inert and could be reactivated, as it were, only by the reinstatement of its connection with an 
external moral authority. Anscombe therefore saw Kant’s internalisation of moral authority, 
though principled, as leading to the hollowing out of the concept of duty. Murdoch on the other 
hand saw the internalisation of duty as a regeneration197, not a degeneration of the concept, which 
now (and probably forever) would require further regeneration. Bagnoli writes, “[to] say that the 
deployment of universals is concrete is to say that we express and manifest something particular 
with them.” (Ibid. 223) And with regard to “duty”, Murdoch writes, as if to illustrate the point:  
 
There are what we call ‘public duties’ and there are ordinary duties, related to personal conduct, such as truth-
telling and benevolence; and there are very difficult duties where what is public or taken for granted is 
scrutinised in an unusual personal situation. The idea of duty extends into a personal sphere of potentially 
minute and not publicly explicable detail. Here where it loses its automatic or semi-public character, it becomes 
a part of what seems more like personal moral desire or aspiration, of experience and consciousness and the 
continuous work of Eros. (MGM, 356) 
 
Plato meets Kant in Murdoch, shall we say, and from the encounter something new emerges. Here, 
for Murdoch, the abstract universal is rendered concrete in a number of different, situated ways. 
This process is one of the ways in which we word our world, and here duty is required to respond 
to love.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 “A main tenet of the Kantian metaphysic has merged into popular, or semi-popular, moral argument. We must 
internalise the demand of duty, understand it, judge it, make it our own, be autonomous, not heteronomous.” (MGM 
,137). 
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Ch.3. The Good 
 
 
1. Life goods and constitutive goods. 
 
 
“Good represents the reality of which God is the dream.” (MGM, 496) 
 
 
Murdoch treats the concept of good in two ways which are essentially interconnected; firstly as a 
regulative idea, an idea that is, in her usage, operational in (and therefore constitutive of) our 
understanding of the world; and secondly as a means of access to the real. The notion of the 
regulative idea she took, as we have seen, from Kant, using it explicitly in relation to the concept 
of the self, and implicitly in her treatment of the concept of the good; while the notion that the idea 
of the good can provide us with access to what is real she took from Plato. With regard to the 
relevance of the regulative idea, just as we need the idea of “consciousness or self-being” as the 
metaphorical locus of our moral being, so – in this world in which we have the bad198 constantly 
before our eyes – we need to believe in the existence of the good. A world without good is clearly 
unthinkable, and for Murdoch, a world without a significant idea of the good, would be drifting 
and impoverished. What is in question here philosophically is whether or not this idea is subsumed 
under another, such as that of God, or of freedom, or of maximising happiness; these conceptions 
all narrowing the range of application of the fundamental idea of the good, to which they are all 
connected, in different ways, each presenting their own problems. For this reason she saw the 
Platonic idea of the moral good (freed of the metaphysical Form) as such a promising starting 
point in moral philosophy. Murdoch insists on the relevance of the simple fact that we all do 
believe that some actions and attitudes are better than others, and recognise that some of our 
actions and attitudes are not good; and further that “we recognise the real existence of evil: 
cynicism, cruelty, indifference to suffering”. Nonetheless, she says, “the concept of Good still 
remains obscure and mysterious.” (SGOC, 380)  
                                                 
198 “Marx said prophetically (…), that now for the first time in history the human race had the technical means to cure 
many of its age-old ills such as hunger and homelessness and poverty. We today are in an even more remarkable 
situation. We are not only coming into possession of the means to cure the ills, we are in the position of not being able 
to avoid quite literally seeing them. On television we see the sufferings of the world, we see how other lives go to 
waste. As our latter day prophets keep telling us, technology is making the world into a village, (…) while at the same 
time, we see that we are still even now patently unable to set things to rights, unable to stop famine in India or war in 
Africa. I think this is fundamentally the situation which drives young people into a kind of frenzy.” (E&M, 230)  
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This is in part because of its level of generality: “Asking what Good is is not like asking what 
Truth is or what Courage is, since, in explaining the latter, the idea of Good must enter in, it is that 
in the light of which the explanation must proceed. … And if we try to define Good as X we have 
to add that we mean of course a good X” (SGOC, 380) So, for example, if we say that Reason, or 
Love, or Pleasure are good, we must acknowledge that there is also bad reason, or love, or 
pleasure. In the same way, the idea of perfection is always linked to some particular thing: “all 
things which are capable of showing degrees of excellence show it in their own way” (Ibid., 381); 
but the concept of “perfect” is also dependent on that of “good”. The non-cognitivist solution to 
this problem was, Murdoch says, to “support a view of Good as empty and almost trivial, a mere 
word, ‘the most general adjective of commendation’, a flag used by the questing will, a term 
which could with greater clarity be replaced with ‘I’m for this.’” (Ibid., 381) We have seen some 
of her objections to this line of argument. Crucial among these, as Moran puts it, is that “Against 
the notion of ‘good’ reduced to evaluative choice in logical empiricism Murdoch pictured it as ‘the 
object of genuine apprehension of something real outside oneself”.” (IM&E, 186)  
 
This, clearly Platonic, view was one developed by Murdoch alone in those years and will be 
discussed later. In her time at Oxford however, another line of development was emerging in 
opposition to the mainstream picture, that of “virtue ethics”, which was generally associated with 
an Aristotelian focus on human flourishing as the ground of orientation to what is good.199 Writing 
in recognition of his debt to Murdoch, Charles Taylor recalls that, in his book Sources of the 
Self,200 he had described the virtues as “life goods”, meaning things it is good to be, which he 
distinguishes from what he calls “constitutive goods”. By the latter, he means “features of the 
world, or God, such that their being what they are is essential to the life goods being good.” 
(IMMP, 12) He draws particular attention to those discussed explicitly and extensively by 
Murdoch, that is, of Plato (The Idea of the Good), and of monotheistic religion (God), and also to 
that of Aristotle, which she treated less, but with which she shares a lot of ground. These will be 
discussed here in reverse order. “For Aristotle”, he writes, “our being animals having logos” is a 
constitutive good, therefore “we come to see better how to order the goods in our lives when we 
understand that we are animals possessing logos.” (Ibid., 12-13). This naturalistic stance was, he 
                                                 
199 “ recently forms of Aristotelian moral philosophy, both Thomist and phenomenological, have given much-needed 
attention to the concept of the inner life (Philippa Foot, Virtues and Vices, Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self).” 
(MGM 151) 
200 Sources of the Self, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989, chap.4. Murdoch refers to this as a “wise and 
learned work” (MGM, 166)  
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says, congenial to Murdoch (without the metaphysic) as far as it went; and many of the ways of 
bringing about freedom from the bad, which she always identifies with the selfishness, the self-
centredness, of the ego, do in fact have to do with human flourishing  – “impulses of love, rational 
reflection, new scenery”, etc. But for her there was something lacking from this worthy, worldly 
perspective; something that has to do with the need for a deeper understanding of life, and 
therefore to do with a coming to terms with death; with a more profound sense of value; something 
she recognised in Wittgenstein’s urge to run up against the limits of language, or in running up 
against paradox. Taylor describes this as, for Murdoch, “the consideration of a good which would 
be beyond life, in the sense that its goodness cannot be entirely or exhaustively explained in terms 
of its contributing to a fuller, better, richer, more satisfying human life. It is a good that we might 
sometimes more appropriately respond to in suffering and death, rather than in fullness and life – 
the domain, as usually understood, of religion.” (IMMP, 5) That is to say, it is the ethical domain 
of religion, of all and any religion (therefore with no necessary connection to dogma), as it is the 
domain of much metaphysics.  
 
The spectrum of connotations of “good” is of course a very large one. At its “upper” end there is 
the notion of a “higher” good requiring a deep personal commitment, whereas material “goods” 
are usually collocated at the “lower” end. To say this is already to use the metaphor connecting 
human “mind/spirit” and “matter” with what is “higher” and “lower”. That this metaphor appears 
to be universally understood, in the most diverse of cultures, is in itself not insignificant; a fact we 
are told something about the world by, as Wittgenstein has it. By the same token, the metaphor 
“deep”, also employed here – deep commitment, deep thought –signifies that the whole of a 
person, heights and depths, as it were, is involved in such commitment, such thought. In many 
traditions of human thought, the notion of a higher good refers to some ideal, something which 
inspires individual humans to go beyond self-interest, to orient themselves to “higher” goals, 
whether these be this-worldy, such as human liberation or some form of perfectionism, or other-
worldly, such as love of God. This is true even in a philosophical tradition such as utilitarianism, 
which looks more kindly than others on material goods. If the greatest good (note the utilitarian 
change of superlative adjective) is held to be the good of the greatest number then, here too, many 
lesser individual goods must be sacrificed to that end201.  
                                                 
201 Though, as a philosophical tradition that set out to define the good, the conundrum represented by quantitative and 
qualitative goods, and “spiritual” and material goods, provided many an opportunity for philosophical headaches. 
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Taylor describes the empiricist and utilitarian visions as belonging to “the cultural revolution 
which I have called the affirmation of ordinary life, which dethroned the supposedly higher 
activities of contemplation and the civic life and put the center of gravity of goodness in ordinary 
living, production, and the family. It belongs to this spiritual outlook that our first concern ought to 
be to increase life, relieve suffering, foster prosperity. Concern for the fullness of life smacked of 
pride, of self-absorption. And beyond that, it was inherently not egalitarian, since the alleged 
“higher” activities could only be carried out by an elite minority, whereas leading one’s ordinary 
life rightly was open to everyone.” (IMMP, 6) Murdoch expressed considerable sympathy with 
this “revolution”, the concern that value be attached also to ordinariness, and that moral 
philosophy should be addressed to everyone, not merely an elite, can be seen throughout her work. 
But whereas for many advocates of these traditions a concern for the inner life was at best a 
private right, at worst morally reprehensible in as far as it did not contribute to the happiness of 
others, for Murdoch the reverse of this was true. For her, as for the virtue ethicists, an ethical 
concern for oneself and one’s own life was central to the way one would operate in the world, 
among others202. Murdoch held that a morality which lacked either a public or a private dimension 
was incomplete. Of empiricism, she writes that, in general, it “is one essential aspect of good 
philosophy, just as utilitarianism is one aspect of good moral philosophy. It represents what must 
not be ignored. It remembers the contingent.” (MGM, 236). And in an essay from 1970 she writes 
: “When I was young I thought, as all young people do, that freedom was the thing. Later on I felt 
that virtue was the thing. Now I begin to suspect that freedom and virtue are concepts which ought 
to be pinned into place by some more fundamental thinking about a proper quality of human life, 
which begins at the food and shelter level.”203 As is evident from this, her focus shifted over the 
years, but never to the extent that any of these dimensions could for her be neglected. 
 
With regard to these “life goods” there is then a certain confluence of opinion, between Murdoch’s 
own ideas and those of virtue ethicists, a certain Aristotelian streak in Murdoch. A reading of 
McDowell’s account of the neo-Aristotelian position he defends can serve to illustrate this 
confluence. He points out that for those ethical positions for which the primary question is “right 
conduct, and the nature and justification of behaviour”, the concept of virtue is only of secondary 
                                                 
202 As noted in Pt.I, Foucault expresses this same point in saying that the care of the self is ethically prior in that it is 
ontologically prior.  
203 She goes on “This philosophical viewpoint is, of course, not new. It is a form of utilitarianism: less optimistic, 
more desperate, but still recognisable as a relation of the great doctrine of Bentham and John Stuart Mill.” (E&M, 
231) 
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interest. On such views, virtue is seen as “a disposition (perhaps of a specially rational and self-
conscious kind) to behave rightly; the nature of virtue is explained, as it were, from the outside 
in.” (V&R, 121) Against this, he puts forward a different view, in the Aristotelian tradition, for 
which the question of what one should do is approached “via the notion of a virtuous person. A 
conception of right conduct is grasped, as it were, from the inside out.”(Ibid.) From this position, 
he takes up the question of the relation of virtue to the knowledge that is required to make morally 
correct decisions, illustrating this with the case of the virtue of kindness thus: 
 
A kind person has a reliable sensitivity to a certain sort of requirement which situations impose on behaviour. 
The deliverances of a reliable sensitivity are cases of knowledge; … a kind person knows what it is like to be 
confronted with a requirement of kindness. The sensitivity is, we might say, a sort of perceptual capacity.” 
(Ibid., 122) 
 
 
This is clearly reminiscent of Murdoch’s insistence that perception is never uncoloured by states 
of mind and mental habits that will be more, or less, virtuous. The attention that she sees as a 
moral requirement is dependent on the type of sensitivity here described, thus she shares this 
“inside out” view of achieving right conduct. McDowell adds, for the sake of pursuing the 
argument, the hypothesis that “the concept of the virtue is the concept of a state whose possession 
accounts for the actions which manifest it. Since that explanatory role is filled by the sensitivity, 
the sensitivity turns out to be what the virtue is.” (Ibid., 123) He later overturns this by pointing 
out that if the holder of the appropriate sensitivity perceives the requirement, but fails to act on it, 
then it must be said that the sensitivity is only one component of, not the whole of, the virtue. 
Murdoch would agree with this; what she would stress however is just how important a component 
it is, and how acting upon the deliverances of that sensitivity will depend on how it is woven into 
the texture of one’s being. McDowell too points out that the argument in any case only holds if the 
“sensitivity” so described indicates something more and something other than a simple 
predisposition. A propensity to kindness, for example, unaccompanied by a practice of moral 
reflection, may not necessarily result in right conduct. There may be some truth in the popular 
saying that sometimes it is necessary to be cruel to be kind; but more importantly, certain 
deontological moralities have objected to treating kindness, or “compassion”, as a principle for 
precisely the reason that it may obstruct “justice”. An alternative reading of this conundrum 
however, may see it as indicative of the relevance of another Aristotelian argument, that regarding 
the unity of virtue. On this reading, kindness as a virtue must be distinguished from a mere 
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propensity to be gentle by the fact that it must include a sense of justice. McDowell explains 
further: 
 
So we cannot disentangle genuine possession of the virtue of kindness from the sensitivity which constitutes 
fairness. And since there are obviously no limits on the possibilities for compresence, in the same situation, of 
circumstances of the sorts proper sensitivities to which constitute all the virtues, the argument can be 
generalized: no one virtue can be fully possessed except by a possessor of all of them, that is, a possessor of 
virtue in general. Thus the particular virtues are not a batch of independent sensitivities. Rather, we use the 
concepts of the particular virtues to mark similarities and dissimilarities among the manifestations of a single 
sensitivity which is what virtue, in general, is: an ability to recognise requirements which situations impose on 
one’s behaviour. It is a single complex sensitivity of this sort which we are aiming to instil when we aim to 
inculcate a moral outlook.” (Ibid., 123-24) 
 
Now, Murdoch never took up the Aristotelian argument of the unity of virtue as such, and 
Aristotelians generally recognise that some individuals clearly do in fact possess some virtues and 
not others, and that some, like prudence and courage, for example, may result in conflicting 
deliverances. Nonetheless, this argument may throw some light on Murdoch’s insistence on moral 
attention being both “just and loving” in that, if it is clear that the virtue of kindness must contain, 
in some sense, that of fairness, an argument may also be constructed which will show that the 
reverse of this is true. They are both significant threads in the texture of one’s being, and the 
absence of one quality will compromise the other. This is also true of the “vices”. What 
convention labels as separate vices are also to be seen, especially in Murdoch’s novels, as 
interconnected. Nussbaum cites a passage from The Black Prince204 in which the main character, 
Bradley bemoans egoistic anxiety as the root of all the vices: “ ‘Anxiety most of all characterizes 
the human animal. This is perhaps the most general name for all the vices at a certain mean level 
of their operation. It is a kind of cupidity, a kind of fear, a kind of envy, a kind of hate. Now, a 
favoured recluse, I can, as anxiety diminishes, measure both my freedom and my previous 
servitude. Fortunate are they who are even sufficiently aware of this problem to make the smallest 
efforts to check this dimming preoccupation … The natural tendency of the human soul is towards 
the protection of the ego.’ p.183).” (Cited FSK, 146) Here anxiety is equated with the protection 
of the ego (from fear), with feeding the ego (cupidity), and with resentment of whoever offends 
the ego (hate), or has what it doesn’t have (envy). What they all have in common is the tension in 
the body and the tightness in the mind we describe as anxiety. Virtue therefore, on Murdoch’s 
view, always tends to the overcoming of the anxious ego.  
Although she holds that it would be difficult to establish an order of virtues in any systematic 
form, she also says that if, for example, “we reflect upon courage and ask why we think it to be a 
                                                 
204 Murdoch, The Black Prince, (New York, Viking, 1973) 
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virtue, what kind of courage is the highest, what distinguishes courage from rashness, ferocity, 
self-assertion, and so on, we are bound, in our explanation, to use the names of other virtues. The 
best kind of courage (that which would make a man act unselfishly in a concentration camp) is 
steadfast, calm, temperate, intelligent, loving … This may not in fact be exactly the right 
description, but it is the right sort of description.” (OGG, 346). Murdoch believes that possessing 
virtue (being good), derives from a desire for the good, and hence, from her viewpoint, from the 
inclination, and intention, to pay great attention to each and every situation of one’s life, and to 
one’s own operations within it, with the good in mind. This however, was an intention that could 
be misdirected by adherence to conventional moral codes, and the language in which they are 
expressed. As she says, with particular reference to moral words: “There are two senses of 
‘knowing what a word means’, one connected with ordinary language and one very much less so. 
Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth, and not in terms 
of switching on to some given impersonal [public] network.” (IP, 322) The reductive, narrow 
views which ordinary language can enshrine may offer us a substitute for reflection on whatever 
matter is at hand. If instead we ask ourselves, for example, what it really means to be just then, 
Murdoch writes, “[w]e come to understand this as we come to understand the relationship between 
justice and the other virtues. Such a reflection requires and generates a rich vocabulary for naming 
aspects of goodness.” (OGG, 347).  
All this, however, refers particularly to “private” morality, for which the ordinary language 
meaning of a word counts as an element in one’s moral reflection; but she believed there were 
good reasons for distinguishing this from, let us say, public morality. “Thinking about politics is in 
certain respects different from thinking about private morals”, she writes. If for no other reason, 
because “One may be ruthless with oneself but not with others.” (MGM, 368). Maintaining such a 
distinction may seem “over-simple”, she says, “as great philosophers have usually collected 
morals and (sometimes by implication) politics, together with epistemology and ‘logical 
foundations’, into one metaphysical internally related package. Yet the distinction deserves to be 
kept in mind.” (MGM, 351) Murdoch held that we require “axiomatic notions which distinguish 
political machinery from moral ideas (e.g. crime from sin), and also allow some ideas a special 
(universal) status (e.g. the idea of human rights).” (Ibid., 358) Though she held that conscientious 
law-breaking should be kept to a minimum in a democracy, where mechanisms exist for change 
within the law, she believed that in democratic states, the law could sometimes rightly be broken 
in the name of axiomatic rights.  
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So – on this picture, if not unity there is at least a necessary interpenetration of the virtues in 
private moral reflection; and at the same time the need for a careful separation and distinction in 
the public sphere, where: “Axioms must be mutually independent (externally not internally 
related) in order to be able to intelligibly fight each other and go on existing in defeat.” (MGM, 
367) In this sense, with regard to the public good, Murdoch stood with Kant, and not with Plato. 
She says that “Plato temperamentally resembles Kant in combining a great sense of human 
possibility with a great sense of human worthlessness. […] Though he knows how passionate and 
bad we are, Kant is a moral democrat expecting every rational being to be able to do his duty. 
Plato, on the other hand, is a moral aristocrat, and in this respect a puritan of a different type, who 
regards most of us as pretty irrevocably plunged in illusion” (F&S, 403) Worse still of course, on 
her view, where the aristocratic Plato thought only the few would use freedom wisely, totalitarian 
thinking denies this possibility to everyone. In totalitarian societies, an order of internally related 
virtues and vices is established, making these coincide with crimes, or simply dematerialising 
“anomalies”. At one time, in China, Murdoch asked a question about homosexuality, and her 
otherwise excellent interpreter did not know what she meant. After giving an explanation, she was 
told there was no such thing in China. This she says, is an example of “conceptual impoverishment 
or concept-starvation”, which “makes it easier for a few leaders to turn their citizens into a 
centrally directed herd.” (MGM, 364)  
 
According to Taylor the constitutive good of “Judeo-Christian-Islamic theism” is “God having 
created us and calling us”, in the light of which “the most important life goods are the love and 
worship of God” (IMMP, 12-13), all other virtues taking their specific form in accordance with 
these central values. Though such goods are clearly unavailable to and unwanted by a non-believer 
such as Murdoch, she was interested in what they implied as practices, as forms of the relation of 
the self to itself, as it were. Just as she had explored the changing nature of moral concepts like 
“duty” and “courage”, which were subject both to historical variation and to personal variation in 
the progressing life of a person, so she was interested in the loss (to many), so recent in the history 
of Western society, of the concept of God; of God as exclusive author of constitutive and life 
goods. Murdoch did not hold, like T. S. Eliot, or Dostoevsky, another of Murdoch’s points of 
reference, that if God is dead all is chaos. What she did fear however was the loss of the function 
of God, so to speak, as a fixed point of exemplary goodness outside of the self, and its leaving 
behind the power (through the will) of the over-confident intellect, a problem she felt Kant, and 
certain descent lines from him, had underestimated or confounded. Kant himself, however, “could 
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still put science ‘in its place’. In our post-Kantian world, where religious faith wanes and truth 
gains so much of its prestige from scientific method, this is harder to do.” (MGM, 50). Kant was 
also of course, like Plato, a religious philosopher, in the sense that mattered to her, that is, in that 
they were both “imbued with a characteristically religious certainty about the fundamental and 
ubiquitous reality of goodness: their real world is the moral world.” (Ibid.) 
She read pre-Kantian Christian philosophers with scepticism about their “proofs”, but great 
interest in how these connected with their ethics. Anselm’s ontological proof, though no proof at 
all and “often treated as an absurdity”205, interested her in that his arguments were more ethical 
than epistemological. The concept of truth was seen to emerge from the experience of truthfulness 
and truth-seeking (attention to reality); in this bearing some resemblance to Foucault’s definition 
of the “meditative” form of pre-Cartesian reflexivity, which Foucault attributes particularly to the 
Stoics, whereas Murdoch attributes it particularly to Plato. For her, Anselm’s arguments recall 
“Plato’s philosophy [which] expounds a fundamental connection between epistemology and 
ethics; truthful knowledge and virtue are bound together.” (MGM, 398) Unlike the Aristotelian 
Aquinas (who rejected the Proof), Anselm was of a Platonic disposition “through Plotinus and 
Augustine, and the neoplatonic transformations of Plato’s Form of the Good into a personified 
one.” (Ibid.) He believed that “we ‘see’ God through the morally good things of the world, through 
our (moral) perception of what is beautiful and holy, […] So we find God both, and inextricably 
both, in the world and in our own soul.” (MGM, 396) Beyond this however, if ‘belief’ is construed 
as of the intellect, ‘faith’ implies a belief experienced as conviction, that is, as a form of certainty 
rendered unshakable by a feeling of its rightness. The feeling that “it must be like this” has its 
dangers in philosophy, and in ethics, where, dangerous as it is, it is of crucial importance in our 
relation to the world. Without such conviction the constitutive goods would be disempowered. In 
this territory where philosophy crosses paths with religion, Murdoch quotes Wittgenstein’s 
remarks from Culture and Value (p.85) on the fact that “proofs” of God rarely seem to be 
convincing (or even intended to be) to the non-believer. This leads him to think “that what 
believers who have furnished such proofs have wanted to do is to give their ‘belief’ an intellectual 
analysis and foundation, although they themselves would never have come to believe as a result of 
such proofs.” (cited MGM, 415) In other words the conviction, which is unshakable, precedes the 
“proof”. As Murdoch shows in her discussion of Anselm’s ontological proof, the conviction has to 
do with the way “The idea of Good (goodness, virtue) crystallises out of our moral activity” Ibid. 
                                                 
205 The Proof itself in its different formulations will not be discussed here. It is the Platonic form of the argument that 
interests Murdoch. 
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426), regardless of the flawed logic of the argument and its failure to prove the existence of God. 
Murdoch, following Weil, associates this finding words for something one already seems to know 
with Plato’s concept of anamnesis, the sense of knowing more than one has words for, of 
recognition, when one finds the words, of a truth one already knew. For Murdoch, there is a 
“religious outlook, religious preoccupations, a religious psychology which is detachable from 
dogma. Religion is a mode of belief in the unique sovereign place of goodness in human life. … It 
adheres essentially to the conception of being human, and cannot be detached; and we may 
express this by saying that it is not accidental, does not exist contingently”. (Ibid.)  
One version of this conviction she mentions, still in Anselm, is his “Credo ut intelligam (I believe 
in order to understand)”; and she says, interestingly, that this is “an idea with which we are 
familiar in personal relationships, in art, in theoretical studies. I have faith (important place for this 
concept) in a person or idea in order to understand him or it.” (MGM, 393). She describes this 
faith as “loving belief”. Anselm love’s God’s truth and so he can understand it. Referring to a 
similar perception in another context, she cites Henry James “well-known remark concerning 
Balzac and his characters; that Balzac did not love these people because he knew them, he knew 
them because he loved them.” (AD, 285) This concept of faith is one which has to do with 
intuition, not with the unreflective acceptance of dogma, though it is vulnerable to dogma. It has to 
do with the experience – known to everyone in some form or degree – of conviction that 
something is right, whether or not there are arguments available to express it: “I intuitively know 
and grasp more than I can yet explain” (MGM, 393), or ever explain. Murdoch would agree with 
Wittgenstein that this type of knowledge is in the territory of the unsayable: “It may be seen too”, 
she notes, as a proof which a man can only give to himself, herein resembling cogito ergo sum, to 
which it is indeed related by Descartes.” (Ibid., 392)  
For her this experience of conviction, which is the sine qua non of constitutive goods, was a 
territory that philosophy needed to explore. Cavell has pointed out that the desire for certainty that 
marks the Cartesian tradition, with which Wittgenstein was trying to come to grips, had its darker 
side in the inevitable persistence of uncertainty; or rather of a vast realm of doubt, lived in the 
absence of metaphysical consolation, that is, of both religious and philosophical consolation. He 
describes this as “our human subjection to doubt” (MMWS, 61), and for Cavell it was 
Wittgenstein who, perhaps more than any other philosopher, exposed the way in which “our desire 
for certainty is written into every word we use, and believe we believe in.” (Ibid.) Plato too of 
course feared the “magical” power of words. He certainly had a thorough knowledge of the myths 
and theologies of his own time, and may well, Murdoch says, have taken part in the Eleusian 
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mysteries, but as she also says that, “he cannot be said to have taken any form of myth literally, 
and constantly draws attention to its status of an edifying or hermeneutic ‘as if’ [including those of 
his own invention].” (MGM, 402). He also “positively excludes theistic magic and belief in gods. 
The form of the Good is never identified with God.” (Ibid. 403)     
For Anselm, the necessary, non-contingent existence of God is established through experience, 
through our capacity to recognise good and evil, and “degrees of good, and [we] are thus able to 
have the idea of the greatest conceivable good.” (MGM, 395) For Murdoch the Proof is interesting 
therefore not as “proof”, but as a particular type of metaphysical argument which is also an appeal 
to experience. And she notes that of course “good metaphysical arguments are successful appeals 
to experience.” (MGM, 395). She points out that this “is essentially an argument from morality not 
from design. It appeals to our moral understanding, and not to any of the more strictly rational 
considerations relied upon by Aquinas” (Ibid., 396) Murdoch suggests that if the Proof proves 
anything it is not the existence of any God, but rather how deep-seated moral value is in human 
life. She quotes Simone Weil’s (Platonic) comment on this in Pensées sans ordre concernant 
l’Amour de Dieu (p.136) : “ ‘For everything which concerns absolute good and our contact with it, 
the proof by perfection (wrongly called ontological), is not only valid, but is the only proof which 
is valid. It is instantly implied by the notion of good.’ ” (Quoted MGM, 401) 
 
Taylor says of Plato that his constitutive good was the Idea of the Good itself, for which “a deeper 
understanding of the life dominated by reason has to pass through attaining a vision of the Idea of 
the Good. The truly good person is inspired to model himself or herself on the order shaped by the 
Good.” (Ibid. 13) Murdoch’s own objective however was clearly not a deeper understanding of the 
life dominated by reason, but rather a deeper understanding of ourselves as moral beings, 
dominated instead by false images and conceptions of ourselves and others, from which we need 
to free ourselves. This was much more a problematic of the Stoics than of Plato’s, who Murdoch 
never explored thoroughly. The Idea of the Good as a model, as exemplar, that Taylor points to 
here was indeed important for her as a moral instrument; but she saw this as perhaps its secondary, 
and not its primary function. Much more importantly, she saw it as a tool for cutting through 
fantasy to get to reality; and for this reason she saw Plato’s work as vitally relevant today, in a 
philosophical context in which the good can no longer be considered as definable. For Plato, she 
writes, “The idea of Good cannot be compromised or tainted by its inclusion in actual human 
proceedings, where its magnetism is nevertheless, and even at the lowest levels, omnipresent. 
Good is unique, it is ‘above being’, it fosters our sense of reality as the sun fosters life on earth. 
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The virtues, the other moral Forms, are aspects of this central idea, increasingly understood as 
interconnected parts of it.” (MGM, 399) Plato assumed however, that only more refined souls 
would feel this magnetism of the good, the rest were to be kept in line by coercion. Murdoch, who 
spurns elitism, seems to believe that the magnetism of good is felt by everyone, though its evident 
corruptibility presents a major problem. Despite these difficulties, the idea of the good remained 
Murdoch’s constitutive good. As Maria Antonaccio writes, what Murdoch means by the 
“sovereignty of good” is that it “supercedes all concepts that might rival it as the norm of 
morality.” (PH, 142).  
 
 
2. Good: Real: Love (IP, 333) 
 
Wittgenstein has nothing to say in the Tractatus about a transcendent reality. Ethics cannot be expressed in 
words. ‘Ethics is transcendental.’ (6.421) (cited MGM, 30) 
(What is transcendent is beyond human experience, what is transcendental is not derived from human 
experience, but is a condition of it.) (MGM, 28) 
 
Murdoch, like Wittgenstein, holds that nothing definitive can be said about transcendent realities 
and that the foundations of ethics cannot be expressed in words, but she rejected the idea that all 
talk of such realities was therefore meaningless. She says that “philosophy has a negative technical 
task of removing (philosophical) errors, which must be combined with a positive task of finding a 
simple open mode of discourse concerning ordinary evident (for instance moral) aspects of human 
life.” (MGM, 212) In effect, on her view, there is nothing that humans do that is not in some way 
connected to morality which, she says, “is not one empirical phenomenon among others [… it is] 
concerned with […] what cannot be ‘thought away’ out of human life, what Plato expressed in the 
concept of the Form of the Good and Kant in the Categorical Imperative.” (Ibid., 412) Philosophy 
has shown the errors inherent in these “transcendent realities”, but what they are pointing to, what 
they are unverifiable descriptions of, is an underlying reality of human life that cannot be denied, 
cannot be “thought away”. This she calls “the omnipresence of value (an opposition between good 
and bad) in human activity.” (Ibid., 259)  
Like Wittgenstein, she holds that ethics is transcendental, that it is, in her terms, a condition of 
human experience. But for her the transcendental character of ethics translates into this idea of the 
omnipresence of value, this sense human beings have of an opposition between bad and good in 
human affairs; and a wanting to do what is good, to be what is good, that is made manifest in the 
ubiquity of moral systems and religions. (That the desire for the good is easily corrupted, 
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becoming a desire for the bad, is integral to this hypothesis, and requires much attention. She sees 
no grounds for hypothesising any autonomous “desire for evil”206.) She notes also that “the 
traditional idea of God was an image or metaphor” (Ibid., 412) of this orientation to the good, 
construed as an absolute of human experience; despite, or maybe even because of, the myriad 
forms in which it is expressed. So for Murdoch, it is precisely because ethics is transcendental, 
that it is a condition of existence, that the “transcendent realities” invented to describe it are all in 
one sense wrong, conflicting with each other and unverifiable; and in one sense right, in that taken 
as metaphor, they point to morality as an essential form of life, though one that manifests in many 
different historical and cultural guises. The guises themselves are of great interest both in what 
they hold in common  –  for Murdoch, an idea of the good, an image which inspires, an ideal to 
aspire to  –  and in their differences. With regard to the latter, some of the images of transcendent 
realities created by human beings, and the memorable stories that enshrine them, have been the 
inspiration of much that is good (and bad) in human life, precisely because, Murdoch says, they 
have to do with the incomprehensibility of the world, not its comprehensibility, around which 
Wittgenstein wished to clarify the limits. She writes:  “How ambiguous a parable [for example, or 
myth] appears to be will depend on the coherence of the moral world in which it is being used. 
Certain parables or stories undoubtedly owe their power to the fact that they incarnate a moral 
truth which is paradoxical, infinitely suggestive and open to continual reinterpretation.” (VCM, 
90-91) (She mentions here the Prodigal Son, many others from various traditions come to mind). 
A salient fact for her was that we mostly do believe, in ordinary life if not in the philosopher’s 
chair, and regardless of whether or not we think it can be “proved”, that objectively, Ghandi was 
“good” and Hitler was “bad”. For this reason, some philosophies have tried to say the unsayable, 
to determine ultimate criteria of goodness and badness that will help us judge morally more 
ambiguous figures, and ourselves, accurately; conversely, others have left unattended the misfit 
between what we may hold philosophically and what we believe in ordinary life. For Murdoch 
such approaches, today, misconceive the task of moral philosophy. What is now needed is 
recognition of the inevitable disjunction between the empirically evident fact that we do think 
some things are objectively better than others, and the theoretical impossibility of establishing 
                                                 
206 The desire for moral good is empirically evident and justifiable on various types of grounds. The desire for evil is 
equally evident, but there is no verifiable means of knowing whether it appears as a corruption of the desire for good, 
or as due to some hypothetical, autonomous, deterministic force (Freud’s position on this varied, for example.) 
Murdoch is not interested in theorising about this. Her own conclusion is that this is impossible to establish either 
way, and in any case it makes no difference to morality how evil is categorised. Its manifestations are what they are, 
and seem to be largely attributable to egoism of one kind or another; and the remedies (if, and as far as they can be 
found) must respond to the presenting case. 
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definitive criteria of good and bad; so that we can move on to the more pressing problem of how 
we can develop our moral reflection in the context of this reality. In as far as we still do believe 
that there is good and bad in this world however, our moral task is to ground ourselves in the good, 
and Murdoch believes modern moral philosophy, like ancient philosophy, should occupy itself 
with how we can achieve this extremely difficult task. 
 
Her own analysis begins with the fact that we are incessantly evaluating; in the first instance 
aesthetically: in all of our looking at the world and at others there is a felt response, a trace of : “I 
like this, I don’t like this, I am indifferent to this”, most of which is not consciously articulated. In 
our moral evaluation this aesthetic evaluation is always, consciously or not, in some way 
present.207 Given that this continuative evaluation is largely inarticulate, some philosophies, as we 
have seen, have regarded it as a messy territory that is best ignored, in that, whatever its effect on 
the moral agent, its deliverances will be seen in behaviour, or will in some way be amalgamated 
into thought and thereby expressed with greater clarity in words or actions. This is a modern view 
which Murdoch challenges.208 To take an example of a dissimilar view from the ancients, 
Epictetus held that one ignored this murkiness at one’s peril. What was ethically necessary was to 
render articulate such desire and aversion (and the resulting judgements), through a close 
examination of which “representations” we give our assent to, and which we reject209. In some 
respects, Murdoch’s account of M reflecting on her own “representations” of D comes close to this 
view of ethical practice210; with the important difference that, on this Stoic view, although 
aesthetic sensibility is held, as it is for her, to be imbued with intellect, the ethical reflection which 
operates on it was not similarly held to be imbued with passion, it could rise above passion (hence 
its appeal to Kant). For Murdoch, on the other hand, there are no clear borderlines between 
aesthetic sensibility and ethical reflection, and the theories that interested her most were those 
where consciousness (or self-being) is seen in some way as a variable continuum of intellect and 
passion, a continuum that may be introspectable and transformable.  
                                                 
207 In Eastern moral philosophy everyday “mind” (as opposed to more awakened mental states) always has some 
affective character, therefore terms for such “mind” usually translate as “heart-mind”. Some forms of meditative 
practice begin with an attempt to determine accurately one’s present state of mind. “Indifference” is here considered a 
negative, not a neutral state, having its own (variable) affective character. 
208 She says of Kant, for example, that “Kant’s aesthetic tastes mirror his moral preferences. He would like, as it were, 
by morality to crystallise out of the historical process a simple society living strictly by extremely general rules 
(‘Always tell the truth,’ etc.), with no place for the morally complicated or eccentric.” (S&G, 215) 
209 See on this especially Hadot, P., The Inner Citadel, 1998, Harvard University Press. 
210 Though Murdoch herself had no sense of affinity with the Stoics. 
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In this regard, she writes that one difference between Kant and Plato is that “Plato insists that 
approach to the central Idea (pure goodness, the Form of the Good) comes through a difficult 
disciplined purification of intellect and passion, wherein passion (Eros) becomes a spiritual force. 
Whereas Kant regards ‘feelings’ as dangerous to morality, sharply divides (noumenal) reason from 
(phenomenal) emotion, and stresses that dutiful action is something of which every man is 
capable.” (MGM, 11). This last point, that morality must be able to elaborate a path that everyone 
can follow, Murdoch too held dear; and she appreciates Kant for democratising spirituality (and 
not just society) in this way. But, though Plato, in his time, did not share these concerns,211 she 
values his capacity to envisage different paths (for different people, or different phases in one life) 
to the Good, rather than imposing a single model; and his awareness that no path was without its 
risks. His most celebrated model is that described magnificently in the Phaedrus, where it is 
beauty, the spiritual thing to which we are most immediately and instinctively attracted, that is our 
first awakening to the Good, understood as difficult to accede to directly. But this is not put 
forward as the only path. “The way of beauty which passes through human love has a more 
obvious, evident and immediate starting point, but also involves great psychological dangers and 
temptations. The way of intellectual activity in the broad sense of Plato’s word techné, which 
would include craft but not fine art, lacks the initial charm of the beautiful, but is on the whole less 
perilous, although knowledge is power, and power poses moral problems. Power as magic, pride, 
secret superior knowledge infects science and technology, as it has always infected religion.” 
(MGM, 17) The last of these statements is clearly a Murdochian extension of Plato’s thought to a 
question that mattered to her in contemporary reality, which she leaves here as an aside. 
  
 Murdoch believed, as we have seen, that to assume a separation between ideas and feelings, 
between aesthetic evaluation and moral evaluation, was more a result of hypostatisation of 
concepts than of attention to reality; typical of attempts to fit the unruly world into an orderly 
philosophical system. Wittgenstein saw the fallacy of any such endeavour and avoided it; 
Tractatus 6.421, cited above, continues: “(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same [i.e. 
transcendental])”. For Murdoch, ethics and aesthetics, if not always the same, were internally 
connected, even inseparable, as two forms of manifestation of the same Eros, in our experience of, 
and operation on, the world. (Her argument rests on a conception of Eros as symbol of 
                                                 
211 Murdoch notes that Plato envisages a “‘way of justice’ which, without necessarily leading to true enlightenment, is 
open to anyone who is able to harmonise the different levels of his soul moderately well under the general guidance of 
reason” (F&S 414); his dim view of the moral standing and capacities of most people notwithstanding. 
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ethics/aesthetics as transcendental, allowing her to draw on “naturalistic” arguments without 
committing to them metaphysically.) Murdoch refers to Eros as the life-energy in human beings, 
our desires, our creativity, our capacity for empathy and for love. The great paradox of Eros is 
that, in its self-centred desires, in order to get from “the other” what it wants, it has to recognise 
the other, relate to the other. “Love” as she says, “is the extremely difficult realisation that 
something other than oneself is real.” And it is precisely as such that “Love … is the discovery of 
reality.” (S&G, 215)  
The great theoretician of Eros was of course Plato, for whom, she writes: 
 
Eros is the desire for good and joy which is active at all levels in the soul and through which we are able to turn 
toward reality. This is the fundamental force which can release the prisoners [from the darkness of the cave] 
and draw them toward the higher satisfactions of light and freedom. It is also the force which finds expression 
in the unbridled appetites of the tyrant (who is described in books VIII-IX of the Republic). There is a limited 
amount of soul-energy (Republic, 458D), so, for better or worse, one desire will weaken another. (F&S, 415) 
 
Reading today of this mutability of psychic energy, through forms of good and bad, immediately 
calls to mind Freud, the great modern theoretician of Eros; and Murdoch notes that Freud readily 
acknowledged his debt to Plato. She quotes, from the preface to Freud’s Three Essays on the 
Theory of Sexuality, his remark that “ ‘The enlarged sexuality of psychoanalysis coincides with the 
Eros of the divine Plato.’ ”(Quoted F&S, 418) Eros was the central concept, both in terms of our 
ethical relation to the world as described above, and in our understanding of reality, for both Plato 
and Freud; one from a materialist, the other from an ideal perspective (with material and ideal sex 
as the great symbols). Murdoch was neither an idealist nor a materialist, but she believed that 
Freud’s work was too important to be ignored by moral philosophy212. From Freud’s vast opus, the 
part most relevant to Murdoch, and to this argument, is his discussion of the relation of the 
“pleasure principle” to the “reality principle”213. To give a very rough sketch of this, Freud holds 
that our original, infantile form of relation to the world can be expressed as: “I like it, therefore I 
want it”, and “I don’t like, I’m getting rid of it (Freud says ‘spitting it out’)”. The resulting 
mechanism of “take or reject, but don’t give” is what he calls the “pleasure principle”; and it is 
entirely selfish. As we grow, we come to understand that the other exists, and has desires and 
aversions that are equally self-centred, therefore in conflict with our own, to which necessity 
                                                 
212 She agreed with Wittgenstein that Freud had, around some ground-breaking and important insights, invented a new 
and enormously persuasive mythology that has suffered the fate of becoming part of our collective western vision, 
without necessarily being properly understood. She writes: “Freud takes the idea of the sexual drive as a unitary 
principle of explanation; and, with simplifications, the ‘modern consciousness’ has followed him. At any rate 
‘explanations by sex’ tend to have for us a kind of intuitive obviousness, as if we perfectly knew what sex was.” 
(MGM, 21) 
213 First elaborated in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, and re-elaborated variously throughout his work.  
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requires we adjust. The resulting need to come to terms with the world outside ourselves he calls 
the “reality principle”. Our narcissistic preoccupation with self is paradoxically self-defeating 
however: if we do not learn to recognise the other, to give as well as take, we will be trapped in 
this conflict. Freud also hypothesises that the birth of thought itself occurs here, in the need to 
activate this dormant capacity, so as to work out a strategy (in effect, a communication strategy) 
for managing this first and most basic of all contradictions in one’s relationship to the other. The 
strategy that works turns out to involve acceptance of limitations on the space and power of the 
self. And from recognition of the other – from putting energy into the effort of seeing the other – 
in sufficiently favourable conditions a warm sentiment of affection arises, and the beginnings of 
love. Thus in Freud, thought and love and recognition of reality arise in relation to each other. 
On this picture, aesthetics appears clearly as the ground of ethics, of the capacity both for love and 
for self-control. Our immediate, necessarily aesthetic, apprehension of the world produces a non-
mediated response, but increasingly, in what Murdoch calls the progressing life of a person, a 
response mediated by reflection. “Virtue” she writes, “is concerned with really apprehending that 
other people exist”, and it starts here. Virtue was not Freud’s primary concern of course. Murdoch 
notes that he makes these observations “in the context of a scientific therapy which aims not at 
making people good but making them workable” (OGG, 341); though in his more discursive, less 
clinical works, he upheld this idea.214 Freudian clinical practice centres on words, on an 
interpretation of their uses as driven by forces within oneself linked to the pleasure principle 
(whose domain is the unconscious), in its lifelong struggle with reality. Bringing to consciousness 
these deep-seated motivations should allow us to overcome fantasy and face reality. It is evident 
from this account that M’s response to D could also be described in these terms. She undertakes an 
examination of the reality of the other, thus disempowering her fantasy construction of who D is. 
What is important to note here however is that the intellect which is thus engaged in the 
adjustment of itself (from a mental health perspective, or, from a moral perspective, is engaged in 
purification, or clarification, or seeing justly) is not disengaged, not dispassionate. What is 
dispassionate is unsympathetic in its mode of looking; “judgemental” is not “judicious”. The 
engaged intellect is striving for a calm passion (and this is only an oxymoron if the two concepts 
are hypostatised as contradictory). Murdoch writes: “we need the concept of consciousness to 
understand how morality is cognitive […] Reflection on this concept enables us to display how 
deeply, subtly and in detail, values, the various qualities and grades between good and bad, ‘seep’ 
through our moment-to-moment experiences. This activity concerns our ability to see that value, 
                                                 
214 See particularly Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents. 
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valuing, is … an apprehension of the world, an aspect of cognition, which is everywhere.” (MGM, 
265)  
 
Apprehension of the world occurs automatically, but it changes according to the degree of 
attention that is brought both to what we are looking at and to the way we are looking, in other 
words, to the state of mind through which we evaluate. On Plato’s picture, Murdoch says, “you 
can only see at your own level and a little above. Perception here is, and properly, the image of 
thought and spiritual insight.” (MGM 400) And the biggest obstacle to clear vision Murdoch sees 
as ego-centred, rather than other-centred vision. As Conradi puts it: “Iris believed … that what is 
self-enclosed is disturbed, and what is good self-transcending. Attention – what she was to call a 
‘passionate, stilled attention’ – was the bridge.” (IML, 545) This sentence of Conradi’s is 
indicative of three of Murdoch’s main sources of reference (though not in equal measure) in 
constructing her own moral philosophy: Freud, for his profound analysis of what is self-enclosed 
and disturbed; Plato for his account of what is good and self-transcending; and Simone Weil, for 
developing a practice of “passionate, stilled attention”. Between them they show that ego traps us 
in fantasy, that attention to the other allows us a way out of the egoic trap, and that orientation to 
the good allows us to grasp reality. For all of them love is the key; the good quality of Eros that 
leads us out of the self to the other and to reality. (“The activity of Eros is orientation of desire.” 
MGM, 497).  
Of Freud’s insights she writes: 
 
Freud takes a thoroughly pessimistic view of human nature. He sees the psyche as an egocentric system of 
quasi-mechanical energy, largely determined by its own individual history, whose natural attachments are 
sexual, ambiguous, and hard for the subject to understand or motive, and fantasy is a stronger force than reason. 
Objectivity and unselfishness are not natural to human beings. (OGG, 341) 
 
She notes that as a theory this is a form of determinism, but it served her purposes in its other 
guise of insightful (and metaphorical) empirical description. As determinism it was rejected by 
Sartre, and others. For her too “Determinism as a philosophical theory is quite unproven”. 
Nonetheless, she writes, “[t]he problem is to accommodate inside moral philosophy, and to 
suggest methods of dealing with the fact that so much of human conduct is moved by mechanical 
energy of an egocentric kind. In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego. Moral 
philosophy is properly, and in the past has sometimes been, the discussion of this ego and of the 
techniques (if any) for its defeat.” (Ibid., 342) The techniques of psychoanalysis were developed 
for the clinical setting of analyst and analysand, and were not easily to be transferred to a form of 
 275 
individual practice, so psychoanalysis ceased to be useful to her in moving from description of the 
problem of ego-centrism to devising personal techniques for working with the self. As previously 
noted, between determinism, like that of Freud, and the existentialist image of total freedom, 
Murdoch proposed, following Weil, the idea of attention, or looking. Sufficient attention 
(according to the possibilities of the specific individual in the specific moment) to a whole 
situation, with all the characters in it, including the self, may lead to an understanding of what is 
the right thing to do, that conventional norms cannot provide. Should the artist sacrifice her family 
to her work or her work to her family? Should one leave a failed marriage or stay for the sake of 
the children? Should one afflict another person with a painful “truth”, or stay silent? There are no 
formulaic answers to these questions. If there is a conflict between what one wants and what one 
considers one’s duty does the “will” enter in conflict with itself?  Murdoch notes that “What I have 
called fantasy, the proliferation of blinding self-centred aims and images, is itself a powerful 
system of energy, and most of what is often called ‘will’ or ‘willing’ belongs to this system. What 
counteracts the system is attention to reality inspired by, consisting of, love.” (OGG, 354)  Rather 
like Kant’s freedom to obey the deliverances of one’s own reason, on this view one exercises 
one’s freedom, one’s courage, one’s will, in choosing to try and get to the truth of the matter under 
observation, choosing not to avoid difficult truths. And though she does not spell this out here, the 
implication is that only love can provide an energy of sufficient strength to counter egoism. “Will 
and reason then”, Murdoch writes, “are not entirely separate faculties in the moral agent. Will 
continually influences belief, for better or worse, and is ideally able to influence it through a 
sustained attention to reality. This is what Simone Weil means when she says that ‘will is 
obedience not resolution. As moral agents we have to try to see justly, to overcome prejudice, to 
avoid temptation, to control and curb imagination, to direct reflection.” (Ibid., 331-32).  
This does not imply that for her “insight or pureness of heart are more important than action… 
Overt actions are perfectly obviously important […] I have suggested that we have to accept a 
darker, less fully conscious, less steadily rational image of the dynamics of the human 
personality.” (IP, 335) Given the difficulties however, clarity may not come easily, and she 
believes, against existentialism, that we cannot always achieve clear insight, and we do also need 
moral codes to fall back on, however personalised. She goes on “With this dark entity behind us 
we may sometimes decide to act abstractly by rule, to ignore vision and the compulsive energy 
derived from it; and we may find that as a result both energy and vision are unexpectedly given. 
To decide when to attempt such leaps is one of the most difficult of moral problems.  But if we do 
leap ahead of what we know, we still have to try to catch up. Will cannot run very far ahead of 
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knowledge, and attention is our daily bread.” (Ibid.) On this picture, she recuperates the concept of 
the moral “will” as in the first place supplying the moral effort that is needed to deepening our 
understanding of where the path of good lies in any one situation, and secondly  –  in those 
situations which may occur when clear vision has not been attained  – she uses “will” in the more 
orthodox sense of holding us to observation of a moral duty. Importantly however, in such cases, 
our moral obligation does not stop there. She suggests here that we must continue to pay 
retrospective attention to whatever it is we had not fully understood, and learn from this. 
For the religious believer on the other hand the focus outside of the self that will help one orient to 
the good (and away from the bad), is God. “Prayer” she says, “is properly not petition, but simply 
an attention to God which is a form of love.”215 Murdoch says of this believer that, “especially if 
his God is conceived as a person, [he is] in the fortunate position of being able to focus his thought 
upon something which is a source of energy.” But, she says, this reorientation of one’s energies to 
the good (as to the bad) is something we all have : “Such focusing, with such results, is natural to 
human beings. Consider being in love. Consider too the attempt to check being in love, and the 
need in such a case of another object to attend to. Where strong emotions of sexual love, or of 
hatred, or of jealousy are concerned, ‘pure will’ can usually achieve little. It is small use telling 
oneself ‘Stop being in love, stop feeling resentment, be just.’ What is needed is a reorientation 
which will provide an energy of a different kind.” (OGG, 345)  
 
The good then, in nature, in art, in beauty, in God, serves as a focus for reorienting psychic energy; 
but Murdoch sees it as a model which inspires rather than as a model to emulate. In discussing the 
ethical significance of Plato’s Forms she says that for him “our relation to the divine pattern thus 
discerned [the Forms, especially the Form of the Good seen in the good man, in the starry heavens, 
in nature, etc.] must not be ambitiously mimetic (mimesis apes appearance), but rather 
participatory and continuous…. To put it (as Plato does not) in terms with a Kantian ring: a good 
man does not copy another good man, playing him as an actor plays a role, but attempts to become 
himself a part or function of the divine intelligence. We were never told to ‘copy’ the Forms by 
producing something else, but only to become able to see them and thus in a sense to become like 
them.” (F&S, 436) This being said however, what is most important in focusing on the good 
remains for her its capacity to clear our vision (to which the good as good energy tends). To clear 
it from that self-enclosed fantasy which constitutes so much more of our mental life than we 
                                                 
215 In Christian theology, this is “perfect prayer”, the prayer of saints, mystics and the good of heart; prayer as petition 
is recognised as better than nothing, as capable of keeping the believers on the right path. 
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would like to admit, and blocks our perception of reality; or colours it with negative states of 
mind. She believed that: 
 
The chief enemy of excellence [and even decency] in morality (and also in art) is personal fantasy: the tissue of 
self-aggrandising and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one. 
Rilke said of Cézanne that he did not paint ‘I like it’, he painted ‘There it is.’ This is not easy, and requires, in 
art or morals, a discipline. One might say here that art is an excellent analogy of morals, or indeed that it is a 
case of morals. We cease to be in order to attend to the existence of something else, a natural object, a person in 
need. We can see in mediocre art, where perhaps it is even more clearly seen than in mediocre conduct, the 
intrusion of fantasy, the assertion of self, the dimming of any reflection of the real world. (Ibid., 347-48). 
 
 
The question of the usefulness of “transcendent objects”, such as God, or the Idea of the Good, or 
the Idea of Perfection, appears in this context of striving for excellence. She asks if, instead of the 
injunction “ ‘Be ye therefore perfect’ ”, whether it would not be more sensible to say: “ ‘Be ye 
therefore slightly improved’?”, given that, as some psychologists say, too high a standard can 
make us neurotic. And she replies that “One cannot feel unmixed love for a mediocre moral 
standard any more than one can for the work of a mediocre artist. The idea of perfection is also a 
natural producer of order. In its light we come to see that A, which superficially resembles B, is 
really better than B.” (Ibid. 350) Yet again, love is seen as the motivating force of morality. As 
Charles Taylor puts it: “If we give the full range of ethical feelings their due, we can see that the 
fullness of ethical life involves not just doing, but also being; and not just these two but also 
loving (which is shorthand here for being moved by, being inspired by, what is constitutively 
good.” (IMMP, 15)  
Murdoch writes: “It is in the capacity to love, that is to see, that the liberation of the soul from 
fantasy consists.” (OGG, 354). If then the ability to see another person clearly is dependent on 
love, then seeing falsely must be blighted by lack of love, by looking through a fog of vice. 
Nussbaum, in discussing Murdoch’s relation to both Plato’s and Dante’s conceptions of the 
relation of love to clear seeing, notes that for Dante, in the Purgatorio, the world is blind “ (‘lo 
mondo è cieco’. Purg. XVI. 66, cited L&V, 34). She goes on: 
 
[For Dante] The manifold lures of the world – including fame, honour, money, and sexual gratification – create 
a ‘fog’ around the sight of the individual, blocking him from truly perceiving other individuals […] The sins 
that are purged in purgatory are all different forms of false love […] In pride, for example, one attends only to 
one’s own standing; this leads to a failure to notice the needs of those one loves. In envy, one fixes on the 
possessions or standing of others, again failing to notice who they are and what they need. In anger one is filled 
with resentment at slights to oneself and so cannot fully attend to the particular history and needs of another. In 
sloth and gluttony, one’s absorption in one’s own comfort and gratification makes one slow to go to another’s 
need. Lust finally, is also seen as a deformation of individual love. […] A person who is seen as a vessel of 
pleasure is not seen truly for what he or she is.  (L&V, 34) 
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It is the last of these in particular that Nussbaum contrasts with Plato’s vision in the Phaedrus. 
Plato, she says, does describe cases of sexual love having this same characteristic of falsity, 
determined by lust, this failure to recognise the soul’s beauty within the beautiful body; but the 
Phaedrus is a hymn to the opposite case, where it is erotic love itself which induces clear vision. 
Among the claims Plato makes in the Phaedrus for erotic love, Nussbaum notes that  
 
First, love of this sort is a crucial, apparently even a necessary, source of motivation for the soul in its search for 
the vision of the Good [“and a lifelong accompaniment to that search”]. And “Second, love of this sort is a 
crucial source of vision, vision both of the beloved person and of the external impersonal Good, the two being 
closely linked. The passage makes it clear that the discovery of the inner divinity and the nature of the beloved 
person and the generous loving actions inspired by this discovery (see 253B, 255B) would not have taken place 
without the violent erotic reaction of the whole soul, therefore not without its sexuality […] The passage also 
argues that although direct unmediated arousal by the Good is conceivable, it is not empirically possible; as we 
are we need the body’s response to beauty to stimulate our vision and send it searching for goodness. (L&V, 
31) 
 
Clearly, this sexual love is largely sublimated in Plato, its physical expression mostly restricted to 
the limited form of caresses; but the sexual desire remains, whereas in Dante it is radically 
purified, so that no physical desire remains. The question Nussbaum poses is whether Murdoch’s 
vision, as expressed in her philosophy and her novels, is closer to that of Plato, her inspiration, or 
of Dante. In this essay (Love and Vision), Nussbaum notes that at no point in her philosophical 
work does Murdoch contrast these two visions directly, and she turns to the novels to examine the 
question. Here she cites different passages which could support either argument, but, whilst 
acknowledging that it is impossible to determine the matter, she says finally that “Murdoch’s eros 
is … more Platonic than Dantean, though it complicates Platonism with a complex diagnosis.” 
(Ibid., 46) Nussbaum makes the suggestion that, in the case of M and D, “it is envy and perhaps 
sexual jealousy that causes the mother-in-law to focus on the superficial and unattractive traits of 
her daughter-in-law.”(Ibid., 36-37) This is a somewhat gratuitous and irrelevant comment as, 
whatever the sources of M’s dislike, and Murdoch lists many of these (but not sexual jealousy, and 
not by “Freudian” omission), why this dislike occurs is not what this case study is about. What it is 
about is self-transformation as a practice of reflection on the way in which one formulates one’s 
moral judgements, and this practice does not change if the obstacle to “the good” (Buddhists 
would say “to right seeing”) changes (from snobbishness to sexual envy, for example). Nussbaum 
seems to be looking for some kind of “natural” explanation of malice, whereas Murdoch is looking 
at the cognitive imagination (in which sexuality figures as one manifestation, not necessarily 
predominant, of a much broader “Eros”). Nussbaum herself notes that “Murdoch, more than any 
other contemporary ethical thinker, has made us vividly aware of the many stratagems by which 
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the ego wraps itself in a cozy self-serving fog that prevents egress to the reality of the other.” 
(Ibid. 36). In fact, it is always egoism that is Murdoch’s cardinal sin; and this may, and often is, 
expressed through sexuality, just as genuine other-centred love may be. Sexuality is therefore 
explored in her work both in its undoubted (for Plato and everyone else) capacity to blind and, as 
with other forms of love, in its capacity to open the eyes to reality. Nussbaum’s target here is not 
so much Murdoch’s Danteism, as her Platonism (as far as that goes), which she contrasts with an 
Aristotelian (and Nussbaum’s own) love of “the flawed, idiosyncratic, lumpy, surprising human 
individual.” She sees in the connection – made by Plato and endorsed by Murdoch – between love 
of an individual person and of the impersonal good, that both “in their accounts of erotic 
achievement, somewhat impatiently bypass this individuality in search of the good.” (Ibid., 38) 
Having said this she then admits that “Murdoch seems more charitable to the sexual than Plato 
himself, since she allows that sexual intercourse itself, not merely the bodily response to the sight 
of beauty, can intimate and express spiritual values” (Ibid., 41). Murdoch’s Plato however is not so 
exclusively concerned with the spiritual. She writes: “In spite of Plato’s repeated declaration that 
philosophers should stay chaste and his requirement that the soul should try to escape from the 
body, it is the whole Eros that concerns him, and not just some passionless distillation.” (F&S, 
415) Nussbaum also accepts that (of all people), Murdoch cannot be criticised for undervaluing the 
contingent, “lumpy” individuality of persons. She writes that “for Murdoch art can present the 
whole human being, the absurd and idiosyncratic alongside the splendid. On the other hand, her 
severe allegiance to the Good colours the way in which these features of daily life are seen.” (Ibid. 
48). It is not so much that Nussbaum sees Plato’s, and Murdoch’s, allegiance to the Good as an 
obstacle, not as an aid, to clear vision however, as that she sees her as moralistic. For Nussbaum it 
as if “Murdoch’s commitment to the idea that ‘What is needed … is a new orientation of our 
desires, a re-education of our instinctive feelings’ (Metaphysics, 503) … leads often, in the fiction, 
to a slight disdainfulness towards characters who do not re-educate their instincts.” (Ibid., 49). 
This would be easy to challenge216, but Nussbaum asserts this here to draw a distinction between 
Murdoch and that self-confessed Aristotelian genius, James Joyce. She says “Joyce is the great 
anti-Platonist of art. … Joyce is anti-Platonist in the … fundamental sense that he simply does not 
see the reason for the Platonic ascent. It is too much fun down here below, with the body and its 
                                                 
216 Illustration through passages from the novels would be too lengthy, but regarding literature Murdoch writes: “I 
would like to say that all great artists are tolerant in their art, but perhaps this can be argued. Was Dante tolerant? I 
think most great writers have a sort of calm merciful vision because they see how different people are and why they 
are different. Tolerance is connected with being able to imagine centres of reality which are remote from oneself.” 
(L&P 29)  
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smells and its odd deflections from rationality, the outhouse and the joys of Plumtree’s Potted 
Meat and the joy of being and making a mess. Joyce, I think, really loves sexuality in a way in 
which neither Plato or Murdoch actually does, much though they give it high praise. For they 
praise it as a route to something else, whereas Joyce made a big point of inverting the direction of 
signification.” (Ibid., 49-50)  
It could be argued of course that it is not that Murdoch sees sexuality as on route to something 
else, but as containing something else, that makes it more exciting, not less, than the more earth-
bound sexuality described in Joyce’s novels, but that, surely, is a matter of taste? Murdoch would 
also argue no doubt that nothing in life is contained within itself, including the sexual act; that 
absolutely everything must be valued in itself, but is also on route to something else. The question 
is to what; but where each moment is leading can be to the good, or to the bad, in myriad ways. 
Murdoch gives no formula for the good, other than the need to pay attention to reality, and to the 
significations of one’s acts (and thoughts). Nussbaum goes on: “Joyce’s holy sacrament is the 
Aristotelian purgation of all Platonic forms. Murdoch’s ‘holy office’ is the sacrament of purifying 
one’s attention so that the good becomes evident. And this means that my original question, Is 
Murdoch Plato or Dante, now has a certain sort of answer: for she is both, insofar as both are 
united in their departure from Joyce’s Aristotle, with his indifference to purifications, his calm 
delight in the body.” (Ibid., 51-52) We each have our own Joyce of course, and our own Murdoch, 
and Aristotle, but Joyce surely expressed hostility rather than indifference to purifications, 
drenched as the concept was for him in the guilt-ridden Catholicism that he had experienced as a 
prison from which it was his life’s work to escape (he wrote often of the three nets that entrapped 
him: Ireland, the Church and the family, and his very troubled relationship with all of them). 
Nussbaum concedes however that “in Murdoch there seems to be a residual Aristotelianism – a 
sense at times, that the real physical being of the object is out there somewhere and the better for 
not being seen with the purifying scrutiny of art. Such moments of sympathy and yielding are 
especially powerful sources of generosity and vision in her work, at odds though they may be with 
the spirit of Platonism that on the whole animates it.” (Ibid., 52)  
In this regard, there is a crucial difference between Murdoch and Plato however. She notes that for 
Plato, “The proper apprehension of beauty is joy in reality through the transfiguration of desire. 
Thus as we respond we experience the transcendence of the real and the personal ego fades as, in 
the words of the Symposium (210 D), we ‘escape from the mean petty slavery of the particular 
case and turn toward the open sea of beauty” (Ibid. 425) In other words, Plato sees the overcoming 
of the personal ego by the “real” as a case of the overcoming of the particular by the universal 
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(open sea of beauty). In Murdoch there is no such metaphysical order, and she never draws this 
parallel. On the contrary, overcoming personal ego in order to see what is real is for her precisely 
to do with each particular case, for all that seeing our common humanity incurs in the particular 
person who is the object of our attention. Where Plato is aiming at the transcendent reality of the 
Forms, Murdoch is aiming at seeing the moral reality of the particular other. Art, for Plato, 
renders the particular too fascinating. Murdoch notes that he attempts to explain the reality “to 
which Eros moves us and from which art allegedly diverts us” (Ibid., 426) through the Theory of 
the Forms; but she points out that this theory went through many stages, and that Plato himself 
was never fully satisfied with it. “The relation of Forms to particulars remains persistently 
problematic as Plato moves uncertainly from a metaphor of participation [in the earlier dialogues] 
to one of imitation, and increasingly emphasises that the forms are separate. The Forms are more 
like ‘imminent universals’ at the start, and ‘transcendent models’ later on.” (Ibid.) In neither case 
did Murdoch feel he achieved his metaphysical aims, which she certainly did not share. 
Murdoch evidently agreed with Plato that the contemplation of beauty opens the mind to the 
possibility of the good, and yet not with the fact that “he practically defines it [beauty] so as to 
exclude art, and constantly accuses artists of moral weakness or even baseness.” (F&S, 387) And 
yet she writes that almost all art “is a form of fantasy-consolation and few artists attain the vision 
of the real.” (Ibid., 352) She hated manipulative or mind-numbing “art” (television, propaganda, 
etc.). Even so, the free practice of both good and bad art was something she defended: “a free art is 
an essential aspect of a free society, as a degraded lying art is a function of a tyrannical one. Art as 
the great general universal informant is an obvious rival, not necessarily a hostile one, to 
philosophy and indeed to science, and Plato never did justice to the unique truth-conveying 
capacities of art…. Art, especially literature, is a great hall of reflection where we can all meet and 
where everything under the sun can be examined and considered. For this reason it is feared and 
attacked by dictators, and by authoritarian moralists such as the one under discussion [Plato]. The 
artist is a great informant, at least a gossip, at best a sage, and much loved in both roles.” (Ibid., 
461) As was the artist Murdoch herself. Her cryptic statement: “Good: Real: Love.” (IP, 333) 
seems at first sight hard to justify. But the first effective step she takes is to show that the great 
obstacle to morality is clothing reality in veils of “selfing”, veils of Bad: Self (false): Hate, as it 
were. She then puts forward various ways to overcome this (to be further examined). Ways of 
moving away from the narcissistic bad, and moving simultaneously towards the good, and to the 
reality of the other. 
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3. Unselfing 
 
Falling in love is for many people their most intense experience, bringing with it a quasi-religious certainty, and most 
disturbing because it shifts the centre of the world from outside ourselves to another place. A love relationship can 
occasion extreme selfishness and possessive violence, the attempt to dominate that other place so that it be no longer 
separate; or it can prompt a process of unselfing wherein the lover learns to see, and cherish and respect, what is not 
himself. (MGM, 16-17) 
 
Caught in the Self-Centred Dream – Only Suffering 
Holding to Self-Centred Thoughts – Exactly the Dream 
Each Moment, Life as It is – The Only Teacher 
Being Just This Moment – Compassion’s Way (Zen “Prayer”) 
 
 
“Unselfing” is a neologism in Western philosophy that Murdoch uses to describe one of the two 
ways in which she saw the possibility of self-transformation. The other, as said, was that of 
orienting our energies to the good, but the two paths lead to each other. Both involve the moral 
practice of cultivating attention, both involve love. In the first quote above, Murdoch sets out the 
limit case of the Platonic argument, wherein awakening to the reality of the other, therefore to 
reality, can occur suddenly, violently, through falling in love. This however, is not an opportunity 
that chance often renders available to human beings, but it provides us with an image of the 
experience of awakening, and of the qualities of a good life – awareness, unselfishness, other-
centredness, love – and these qualities may be cultivated more slowly through a patient sustained 
attention to others, and also to beauty in nature and (for her and not for Plato) in art. The concept 
of unselfing on the other hand, not formally thematised in Plato’s writings, is present there, on 
Murdoch’s reading, as a case of awareness of the insignificance of individual particularity in the 
face of the universal, especially of the Form of the Good. As to the concept of unselfing, its natural 
home is of course Buddhism. Murdoch took the concept of unselfing in part directly from 
Buddhist sources, and in part from the use Simone Weil made of it in her writings.  
In Buddhism, unselfing refers on the one hand to the capacity to see one’s own finitude as an 
instance of the impermanent reality of all existing things; and on the other to learning to see one’s 
interconnection with everyone, and everything else. Impermanence and inter-being constitute the 
Buddhist conception of reality. The Pali root term, Anatta217 – non-self, means not nothingness, 
but openness (a vital, not a dead void), non-separateness, and above all non-identification with a 
“self” imagined as a fixed being; (though the temporary aggregate which is atta (self) is known to 
put up considerable resistance to developing consciousness of the truth of anatta, hence the need 
                                                 
217 A concept used by the Buddha to counter both the Indian concept of purusa, construed as a personal soul, and the 
religious practices associated with this concept. 
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for reminders, like the Zen verse cited above, and for meditation and reflective practices in daily 
life, the primary Oriental techniques of the self).  
The importance of finitude, of suffering and death in our lives was a central concern for Murdoch, 
but one which occupies more space in her novels than in the philosophical texts. In Nuns and 
Soldiers, for example, there is a long conversation between a man dying of cancer and an ex-nun, 
which includes this exchange: 
“Guy said, ‘You don’t, I imagine, believe in the anti-religious idea of life after death?’ 
‘No. I agree it’s anti-religious. I mean – whatever it is – it’s happening now and here.’ That’s what I couldn’t 
tell them in the convent, she thought.” (N&S, 68) 
 
It is anti-religious for these two (Guy and Anne, the ex-nun), both here speaking with Murdoch’s 
voice, in the one sense of “religious” which Murdoch valued in that it is concerned with truth and 
with how to live (including how to die); and not with a fantasy of escape from the reality of death, 
or from the realities of the present. All else in religion was for her myth, though myths with 
potentially valuable uses if their consolatory function of masking the harshest truths could be held 
at bay. The falsifying nature of consolation enjoined for her “the traditional problem of preventing 
the idea of God [as Good] degenerating in the believer’s mind.” (OGG, 346) In the same novel 
Anne muses on the Christian story of purgatory thus: “Purgatorial suffering is a magical story, the 
transformation of death into pain, happy pain whose guaranteed value will buy us in return some 
everlasting consolation. But there are eternal partings, all things end and end forever and nothing 
could be more important than that. We live with death. With pain, yes. But really … with death.” 
(N&S 510, ellipsis in original.) Murdoch cites from Simone Weil’s Notebooks these words:  
 
‘To lose somebody: we suffer at the thought that the dead one, the absent one, should have become something 
imaginary, something false. But the longing we have for him is not imaginary. We must go down into ourselves where 
the desire which is not imaginary resides … The remedy is to use the loss itself as an intermediary for attaining reality. 
The presence of the dead one is imaginary, but his absence is real, it is henceforth his manner of appearing.’ (p.28) 
 
Murdoch comments on this that instead of surrendering to the need for consolation, “with fantasies 
of ‘bouncing back’”, “we must hold on to what has really happened and not cover it with 
imagining how we are to unhappen it…. What is needed here, and is so difficult to achieve, is a 
new orientation of our desires, a re-education of our instinctive feelings.” (MGM, 502-03) She 
also says, of our “natural impulse to derealise our world and surround ourselves with fantasy”; that 
“Simply stopping this, refraining from filling voids with lies and falsity, is already progress.” 
(Ibid., 503) 
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In Buddhism, direct contemplation of the forms of finitude – chance, incompletion, change, loss, 
death etc. is practised in similar ways, as it was also by the Stoics. In today’s world, Murdoch 
thought art could play the role of memento mori. Despite its closeness to fantasy, it can appeal to 
the moral imagination. She admits that the great deaths of literature are few (and the “fake, 
prettified death”s are many), but says of the few, for example, Patroclus, Cordelia, Petya Rostov, 
that they show us that “All is vanity. The only thing which is of real importance is the ability to 
see it all clearly and respond to it justly which is inseparable from virtue.” (SOGC, 372). She 
writes: 
 
Any story which we tell about ourselves consoles us since it imposes pattern upon something which might 
otherwise seem intolerably chancy and incomplete. However, human life is chancy and incomplete. It is the 
role of tragedy, and also of comedy, and of painting to show us suffering without a thrill and death without a 
consolation. 
[…] Good art, unlike bad art, unlike ‘happenings’, is something pre-eminently outside us and resistant to our 
consciousness. We surrender ourselves to its authority with a love which is unpossessive and selfish. Art shows 
us the only sense in which the permanent and incorruptible is compatible with the transient; and whether 
representational or not it reveals to us aspects of our world which ordinary dull dream-consciousness is unable 
to see. Art pierces the veil and gives sense to the notion of a reality which lies beyond appearance; it exhibits 
virtue in its true guise in the context of death and chance. (SOGC, 371-72) 
 
Here Murdoch describes the experience of something of extreme beauty that takes one completely 
out of one’s ordinary dull dream-consciousness, into a state of mind that is more spacious, open 
and awake. It is a state of mind that seems impregnated with ‘good’, with what is highest in human 
experience; a transient state in itself, but one that leaves its mark. For many today the 
contemplation of the art object (painting, music etc.) is the only form of contemplation, perhaps 
not even recognised as such, that they know. What is more generally recognised is how much love 
is felt for the artist who evokes such intense feelings of what is good, beautiful, of the highest 
value, and no less love is felt for what is most tragic in art. This emotion, this sense of being in the 
presence of something of great value, is something that is still often described as “sacred”. As such 
the concept, used by non-believers, lends itself to Murdoch’s interpretation of this experience as 
affirming a sense of the good. But this is perhaps a first, and not fully conscious awakening to the 
good. There is a sense of the good which does not necessarily crystallise into an idea of the good. 
The idea of a sacrament, in moving from receptivity to action, takes that next step, and this is 
clearly a move made by many artists, if not by their public. Murdoch says that a sacrament 
“provides an external visible place for an internal invisible act of the spirit” (OGG, 356); but notes 
also that even the “idea of contemplation is hard to understand and maintain in a world 
increasingly without sacraments and ritual and in which philosophy has (in many respects rightly) 
destroyed the old substantial conception of the self.” (Ibid.)  
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Nonetheless, clearly this experience of a sense of good, of extreme value, can form part of a moral 
education; the problem is that it can also be reduced to an object of self-interested consumption, 
and Murdoch does not take on the problem of how the latter path can be avoided. Plato of course 
resolved it by not taking the risk of sorting out the good art from the bad, and simply banishing art 
from the ideal city; though as Murdoch notes, as a great artist himself, and as one of the greatest 
myth-makers of all time, “we can see played out in that great spirit the peculiarly distressing 
struggle between the artist and the saint.”(SGOC, 372) That art is another form of magic Murdoch 
of course recognises. It releases and stimulates great energies, therefore its psychic power is great. 
In this it has a kind of affinity with religion, and in collaboration with it becomes extremely 
powerful. This is true, she says, nowhere more than in Christianity, “which has been served by so 
many geniuses. The familiar figures of the Trinity have been so celebrated and beautified in great 
pictures that it almost seems as if the painters were the final authority on the matter, as Plato said 
that the poets seemed to be about the Greek Gods.” (F&S, 447). (The Islamic and Hebrew 
traditions were perhaps more astute in restricting artistic references to the deity to the 
geometrical.) Because of this magical nature of art for Plato, (as with Kant’s ‘sublime’), it is 
nature, not art, that can provoke this experience of “piercing the veil” of the dull mind. But (ever 
wary of shifting concepts), Murdoch points out that for him, nature, not art “means: not statues but 
boys”(F&S, 423). She also remarks that Kant’s choice of examples of experiences of the sublime 
“suggests an eighteenth-century cult of the more Gothic aspects of nature which it does not now 
occur to us to think of as particularly edifying” (S&G, 212-13). Here too however, even though 
“Plato allowed to the beauty of the lovely boy an awakening power which he denied to the beauty 
of nature or art” (SGOC, 372), Murdoch notes that he “does not analyse in detail how selfish love 
changes into unselfish love.” (F&S, 437). And this seems to be the major difficulty with finding a 
contemporary application of Platonic, and Murdochian, moral reasoning; the problem of how the 
step from the selfish to the unselfish is achieved. 
Buddhism takes a different stance on these intense experiences which pierce the veil, (among 
which it includes certain deep meditative states). It sees them as indeed able to provoke the 
beginnings of awakening, and as glories to be celebrated; but also as potentially addictive, as 
bearing the risk of bringing about a romantic division of life into “higher” (valuable) and “lower” 
(valueless, ordinary) experiences (à la Nietzsche). Therefore great attention to one’s states of mind 
as one “comes down” from the high is needed. A good life is thought to have instead more to do 
with seeing everyday reality (which may or may not include Beethoven sonatas, or other peak 
experiences) as the fullness of life, the place where contingency can be lived as suffering or as joy, 
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as vitality or as dullness. It is knowledge of this contingent reality that is the epistemological 
foundation in Buddhism of an ethic of unselfishness : I know you to be a temporary and constantly 
changing aggregate like myself, one who like me will love and lose, suffer and die; in you I see 
myself; in wishing your happiness I wish my own. And, be it noted that as for all other living 
beings, my own happiness is also to be cared for.218 Here care of the self and unselfing coincide. 
Although both the Platonic and the Buddhist spiritual paths involve intellect and passion, or mind 
and heart, it would not be an unreasonable oversimplification to say that  –  in terms of the way 
they are presented in the texts – the Platonic path starts from love and arrives at knowledge of 
reality (the Good), and the Buddhist path starts from knowledge of reality (finitude) and arrives at 
love (the Good).219 In terms of following either path however, in both the growth of knowledge of 
reality and the capacity to love are interwoven. The Pali term karuna, usually translated as 
“compassion”, is considered in the West to be the rather sad supreme value in Buddhism, as a 
response to human suffering (and that of other beings); but in fact it belongs to a group of virtues, 
including metta, loving kindness, and muddhita, joy in the happiness of others. Among the 
common techniques of the self there are practices designed to increase awareness of the different 
experiential qualities of these different manifestations of love (including generosity), and to 
increase the space for these qualities within the “self”.220 “Falling in love” however is not 
separately thematised. (The combination of great joy, wonder, and great risk in falling in love is a 
major theme in the broader Indian tradition, as is the symbolism of union of earth and cosmos, 
gods and humans, under the auspices of that other Eros of myriad amorous adventures, Lord 
Krishna). Murdoch received some instruction in meditation practice in Japan, makes frequent 
reference to Buddhism, and read certain texts with great interest, but not in such a way as to bring 
a more detailed insight from them into her philosophy. She believed that throughout the twentieth 
century a process of demythologisation was underway within Christianity (reminiscent of the 
demythologisation the Buddha had carried out over two millennia ago in India), whereby the 
biblical narratives were increasingly recognised as myths, rather than treated as literal truths. She 
wondered, though pessimistically, whether, in the West, the figure of Christ could “become like 
                                                 
218 The Buddha rejected the extreme ascetic traditions of India that he had practiced before his enlightenment. Simone 
Weil’s extreme asceticism had its origins more in Christian traditions. 
219 Bliss for the Boddisattvas (the enlightened symbols of perfect love and knowledge, who renounce liberation to help 
all living beings become free), is when the tiniest living being passing by fills them with happiness. 
220 The absence of an adequate vocabulary of love causes problems both in philosophy and in ordinary life in the 
West, and Murdoch complained often of the paucity of moral concepts in use. Oriental languages have as many words 
(and concepts) for the emotions and states of mind as Alaskans have for snow. Each virtue has its opposite vice 
(meanness, indifference, envy, etc.), though conceived always as error, not as “sin”, and always as relative (on a 
sliding scale). Ethical practice tends to involve learning to identify one’s errors, in all their nuances, not in order to 
castigate oneself (unskilful), but in order to develop skills of self-transformation. 
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Buddha, both real and mystical, but no longer the divine all-in-one man of traditional 
Christianity?” (MGM, 136).221  
 
What Murdoch meant by unselfing corresponds to the Buddhist concept specifically in relation to 
the not unimportant fact that both hold self-centredness, identification with the self, to be the 
primary cause of all that is morally bad in this world. (And both also hold that chance, 
contingency, have a hand in everything, and that this must always be recognised as the given, with 
which one interacts). Murdoch speaks of the human need to have an idea of who one is as a 
necessary regulative idea of consciousness or self-being. She is concerned to individuate practices 
that render this self-being less self-enclosed, more open to reality, to the good. The Buddha speaks 
of the way self-obsessive fantasy clothes the idea of self with many fixed attributes, which 
constitute obstacles to “right seeing”, of self and others. On this view, identification with an image 
of self may extend from “me” to “mine”, to false ideas about the characteristics of “us” (variously 
defined), and of “them” (correspondingly defined), even to the point of making a morality out of 
such a divisory practice (e.g. religious bigotry, patriotism). Since false notions of “self” and 
“other” are the root of so much that is bad, this must be countered by a slow process of taking 
these false images apart, piece by piece; this is the central technique of the self, of unselfing, in 
Buddhism. (Noting how often one reruns the same films of past and future in one’s head, 
enriching the villainy of whoever has offended us with extra details; running films about how 
clever or stupid we are, or how much better life is going to be as soon as the next corner is turned. 
One gets tired of one’s fantasies when too long in their company.) Freedom in Buddhism means 
freeing oneself of all this fantasy, to be able to live in the present, with eyes open to what one is 
living and with whom; removing the impediments to right seeing.222 For Murdoch too of course, 
                                                 
221 Murdoch’s reflections on this had more to do with the general problem of where moral guidance is to be had in the 
modern world than with exploring techniques of the self used in the East. She notes that “simpler” believers in the 
East took the various religious mythologies literally, whereas “reflective” believers had a long tradition of using the 
myths as non-theistic spiritual guidance, so that an atmosphere of spirituality, and a sense of human life as anchored in 
morality, continues to prevail. In the West on the other hand simpler believers were becoming unbelievers and drifting 
away from religion, and among reflective Christians, for whom the whole point of the myth is spiritual guidance and 
the question of its veracity best left to individual interpretation, crisis reigns. She observed, with regret at the loss of 
some form of moral guidance from outside the self, the process whereby the greater the freedom of interpretation, the 
greater the disarray and division that characterises modern Protestantism. (See MGM, 135-38) “T.S.Eliot said that 
Christianity has always been changing itself into something which can be generally believed. There may be a limit to 
this process, where a demythologised religion becomes intolerable. …A denuded ‘existentialist’ faith may lose its 
identity in the mind of the believer and become more like and unadorned high moral asceticism. (MGM 126-27) 
222 Like his (roughly) contemporary, Socrates, the Buddha believed that only through moral (intellectual) effort will 
one truly understand what is before one (right comprehension). If one overcomes one’s ignorance, it becomes clear 
which course of action has the best chance of leading to the good, and one will not choose the path that is bad (of 
course there is failure and error, but this is the moral path).  
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egoistic fantasising clouds the vision and must be overcome by clear-sighted knowledge of the 
reality of both self and other, and knowledge and love arise together as responses to reality. More 
specifically, she writes of the psyche that : 
 
One of its main pastimes is dreaming. It is reluctant to face unpleasant realities. Its consciousness is not 
normally a transparent glass through which it views the world, but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie 
designed to protect the psyche from pain. It constantly seeks consolation, either through imagined inflation of 
self or through fictions of a theological nature. Even its loving is more often than not an assertion of self. I think 
we can probably recognise ourselves in this rather depressing description.” (MGM, 364) 
 
 
This passage recalls and puts together insights of Freud, the Buddha, Plato, and Simone Weil, all 
of whom were concerned in one way or another with the moral-psychological problem of false 
images of the self. For Murdoch, moral philosophy is empty in the absence of an appropriate 
moral psychology. She spends some time discussing critically Plato’s metaphysics, but what she 
took from him and reworked was not so much this but rather his moral psychology: “a psychology 
which implicitly provides a better explanation of evil (how good degenerates into egoism) than 
Plato’s more strictly philosophical arguments … for instance in the Philebus. Eros is the desire for 
good which is somehow the same even when a degenerate ‘good’ is sought.” (Ibid.) In this sense, 
she says, “morality, goodness is a form of realism” (Ibid.), in which the idea of reality is taken, not 
as given, but as normative. She was clearly not a “realist” in the traditional sense of believing 
value to be inherent in the world. She clarifies by suggesting that “the authority of the good seems 
to us something necessary because the realism (ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is 
a kind of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a 
suppression of the self.” (OGG, 353) If for Plato “reality” refers to what is eternal, unmoving, to 
“being” and not “becoming”, for Murdoch it refers precisely to the particular individual before 
one, in her becoming, and to oneself in one’s becoming; more like the Buddha in this. Like him 
also in his consistent refusal to answer any questions about the universe or the unknowable, 
struggling (as did Plato) against belief in gods and magic, Murdoch worried about the pictures that 
hold us captive – of God, and as she says, equally “the various metaphysical substitutes for God – 
Reason, Science, History – are all false deities. Our destiny can be examined but it cannot be 
justified or totally explained. We are simply here. And if there is any kind of sense or unity in 
human life, and the dream of this does not cease to haunt us, it is of some other kind, and must be 
sought within a human experience which has nothing outside it.” (SGOC, 365)  
In her considerations of the way in which philosophies have either helped or hindered this quest 
for freedom from illusion and self-obsession she felt that Kant came close to a solution, which 
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ultimately eluded him. She writes, “When Kant wanted to find something clean and pure outside 
the mess of selfish empirical psyche he followed a sound instinct but, in my view, looked in the 
wrong place. His enquiry led him back again into the self, now pictured as angelic, and inside this 
angel-self his followers have tended to remain.” (SGOC, 368) This is clearly provocation, a 
Murdochian shock tactic used occasionally in her philosophy and her novels; nonetheless it 
pinpoints a problem in modern moral philosophy that she discussed extensively. Kant had rejected 
the medieval practice of aligning one’s life (entia creatum) to an idea of the Good incarnated in 
God (ens perfectissimum), or rather he had rejected the version of this given by an authority 
outside the self, but the result for philosophy was the same. For Kant himself, the Moral Law to 
which Reason acceded could be construed as constituting a vital point of reference outside the 
individual self, though only accessible from inside, and Murdoch says, “indeed his term ‘Idea of 
Reason’ expresses precisely that endless aspiration to perfection which is characteristic of moral 
activity.” (IP, 324) But as we have seen, Murdoch believed that this notion was taken up and 
transformed by existentialism into a moral vision whose paramount value was sincerity, or one’s 
personal truth, not obedience to the moral law. In this tradition, she says, an “authentic mode of 
existence is presented as attainable by intelligence and force of will. The atmosphere is 
invigorating and tends to produce self-satisfaction in the reader, who feels himself to be a member 
of the elite, addressed by another one.” (OGG, 340). The tradition of analytic philosophy, also 
focusing on freedom of choice, she felt simply put the problem of egoism aside. In analysing 
moral concepts on the basis of ordinary (thereby conventional) language, it presents, she says, “a 
relaxed picture of a mediocre achievement” (OGG, 340). What instead of these views was needed, 
she said, was: 
 
 to return from the self-centred concept of sincerity to the other-centred concept of truth. We are not isolated 
free choosers …, but benighted creatures sunk in a reality whose nature we are constantly and overwhelmingly 
tempted to deform by fantasy. Our current picture of freedom encourages a dream-like facility; whereas what 
we require is a renewed sense of the difficulty and complexity of the moral life and the opacity of persons. 
(AD, 293) 
 
 
That philosophy itself, especially in the complex forms that writing allows, can create fantasies to 
live by is of course a problem that is not new. As Murdoch points out, Plato had already insisted 
that in philosophy, “(Seventh Letter 341C-D) it is only after a persistent study of the matter in 
hand – the thing itself – and an abiding with it, that understanding comes ‘like a light that is 
kindled by a leaping spark, and thereafter nourishes itself’.” Plato complained that a written 
statement “is ambiguous, and defenceless in the hands of knaves or fools. So it may become a 
 290 
vehicle of falsehood even though it was set down as a memorandum of truth.” (MGM, 19). She 
says that Wittgenstein too chose to write little in case his writing fell into the hands of fools. For 
Murdoch, the concept of sincerity can be warped in various “self-centred” ways in the absence of 
an “other-centred” concept of truth. The force of ego is such that, she writes, “psychic energy 
flows, and more readily flows, into building up convincingly coherent but false pictures of the 
world, complete with systematic vocabulary … Attention is the effort to counteract such states of 
illusion.” (IP, 329) 
Philosophy, however, and intellectual study in general, can also be a valuable technique of the self. 
She says that Plato thought of it as a spiritual activity (especially mathematics, but Murdoch says 
learning languages works better for her), “the love of learning spoken of in the Symposium and the 
Philebus.” (F&S, 437) The practice of attention is close to that of concentration, and all forms of 
concentrated work are known to increase the capacity for attention, both where it is learned and 
elsewhere. For this reason also access to the good may occur “not only in intellectual studies but 
also through personal love and through the various technai, all kinds of crafts and skill (excluding 
mimetic art) to which Plato at different times attaches importance. Love of beauty and desire to 
create inspire us to activities which increase our grasp of the real, and because they diminish our 
fantasy-ridden egoism are self-evidently good.” (Ibid.)  
 
It was Simone Weil, above all, who thematised the related practices of attention and of unselfing. 
Murdoch writes of her that she presents us “with a psychology whose sources are in Plato, in 
Eastern philosophy and in the disciplines of Christian mysticism.” (KV, 158). We have seen how 
attention serves to achieving clear vision of the besetting moral problem, but for Murdoch 
“attention” is also a technique of the self in other ways, focusing on other types of objects, for 
other moral purposes. When, for example, one’s vision is darkened and one’s energy is low, 
focusing on what is light may help to change one’s viewpoint and restore energy. There is nothing 
at all banal for her in practices such as taking a walk in nature, looking at something beautiful, 
listening to music, reading something uplifting (the metaphor in this adjective is explicit, as are all 
the metaphors of mood: of depression and uplift, tension and release, lightening and darkening, 
etc.). These things can help to heal an anguished soul, and importantly, clear the vision. She gives 
the example of being in an offended, self-obsessed bad mood, and then looking out of the window 
and seeing by chance “a hovering kestrel. Then in a moment everything is altered. The brooding 
self with its hurt vanity has disappeared. There is nothing now but kestrel. And when I return to 
thinking of the other matter it is less important.” (SGOC, 369) (In the absence of the kestrel 
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however – for a Bodhisattva a fly would do just as well –  Buddhism, again like Stoicism in this, 
offers various mental techniques, including that of phrases to be learned and used as reminders of 
reality. Reminding oneself gently but with conviction that “Caught in the self-centred dream 
brings only suffering” might, if practised seriously, achieve the effect of a passing kestrel.) In 
these cases, a technique is used to redirect one’s energies. Sometimes it is necessary to move away 
from the besetting problem, and when the negative state of mind is quieted move back. Other 
times it is necessary to keep the focus on reality.  
For Murdoch, the first thing it was necessary to recognise in moral philosophy, the first principle, 
is that the moral life “is not intermittent or specialised, it is not a peculiar separate area of 
existence.” (MGM, 495). She says that it is in looking into ourselves, an outmoded practice in and 
out of philosophy, that we discover that “every little thing matters. Life is made up of details.” We 
are in a hurry. We compartmentalise our busy lives, and yet, she says, “we are always deploying 
and directing our energy, refining it or blunting it, purifying it or corrupting it, and it is always 
easier to do a thing a second time.” (Ibid.) And this is true of all practical skills, including those of 
paying attention to the details of life, to what kind of difference one’s presence makes in any 
situation. That is what techniques of the self are all about, they involve practice, they take 
commitment and work. She goes on: “All sorts of momentary sensibilities to other people, too 
shadowy to come under the heading of manners of communication, are still parts of moral activity. 
(‘But are you saying that every single second has a moral tag?’ Yes, roughly.) […But this] is not 
to advocate constant self-observation or some mad return to solipsism. We instinctively watch and 
check ourselves to some extent, but much of our self-awareness is other-awareness, and in this 
area we exercise ourselves as moral beings in our use of many various skills as we direct our 
modes of attention.” (Ibid.) As to how to get the balance between diligent attention and 
spontaneity, this is not made clear.  
 
In discussing Kant’s “sublime” she says that as he gazes on sea or mountains, “he feels defiant 
pride in the free power of his reason.” Even though his Reason is frustrated by its inability to 
achieve complete understanding it is not humbled, rather it “experiences a larger consciousness of 
the dignity of rationality.” (S&BR, 283). Against this picture, with its obvious moral risks, 
Murdoch puts forward one of a person who, “faced by the manifold of humanity, may feel, as well 
as terror, delight, but not, if he really sees what is before him, superiority. He will suffer that 
undramatic, because un-self centred, agnosticism which goes with tolerance. To understand other 
people is a task which does not come to an end. This man will possess ‘spirit’ in the sense 
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intended by Pascal when he said: ‘The more spirit one has the more original men one discovers. 
Ordinary people do not notice differences between men.’ And a better name for spirit here is not 
reason, not tolerance even, but love.” (Ibid.). All this amounts to a normative thesis whereby the 
practice of attention, having as its object a vision of reality cleared of the obfuscating veils of the 
self-centred view, is able to attain to valid moral knowledge. “The self, the place where we live, is 
a place of illusion. Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, to see and to respond 
to the real world in the light of a virtuous consciousness. This is the non-metaphysical meaning of 
the idea of transcendence to which philosophers have so constantly resorted in their explanations 
of goodness.” (SOGC, 376). 
It is undoubtedly true that these practices – what is being referred to here, following Foucault, as 
techniques of the self – that Murdoch describes are all efficacious means of redirecting our 
energies, and also of improving our general state of well-being. It is also undoubtedly true that the 
more at peace we are with ourselves the more at peace we will be with others, and the more we 
truly try to focus on others the more (however little more) we will see them, and recognise our 
common humanity in them. Nonetheless it has to be said that, despite the beauty of the morality 
Murdoch puts forward, she does not really set out a path that can be easily followed by someone 
lacking her own sensibility to the good, to beauty. At one point she says, according to Conradi, 
that her philosophy “was essentially religious”, and qualifies this by saying that “[t]o be religious 
is to differ from oneself, to notice that everyone is (at least) two people, one worse or darker than 
the other, then to seek a means to privilege the better.” (IM, 543) In other words, her philosophy 
served her and also of course, though she does not say this, her readers, as a conducting thread 
guiding firstly moral introspection, and secondly self-work, just as ancient philosophy served its 
practitioners. It is ignorance, particularly ignorance of the self, a habit which may be shared by the 
greatest genius and the uneducated, that favours the darker self. But just as she feared that without 
a framework of belief religions as moral practice would founder, so too the path she lays out is a 
meandering one, with beautiful descriptions of forms of attention, but little indication of how to 
practice without guidance, or how to find guidance in developing that attention. The biographical 
information regarding Murdoch all confirms how good and kind she was, though Conradi notes 
that “[i]n her 1970s journals Iris notes objectively in herself envy, jealousy, losses of nerve, 
depression, masochism, anger, anxiety, silliness, ‘asininity’, artistic vulgarity, surreptitious 
optimism. […] She enquires how low, resentful states of being are to be expelled, transcended, 
‘seen through’. Such a movement from a closed-off obsessional enclave towards wonder at the 
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more ‘open scene’ – what Zen calls little mind to big mind – marks her fictions, philosophy, and 
her private journey too.” (IM, 544)  
But it must be Plato, Murdoch’s Plato, who has the last word. She describes “the cosy dreaming 
ego, the dweller in the vaults of eikasia” (F&S, 455), in Plato’s cave, as a form of unconscious 
mind, whereas those who have moved out of this shadowy region to the fire, which they take as 
their sun, have acquired some knowledge, and with it some pride. (Republic, 517 B) But 
philosophy (intellectual study) may also function as and feed illusion, like the semi-enlightening 
fire, not the sun it replicates. “Here” by the fire, she writes, “[they] can recognise for what they are 
the objects which cast the shadows. The bright flickering light of the fire suggests the disturbed 
and semi-enlightened ego which is pleased and consoled by its discoveries, but still essentially 
self-absorbed, not realising that the real world is still somewhere else. […] The Delphic precept 
does not enjoin that kind of self-knowledge. The true self-knower knows reality and sees, in the 
light of the sun, himself as part of the whole world.” (F&S, 423).  
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Conclusion  
1 
 
As we have seen, much of the work of Michel Foucault and Iris Murdoch had to do with the 
recuperation of a notion of philosophy as a way of life and as a form of self-work. Despite the fact 
that neither supported any metaphysical idea of a substantive self, much of the work of these two 
philosophers was concerned; in Murdoch’s terms, with the “progressing life of a person”; and in 
Foucault’s terms with “the self’s relation to itself”. Whereas both Foucault and Murdoch began 
their philosophical work from the central preoccupations – especially with regard to the relation of 
language to thought – of their respective colleagues in Paris and Oxford (and in the same middle 
years of the twentieth century); when the question of moral subjectivity came more clearly into 
focus for each of them they turned their attention to Antiquity, Foucault mostly to the Stoics and 
Cynics, Murdoch to Plato. Not of course in order to re-propose ancient ethical models as such, but 
to gain a better understanding of them; and in both cases, to understand them as philosophical 
practices that were not necessarily linked to the specific metaphysical systems that had most 
clearly articulated them. Such an approach would allow these ancient practices, in Paul Veyne’s 
fine metaphor, to reacquire “a contemporary meaning, in the manner of one of those pagan temple 
columns that one occasionally sees reutilized in more recent structures.” (FFE, 231) In fact, as 
Hadot (a pioneer of this type of reading) has pointed out, the ancients themselves, though ardent 
defenders of their metaphysical positions, were generally eclectic and non-denominational, as it 
were, in the range of “techniques of the self” they employed. Foucault quotes Seneca, for example, 
saying: “The thought for today is one which I discovered in Epicurus; for I am wont to cross over 
even to the enemy’s camp, – not as a deserter, but as a scout [tanquam explorator M.F.]”223 Like 
Hadot, Foucault and Murdoch found contemporary conceptions of “philosophy” as a merely 
intellectual activity regrettable; for both of them – in theory and in practice – the philosophical 
intellect was, and must be, essentially ethical.  
This very important motivation to their work they held in common; another was the intensely 
erotic dimension of their personal lives, in all senses; which meant for them – as philosophers 
concerned with moral subjectivity in general and their own in particular – an equally intense, but 
enormously different reflection on eros. What separated them was their very different intellectual 
and existential biographies, one important feature of which was the divide in contemporary 
philosophy between the “continental” and the Anglo-American traditions in which they were 
                                                 
223 Seneca, Lettres, Vol.I. let. 2. Quoted in Foucault “Self Writing”, (EWF1, 221)  
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respectively trained. What became known as “the linguistic turn” in philosophy played itself out in 
the two traditions in different ways in the course of the twentieth century, through structuralism in 
mainland Europe and in linguistic empiricism in Britain and America. Foucault’s early writings 
are heavily influenced by structuralism, though this was for him something of a straitjacket that he 
worked his way out of; and Murdoch placed herself in the tradition of analytic philosophy, though 
always in a critical relationship with linguistic empiricism.  
 
2 
 
Foucault’s dedication to “thinking differently” was of course a constant of his work, but in the 
early years this was not an ascesis. The intellectual work involved did not require any particular 
focus on what he would later call, from the Greek epimeleia heautou, the “care of the self”. 
Foucault always said that his work focused on the three axes “that constitute any matrix of 
experience” (PHS, 200): knowledge, power, and the subject, and insisted that from the beginning 
all three, in their interaction, were the objects of this work. Clearly the focus changed however, 
from the early phase which he himself characterised as an “archaeology of knowledge”, to the 
complex interrelation of knowledge and power in his middle “genealogical” phase, and in the last 
phase of his work to which he never gave a similar methodological denomination, to the subject, 
to the self’s relation to itself (in varying contexts of knowledge/power). He reformulated these 
three axes many times. In the Preface to the History of Sexuality they appear as “links to truth, to 
rules and to the self” (Ibid.); in The Governmentality of Self and Others as: “the forms of a 
possible knowledge; […], the normative matrices of behaviour for individuals, and finally the 
modes of virtual existence for possible subjects.” (GSA, 4-5) And in his last course he writes that: 
“the modes of veridiction, the techniques of governmentality, and the practices of the self, is 
basically what I have always tried to elaborate. (CV, 9-10) It is clear from these rewrites of the 
three axes that they do indeed constitute a strong thread through all his work. What changes is the 
gradual process from the early focus on the forms of knowledge/power that shape the subject from 
outside, to how the (always historically situated) subject may constitute itself from within; through 
modes of veridiction, the governmentality of self and others, and practices of the self. Throughout 
his work however, Foucault’s absolute moral priority did not change, it was always freedom: “for 
what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, the conscious [réflechie] practice of freedom?” (ECS, 
284). For him this meant, above all, freedom from the way the games of truth (les jeux de vérité) 
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prevailing during one’s lifetime were played out in one’s own mind224. Therefore gaining insight 
into the historically relevant truth games and their epistemic underpinnings was for him an ethical, 
as well as an epistemological, priority; and these games were played out in human institutions, 
through their specific discourses and practices. More than in philosophy, Foucault’s work in these 
areas has radically and definitively changed the human sciences, yet his work was philosophical, 
and his life was his own form of philosophical practice. 
The “history of thought” – which was how Foucault always described his work – was initially 
elaborated in response to what he saw as the shortcomings of contemporary (1950s and 60s) 
philosophy in its preoccupation with consciousness and the meaning-giving subject (under the 
influence of Hegel and phenomenology).225 He complained that this  
 
philosophy of consciousness had paradoxically failed to found a philosophy of knowledge, and especially of 
scientific knowledge. Also, this philosophy of meaning had failed to take into account the formative 
mechanisms of signification and the structure of systems of meaning. (S&S, 176) 
 
On occasion, he expressed a certain admiration for analytic philosophy, as an outsider, precisely 
for its meticulous (though insufficiently far-reaching) concern for analysing systems of meaning as 
they present in language. Paradoxically, Murdoch, who was trained in analytic philosophy and 
also appreciated its precision and its exposure of the ungrounded nature of metaphysical 
suppositions, reversed this complaint thus:  
 
terms such as ‘being’ and ‘consciousness’ have been dropped from Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Here the philosopher 
largely confines his activity to removing problems attaching to particular concepts by an examination of the 
functioning of language in the affected area. […] It seems to me that in this country our exposure of certain types of 
metaphysical argument has led us too readily to reject the grandiose picture-making aspects of metaphysics. Such 
pictures can be illuminating, in a psychological and moral sense, even if their status is dubious, and even if they are 
established more by a general appeal to our knowledge of human nature than by a rigorous argument. (HMD 148)  
 
What she is saying is not that such concepts are unproblematic, on the contrary, that they are 
highly problematic, but precisely because they refer to highly problematic areas of our life as 
human beings; therefore the fact that their “meaning” cannot be pinned down is not resolved by 
simply declaring them as meaningless or confusing. She herself found such terms useful as 
descriptions of common human experience, as terms which therefore lent themselves to careful, 
                                                 
224 “What truth game is the person playing, for example, who regards himself as insane or sick?” Flynn (FMH, 38) 
asks this question in illustration of the way the objects of particular discourses (the “truth games”, for example, of 
“justice”, in the seventeenth century,  or of “criminal psychiatry” in the nineteenth), “objectify” the individual subject. 
225 For Foucault it was his reading of Nietzsche who liberated his mind from what he experienced as philosophical 
constraints in epistemology and in ethics. Sluga writes that it was Nietzsche “who helped him to describe the history 
of knowledge and reason freed from the phenomenological assumption of a founding, transhistorical subject. [… And 
subsequently led him to] the realization that there is a history of the subject as well as of reason.” (FEHN, 224)”. 
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non-metaphysical redescription. The “exposure to certain types of metaphysical arguments” she 
refers to here has to do with the fact that where, “Hume and Locke thought that there must be 
some constant and rigid connection between language and experience”, such ideas had now been 
decisively overturned within the empiricist tradition, but in the process she says that “[in] ceasing 
to believe this we have, perhaps too readily, let the notion of ‘experience’ drop out of sight 
altogether.” (NP, 43) This “ceasing to believe” in a rigid connection between language and 
experience, a perspective which Murdoch shares, had, she felt, been replaced in the early 20th 
Century by an equally rigid disconnection, for which language was seen as a system having its 
own internal and formal logic, regardless of its empirical content, or its relation to experience. She 
writes of this disconnection that it occasions “a sense […] of an unbridgeable gulf between the 
‘meaning’ which is investigated by linguistic analysis, and the ‘meaning’ involved in poetry, or 
investigated by psychoanalysis, which seems inextricably linked with experience.” (Ibid.) 
  
3 
 
Something Murdoch particularly appreciated in analytic practice, however, was “the elimination of 
hypostatised and non-observable ‘qualities’, ‘sentiments’ or ‘acts of will’” (Ibid.). She refers to 
these three concepts in particular because of their association with, respectively, Locke, Hume, 
and Kant. Though this is not spelt out here, as her target when writing this was a different one, this 
comment is indicative of her (quasi-Foucauldian) concern with the way in which these concepts 
function as part of philosophical discourses which present some kind of deep structure of mind or 
world, each in their own way. She writes: “It is certainly a great merit of this [recent Oxbridge] 
tradition […] that it attacks every form of spurious unity. It is the traditional inspiration of the 
philosopher, but also his traditional vice, to believe that all is one. Wittgenstein says, ‘Let’s see.’ 
(OGG, 340) The term Murdoch generally used to express the type of unified vision around key 
concepts expressed by philosophical discourse was that of “limited whole”, which she took from 
Wittgenstein; noting that the “lesson of Wittgenstein”, is that there “may be no deep structure” 
(ME 74, my emphasis); a view she shared. That is to say, whether or not there is any deep 
structure could only be observed from the point of view of eternity, a viewpoint which is not 
available to us. 
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In this connection, Murdoch saw structuralism too as offering “a metaphysic which offers a new 
model of language as a structure of reality” (MGM, 5)226; one that Foucault was initially attracted 
to, though he “never posited a universal theory of discourse, but rather sought to describe the 
historical forms taken by discursive practices.” (BSH, vii-viii). As the influence of structuralism 
waned, what he calls his “nominalism” comes to the fore. Already in L’archéologie du savoir 
(1969) he was adopting a nominalist method for which the key concepts of scientific discourse 
were not to be read as pre-constituted, but as demarcating objects in historically specific domains 
of knowledge; concepts (or their connotations) which, as Rouse notes, “came into existence only 
contemporaneous with the discursive foundations that made it possible to talk about them.” (PM, 
96) Flynn says of this nominalism that it “treats such abstractions as ‘man’ and ‘power’ as 
reducible for purposes of explanation to the individuals that comprise them. This is the context of 
his claim, for example, that ‘power does not exist’, that there are only individual instances of 
domination, manipulation, edification, control, and the like.” (FMH, 40) It may be interesting to 
compare here Murdoch’s comments on what she calls the hypostatised (i.e. dehistoricised, or 
departicularised) concept of “the will”. “Will can be a term which, seeming to deal with or explain 
a large matter, halts reflection at a crucial point. It may be better […] to restrict the term will, as 
‘willing’ or ‘exercise of will’, to cases where there is an immediate straining, for instance 
occasioned by a perceived duty or principle, against a large part of preformed consciousness.” 
(MGM, 300)  
Foucault was of course inspired by Nietzsche’s historicism in the construction of his own 
genealogies, but, as Sluga points out, with this important difference: “Where Nietzsche had sought 
to understand human relations in terms of the global concept of the will to power, Foucault sees 
power relations as exclusively social, multiple, and variable in character. Adopting what he calls a 
strictly nominalist point of view, he denies altogether that there is a single phenomenon to be 
called power or will to power.” (FEHN, 231) In this he shares, with Wittgenstein and Murdoch, 
the same twentieth century aversion to what Murdoch calls the hypostatised, unifying concepts of 
the great philosophers of previous centuries, Nietzsche included. Though Murdoch saw the key 
concepts and contents of philosophical systems as always historically collocated and subject to 
change that could be entirely contingent in origin, she saw this fact itself as a constant of human 
life, that is to say, that the individual derives a concept from a culture, but then “takes it away into 
                                                 
226 See §. Ch.X, Language and Experience. She says that for structuralists (post-structuralists, deconstructionists), 
“[r]eality, it is argued, lies in the linguistic medium itself, in the various (including scientific) languages of the 
planet”(MGM 6) 
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his privacy”. (IP 319) She says people make their own specialised uses of concepts, and that 
“[c]ontingency must be defended for it is the essence of personality” (S&BR 285). How a concept 
is used will therefore depend both on where its user stands in History, and on the personal history 
of the individual. And, she says “once the historical individual is ‘let in’ a number of things have 
to be said with a difference. The idea of ‘objective reality’, for instance, undergoes important 
modifications when it is to be understood, not in relation to ‘the world described by science’, but 
in relation to the progressing life of a person.” (Ibid., 319-20). Bagnoli comments on what she sees 
as a profoundly Hegelian streak in Murdoch’s thinking with regard to individual consciousness, 
but she also notes that “this historical dimension is, for Murdoch, confined within the bounds of 
individuals; it concerns exclusively the mind of the person. To this extent, she does not fully 
exploit Hegel’s main insight, which is that of relating the progressive life of a person to the 
communal life within the slow development of institutions, through mechanisms of mutual 
recognition. Murdoch does not care much for investigating the institutional landscape in which the 
moral life takes place.” (EML, 225) And this of course, was Foucault territory. However, Foucault 
too disliked any hypostatised view of “History”; he was preoccupied instead with giving adequate 
space to contingency in human affairs. Already in his Inaugural Lecture at the Collège de France 
in 1970, for example, he expressed his intent to restore “chance as a category in the production of 
events” (AK, 231) 
4 
 
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch’s last work,227 begins with the statement that: “The 
idea of a self-contained unity or limited whole is a fundamental instinctive concept. We see parts 
of things, we intuit whole things.” (MGM, 1) This is of course also verifiable in one sense on a 
literal, empirical level, in laboratory experiments where the mind “believes” it sees whole things 
of which it has only seen a part; but what Murdoch found interesting was the way the phenomenon 
appears to occur all the way up from (literal) vision of a single object to (metaphorical) vision of 
the universe, so to speak. She remarks that Hume’s rightful scepticism about the unities we hold 
most dear – the self, the material object, etc. – led him to contend that they were, “illusions 
fostered by imagination, by association of ideas, by ‘habit and custom’.” (Ibid.) But once this 
contention becomes the basis of a philosophy, of a new conceptual system, then a new unity, a 
new metaphysic, a new limited whole, a new picture, is born. Wittgenstein’s more profound 
scepticism about what it is possible to know systematically served to free Murdoch to be able to 
                                                 
227 Apart from an uncompleted and unpublished monograph on Heidegger.  
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see philosophical systems in relation to each other, and this was crucial to the development of her 
own thought. The methodology she developed in this inquiry involved as much attention to the 
language, especially the metaphor, in which the ideas were expressed as to the abstractions 
themselves. She believed, as one also in the literary trade of creating plausible worlds, that the 
aesthetics of philosophies, the image-making and atmosphere-creating power of the language in 
which they are expressed, has a lot more to do with their appeal than is generally recognised. For 
Murdoch, this was also true of science, at least at the level of the popularisation of science which 
now has such a forceful (and therefore ethically crucial)  hold on the popular imagination. 
“Historical change” she writes, “is (in part and fundamentally) change of imagery. This is often 
prompted by scientific discovery.” (MGM, 47)  
The scientific domination of what he calls the modern episteme was of course a central 
preoccupation of Foucault’s. (Even such distinguished thinkers as Marx228 and Freud both claimed 
their work was essentially “scientific”, as if this was by then the only acceptable claim to “truth”, 
despite the constant historical changes in scientific paradigms). Foucault looked at science’s claim 
to “objectivity” primarily from the point of view of discursive practices (institutional and 
academic) in society at large, and crucially in the way this affects one’s reading of oneself, that is 
to say: where one finds oneself situated between specific determinisms and freedom. Murdoch, 
herself situated in a philosophical tradition that she saw as increasingly and dangerously infatuated 
with science – therefore one posing for itself the same problem of where freedom lies – was 
concerned to unpick the epistemological knots of this tradition, in the first instance because of 
their strong ethical implications. Against this tendency she writes: “Moral concepts do not move 
about within a hard world set up by science and logic. They set up, for different purposes, a 
different world.” (IP, 321) Both she and Foucault maintained, against this scientific and often 
scientistic trend, that our aesthetic relation to the world is of enormous ethical (and 
epistemological) importance and a lot of their work thematised this.  
 
5 
 
With regard to moral philosophy there is a large area of agreement between Foucault and Murdoch 
on the parameters of what can be said, and a large area of disagreement on what it is they 
personally want to say. Both (with Nietzsche on this) opposed all forms of moral absolutism, 
                                                 
228 Given the political climate of the mid-century, both Foucault and Murdoch were briefly members of their 
respective Communist parties, but both were too anti-essentialist to ever be convinced Marxists.  
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maintaining a rigorously historicist position. As Sluga puts it, Foucault argues that “the 
genealogist [of morals] must seek to find behind things ‘not a timeless and essential secret, but the 
secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from 
alien forms.’ (NGH, 142)” (FEHN, 228) And Murdoch, arguing against attempts to fix what 
morality should be, writes: “Why should philosophy be less various, where the differences in what 
it attempts to analyse are so important. Wittgenstein says that ‘What has to be accepted, the given, 
is – so one could say – forms of life.’ For purposes of analysis moral philosophy should remain at 
the level of the differences, taking the moral forms of life as given, and not try to get behind them 
to a single form.” (VC 94). Both were anti-essentialist; but when Murdoch says: “At a superficial 
level history fashions morals, at a deep level morals resist history” (MGM 223); she is referring to 
Wittgenstein’s statement in the Tractatus, that “ethics is transcendental”, in the sense – for her – 
that it is a condition of human existence. That is to say that to discriminate between what is good 
and what is bad, both aesthetically and morally, is a continuative part of what it is to be a human 
being – regardless of what different ideas people might have about value, or “human nature” or 
transcendent entities. On this picture, the transcendent entities themselves, such as God, Reason, 
the Idea of the Good, History, etc., whilst all unprovable and, today, no longer philosophically 
defensible, constitute images that say a lot about morality in general, as well as about moralities in 
particular. The ubiquity of ethical systems, in all their myriad historical and cultural forms stood 
witness, for Murdoch, to a human interest in the moral good, whichever way this is interpreted. 
For her therefore “the good” was the sovereign moral concept, all other moral concepts, including 
freedom, describing different qualities of what is good. For this reason, because he put the Idea of 
the Good at the centre of his philosophy, as well as for her love of the beauty and insightfulness of 
his writings, Plato was a key figure for Murdoch, though “Platonist” metaphysically, she definitely 
was not. Foucault on the other hand generally followed Nietzsche in his dislike of all things 
“Platonic”, and the idea of the good does not figure in his philosophical vocabulary. Ironically 
perhaps, though in his personal ethics Foucault was much closer to Nietzsche than was Murdoch, 
in their thinking this was not always the case. Sluga writes: 
 
That Nietzsche’s genealogy intends no legitimation of moral values is made perfectly clear in his rude 
persiflage of the Platonic allegory of the cave. Where Plato had insisted that the philosopher must escape from 
the human cave in order to discover the origin of value, Nietzsche asserts that ‘ideals are made on earth’, in the 
dark, smelly cave of human life and are manufactured from falseness and self-deception (GM, 1.14).229 Against 
all forms of moral absolutism, the genealogist maintains thus a resolutely historical and critical stance, and 
                                                 
229 Nietzsche, The Genealogy of Morals. 
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Foucault entirely agrees with that judgement. He insists for this reason that ‘the work of the intellect is to show 
that what is, does not have to be, what it is’(FL, 252)230 (FEHN, 227) 
 
This last statement, displaced to another context, could stand as a precise description of the type of 
exercise of oneself in thought that Murdoch advocates as ethical practice, as, for example, in the 
hypothetical case of M’s reflections on D231; but where Murdoch agreed so thoroughly with 
Nietzsche is in his description of the human tendency to produce moral views from “falseness and 
self-deception”, this is in fact an area of ethics which Foucault steered well clear of. His brilliant 
exposures of the objectification of persons through practices of external surveillance, as in prisons 
and psychiatric institutions232, and of forms of internal self-surveillance such as confession and 
psychoanalysis, augmented his wariness of such forms of introspection. When Foucault says that it 
is the work of the intellect to show that what is doesn’t have to be, he is talking not only about 
aspects of external reality, but also about ideas, and about the ideas one has about oneself, often 
acquired through “subjection” (assujetissement) more than “subjectivation” (sujectivation). Self-
transformation therefore was for him the work of the intellect in that by exposing the contingent 
nature of any such idea, the idea would be disempowered, freeing one to recreate oneself. 
Murdoch on the other hand believed that much of our mental life consists of self-centred 
narratives, of fantasy, that prevent us from seeing the truth. In this her guide was Simone Weil, for 
whom, she says, “Moral change comes from an attention to the world whose natural result is a 
decrease in egoism through an increased sense of the reality of, primarily of course other people, 
but also other things.” (MGM 52).  
 
6 
 
Foucault says of the subject: 
 
[The subject] is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not primarily or always identical to itself. You do 
not have the same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who goes 
to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship. 
Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences between these different forms of the subject, but we are 
not dealing with the same type of subject. In each case one plays, one establishes a different type of relationship 
to oneself. And it is precisely the historical constitution of these various forms of subject in relation to the 
games of truth which interests me.  (ECS, 290. From a 1984 interview.)  
 
                                                 
230 Lotringer, Sylvère, ed. Foucault Live: Interviews 1966-1984. New York: Semiotext(e), 1989 
231 Discussed in The Idea of Perfection. 
232 In which he had worked and suffered. 
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Murdoch, while sharing the view that the subject is not a substance, instead believed that these 
internal “relationships and interferences[?] between these different forms of the subject” were of 
crucial importance. She writes: 
  
where the central problem of human consciousness is concerned the alleged ‘disappearance’ of the old 
substantial self has not led to any new philosophical enlightenment, or clear indication concerning how we are 
to discuss in a more realistic way a demythologised and (apparently) disunited self [; though m]etaphysical 
ideas persist of more deprived but still unitary selflets, leading a minimal yet dignified sort of existence as 
principles of will or sincerity or non-universal rationality. (MGM, 162. From a 1982 Gifford lecture, published 
1992) 
 
 
The curious term “interferences” Foucault uses above might suggest some kind of function 
resembling that of Freud’s “superego” as an operator in the process of “objectification” by which 
we internalise and then identify with images of the self (I am mad, bad, etc.). However, the term 
“objectification” was in any case the fruit of his earlier, more structuralising phase; and true to his 
nominalist methods, he chose not to hypothesise any explanation of this mechanism. Flynn writes 
that “Foucault’s method is radically anti-Platonic and individualistic. His sympathy with the 
Sophists, Cynics, and other philosophical ‘outsiders’ is based on a profound distrust of essences, 
natures, and other kinds of unifying, totalizing, and exclusionary thought that threaten individual 
freedom and creativity. That is to say his misgivings are moral (in the broad sense) as well as 
epistemological, as becomes clear from his numerous remarks about ‘an aesthetics of existence’ 
toward the end of his life.”233 Foucault was clearly not attracted to Plato, who is treated rather 
schematically in his work, and he tended to take him literally, treating anamnesis, for example, as 
literally referring to an unconscious memory of the Forms. His classification of the ancient 
(Platonic) form of reflexivity as based on “memory” refers specifically to this.  
Given Murdoch’s own “distrust of essences, natures, and other kinds of unifying, totalising” 
thought, her love of Plato may seem surprising. However, her own reading of Plato was never 
literalist, and she was in fact rather scathing of such readings, believing that Plato’s use of abstract 
concepts, just as much as his creation of myths like that of the cave, was often a metaphorical 
means of picturing an important aspect of our mental experience. She writes, for example: “Failure 
to understand how thought constantly works in moral living supports a popular misrepresentation 
of Plato as an ‘intellectualist’ philosopher who (in the ordinary sense) put the highest value on 
intellectual skill, and (in the metaphysical sense) thought that nothing was real except objectified 
abstract ideas lodged somewhere in heaven.” (MGM, 177) Following Simone Weil, who wrote of 
                                                 
233 Flynn, Thomas, “Foucault’s Mapping of History.”, in CCF, pp.39-40. 
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anamnesis that it is “ ‘an orientation of the soul towards something which one does not know, but 
whose reality one does know’ ” (cited in MGM 505); she held that this type of experience has to 
do with attempts at understanding what is difficult; one that is familiar to the thinker waiting for 
the idea to crystallise, and to the artist waiting for the idea to materialise in form. Many artists, like 
Michelangelo who famously said his task was to release from the rock the form that was already 
there, see themselves as simply the instrument of some kind of truth waiting to be expressed. 
Murdoch believed that the energy involved in intellectual activity and in art had to do with the 
contemplative experience of stilling the mind from its usual whirling, and quieting its self-
preoccupied fantasies; and that this was also an important requisite of moral reflection. Like every 
experience, it has a particular form of energetic marker; that “the world of the happy is not the 
world of the unhappy”, one of her favourite quotes from Wittgenstein, is something that can also 
be characterised by lighter, more vibrant, or darker and duller energies. In the sense in which the 
whole of ancient philosophy was “spiritual”, Murdoch maintained that “The energy of the 
attentive scholar or artist is spiritual energy. […] One uses this word with a certain purpose, to set 
up certain pictures, to draw attention to similarities and to explain and clarify the obscure by the 
familiar. Plato called such energy Eros, love.” (Ibid.) Love and hate in our mind-body experience 
are forms of energy, and they correspond to the good and to the bad; therefore, for Murdoch, any 
morality which leaves out of account the question of how to diminish the self-centred energy of 
egoism and hate, and how to augment the other-centred energy of love, how to orient oneself to 
the good, will have failed to address the problem at its core.  
 
7 
 
The great artist expresses for her something we all know in our lives to some degree; but 
philosophy has been afraid of the indefinability of such experiences, that often can only be 
expressed in metaphor. It has therefore often preferred to dismiss them as philosophically 
irrelevant (except where it has attempted to fix them metaphysically). Murdoch was anti-
metaphysical in the sense that she believed, following Wittgenstein, that the point of view of 
eternity taken by metaphysics was not available to human beings, but at the same time she 
believed that metaphysics, like art, and also certain kinds of religiosity, expresses much that is at 
the heart of our human experience, and constitutes a vast phenomenological reserve of material on 
which to draw in order to gain a better understanding of our human form of life. Such experiences 
provide a model of spiritual exercises, or techniques of the self. She writes:  
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the appreciation of beauty in art or nature is not only (for all its difficulties) the easiest available spiritual 
exercise; it is also a completely adequate entry into (and not just analogy of) the good life, since it is the 
checking of selfishness in the interest of seeing the real. 
[…] It is important too that art teaches us how real things can be looked at and loved without being seized and 
used, without being appropriated into the greedy organism of the self. This exercise of detachment is difficult 
and valuable whether the thing contemplated is a human being or the root of a tree or the vibration of a colour 
or a sound. Unsentimental contemplation of nature exhibits the same quality of detachment: selfish concerns 
vanish, nothing exists except the things which are seen. […] I would suggest that the authority of the Good 
seems to us something necessary because the realism (ability to perceive reality) required for goodness is a kind 
of intellectual ability to perceive what is true, which is automatically at the same time a suppression of self. 
(OGG, 352-53) 
 
This long quotation provides us with examples of the spiritual exercises, the techniques of the self, 
that the Murdochian seeker after truth is advised to engage in; and these are techniques of 
unselfing (a word Murdoch introduced to Western moral philosophy). Attention to reality as what 
exists outside the self, inspired by an aspiration to the Good, constitutes the necessary cognitive 
basis of moral judgement and moral conduct. Foucault too uses art as a model for life, though 
differently, thus:  
 
why couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object but not 
our life?  
[…] From the idea that the self is not given to us [as in Sartre], I think there is only one practical consequence: 
we have to create ourselves as a work of art. (OGE, 261-62) 
 
Foucault here objects to Sartre’s “moral notion of authenticity [in that through it], he turns back to 
the idea that we have to be ourselves – to be truly our true self. I think the only acceptable 
practical consequence of what Sartre has said is to link his theoretical insight to the practice of 
creativity – and not to that of activity.” (Ibid. 262) For Foucault the problem with this is it allows 
some sense of a pre-constituted self to interfere with one’s ethical self-creation. Murdoch on the 
other hand, as we have seen, read Sartre’s pour-soi as conceived precisely as the kind of free 
spirit, of intellect and will, that would create its own life as a work of art, as Foucault envisaged. 
Her own objection to Sartre’s picture was that she saw this capacity of the pour-soi to leave the 
gluey, earthbound en-soi behind, as a pretty picture, a philosophical illusion. The source of artistic 
creativity is famously not the intellect, except in conjunction with the imagination, which Foucault 
does not thematise. When he speaks of creating the self, it is always as an act of freedom, it is 
willed, even in his ethical choice of focusing on “pleasures” one “chooses”, rather than “desires”. 
Murdoch reminds us, however, that 
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artists are human individuals, no work is perfect, though our hearts may claim perfection for some. The 
material of art is contingent limited historically stained stuff. Nevertheless art is a great source of revelation. 
Bad art displays the base aspects of human nature more clearly than anything else, though of course not so 
harmfully. One might even say that the exemplification of human frailty in bad art is a clearer warning to us 
than its representation in good art. (MGM, 85-86) 
 
 
 Just as for Foucault the self was to be created; for Murdoch the self-centred self, or rather our 
fantasy of who we are, and of how we operate in and on the world, is the obstacle to clear vision, 
and must be “suppressed”. Not, however, as Foucault feared of ethical theories having this 
component, in order that some pre-existing “true” self will then rise from the ashes; but simply 
that, freed of the unhelpful baggage of self-centredness one will live more freely, more able to see 
and connect with reality. One will live a better life, without the identity-obsession of defining who 
one is, or deliberately creating a life-style. For Murdoch, the “aesthetics of existence” means being 
able to truly see reality, in order to be able to live in it, in all our activities, and with others. She 
writes: “[the] same virtues, in the end the same virtue (love), are required throughout, and fantasy 
(self) can prevent us from seeing a blade of grass just as it can prevent us from seeing another 
person.” (OGG, 357)  
For Foucault, the defining aesthetic of the philosophical life was that it would be an other life, 
radically different from conventional lives, under the sign of a courageous truth that would 
challenge the illusions built into social convention, and he lived that life. For Murdoch, the choice 
of a life-style was not what was important – contingency can play one any type of hand; what was 
important was rather to live consciously, cultivating attention to the reality around one in all its 
contingent dynamics, and to oneself within it, under the sign of the good and of love, and she lived 
that life.  
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